Juan Manuel Casares v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-23-00561-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JUAN MANUEL CASARES, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 83RD DISTRICT COURT
OF VAL VERDE COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

A jury found appellant Juan Manuel Casares guilty of two counts of indecency with

a child by sexual contact, second-degree felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a),

(d). The jury also found the State’s habitual-felony-offender enhancement allegations

true, see id. § 12.45(d), and assessed punishment at forty years’ imprisonment for each

count, with the sentences to be served consecutively. By three issues, Casares argues
that (1) the trial court erred when it failed to sua sponte conduct an informal inquiry into

his competency to stand trial, (2) the trial court erred when it denied his court-appointed

counsel’s motion to withdraw from representing Casares, and (3) that he suffered from

ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND 1

A. Competency to Stand Trial

On November 30, 2018, Casares was indicted on two counts of indecency with a

child by sexual contact involving complainants “Jennifer” and “Paula.” 2 On February 21,

2019, Casares’s court-appointed defense counsel Jad Harper filed his first motion

suggesting that Casares was incompetent to stand trial and requesting an examination.

On February 25, 2019, the trial court ordered Dr. Jarvis Wright to conduct a psychological

examination of Casares for competency to stand trial. On June 27, 2019, Wright filed his

report finding Casares incompetent. Wright indicated in his report that during the

examination, Casares “spoke rapidly, talked very loud[,] and did not stop talking[,]” and

noted that “[h]e dwelled on the theme of a conspiracy by [‘Yvette’3] and his probation

officer.” However, Wright also noted that Casares’s “suspicions were possible in real life

and did not constitute bizarre delusions.” Wright found that Casares experienced an

1 This appeal was transferred from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio pursuant to an order

issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001(a). We are required to follow the
precedent of the transferor court to the extent it differs from our own. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2 To preserve the complainants’ privacy, we identify them and related individuals by pseudonyms.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8; Salazar v. State, 562 S.W.3d 61, 63 n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
2018, no pet.) (noting that the comment to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.8 does not limit an appellate
court’s authority to disguise parties’ identities in appropriate circumstances).
3 “Yvette” is the mother of the child complainants involved in this case.

2
“episode of mania” at the time of the examination and may suffer from bipolar disorder.

Wright concluded that Casares demonstrated “no ability to recognize facts and events

that might be pertinent to his defense”; “no ability to cooperate with counsel by disclosing

pertinent facts, events[,] or states of mind”; and “no ability to engage in a reasoned choice

of legal strategies.” On July 15, 2019, the trial court found Casares incompetent to stand

trial based on Wright’s competency evaluation and ordered that he be committed to the

Texas Department of State Health Services for further examination and treatment “toward

the specific objective of attaining competency to stand trial.”

On March 4, 2021, North Texas State Hospital (NTSH) admitted Casares pursuant

to the trial court’s order for further examination and treatment. In a letter dated May 12,

2021, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) informed the trial court

that “[a]fter a period of observation and treatment,” Casares was incompetent to stand

trial and suggested that he be further committed. Attached to the letter was a trial

competency evaluation report by Dr. Andreana Augustus, dated May 8, 2021. Augustus’s

report indicated that she diagnosed Casares with “Bipolar Disorder, Not Otherwise

Specified,” and that he was incompetent to stand trial but “restorable to trial competency

in the foreseeable future.” Augustus also opined that Casares was “unable to demonstrate

an adequate factual and rational understanding of his current charge and the potential

consequences of the pending proceedings”; that his “capacity to disclose the relevant

facts, events, and states of mind regarding the alleged offense” were “impaired due to

symptoms of mental illness (mood instability/mania) that interfere with his trial

competency-related abilities”; he is “unable to demonstrate a minimally logical, cogent,

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and organized discussion of possible legal strategies and options available to him with

respect to resolving his current charge due to active symptoms of mental illness”; he

demonstrated “an impaired understanding of the adversarial nature of criminal

proceedings, and his responses were indicative of the ongoing active symptoms of mental

illness”; he “is unable to provide a minimally cogent answer to most queries” and “his

capacity to exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior . . . should be regarded as impaired

due to ongoing symptoms of mental illness”; he was “willing but unable to demonstrate

an ability to collaborate with defense counsel, due to his active symptoms of mental

illness”; he did not have “adequate capacity to maintain attention and concentration

sufficient to withstand the stressors of Court”; and he did not “possess the capacity to

testify relevantly due to active symptoms of mental illness.”

On June 8, 2021, the trial court held a recommitment hearing. At the hearing, Dr.

Feroz Yaqoob testified that he was a staff psychiatrist at NTSH and examined Casares

for purposes of recommitment. Yaqoob testified that:

[Casares] continues to have disorganized thought process, he continues to
say his charges have been dropped. . . . [H]e’s currently court ordered to
take his medications due to refusal. He continues to make delusional
statements regarding the judge and . . . his charges and everything else. So
at this time he cannot . . . rationally understand his charges and cannot
defend himself in the Court.

Yaqoob diagnosed Casares with “bipolar disorder, not otherwise specified,” and

explained that “Bipolar is mania and depression or manic depression,” which are “different

names for the same illness.” When asked if Casares had progressed since being

committed, Yaqoob stated:

Well, I have reviewed the chart, there’s some progress, I think, he may need

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some medication adjustment because he’s still pretty delusional in terms of
his charges and in terms of the understanding of the nature of the
proceedings, his pending charge and, you know, he still believes that his
charges have been dropped in the past and those are not his current
charges. There probably have been other charges in the past that he’s still
thinking that they, you know, the charges were dropped and he doesn’t
need to be here and needs to be released. So his understanding of his
current charges are still, you know, not, you know, rational understanding is
not there. So I think he may need some adjustment to the medications and
hopefully with that in the foreseeable future he may be able to regain
competency.

In addition, Dr. Kevin Brown testified that he did a separate evaluation of Casares,

and informed the trial court of the nature and severity of Casares’s mental illness:

[W]hen I talked to . . . Casares on exam, he was speaking rapidly. He kept
perseverating possibly he should be let out, and . . . his charges were
dropped, he displayed poor insight on judgment, and he also appeared to
make a [delusional] statement to the judge that . . . ordered him to come
here was not a real judge, and he was also irritable at times when talking
about aspects related to his competency or his care here. In other words,
he would escalate very easily. My opinion was that he does have a major
mental illness and he would need further inpatient care to stabilize his
symptoms.

Brown opined that it was necessary for Casares to continue his bipolar disorder

medication to obtain competency. At the end of the hearing, the trial court indicated it was

going to order an extension of mental health services for Casares. On June 9, 2021, the

trial court signed an order finding Casares incompetent to stand trial and mentally ill, that

he met the criteria for court-ordered extended in-patient mental health services, and that

he was to remain committed with NTSH for a period not to exceed twelve months.

In a letter dated November 15, 2021, HHSC suggested to the trial court that

Casares was competent to stand trial and requested that he be transported back to the

county for further court proceedings. Attached to the letter was a second evaluation report

5
by Augustus dated November 8, 2021. Augustus opined that Casares “improved

markedly during his course of hospitalization to evidence sufficient factual and rational

understanding of his charge and the gravity of potential consequences of the pending

proceedings in his case”; he was able to “demonstrate a capacity to disclose to counsel

pertinent facts, events, and states of mind”; he had “adequate capacity to engage in a

reasoned choice of legal strategies and options”; he exhibited “sufficient factual and

rational comprehension of the adversarial nature of judicial process”; “it is reasonable to

anticipate that he could manifest appropriate [c]ourtroom behavior through the duration

of trial proceedings”; and he was “able to engage in a collaborative relationship with his

defense counsel.” Augustus concluded that after treatment and participation in trial

competency instruction, Casares’s thought process is “logical, organized, cogent, and

goal-directed” and he is “presently COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL.” However, she

strongly recommended that Casares “continue to receive ongoing psychiatric services,

and that he continue[] to adhere to the recommended medication regimen until disposition

of his charge to minimize the potential that he may regress, which may again call into

question his trial competence.”

On May 12, 2022, Harper filed his second motion suggesting Casares was

incompetent and requested another examination. On May 13, 2022, the trial court ordered

Dr. Leana Talbot to examine Casares for competency to stand trial. Talbot conducted the

examination on June 28, 2022, and submitted her written report to the trial court on July

18, 2022. In her report, Talbot noted that Harper informed her that Casares “had

discontinued his medications after returning to Val Verde County, which has impacted his

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mental health”; that Casares was “experiencing ‘manic behaviors’ and struggling to stay

focused and engaged”; and that “communication with [Casares] is difficult, which makes

it challenging to collaboratively engage with him.” Talbot further noted that Casares

“speaks quickly and appears to have some intensity in his actions”; that Harper observed

“periods of mania, though that wasn’t fully evident at the time I assessed [Casares]”; and

that Casares “demonstrates conspiratorial beliefs and delusional thinking, though none

are bizarre or outside the realm of something that could be true.” Talbot reported that,

“Though . . . Casares is a person with mental illness, he had both factual and rational

understanding of the charges against him and good legal knowledge” and he “was able

to engage in a mostly rational and reasonable way during the assessment and appears

to have sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding.” Talbot recommended that Casares be considered competent to

stand trial. Nevertheless, she noted that though Casares “met the competency standard

without medication, however, some people with mental illness may decompensate

significantly after a longer period of time without medication” and “[i]t is not clear whether

medication is necessary for maintaining his competency, but it is recommended to provide

benefits in mood stabilization and increasing rational thinking.” After Talbot submitted her

report, trial court proceedings commenced.

B. Voir Dire

Jury selection for Casares’s trial took place at about 9 a.m. on October 30, 2023.

At this time, Casares was represented by court-appointed defense counsel Alberto

Ramon. As the trial court addressed the venire panel regarding qualifications and

7
exemptions for jury service, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Anybody want to claim that exemption? Okay.
Come on down we’ll have you just report out.

[Prospective Juror]: 80.

THE COURT: 80, okay.

[Casares]: Your Honor, excuse me.

THE COURT: No.

[Casares]: Your Honor—

THE COURT: Sit down. Sit down. Sit down. Sit down.

[Casares]: I got this right here.

THE COURT: Sit down.

[Casares]: Bring—bring me to double jeopardy—

THE COURT: Sit down.

[Casares]: I’ve been a long time ago—I’ve been
incarcerated for five years and I’ve been locked
up.

THE COURT: Take him out. Take him out.

[Casares]: My probation officer will tell you. I don’t want
Alberto Ramon with me. I bring my lawyer. I
bring my lawyer.

THE COURT: Thank you, take him out.

[Casares]: I bring my lawyer, not Alberto Ramon. I’ve been
in court a long time ago.

THE COURT: Take him out. Thank you.

After Casares was removed from the courtroom, the trial court resumed addressing the

8
venire panel, excused some from jury service, and released the rest for the remainder of

the morning. Outside the presence of the venire, the trial court addressed Casares’s

removal from the courtroom:

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, we’re outside the presence of
the panel. The Court had to remove [Casares],
this is not unexpected. His behavior has been
exhibited over the course of the time of this trial
has been disruptive. Mr. Ramon was aware that
more than likely this was going to happen.

[Defense Counsel]: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The Court is going to endeavor to setup
a closed circuit provision between now and 1:00
[] where [Casares] will be able to view and hear
the court proceedings via [Z]oom and that way
he’ll have access to counsel, counsel will have
access to him but we intend to continue these
proceedings. [Casares] has been incarcerated
approximately five years. He[] has been to
multiple mental health evaluations. Each time
he’s been evaluated he’s come back as
competent [sic]. This is his second counsel Mr.
Ramon. You don’t mind if [I] say you[’re] 80
years old, right?

[Defense Counsel]: 83, going on 84 on the 12th.

THE COURT: He’s one of the most patient individuals I’ve
known and taken on very difficult cases in the
past and he’s licensed in both federal and state
court here. This is [Casares’s] second counsel.
Mr. Ramon, do you want to put anything else on
the record? I’m just trying [to] let the appellate
court know that we are attempting and
endeavoring to have [Casares] participate in a
way that is meaningful; however, the Court
cannot allow him to disrupt our solemn court
proceedings and that’s why I had him removed.
Did you agree with the removal, Mr. Ramon?

9
[Defense Counsel]: I do agree, Your Honor, I do believe that it would
be—

THE COURT: You can sit down. Y’all can sit down.

[Defense Counsel]: —in the best interest of [Casares] that he be
allowed to participate through [Z]oom. If this
were to happen in front of the jury, it would be
certainly not to his advantage at all.

THE COURT: Okay.

[Defense Counsel]: He has been an uncooperative client.
Disappointed that his family [has] also bec[o]me
uncooperative. I would do my best. I will honor
my oath as a lawyer and I represent to this Court
and I will represent to [the prosecutor] as a
representative of the state that I will do my very
best to be as professional as I can given the
circumstances.

THE COURT: I didn’t ex[pec]t anything else Mr. Ramon when
I appointed you.

[Defense Counsel]: Thank you.

THE COURT: [Prosecutor], [is] there anything that you wish to
put on the record at this time[?]

[Prosecutor]: Nothing[,] Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Then we are going to endeavor—

[Defense Counsel]: I would like to have one more thing put on the
record. We reopened the offer this morning.

[Prosecutor]: We told the defense to ask if he’s open to an
offer and he doesn’t seem to be.

[Defense Counsel]: Correct, Your Honor[.] I do want to put that on
the record. I do have another conference, a final
conference with Mr. Casares. He understands
and refuses to accept though that this is an
enhanced case and the Court admonished him

10
last week and he said it on the record that he
wants to go forward. He has never waived at any
time from persistent on a trial. Now, he is fully
aware of [and] the family is [ ] also aware[—]I
want that to be clear on the record. They’re fully
aware of what [h]is situation is. He, basically,
would be walking if he accepted the plea; but I
was not able to convince him or the family. And
I wanted to [be] absolutely clear that I did my
best with the family and with Mr. Casares.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then that’s on the record and we
will also—I would like to tell [d]efense counsel
that if at any time [Casares] would peaceably sit
in proceedings, he’s more than welcome to
come back in.

[Defense Counsel]: I will keep [a]n eye open, but I do not expect that
he will, not given the circumstances.

THE COURT: I more than welcome him being here for this trial.
I cannot have him disrupting the trial.

[Defense Counsel]: We have to do the best we can and protect his
constitutional rights and I know the state will do
that and certainly we have an excellent judge.

THE COURT: Well, we’re doing our best. I’m not going to say
anything about me.

After a brief adjournment, trial proceedings resumed at 12:49 p.m., and the trial

court addressed Casares, via Zoom, outside the presence of the venire members:

THE COURT: We are outside the presence of [the] venire.
[Casares] has now arrived. I’m going to address
myself to Mr. Casares. He was present earlier
when we were doing the qualifications and
exemptions of the venire. Mr. Casares had to be
removed and stood up and started talking after
I told him not to. I’ll advise Mr. Casares I would
like [for] you to participate in this trial and I would
like you to be here. I want you to be able to
consult with your attorney. I want you to

11
participate fully in your trial. I welcome you here
in this trial; but I cannot have you disrupting the
trial.

So as long as you can behave yourself and talk
to your attorney in a low voice and everybody
can hear, I’ll be happy to have you in the
courtroom. But I cannot have you talking over
me. I can’t have you talking over the counsel—

Hold on, lower your hand, lower your hand. I
want you to be able to confer with your attorney,
and I want you to be able to participate in your
trial fully. This is as very important trial for you.
There’s a lot at stake. But I can’t have you
disrupting these proceedings. If you disrupt the
proceedings[,] I have to remove you because
we have to do this in an orderly manner. Do you
understand what I’m telling you, Mr. Casares?

[Casares]: I just want to say Harper told me a long time ago
that you people will try to double jeopardy.
Harper told me. I’m not saying, Your Honor, for
real. I’m not saying I’m perfect. But Harper told
me this come [sic] he would—and get he said it
was double jeopardy and the state hospital that
sent me, they told me I was not crazy and
nothing like that, you to go trial.

And tell them to tell Harper, to tell me to Harper,
if they do you double jeopardy, the first person
to go wrong is to him. This account, he went and
tell you this and that—I’m not saying they are
perfect. I’m telling you straight up. I know I’m not
perfect but this lady I was at for real, they were
messing around with probation officers. They
set me up.

But, hey, Harper told me also when I tell him the
conversation and they—the detective that arrest
me, they did the investigation, and Harper told
me everything came in your favor Casares. [In]
2019 when you told me, you were going to send
me to hospital, you didn’t want to do nothing to

12
me and you were from the federal side to the—
from the state side to the federal side. I’ve been
waiting over there in the state side over five
years there.

THE COURT: Can you behave yourself so that we can
conduct you[r] trial in an orderly manner?

[Casares]: I’ll behave myself just give me a chance please
to express myself. I’m not saying I’m perfect this
and that, for real. But they set me up, Your
Honor, for real.

THE COURT: As long as you can stay in here and you do
not . . . disrupt proceedings, I will let you stay
here. But if you disrupt proceedings[,] I have to
remove you.

[Casares]: Even [Yvette], when she come and show you 8
or 10 months ago the accident happened in May
2017, I was in the half way house.

THE COURT: Okay. I’m going [to] tell you, I do not want to talk
to you directly, only your lawyer is going to be.

[Casares]: My lawyer is Harper.

THE COURT: No, your lawyer.

[Casares]: My lawyer—

THE COURT: No, I’m not—

[Casares]: Call in Austin. They told me your lawyer is
Harper. Don’t be lying, they told me.

THE COURT: Your—

[Casares]: Harper is my lawyer. They told me in Austin. I
already called them.

THE COURT: No.

[Casares]: Harper for five years, my lawyer. Alberto Ramon

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because you guys knew I was going put
somebody there. Knew you be put him in the bill
[sic].

THE COURT: Mr. Casares, will you be able—

[Casares]: No, sir, if you not going let me talk, no, for real.
I’m not trying—judge have you guys nothing like
that but [Yvette] and my probation officer, they
set me up. This time they got fired from the
federal courthouse 2019, they got arrested.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then.

[Defense Counsel]: You—

[Casares]: I’m not saying I’m perfect, this and that, also
nothing against you guys, for real but, hey,
yo . . . my girlfriend and my probation officer,
they were having an affair with her.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

[Casares]: God bless you-all.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Just for the record, I’ll try to do
this again after voir dire and he wants to behave.

Thereafter, the venire members were brought back in the courtroom. The trial court

informed the venire that Casares’s counsel was present and that Casares was “upstairs

on the third floor” watching the proceedings via Zoom. Voir dire proceeded without

interruption and a jury was selected and empaneled. The State read the indictment to the

jury and Casares’s counsel pleaded not guilty on Casares’s behalf. The jury was then

released for the day.

On October 31, 2023, the trial court addressed Casares in open court, outside the

presence of the jury:

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THE COURT: . . . Going to afford Mr. Casares the opportunity
to stay in court.

....

[Casares]: Okay.

....

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. I’ll permit Mr. Casares to be
present during his trial as long as he’ll comport
himself and stay calm and then I think it’s
important for you to be here and sit here. Just
don’t talk. You can talk to your attorney at the
breaks or write notes to your attorney but don’t
disrupt the proceedings, okay?

[Casares]: Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, if I may, I’m tempted to confer with
the—my client, Mr. Casares, regarding his
children being called to testify. At one point he
absolutely wanted them not to participate.

THE COURT: Okay.

[Defense Counsel]: I have—I believe they can be of some help but
he’s keeps insisting that I consult Mr. Harper. He
still considers Mr. Harper his lawyer.

THE COURT: I understand.

[Defense Counsel]: Again, reiterate the attorney-client relationship
here is very weak if not non-existent.

THE COURT: Okay.

[Defense Counsel]: And I, of course, want my client to be here.
That’s his absolute right and, of course, I would
have no objection to that and I hope that he will
comply.

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The trial court then proceeded to conduct a hearing regarding the admissibility of

extraneous offense testimony from a particular witness at the request of Casares’s

counsel. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37. Thereafter, the jury entered the

courtroom, and the prosecutor provided its opening statement. Casares’s counsel waived

the opportunity to present an opening statement.

C. Trial

Jennifer was born in November of 2008 and was fourteen years old at the time of

trial. Jennifer testified that she previously lived in Del Rio with her siblings, her mother,

and her mother’s boyfriend, Casares. Jennifer stated that when she was nine or ten, her

mother and sisters went to the grocery store while Casares, Jennifer, and Jennifer’s

brother stayed at their residence. Casares was drunk and sat on a chair in the living room.

Casares told Jennifer to sit on his lap. Jennifer sat on his lap, facing away from him.

According to Jennifer, Casares grabbed her waist with one hand, and used his other hand

to touch her chest underneath her shirt. Thereafter, Jennifer felt uncomfortable, got off

Casares’s lap, went to her room and cried. Jennifer did not tell her mother what happened

when her mother returned home because she was afraid of Casares and embarrassed.

Jennifer later outcried to her mother about the incident and her mother reported the

incident to law enforcement the next day. Jennifer did not recall the exact date she told

her mother but stated she did so when she was in fourth grade at the time.

Paula was twenty-one years old at the time of trial and testified that Casares moved

in with her family when she was fourteen years old. Paula stated that around September

or October of her ninth-grade school year, Casares touched her breasts with both of his

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hands outside of her clothes while she was asleep in her bed. After he touched her, Paula

cried and got under the covers. According to Paula, Casares did not leave her bedroom

until she cried louder. Paula testified about other incidents that had occurred in Mexico

where Casares had touched Paula’s buttocks underneath her pajamas, had lifted her

dress and touched her legs, and had touched her upper legs and “private part” when she

sat on his lap. Paula stated that Casares gave her money “every time that happened.”

Paula further stated that Casares threatened to kill her if she told her mother the second

time she was touched. In addition, Paula testified that Casares would call her cell phone

at 2 a.m. and would not talk but make “moaning” sounds. Paula stated she received

several of these calls. Paula outcried to her mother about the incidents involving Casares

on the same day her sister Jennifer told her mother about what Casares did to Jennifer.

Yvette, the complainants’ mother, testified that she and Casares were previously

in a relationship and had lived together. Yvette stated that she had left her residence with

her older daughters on May 10, 2018, to send a money order to Casares’s daughter.

Jennifer and her brother stayed at home with Casares, who was drinking beer at the time.

When Yvette returned, she noticed that Jennifer was crying. Yvette asked Jennifer if

Casares had scolded her and Jennifer replied no. Yvette asked Jennifer if she had a

headache and Jennifer said yes. Yvette testified that Jennifer later told her that Casares

had touched her breasts on the day she went to get the money order. According to Yvette,

she had broken up with Casares and he had already stopped living with Yvette and her

children at the time Jennifer and Paula told her about the touching incidents.

Steven Moreno, Casares’s former federal probation officer, testified that Yvette

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visited his office in July of 2018 and informed him of what Casares had done to her

daughters. Moreno thereafter called the Del Rio Police Department (DRPD) and arranged

for Yvette to speak to someone there. According to Moreno, Yvette spoke to an

investigator named Michelle that day. Moreno stated that there were concerns regarding

how Casares would react when he found out about the allegations against him. Moreno

explained that law enforcement “needed the time to do their investigation and . . . they

had advised [Yvette] not to gather [Casares’s] belong[ings] and throw him out.” Moreno

also testified that he told Yvette that she needed to “work with [Casares] and give [law

enforcement] the time they needed to complete the investigation and get the warrants

issued.” According to Moreno, Casares was arrested in September of 2018. Moreno also

stated he was aware that Casares had alleged that Moreno and Yvette were having an

affair. Regarding this allegation, Moreno testified there was “no truth to it.” Moreno

explained that he and a partner would make unannounced visits to Casares “at any given

day or . . . time,” as well as “‘collateral visits’. . . with spouses, sons, daughters, and

neighbors.” Moreno further added, “Sometimes I would catch . . . Casares there if he was

in [Del Rio], sometimes I wouldn’t. Sometimes he was working in Big Lake.” Moreno

explained that these visits were part of his job and that his visits to Yvette and her children

were “professional only.” Moreno testified he had informed his supervisor about Casares’s

allegations.

Michelle Salinas, a former investigator with DRPD, testified that Yvette filed a

police report on July 25, 2018. According to Salinas, Yvette continued talking to Casares

after filing the report and acted normal so as “to get him back to Del Rio” because he was

18
working in Big Lake. Salinas stated that “[Yvette] thought that if she would have made

him aware that the police knew” about the allegations, “he would not come back,” and

“[Yvette] wanted to make sure we got him—I guess, arrested for what he had done.” On

September 24, 2018, Salinas interviewed Casares after he was arrested. The interview

was recorded on a body camera, and the recording was admitted into evidence. In the

beginning of the interview, after he was read and waived his Miranda rights, Casares

stated that he had been living with Yvette for a year and a half, and that Yvette had been

cheating on him with his probation officer. Casares explained that his probation officer

had been going to the residence he shared with Yvette when he was not there, that his

probation officer gave him permission to go to Big Lake, and that he had been in Big Lake

for over a year. Casares stated that his cell phone was “tapped,” and that Moreno had

“got on the line” while Casares had been talking to Yvette. In addition, Casares claimed

that Yvette “prostituted” her daughters “every Saturday” in Mexico and that his probation

officer would visit his residence every Saturday.

In the recorded interview with Salinas, Casares denied touching Jennifer or Paula

inappropriately, but admitted that they sometimes sat on his lap, and he would hug them

in Yvette’s presence. When asked why Yvette, Jennifer, and Paula would lie about the

allegations made against him, Casares responded, “They are playing a joke on me.

[Yvette] and the probation officer. They want me to go to jail and prison.” Later in the

interview, Casares, unprompted, stated that he never gave the complainants money in

exchange for touching them.

At trial, Casares testified in his own defense with the assistance of a Spanish

19
language translator. During his testimony, Casares generally denied the testimony and

evidence admitted against him and echoed his statements made during the recorded

interview with DRPD. Casares also testified regarding whether he was “mentally

examined” as ordered by the trial court during the pendency of the case:

[Defense Counsel]: Now, during the [pendency] of this case, were
you examined mentally?
....

[Casares]: Yes, because I found out that [Yvette] was
cheating on me and then they told me that I was
crazy. They locked me up and told me that I was
crazy.

[Defense Counsel]: Now, I’m talking about any examinations done
at the direction of the Court. You were mentally
examined and a report was given to the Court,
“yes” or “no”?

[Casares]: They did an evaluation on me in 2018 to 2019.
They told me I was fine they did another one in
2020 and they said I was fine. They did another
one ‘21 and ‘22 and they said I was fine. It was
three times and they said that I was fine.

[Defense Counsel]: During those examinations were you ever asked
questions regarding your sexual orientation or
tendencies or that subject matter?

[Casares]: Yes, I was sent to the state hospital where they
have the crazy people and I was over there by
Boerne that area over there and I was over there
from 8 to 10 months, between 8 and 10 months
and I was there and doing school and doing the
classes and everything.

[Defense Counsel]: Did you cooperate with your psychiatrist?

[Casares]: Yes, I did. I did—they told me that I was fine and
that I was a good worker and that I was kind and
that there was nothing wrong with me. They had

20
everything in general.

Later, during cross-examination by the prosecutor, the following exchange occurred:

[Prosecutor]: Are . . . you also claiming that the state system
has kept you wrongfully in the state hospital in
the years that you’ve been awaiting trial?

[Casares]: I don’t understand.

[Prosecutor]: So you stated earlier on your . . . direct
examination that some people in the state
hospital told you you were fine and that you
have everything “in general” implying good
things about your character but that’s not
actually the full story of what happened, was it?

THE COURT: Hold on.

[Defense Counsel]: Again, Your Honor, we have two questions.

THE COURT: Okay.

[Defense Counsel]: Two questions before.

THE COURT: Let me have you approach.

[Defense Counsel]: This is confusing.

THE COURT: Approach. All right. Can you hear?

[Court Reporter]: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. This issue of competency I think it’s going
to be a real problem if it continues.

[Prosecutor]: Judge, I’m concerned too but he testified about
the fact that multiple people in the state system
told him he was fine. The defense attorney
asked him a whole line of questions about it and
I feel like it’s one of his.

THE COURT: Okay. Then probably suggest you try [to] break
up the questions and be really elementary and

21
one at a time because you are compounding
quite a few questions.

[Prosecutor]: I understand but he’s purposely not
understanding my questions.

[Defense Counsel]: The way I understand it, that’s not the issue—

[Prosecutor]: So if I’m going to ask him questions about
previous statements—

THE COURT: Let him finish, [Prosecutor]. Go ahead.

[Defense Counsel]: He barely reads and he has obviously some
issues, okay. And you’re just trying to confuse
him more and get him to react. That’s the way I
see it and that’s a lot to do—it seems to suggest
that taking advantage of the fact that he may not
be competent and you opening a big door.

[Prosecutor]: You opened the door. You asked multiple
questions about it.

[Defense Counsel]: I did not go into competency. I went into all that
have to do be [sic] the trial, nothing else.

[Prosecutor]: That’s not how he answered the questions,
unfortunately.

THE COURT: Just try [to] make the question simple.

After the bench conference ended, Casares resumed testifying. Ultimately, the jury found

Casares guilty on both counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact.

During the punishment phase, Casares pleaded true to the State’s enhancement

paragraphs alleging that he had previously been convicted of two felony offenses. After

the parties presented closing arguments, the jury sentenced Casares to forty years’

imprisonment on each count. The trial court ordered that the sentences run consecutively.

This appeal followed.

22
II. COMPETENCY

In his first issue, Casares argues that there was “overwhelming evidence that [his]

mental status had deteriorated since his last competency evaluation” such that the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to inquire, sua sponte, as to his competency to stand

trial.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s decision not to conduct an informal competency inquiry

into a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial for an abuse of discretion. Montoya

v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), superseded by statute on other

grounds as recognized in Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 692 & n.31 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013); Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A trial court does

not abuse its discretion absent a showing that its decision was arbitrary or unreasonable.

Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426; Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 393. In conducting our review, we

do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but rather determine whether the

trial court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426. We give

“great deference” to the trial court’s assessment of a defendant’s ability to rationally and

factually understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. See Lewis v. State, 532

S.W.3d 423, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing McDaniel v.

State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).

A fundamental principle of our criminal justice system is that, as a matter of

constitutional due process, a criminal defendant who is incompetent may not stand trial.

Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Owens v. State, 473 S.W.3d

23
812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 688; see Drope v. Missouri, 420

U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition

is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings

against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be

subjected to a trial.”). The constitutional standard for competency to stand trial is codified

in Article 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which describes the

circumstances that require, and the procedures for making, a determination of whether a

defendant is competent to stand trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46B.001–

.055.

“Substantively, incompetency to stand trial is shown if the defendant does not

have: ‘(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable

degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against the person.’” Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a)); Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 689. “Procedurally, a trial court

employs two steps for making competency determinations before it may ultimately

conclude that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial[:] [t]he first step is an informal

inquiry; the second step is a formal competency trial.” Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563. “At the

informal inquiry, there must be ‘some evidence from any source that would support a

finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.’” Id. (quoting TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(c)). “If that requirement is met, then the trial court must

order a psychiatric or psychological competency examination, and except for certain

exceptions, it must hold a formal competency trial.” Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

24
arts. 46B.005(a), (b), 46B.021(b)); Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 693. Article 46B.004 describes

how the informal inquiry can be triggered:

(a) Either party may suggest by motion, or the trial court may suggest
on its own motion, that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. A
motion suggesting that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial may
be supported by affidavits setting out the facts on which the suggestion is
made.

(b) If evidence suggesting the defendant may be incompetent to stand
trial comes to the attention of the court, the court on its own motion shall
suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.

(c) On suggestion that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial,
the court shall determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence
from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be
incompetent to stand trial.

(c-1) A suggestion of incompetency is the threshold requirement for an
informal inquiry under Subsection (c) and may consist solely of a
representation from any credible source that the defendant may be
incompetent. A further evidentiary showing is not required to initiate the
inquiry, and the court is not required to have a bona fide doubt about the
competency of the defendant. Evidence suggesting the need for an informal
inquiry may be based on observations made in relation to one or more of
the factors described by Article 46B.024 or on any other indication that the
defendant is incompetent within the meaning of Article 46B.003.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004. Article 46B.024 lists several factors which must

be considered in a competency evaluation, including a defendant’s capacity during trial

court proceedings to: (1) rationally understand the charges against him and the potential

consequences of the proceedings; (2) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and

states of mind; (3) engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options;

(4) understand the adversarial nature of the trial court proceedings; (5) exhibit appropriate

courtroom behavior; and (6) testify. Id. art. 46B.024(1). Additional factors include

information regarding whether the defendant has a mental illness or intellectual disability;

25
whether the identified condition has lasted or is expected to “last continuously for at least

one year”; whether medication is necessary to maintain the defendant’s competency; and

the degree of impairment resulting from any mental illness or intellectual disability and

“the specific impact on the defendant’s capacity to engage with his counsel in a

reasonable and rational manner.” Id. art. 46B.024(2)–(5).

Here, multiple competency evaluations were performed prior to trial, and the final

evaluation resulted in a finding of competence by Talbot, which the trial court accepted.

If a formal competency proceeding results in a finding of competency, “the trial court is

not obliged to revisit the issue later absent a material change of circumstances suggesting

that the defendant’s mental status has deteriorated.” Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 693 (noting

that, “especially when there has been a suggestion of incompetency but no formal

adjudication of the issue, due process requires the trial court to remain ever vigilant for

changes in circumstances that would make a formal adjudication appropriate”); Learning

v. State, 227 S.W.3d 245, 250 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (“To justify a

second competency hearing, defense counsel would have had to offer new evidence of

a change in [appellant]’s mental condition since the first competency hearing.”).

B. Discussion

Casares points out several statements from the record by which he claims

“trigger[ed] the trial court’s statutory duty to make [an informal] inquiry.” We address each

in turn.

Casares first points to his interruptions during jury selection, which led to his

removal from the courtroom. One factor under Article 46.024 is a defendant’s capacity to

26
display appropriate courtroom behavior. See id. art. 46B.024(1)(E). However, disruptive

courtroom behavior and a general failure to cooperate are not always probative evidence

of incompetence to stand trial. See George v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (citing Burks v. State, 792 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)). “If such actions were probative of

incompetence, one could effectively avoid criminal justice through immature behavior.”

Id. (quoting Burks, 792 S.W.2d at 840). We note that Casares’s disruptions were limited

to jury selection; he did not disrupt proceedings at any other point during trial. In addition,

Casares argues that his own “long, discursive non-responsive answers to the [trial] court’s

questions as to whether he could behave” was evidence of incompetency. While some of

Casares’s answers to the trial court’s inquiries were rambling and nonresponsive, the trial

court was within its discretion to determine that they were not the type of disruptive

behavior that might suggest incompetence. See Lindsey v. State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 24

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (“Appellant’s behavior, while imperfect

and rude, at times, did not suggest incompetency.”) (citing George, 446 S.W.3d at 501).

Importantly, the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the significance of

Casares’s responses and whether they indicated he was incompetent to stand trial. See

Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426 (“[T]hose who observed the behavior of the defendant at the

hearing were in a better position to determine whether she was presently competent.”);

see also Ramos v. State, No. 13-22-00293-CR, 2023 WL 8850088, at *11 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (concluding that, although appellant made “demonstrably false or non-

27
sensical statements to the trial court” and “appeared confused about his application for

probation and his not guilty plea,” the trial court could have rationally determined

appellant’s statements were “made purposefully in order to obstruct the trial” and no

second competency evaluation was required); Duong v. State, No. 02-18-00128-CR,

2019 WL 3334426, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 25, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (finding that the trial court could have reasonably concluded

that it was facing a disruptive but competent defendant intent on stopping the trial and

therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a competency

hearing).

Casares also argues that his repeated references to double jeopardy “evok[ed] his

insistence to Dr. Augustus that the criminal charges against him had been dismissed.”

The record shows that Casares’s references to double jeopardy during jury selection

included no explicit or implicit assertions that his criminal charges were dismissed, and it

appears that Casares was merely trying to convey what he was told by his former defense

counsel. Under these circumstances, we disagree that these references suggest that he

lacked a rational understanding of his charges and potential consequences. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46B.003(a), .024(1)(A).

Additionally, Casares asserts that his statements “that Mr. Ramon was not his

attorney [and] that his attorney was the discharged lawyer Mr. Harper” evidenced his

confusion about the identity of his defense counsel and “should have alerted the [trial]

court that [he] was unable to cooperate with his attorney on his defense.” Regarding this

purported confusion, we note that when Casares stated his attorney was Harper, he also

28
stated, “Call in Austin. They told me your lawyer is Harper. Don’t be lying, they told me.”

Casares did not fully explain who told him Harper was his defense counsel, but given this

context, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude the statements were not so

bizarre or unusual as to indicate an inability to assist his counsel or a material change of

circumstances since Talbot’s evaluation. 4 See Lindsey, 544 S.W.3d at 24; Turner, 422

S.W.3d at 693; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.024(1)(B).

Casares next contends that his statements that he had been “set up” by Yvette

and Moreno further indicated his incompetence. The record indicates that Casares

continuously asserted his belief he was “set up” during his post-arrest interview with law

enforcement and his various competency evaluations. However, Wright noted during the

first competency evaluation that Casares’s “suspicions were possible in real life and did

not constitute bizarre delusions.” Similarly, Talbot noted during Casares’s last

competency evaluation that he “demonstrates conspiratorial beliefs and delusional

thinking, though none are bizarre or outside the realm of something that could be true.”

For the same reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the

statements were not probative of incompetency or a change in circumstances. See

Lindsey, 544 S.W.3d at 24; Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 693.

Casares also contends that the trial court was “placed on notice by both Dr.

Augustus and Dr. Talbot that questions as to [his] competence could arise again,

particularly if he went a long time without medication.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

4 The record indicates that Casares was generally uncooperative with both of his court-appointed

attorneys throughout the pendency of the case, including when mental health professionals concluded that
he was not competent, and later, when they found him competent.

29
art. 46B.024(2)–(5). The record indicates that Casares suffered from bipolar disorder and

had been prescribed medication for it. See id. Specifically, Augustus diagnosed Casares

with “Bipolar Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified,” and she concluded in her report that he

was then incompetent to stand trial “due to symptoms of mental illness” but that he was

“restorable to trial competency in the foreseeable future.” Talbot noted in the last

competency evaluation that Casares “met the competency standard without medication,

however, some people with mental illness may decompensate significantly after a longer

period of time without medication” and that “[i]t is not clear whether medication is

necessary for maintaining his competency, but it is recommended to provide benefits in

mood stabilization and increasing rational thinking.”

In connection to the possibility of regression of his competency due to lack of

medication, Casares merely points to his “tangential” responses to the trial court’s

questions during jury selection, which we have already concluded above was not

necessarily indicative of incompetency. Furthermore, there was no evidence shown at the

time of trial that Casares was failing to take his bipolar medication currently prescribed to

him. See Lindsey, 544 S.W.3d at 26. (“Although some evidence suggested that appellant

had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and, at one time, had been prescribed

medication, . . . [n]o evidence showed appellant was failing to take medication currently

prescribed.”)

Casares further directs us to matters that occurred several months prior to his trial,

including the joint motion to withdraw by his defense attorneys and the hearing that

occurred regarding that motion. However, Casares does not connect said matters to

30
evidence of his incompetence that was observed by the trial court at the time of trial. The

relevant time frame for determining a defendant’s competency is at the time of the trial

court proceedings. Laflash v. State, 614 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2020, order). While Casares’s defense counsel expressed to the trial court that the

attorney-client relationship was “very weak if not non-existent” just prior to the

prosecutor’s opening statements, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that

this statement did not raise an inference that he was unable to assist his counsel. See

Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 696 (explaining that trial court need not conduct competency

inquiry when “there is some evidence that the defendant obstinately refuses to cooperate

with counsel but nothing from which to rationally infer that his obstinacy is fueled by

mental illness”); see also DeWitt v. State, Nos. 05-12-00583-00585-CR, 2013 WL

3389055, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (noting that “a failure to consult with counsel does not demonstrate a lack of

competence; instead, a defendant must be unable to consult with counsel”).

Casares argues that the trial court was aware that his own statement that he had

“gone to the state hospital and they evaluated him multiple times and found him ‘fine[]’”

was untrue. The record shows that mental health professionals twice concluded Casares

was incompetent due to mental illness, and subsequently twice concluded that he was

competent to stand trial. Whether Casares’s statement is characterized as misleading,

deceptive, or an outright falsity, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude it was

not probative of present incompetency or a change in circumstances since Talbot’s report.

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46B.003, .024(1)–(5); Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 693.

31
Related to this issue are Casares’s responses to the prosecutor’s cross-examination

questions regarding his court-ordered examinations. When the parties approached the

bench after Casares objected to the compound form of the prosecutor’s question, the trial

court warned, “Okay. This issue of competency I think it’s going to be a real problem if it

continues.” We do not interpret this statement to indicate that the trial court was itself

suggesting that Casares was presently incompetent to stand trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(c-1). Rather, the context appears to be that the trial court was

concerned regarding the subject matter of the prosecutor’s questions.

Finally, Casares argues that his defense counsel suggested he “may not be

competent” during this exchange at the bench. The record indicates that the quoted

language at issue occurred during defense counsel’s response to the prosecutor’s

assertion that Casares was “purposely not understanding” her questions. We note that

defense counsel did not request the trial court to stay the proceedings to have Casares

evaluated for competency to stand trial during this exchange, nor at any other point during

the trial, nor was the issue of competency raised by post-judgment motion for new trial. 5

The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a] suggestion of incompetency . . . may

consist solely of a representation from any credible source that the defendant may be

incompetent.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(c-1). To the extent that the

quoted language can be considered a “suggestion of incompetency,” we do not find that

it constituted evidence of a present mental illness from a credible source due to the

5 Neither party filed a motion suggesting that Casares was incompetent at the time of trial. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(a).

32
surrounding circumstances by which it was uttered. See id. arts. 46B.004(c-1),

46B.024(2)(a), (3)–(5); see also Lindsey, 544 S.W.3d at 26 (holding that the appellant’s

brother’s statement describing appellant as mentally disabled was not evidence of a

present mental disability from a credible source). Moreover, the remark is not indicative

of a material change in circumstances in Casares’s mental condition since the final formal

evaluation was concluded. See Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 693.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to

conduct a sua sponte informal inquiry as to Casares’s competency to stand trial. See

Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426; Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 393. Casares’s first issue is

overruled.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In his second issue, Casares argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying, in part, his defense attorneys’ joint motion to withdraw.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

“The Federal and Texas Constitutions, as well as Texas statute, guarantee a

defendant in a criminal proceeding the right to have assistance of counsel.” Gonzalez v.

State, 117 S.W.3d 831, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV;

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.05. However, such right is not

absolute. Gonzalez, 117 S.W.3d at 837. “Once the court has appointed an attorney to

represent the indigent defendant, the defendant has been accorded the protections

provided under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article 26.04 of the Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure, and the defendant then carries the burden of proving

33
entitlement to a change of counsel.” Barnett v. State, 344 S.W.3d 6, 24 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing Webb. v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. App.

1976)); see also Longoria v. State, No. 13-16-00680-CR, 2018 WL 3151473, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 28, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (“[W]here the defendant is indigent and counsel has been appointed, there is

no established right to pick and choose one’s representation.”).

Significantly, a trial court is under no duty to search for an attorney until it finds one

agreeable to the defendant. See Barnett, 344 S.W.3d at 24. A defendant’s right to counsel

of choice “may be overridden by other important considerations relating to the integrity of

the judicial process and the fair and orderly administration of justice.” Gonzalez, 117

S.W.3d at 837; see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (noting

the trial court’s “wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs

of fairness and against the demands of its calendar”). The decision to permit the

withdrawal of court-appointed counsel and subsequently appoint substitute counsel rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Coleman v. State, 246 S.W.3d 76, 85

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(j)(2) (“An attorney

appointed under this article shall . . . represent the defendant until charges are dismissed,

the defendant is acquitted, appeals are exhausted, or the attorney is permitted or ordered

by the court to withdraw as counsel for the defendant after a finding of good cause is

entered on the record[.]”). The trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily,

unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Rhomer v. State,

569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). “We make this determination based upon

34
what was before the trial court when it made its decision.” See Williams v. State, 154

S.W.3d 800, 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Montgomery v.

State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380, 391 (Tex. Crim. App.1990)).

B. Analysis

On March 30, 2023, Harper filed a motion to withdraw citing an inability to

“effectively communicate” with Casares as good cause. The trial court did not grant

Harper’s motion. Instead, the trial court appointed Ramon as co-counsel on April 5, 2023.

On May 24, 2023, Ramon and Harper filed a “Joint Defense Attorneys’ Motion to

Withdraw.” In the motion, the attorneys averred that they had unsuccessfully attempted

to confer with Casares; that Casares was “seriously and aggressively not wanting to be

represented by [Harper]”; that the “same situation exists” as to Ramon but without the

“animosity”; that Casares “had very harsh words for . . . Harper as well as the Court”; and

that Casares “may not be mentally ill, but he is dangerous.” In addition, the motion stated:

There is no viable nor constitutionally sound attorney-client relationship and
thus there can be no effective assistance of defense counsel guaranteed to
[Casares]. This situation can only lead to trouble for both defense counsel
of record. [Casares] indicated that he wants to represent himself and to do
so before another District Judge. Not a good omen for his chances in a very
serious case where absolute confidence and communication is necessary
to mount a viable defense. As of now, [Ramon] has no idea nor indication
of what that might be since [Casares] refused to confer with him and instead
wanted me to convey messages as stated above to . . . Harper and the
Court.

Accordingly, Movants . . . Ramon and . . . Harper jointly move to
withdraw in the best interest of justice and to find other defense counsel that
might be able to communicate with the defendant.

At a hearing on June 30, 2023, Ramon asked the trial court to “put on the record”

that Casares’s charged offenses were second-degree felonies because Casares “h[ad] it

35
in his mind that he had a third-degree felony.” Thereafter, the following exchange

occurred:

[Casares]: Harper tells me it’s two.

THE COURT: Don’t say anything. I’m not going to hear from
you anymore.

[Casares]: Okay.

Subsequently, Ramon explained that the State offered Casares a plea bargain and that

Ramon would need time to discuss it with Casares and his family. Ramon also indicated

that Casares wanted a trial and had a “misconception of what’s going on in federal court

and I need time to investigate that and find out.” The trial court then informed Casares of

his charges and that they were second-degree felonies. The trial court next asked Ramon

if he had any objection to allowing Harper to withdraw, and Ramon responded, “No

objection.” The trial court subsequently asked him if there was anything else and Ramon

replied, “Not at this time.” On the same day, the trial court signed its written order granting

the joint motion to withdraw “[a]s to [a]ttorney Jad Harper only. Attorney Ramon will

remain as Counsel of record for the Defendant.”

On appeal, Casares complains that the trial court erred in failing to grant the joint

motion to withdraw as to Ramon. Casares argues that the “grounds for the motion to

withdraw pertained to a [non-]waivable right—effective assistance of counsel” and that

“well-established law requires the court to have made some inquiry into the dissatisfaction

of . . . Casares with his attorney before ruling upon a motion to withdraw premised upon

conflict between attorney and client.” As shown above, the “good cause” cited by the joint

motion to withdraw was that Casares refused to communicate with both of his defense

36
attorneys. The motion asserted that animosity existed between Casares and Harper, but

not between Casares and Ramon. At the June 30, 2023 hearing, Ramon did not elaborate

on the joint motion and the trial court impliedly denied the motion as to Ramon without

further inquiry or explanation. Thus, Casares’s alleged refusal to communicate with

Ramon was the only allegation supporting “good cause” as to Ramon that was before the

trial court at the time it made its ruling. 6 See Williams, 154 S.W.3d at 802.

At most, Casares’s refusal to communicate indicates a personality conflict, which

does not necessitate appointment of new counsel. See Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919,

927 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (concluding no abuse of discretion in

denying two separately filed motions to withdraw prompted by appellant’s filing of

meritless grievances to the State Bar of Texas); Maes v. State, 275 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (concluding same where appellant characterized his

relationship with counsel as “irreparable, antagonistic”); see also Grantham v. State, No.

06-21-00150-CR, 2022 WL 4232914, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 14, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding same where appellant told

the trial court he did “not like or trust [counsel] and did not feel that [counsel] would ‘fight

for [him] . . . at all’” and “accused [counsel] of threatening him, which prompted [counsel]

to notify the trial judge, ‘Almost everything [appellant]’s telling you is a lie’”); Morris v.

6 In his brief, Casares references a handwritten letter to the trial court in which he alleged his

attorneys were “unhelpful.” Casares also requested to “fire” them and obtain new court-appointed counsel.
This letter was file-stamped July 26, 2023, and is included in the appellate record. However, there is no
indication that the trial court was aware of this document at the June 30, 2023 hearing. Therefore, we do
not consider the letter in our analysis. See Haas v. State, 494 S.W.3d 819, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“An appellate court must review the trial court’s ruling in light of what was before the
trial court at the time the ruling was made.”).

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State, No. 12-17-00124-CR, 2018 WL 6321081, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 4, 2018, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding same where counsel filed two

separate motions premised on appellant’s recurring complaints that counsel was failing

to communicate with him or spend time on his case); Anderson v. State, No. 02-17-00044-

CR, 2018 WL 359635, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (concluding same where counsel notified the trial court

that appellant had “told him that he should consider their relationship severed and asked

him to file the motion to withdraw” and “did not ‘seem to have any interest in any of the

legal advice’” that counsel had to offer); Johnson v. State, 352 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (observing the prevalence of opinions

examining a trial court’s decision on an attorney’s motion to withdraw based “on

disagreements between counsel and client”).

Under the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by denying the joint motion to withdraw as it applied to Ramon. See Coleman, 246 S.W.3d

at 85; Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 669. Casares’s second issue is overruled.

IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In his third issue, Casares argues that he suffered from ineffective assistance of

counsel.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

To reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we must find:

(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and

(2) the defendant was prejudiced. Andrus v. Texas, 590 U.S. 806, 813 (2020) (citing

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–94 (1984)); Hart v. State, 667 S.W.3d 774,

781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). Any claim for ineffectiveness of counsel “must be firmly

founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged

ineffectiveness.” Prine v. State, 537 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citations

omitted); see Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 781.

The appellant bears the burden to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by a

preponderance of the evidence. Perez v. State, 689 S.W.3d 369, 381 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2024, no pet.) (citing Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1999)). We employ a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide

range of reasonable, professional assistance and that it was motivated by a sound trial

strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 781. We consider “the

reasonableness of counsel’s actions at the time, rather than viewing such actions through

the benefit of hindsight.” Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 782.

To establish prejudice under the second prong, appellant must show “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “An appellant’s failure to satisfy

one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.”

Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Accordingly, failure to

make a showing under either Strickland prong defeats a claim for ineffective assistance.

Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Thompson, 9 S.W.3d

at 813).

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B. Analysis

1. Failure to File Competency Motion

Casares argues that Ramon was ineffective for failing to file a motion suggesting

incompetency. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(a). The record is silent as to the

reasons why Ramon did not file a motion suggesting incompetency. See Thompson, 9

S.W.3d at 813–14. However, we have thoroughly analyzed the competency issue above

and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining there was no

evidence suggesting that Casares was incompetent during his trial. Thus, Casares has

not overcome the strong presumption that Ramon’s conduct was “within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Ex parte

LaHood, 401 S.W.3d 45, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (noting that, to prevail in a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure of counsel to seek a full competency

evaluation, “there must be some affirmative showing that the [defendant] lacked ‘sufficient

present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding’ or ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against

the person’”); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813.

2. Waiver of Statutory Right to Be Present During Voir Dire 7

Casares next argues that Ramon was ineffective for waiving Casares’s statutory

right to remain in the courtroom during voir dire. “Texas law provides that the right to be

present during voir dire . . . cannot be waived.” Smith v. State, 534 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. ref’d) (cleaned up); see also U.S. CONST.

7 Casares does not raise a claim that his constitutional rights were violated.

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amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 19; Lira v. State, 666 S.W.3d 498, 511 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2023) (“[T]he right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of trial is guaranteed

by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

33.03 (“In all prosecutions for felonies, the defendant must be personally present at the

trial”). Until the jury is seated, a defendant has an absolute right to be present during the

voir dire. See Smith, 534 S.W.3d at 91; see also Ashley v. State, 404 S.W.3d 672, 681

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (holding that it violated article 33.03 when the trial

court conducted voir dire proceedings without the defendant even though the defendant

had voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings).

After the trial court removed Casares for interrupting the proceedings during jury

selection, the trial court asked Ramon if he agreed with Casares’s removal, and Ramon

responded that he agreed and that it was in the “best interest of [Casares] that he be

allowed to participate through [Z]oom. If this were to happen in front of the jury, it would

be certainly not to his advantage at all.” However, Ramon was not at liberty to waive

Casares’s presence at voir dire. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.03; Smith, 534

S.W.3d at 91. We assume without deciding that Ramon’s action in waiving Casares’s

right to be present during voir dire was deficient and analyze whether Casares suffered

the requisite level of prejudice as a result. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812.

In order to determine whether the result of this proceeding would have been

different but for Ramon’s actions, it is prudent to first determine whether the trial court’s

decision to exclude Casares from the courtroom for voir dire was harmless error. When

a trial court commits statutory error, an appellate court may not reverse unless it

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determines that the error affected a substantial right. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). “A

substantial right is affected when the error (1) had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict or (2) leaves one in grave doubt whether it had

such an effect.” Ashley, 404 S.W.3d at 681 (cleaned up). “A substantial right is not

affected and the error is harmless if, after reviewing the entire record, the appellate court

determines the error did not influence, or had only a slight influence, on the trial’s

outcome.” Id.

The court of criminal appeals has held no violation of substantial rights occurs

during voir dire unless the record shows the defendant was actually denied a fair and

impartial jury. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Nothing in

the record before us shows that the jury selected in Casares’s absence was unfair or

impartial. See Gray v. State, 233 S.W.3d 295, 298–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding

that appellant’s only substantial right is that jurors who serve be qualified); Ladd, 3 S.W.3d

at 562 (holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record

did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial). Accordingly, we cannot

conclude that Ramon’s waiver of Casares’s right to be present during voir dire, even if

improper, had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of Casares’s trial. See Andrus, 590 U.S.

at 813–14; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In other words, Casares has not shown that the

result of his proceeding would have been different but for the alleged deficiency. See

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812.

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3. “Disparaging Comment”

Casares argues that Ramon’s “disparaging comment about [Casares] being

‘uncooperative’ was unnecessary and disloyal to [Casares].” Casares provides no

authority supporting the assertion that such comments constitute deficient performance.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”).

Furthermore, the record indicates that the complained-of comment was uttered to the trial

court outside the presence of the venire panel, after Casares was removed from the

courtroom for his disruptive behavior. Because the comment was not heard by any

individuals that may have comprised the jury, Casares has not shown he suffered any

prejudice from the alleged deficiency. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812.

4. Disclosure of Plea Agreement

Casares contends that Ramon’s “public disclosure of the specific terms of the plea

offer that [Casares] rejected also showed disloyalty and violated his client’s right to

confidential communications with counsel” and did not advance his interest. In support of

his argument, Casares cites a singular concurring-and-dissenting opinion without

elaboration. See Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 567 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (Bard,

J., concurring and dissenting).

In Monreal, defense counsel questioned the appellant regarding plea negotiations

before the judge during the punishment phase of the appellant’s bench trial. Id. at 561–

62. On petition for discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the

Fourth Court of Appeals’s holding that the appellant did not demonstrate that counsel

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rendered ineffective assistance due to a conflict of interest. 8 See id. at 560–565. Unlike

the facts in Monreal, the disclosure of the terms of the plea agreement in this case were

not presented to the jury. Instead, the information was presented to the trial court outside

the presence of the jury. Therefore, Monreal is not applicable to the instant case. Casares

presents no further argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We conclude Casares has not

shown his counsel was ineffective for disclosing the terms of the plea agreement to the

trial court. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812.

5. “Non-Existent” Counsel

Casares contends that his attorney-client relationship with Ramon “never existed,”

citing the previously discussed joint motion to withdraw and Casares’s subsequent letter

by which he claimed both his attorneys were “unhelpful” and requested new court-

appointed counsel.

In particular, Casares claims Ramon was ineffective for failing to “urge” the joint

motion to withdraw as it pertained to Ramon, which we construe as an argument that

Ramon failed to object to the trial court’s ruling on the motion. To establish ineffective

assistance of counsel based on a failure to object, Casares “must demonstrate that the

trial court would have committed harmful error in overruling the objection if trial counsel

8 The majority held there was no actual conflict of interest created when defense counsel

questioned the appellant regarding plea negotiations. See Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997). Furthermore, the majority held that the Fourth Court of Appeals applied the correct legal
standard and considered relevant factors in holding that the appellant had not demonstrated his defense
counsel was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland test. See id. at 562–65. In contrast, J. Bard
opined that “[t]he first prong of Strickland was met when trial counsel demonstrated an actual conflict of
interest by abandoning the interests of her client to protect herself against some future action by [the]
appellant.” Id. at 567 (Bard, J. concurring and dissenting). “The effect of the conflict was to place before the
fact finder evidence which is inadmissible under TEX. R. EVID. 410.” Id. However, J. Bard opined that the
appellant had not proven the second prong of Strickland. See id. at 567–68.

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had objected.” Alexander v. State, 282 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2009, pet. ref’d). However, as discussed above, Casares’s refusal to communicate with

Ramon indicated nothing more than a personality conflict that did not necessitate

appointment of new counsel, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

joint motion to withdraw as it pertained to Ramon. Ramon was under no obligation to

make a further objection to an adverse ruling on a motion which was duly filed and

presented to the trial court. See Mooney v. State, 817 S.W.2d 693, 698 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991) (“Counsel is not required to engage in the filing of futile motions.”). Thus, we reject

this argument. See Alexander, 282 S.W.3d at 705.

Casares points to Ramon’s statements to the trial court, outside the presence of

the jury, that Ramon had not had “a single conference” with Casares after taking over the

case, that Ramon was not aware what Harper had discussed with Casares, and that

Ramon had not discussed the extraneous offense testimony of Paula with Casares. 9

However, these statements were made in connection with Ramon’s objection to

admission of Paula’s extraneous offense testimony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.37. Ramon requested that Paula testify regarding the extraneous offense in a pretrial

hearing to “give [Casares] an idea of what’s going on.” The record establishes that Paula

testified about the extraneous offenses at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, with

Casares present. Casares does not explain how his proceeding would have been different

9 We are mindful that the record establishes that Casares refused to communicate, assist, or

cooperate with both of his court-appointed attorneys throughout the pendency of his case.

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had he and Ramon discussed Paula’s extraneous offense testimony, or the State’s

evidence in general, prior to trial. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14.

Casares generally cites Ramon’s statements to the trial court during various pre-

trial hearings and the trial itself to exemplify the continuous conflict between them. While

Ramon indicated to the trial court that “the attorney-client relationship here is very weak

if not non-existent,” the record does not support a conclusion that he provided ineffective

assistance. The record demonstrates that Ramon engaged in vigorous cross-

examination of the State’s witnesses, lodged several objections to the admission of

various evidence offered by the State, and presented witnesses on behalf of Casares’s

defense. The record also establishes that Ramon attended various pretrial hearings,

including one where Casares voluntarily absented himself by refusing to leave his cell.

The totality of the representation demonstrates that Ramon did not provide ineffective

assistance. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Accordingly, Casares’s third issue is

overruled.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CLARISSA SILVA
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
22nd day of May, 2025.

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