Damonte Deandre Shears v. the State of Texas

NO. 12-22-00268-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

DAMONTE DEANDRE SHEARS, § APPEAL FROM THE 241ST
APPELLANT
§ DISTRICT COURT
V.
§ SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Damonte Deandre Shears, appeals his conviction for possession with intent to
deliver cocaine. In five issues, Appellant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, and alleges the
trial court erroneously admitted evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND

On March 18, 2021, Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Donald Appleman was
driving through the Butler College area of Tyler, Texas, attempting to locate Appellant.
Appleman saw a GMC Yukon SUV that he believed to be driven by Appellant and confirmed his
identity using law enforcement intelligence photographs. Thereafter, Appellant appeared to
notice Appleman following him, stopped the SUV in the driveway of 2000 West Robbins Street,
exited the vehicle, and appeared to be making a call on his cell phone. When Appleman
approached, identified himself, and asked to speak with Appellant, Appellant fled on foot.
Appellant ran through the yard on the property, jumped over a fence, and turned east into an
easement beside the property.
Other law enforcement officers quickly responded to the scene and secured the area.
About forty-five minutes after Appellant’s flight, while walking the path Appellant took,
Appleman and Corporal Jonathan Peters located a clear plastic bag containing a “cookie” of
crack cocaine and a large number of pills.1 The bag was located at the northeast corner of the
fence surrounding 1929 West Jackson Street, the property immediately to the south of 2000 West
Robbins. There had been no foot traffic in the area between Appellant’s flight and the discovery
of the drugs, and Appleman noticed that the cocaine “cookie” was still wet when he found the
plastic bag, indicating that it had been newly created. That same day, during his investigation,
Appleman viewed footage from a doorbell camera belonging to the owner of the house on 1929
West Jackson, showing Appellant running across the front part of the house less than one minute
after he fled from Appleman. The next day, Shakayla Shackleford, Appellant’s girlfriend and the
registered owner of the Yukon SUV that Appellant had been driving, called Appleman and told
him that she loaned her vehicle to Appellant the previous day.
Law enforcement subsequently arrested Appellant and he was indicted by a grand jury
for the offense of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, specifically cocaine, in
an amount of more than four grams but less than 200 grams.2 Appellant pleaded “not guilty,” and
this matter proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, Appleman testified to the aforementioned details of his investigation, including
that Appellant’s behavior was consistent with a “heat run,” wherein criminals in an area attempt
to determine whether police are present in the area because of them. Defense counsel lodged a
hearsay objection to Appleman’s testimony regarding Shackleford’s telephone statement, which
the trial court overruled. Outside the jury’s presence, Defense counsel re-urged a best evidence
objection to Appleman’s testimony regarding the doorbell camera video. The prosecution
asserted that the footage no longer existed, because the video was not previously collected and
the camera recorded over the footage. The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection.
Thereafter, Appleman testified to what he saw on the video. Defense counsel again objected to
Appleman’s testimony about the contents of the doorbell camera video based on the best
evidence rule. The trial court overruled this objection.
Corporal Peters testified that he responded to the scene to assist Appleman by securing
the area and the vehicle while Appleman attempted to locate Appellant. He later accompanied
Appleman to walk the path Appleman suspected Appellant took on foot, during which they

1
The identity of the “cookie” was later confirmed by laboratory testing, which showed that it contained
cocaine and weighed 13.19 grams.
2
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (d) (West 2023).

2
located the plastic bag containing the cocaine and pills. Peters also viewed the doorbell camera
video during the investigation, and although he did not recognize Appellant because he had not
seen him before, Peters testified that Appleman acknowledged that Appellant was the person in
the video.
Shackleford testified that she was still dating Appellant and had known him for over
seven years. She owned a gold GMC Yukon and she sometimes permitted Appellant to drive it,
but she could not remember whether she allowed him to drive the vehicle in March 2021. She
did not remember either the police contacting her because the Yukon had been towed or
speaking to Appleman on the phone. Shackleford cited her use of antidepressants as the reason
she could not remember these events. Thereafter, the State recalled Appleman to repeat his
testimony about the March 19 telephone conversation with Shackleford, to which defense
counsel did not object.
Detective Aneas Sutton of the Texas Anti-Gang Center testified that prior to March 18,
he provided Appleman information and recommended that he locate Appellant. Sutton also
obtained the arrest warrant for Appellant after the events of March 18. He stated that in his
experience as a narcotics-focused officer, the crack cocaine in the clear bag would produce about
13 “servings” and cost anywhere from $750.00 to $1,300.00. The multicolored pills from the
bag, which Sutton’s field test presumptively determined to be ecstasy or MDMA, weighed
approximately 100 grams. Sutton testified that each pill would likely sell for around $20.00.
The jury found Appellant “guilty” of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and
assessed punishment of forty-five years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In Appellant’s first, second, and third issues, he complains that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to hearsay evidence and improper predicate, and to
request a limiting instruction as to hearsay evidence. Appellant further asserts that the cumulative
impact of trial counsel’s errors denied him effective assistance of counsel.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we follow the United States
Supreme Court’s two-pronged test found in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). Under the first prong of the Strickland test, an appellant must show that counsel’s

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performance was “deficient.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Tong v. State, 25
S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A deficient performance occurs when “counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. To be successful, an
appellant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Id., 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Tong, 25 S.W.3d at 712.
Under the second prong, an appellant must affirmatively show that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Mitchell v.
State, 989 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The appellant must prove that his attorney’s
errors, judged by the totality of the representation and not by isolated instances of error, denied
him a fair trial. Burruss v. State, 20 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d).
It is not enough for the appellant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceedings; he must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his
attorney’s errors, the verdict or the extent of his punishment would have been less. See id.; see
also Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The appellant must prove both
prongs of the Strickland test by a preponderance of the evidence to prevail; failure to make the
required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the
ineffectiveness claim. Tong, 25 S.W.3d at 712; Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999).
Review of trial counsel’s representation is highly deferential. Tong, 25 S.W.3d at 712.
We begin with a “strong presumption” that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance and was motivated by sound trial strategy. Jackson v. State,
877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The appellant bears the burden to overcome this
presumption by presenting evidence showing why trial counsel did what he did. Id.; Tong, 25
S.W.3d at 712. An appellant cannot meet this burden if the record does not affirmatively
demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. See Kemp v. State, 892 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (a record that specifically focuses on the conduct of trial
counsel is necessary for a proper evaluation of an ineffectiveness claim). Before being
condemned as unprofessional and incompetent, defense counsel should be given an opportunity
to explain his actions. See Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 836. When the record is silent regarding the
reasons for counsel’s conduct, a finding that counsel was ineffective would require

4
impermissible speculation by the appellate court. Gamble v. State, 916 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.); see also Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011) (“In order for an appellate court to find that counsel was ineffective, counsel’s
deficiency must be affirmatively demonstrated in the trial record; the court must not engage in
retrospective speculation.”).
Failure to Object to Hearsay

Appellant asserts that trial counsel was deficient because he failed to object to
Appleman’s testimony that Shackleford told him she loaned Appellant the vehicle he was driving
on the date of the offense. Appellant’s trial counsel raised a hearsay objection to this testimony
the first time that Appleman testified (although after Appleman had already answered the
question), which the trial court overruled. Counsel did not object on the basis of hearsay the
second time Appleman testified about the phone conversation, when the State recalled him to
impeach Shackleford.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to object, appellant must
demonstrate that the trial court would have committed error in overruling the objection had trial
counsel objected. See Vaughn v. State, 931 S.W.2d 564, 566–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996);
Donald v. State, 543 S.W.3d 466, 478 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Failure
to object to admissible evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. McCallum
v. State, 311 S.W.3d 9, 16 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.).
Any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack a witness’s credibility.
TEX. R. EVID. 607. One permissible way of attacking a witness’s credibility is through
impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. See TEX. R. EVID. 613(a). Rule 613 requires that
the party intending to examine a witness about a prior inconsistent statement must tell the
witness the contents of the statement, the time and place of the statement, and the person to
whom the witness made the statement. Id. at (a)(1). Then, the witness must have the opportunity
to explain or deny the statement. Id. at (a)(3). If the witness does not “unequivocally admit”
making the statement upon examination, extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement is
admissible (including otherwise-inadmissible hearsay). Id. at (a)(4); Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d
841, 846 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
The record reflects that counsel for the State informed Shackleford of the contents of her
statement, the time and place she said it, and to whom she said it. She testified that she did not

5
recall ever speaking to Appleman on the phone, which is not an unequivocal admittance of the
statement. Therefore, under Rule 613, the State was permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence to
impeach Shackleford, and it did so through Appleman’s testimony about the conversation with
Shackleford. See TEX. R. EVID. 613(a). Without showing that the evidence to which trial counsel
did not object was inadmissible, Appellant cannot prove that his trial counsel performed
deficiently in failing to object to same, and therefore cannot prove the first prong of the
Strickland test. See Donald, 543 S.W.3d at 478. Consequently, we overrule this portion of
Appellant’s first issue.
Failure to Request Limiting Instruction

Appellant argues that trial counsel was deficient by failing to request an instruction
limiting the jury’s consideration of Appleman’s impeachment testimony only for its reflection on
Shackleford’s credibility, and not for the truth of the matter asserted.
Generally, if a defendant does not request a limiting instruction at the time evidence is
admitted, then the evidence is admitted for all purposes, and the trial judge has no obligation to
limit the use of that evidence later in the jury charge. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 251
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). But defense counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction is not, by
itself, deficient performance. Agbogwe v. State, 414 S.W.3d 820, 837 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2013, no pet.). If a reviewing court can imagine a strategic motive to explain the
ineffective assistance claim, then the reviewing court may not sustain the appellant’s point of
error. Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833 n. 13.
Here, the record is silent as to trial counsel’s defensive strategy or the reasoning for his
failure to request a limiting instruction on Appleman’s impeachment testimony, and we may not
speculate as to those reasons. Generally, a silent record cannot defeat the strong presumption that
counsel was effective. See Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), but see
Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (appellate court should not find
deficient performance from undeveloped record unless challenged conduct “so outrageous that
no competent attorney would have engaged in it”); Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102-03
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (reversing conviction “in a rare case” on basis of ineffective assistance
of counsel). The record does not show that Appellant’s trial counsel engaged in such outrageous
conduct that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. Multiple Texas courts have held
that defense counsel’s choice not to request a limiting instruction on certain evidence may well

6
be the product of trial strategy. See Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (defense counsel may decide not to request a limiting instruction so as not to emphasize
unfavorable evidence); Villalva v. State, No. 08-13-00219-CR, 2015 WL 4134531, at *6 (Tex.
App.—El Paso July 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial attorney
may reasonably decide, as part of trial strategy, not to highlight objectionable testimony by
requesting limiting instruction). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional assistance. Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833 n.
13. Because Appellant has not made the showing required for the first prong of the Strickland
test, we overrule this portion of Appellant’s first issue.
Improper Predicate Objection

Appellant argues in his second issue that trial counsel was deficient because he failed to
object to “the introduction of a verbal description of [the] ‘doorbell camera’ photographic
evidence that was not properly supported by predict [sic] testimony[.]” Appellant later clarifies
that trial counsel should have objected specifically because the State did not establish the
authenticity of the original doorbell camera footage about which Appleman testified, and
counsel’s failure to do so amounted to ineffective assistance.
Any proffered item of evidence may be authenticated under Rule 901 of the Texas Rules
of Evidence by “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). Conclusive proof of authenticity before allowing admission
of disputed evidence is not required. Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018). “Evidence may be authenticated in a number of ways, including by direct testimony from
a witness with personal knowledge, by comparison with other authenticated evidence, or by
circumstantial evidence.” Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Rule
901’s standard for authentication has been described as a “liberal standard of admissibility.”
Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849. Consistent with the concept that counsel is not required to take an
action that would be futile, counsel’s failure to object to a lack of foundation is not ineffective
assistance unless the record shows that the State would not have been able to lay proper
foundation. Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Darnell v. State,
No. 14–11–00437–CR, 2012 WL 626318, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2012,

7
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).3 We examine counsel’s actions from the
viewpoint of an attorney at the time he acted, not through 20/20 hindsight. Ex parte Jimenez,
364 S.W.3d 866, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Although generally the original recording is
required to prove the content of a video recording, other evidence of the contents of a recording
is admissible if all originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or
destroyed them in bad faith. TEX. R. EVID. 1002, 1004(a).
In this case, counsel represented to the trial court that the footage from the doorbell
camera had been overwritten by the camera’s usual operation, because it saves new footage over
older footage after a certain period of time, and the video of Appellant was not collected before it
was overwritten. Appellant did not assert that the recording was destroyed in bad faith rather
than inadvertently, and the record contains no evidence to support such a finding. Appleman
testified that he personally noticed the doorbell camera at the house located at 1929 West
Jackson Street, and the homeowner allowed him to view the video captured by the camera. The
camera was triggered to record because Appellant ran past the front of the house. Appleman was
familiar with Appellant’s appearance generally and on March 18 and recognized him in the
footage as the same person he saw driving the gold Yukon. Peters similarly testified that he
viewed the doorbell camera recording with Appleman and that the homeowner voluntarily
showed them the video, corroborating Appleman’s testimony as to the circumstances
surrounding their viewing of the recording. The evidence presented by the State, both direct and
circumstantial, satisfied the requirements of Rule 901 and served to authenticate the original
recording. See Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (testimony of person
who viewed destroyed videotape and could identify the people depicted sufficient for
authentication). Moreover, even if the State’s authentication evidence as actually presented at
trial was insufficient, Appellant does not contend and the record does not show that the State

3
Multiple other Texas courts have similarly held that trial counsel’s failure to object based on lack of
foundation is not ineffective assistance unless the record shows that the State would not have been able to lay proper
foundation. See, e.g., F.R. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-17-00487-CV, 2017 WL 6503082, at
*8 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Assuming without
deciding a business record affidavit would have been insufficient, there is no indication that the Department would
not have provided adequate foundation in another way[.]”); Coker v. State, No. 08-02-00014-CR, 2004 WL
1194362, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso May 27, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“There is
no evidence in the appellate record that had trial counsel made [foundation] objections the State would have been
unable to meet it.”); Carrillo v. State, No. 13-01-649-CR, 2004 WL 34857, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 8,
2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling ineffective assistance point based on second
Strickland prong because, “[h]ad trial counsel objected, the State could have presented additional evidence properly
authenticating the [item].”)

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could not have provided adequate foundation through other, additional evidence. Darnell, 2012
WL 626318, at *2.
Because Appellant did not file a motion for new trial, the record is silent as to counsel’s
reasoning for choosing not to object or failing to object to Appleman’s testimony based on
improper predicate. To satisfy the first prong of Strickland on a silent record, it must be apparent
“that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of
law, and that no reasonable trial strategy could justify trial counsel’s acts or omissions,
regardless of his or her subjective reasoning.” Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143. Failing to object to
admissible evidence is not ineffective assistance of counsel, but even counsel’s decision not to
object to arguably admissible evidence may be a matter of sound trial strategy. Thompson, 9
S.W.3d at 814; Jones v. State, 950 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d).
In this case, it is possible that trial counsel reasonably decided at that moment that the testimony
was not inadmissible on the basis of improper predicate, or that raising an additional objection on
this basis would appear to the jury to be trying the case on technicalities. Fuller v. State, 224
S.W.3d 823, 831 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). Whether counsel’s decision was the
best possible trial strategy in hindsight is not an appropriate inquiry. Ex parte Kelley, No. WR-
87,470-01, 2019 WL 5788034, at *35 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2019) (mem. op., not designated
for publication).
Thus, under the circumstances of this case, we cannot find that counsel’s performance
was deficient for purposes of proving the first prong of Strickland. See Lopez v. State, 462
S.W.3d 180, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). We overrule Appellant’s
second issue.
Cumulative Effect of Errors

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors
constitutes ineffective assistance. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has extended the concept
of “cumulative error” to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Chamberlain v. State, 998
S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). However, there is no authority for the proposition that
the cumulative effect of non-errors requires reversal. Id. Additionally, if an appellant’s
individual claims of error lack merit, then there is no possibility of cumulative error. Gamboa v.
State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

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Appellant does not attempt to explain how each of defense counsel’s alleged deficiencies
cumulatively prejudiced the outcome of the case. Rather, he simply argues that the sum total of
the errors resulted in an “unfair” and “unjust” verdict and sentence. We have already addressed
Appellant’s complaints against his trial counsel and concluded that they are lacking in merit—
counsel’s actions were either not deficient, or those actions could not have prejudiced Appellant.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that this is one of those rare cases wherein the cumulative
effect of ineffective assistance warrants reversal of the judgment on direct appeal. See id. We
overrule Appellant’s third issue.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

In his fourth issue, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed the bag of crack cocaine.
Standard of Review

The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a conviction be
supported by legally sufficient evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16, 99 S.
Ct. 2781, 2786–87, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). In Texas, the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard that a reviewing
court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a
criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence,
we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445
S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). Juries are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences from direct or circumstantial
evidence. Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When the record
supports conflicting inferences, a reviewing court must presume that the fact finder resolved the
conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Clayton v. State,
235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated
equally. Id. A conclusion of guilt can rest on the combined and cumulative force of all the
incriminating circumstances; the duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the evidence
presented supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime charged. See Hernandez

10
v. State, 190 S.W.3d 856, 864 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.); Williams v. State, 235
S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense(s) as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict
the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant is tried.” Id.
Applicable Law

To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that
Appellant (1) exercised actual care, control, and management over the contraband and (2) knew
the substance in his possession was contraband.4 Nixon v. State, 928 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 1996, no pet.) (citing King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995)). When contraband is not found on the accused’s person, or is not in the exclusive
possession of the accused, additional facts must affirmatively link the accused to the contraband
so that one may reasonably infer that the accused exercised control over it. Smith v. State, 56
S.W.3d 739, 747 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d).
A nonexclusive list of factors relevant to knowing possession—or “affirmative links”—
includes (1) the defendant’s presence during the search, (2) whether the contraband was in plain
view, (3) the contraband’s proximity and accessibility to the defendant, (4) whether the
defendant was under the influence of narcotics, (5) whether the defendant possessed other
contraband, (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested, (7) whether
the defendant attempted to flee, (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures, (9) whether
there was an odor of contraband, (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia was
present, (11) whether the defendant owned or had a right to possess the place where contraband
was found, (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed, (13) whether the

4
The State must also prove that Appellant possessed the crack cocaine with intent to deliver.
Circumstances considered by the courts in determining “intent to deliver” include (1) the nature of the location
where the defendant was arrested, (2) the quantity of the drugs the defendant possessed, (3) the manner of packaging
the drugs, (4) the presence or absence of drug paraphernalia (for use or sale), (5) whether the defendant possessed a
large amount of cash in addition to the drugs, and (6) the defendant’s status as a drug user. Garrett v. State, 161
S.W.3d 664, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d). Appellant does not contest the legal sufficiency of the
evidence for a finding of intent to deliver.

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defendant was found with a large amount of cash, and (14) whether the defendant’s conduct
indicated consciousness of guilt. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
(quoting Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). Further, the
presence of a large quantity of contraband may be a factor affirmatively linking an appellant to
the contraband. Espino-Cruz v. State, 586 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, pet. ref’d).
An affirmative link is a shorthand expression of what must be proven to establish that a
person possessed a controlled substance knowingly or intentionally. Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d
744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). In other words, “the concept of an affirmative link is simply
one way to describe the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove intent to possess drugs.”
Brochu v. State, 927 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d) (citing
Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747). Although these factors can help guide a court’s analysis, ultimately
the inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson—whether, based on the combined and cumulative
force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, the jury was rationally justified in
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414; see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-
19, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. “It is ... not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical
force of all the evidence, direct and circumstantial.” Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162.
Analysis

Appellant argues that the State’s evidence on the element of care, control, and
management was legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt. In support of his
argument, he asserts that law enforcement did not see him carrying or discarding any narcotics or
plastic bags, no fingerprints were found on the narcotics or the plastic bag, and law enforcement
found no narcotics, paraphernalia, or large sums of money when they searched the Yukon.
Appellant further argues that the State did not develop testimony as to “how long the narcotics
had been in its [sic] location before Appleman found them.”
Several factors link Appellant to the contraband and support a finding of knowing
possession. The bag containing the contraband was in plain view on the ground when law
enforcement found it, and the bag contained a very large amount of crack cocaine. Appleman
saw Appellant running toward the area where he found the bag, and Appellant’s path of flight
was further confirmed by Appleman’s review of the video recording from the doorbell camera.
Appellant immediately fled from Appleman on foot when Appleman approached and identified

12
himself. Even before running from Appleman, Appellant drove erratically when he noticed
Appleman following him, parked at a house to which he had no connection, and made prolonged
eye contact with Appleman before fleeing, all indications of a consciousness of guilt. That the
“cookie” of crack cocaine had been newly created, and thus could not have been in the yard
where the bag was found for very long, is additional evidence linking Appellant to the drugs.
As Appellant points out, evidence pertaining to several possible affirmative links was
either not present or not discussed at trial. But the State is not required to establish all possible
affirmative links or present evidence on each factor, and the absence of some factors is not
evidence of innocence that must be weighed against the other factors present. Espino-Cruz, 586
S.W.3d at 546. Additionally, that Appellant ran so that Appleman could not see him significantly
lessens the importance that Appleman failed to see Appellant drop the bag. Accordingly, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly possessed crack cocaine. We overrule
Appellant’s fourth issue.
BEST EVIDENCE OBJECTION

In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Appleman’s testimony about the contents of the doorbell camera video over Appellant’s best
evidence objection.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Manuel v.
State, 357 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2011, pet. ref’d). If the ruling is within the zone of
reasonable disagreement, an appellate court will not disturb it. Manuel, 357 S.W.3d at 74.
As previously discussed, Texas Rule of Evidence 1002 provides that an original writing,
recording, or photograph is required to prove its content unless the Rules of Evidence or other
law provides otherwise. TEX. R. EVID. 1002. Although generally the original recording is
required to prove the content of a video, other evidence of the content of a recording, such as
testimony from a person who saw the video, is admissible if all originals are lost or destroyed
(unless the proponent lost or destroyed the originals in bad faith). Id. at 1004(a); Wood, 18
S.W.3d at 647.

13
Analysis

Outside of the jury’s presence, Defense counsel re-urged Appellant’s best evidence
objection to Appleman’s testimony regarding the video. At that time, counsel for the State
represented to the trial court that the doorbell camera footage had been destroyed by the standard
operation of the camera itself, because it records over older footage after a certain period of time,
and the video of Appellant was not collected before it was overwritten. Appellant did not argue
that the recording was destroyed in bad faith rather than inadvertently. Accordingly, the trial
court was within its discretion to determine that the original recording was unavailable as lost or
destroyed. See Howell v. Howell, No. 13-10-00687-CV, 2013 WL 784542, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi Feb. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (representation
of counsel that document was not obtainable sufficient for finding that document had been lost or
destroyed). Consequently, the trial court’s ruling that Appleman’s testimony was admissible as
“other evidence” of the video’s contents was well within the zone of reasonable disagreement,
and thus not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. TEX. R. EVID. 1004(a); Wood, 18 S.W.3d at
647; see also Ellis v. State, 517 S.W.3d 922, 931 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.)
(purpose of best evidence rule is to secure production of the best obtainable evidence of
document’s contents, if the document cannot as a practical matter be produced). We overrule
Appellant’s fifth issue.
DISPOSITION

Having overruled each of Appellant’s five issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BRIAN HOYLE
Justice

Opinion delivered June 14, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

14
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JUNE 14, 2023

NO. 12-22-00268-CR

DAMONTE DEANDRE SHEARS,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

Appeal from the 241st District Court
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 241-1718-21)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in
the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.
Brian Hoyle, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.