Yashica Beasley and Murphy Henderson v. Allied Trust Insurance Company

NO. 12-24-00199-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

YASHICA BEASLEY AND MURPHY § APPEAL FROM THE
HENDERSON,
APPELLANTS
§ COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 3
V.

ALLIED TRUST INSURANCE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
COMPANY,
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM

Yashica Beasley and Murphy Henderson appeal the trial court’s order granting Allied
Trust Insurance Company’s motion for partial summary judgment. They present six issues on
appeal. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND
Beasley and Henderson filed suit against Uriyah Smith and Christopher Deshaun
Wansley for damages arising out of a shooting incident that occurred at Smith’s apartment in July
2021. Beasley and Henderson sought coverage under Allied’s policy issued to Marcus Lockett,
Smith’s stepfather, for Smith’s alleged acts and omissions in the shooting incident. Allied
maintains that Smith is not covered under the policy because she was not a resident of Lockett’s
household, did not move out to attend school, and was not enrolled full-time as a student. As a
result, Allied took the position it does not a have a duty to defend the lawsuit.
Allied filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that Smith is not an
insured under the policy and that it does not have a duty to defend in the underlying lawsuit.
Allied also sought attorney’s fees. Beasley and Henderson filed an answer and counterclaim
seeking a declaration that Smith meets the definition of an “insured” and attorney’s fees. Beasley
and Henderson filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the trial court to declare the
insurance policy ambiguous. The trial court denied the motion. Allied filed a motion for partial
summary judgment, arguing that the evidence established that it did not have a duty to defend
under the policy because Smith did not meet the definition of an insured. The trial court granted
Allied’s motion. Murphy and Henderson filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
This appeal followed.

FINALITY OF JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
We first address the issue of our jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See M.O. Dental
Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (appellate courts have duty to assess their own
jurisdiction sua sponte).
Standard of Review and Governing Law
Appellate jurisdiction is never presumed. Beckham Group, P.C. v. Snyder, 315 S.W.3d
244, 245 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Unless the record affirmatively shows the propriety
of appellate jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. See id. This court’s jurisdiction is
established exclusively by constitutional and statutory enactments. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. V,
§ 6; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.220(c) (West Supp. 2023). Unless one of the sources of our
authority specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal, we only have jurisdiction over an
appeal taken from a final judgment. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.
2001); N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966).
A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims
in the record, except as necessary to carry out the decree. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195.
“Because the law does not require that a final judgment be in any particular form, whether a
judicial decree is a final judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the
case.” Id. When making this determination, “[a] judgment ‘must be read in light of the
importance of preserving a party’s right to appeal’; if we imply finality from anything less than
an unequivocal expression, a party’s right to appeal may be jeopardized.” In re Burlington Coat
Factory Warehouse, 167 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195);
see TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1 (setting deadlines for perfecting appeal from date judgment or order is
signed); Park Place Hosp. v. Estate of Milo, 909 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1995) (“All parties and

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all issues before the trial court must be disposed of before a summary judgment becomes final
and appealable . . . Although the plaintiffs had filed notice to nonsuit [pending party], the
appellate timetable could not be triggered until a signed, written order of the court dismissed
him.”); Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (“The
appellate timetable does not commence to run other than by signed, written order, even when the
signing of such an order is purely ministerial.” (emphasis in original)).
A summary judgment is presumed to dispose of only those issues expressly presented.
City of Beaumont v. Guillory, 751 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam). “A summary
judgment that fails to dispose expressly of all parties and issues in the pending suit is
interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance of that phase of the case is ordered by the
trial court[.]” Id. Absent an order of severance, the “party against whom an interlocutory
summary judgment has been rendered has his right of appeal when and not before such partial
summary judgment is merged in a final judgment disposing of all parties and issues.” Id.
Finality of Order Granting Allied’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
In this case, there is no unmistakably clear statement on the face of the trial court’s order
granting Allied’s motion for partial summary judgment indicating that it intended the order to be
a final judgment as to all claims and parties. Rather, the order states that Allied’s motion for
partial summary judgment is well-taken and should be granted. It explicitly states that Allied’s
“Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.” Thus, the express terms of the
order itself clearly indicate that it is not a final judgment.
Furthermore, the record does not indicate that the trial court’s order actually disposed of
all claims and parties before the court. In their original petition and first amended petition,
Allied sought attorney’s fees. And Allied specifically reserved its right to attorney’s fees in its
motion for partial summary judgment. The summary judgment order, however, does not address
or dispose of Allied’s claim for attorney’s fees. Nor did the trial court address the attorney’s fees
claim in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the order does not dispose of
Allied’s claim for attorney’s fees, it is not a final judgment. 1 See Farm Bureau Cty. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Rogers, 455 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam); see also Homeward Residential,

1
The order does not explicitly dispose of Beasley’s and Henderson’s counterclaim and claim for attorney’s
fees; however, because their claim sought a declaration that Smith is an “insured” under the policy, a declaration that
she is not appears to dispose of that claim.

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Inc. v. Burch, No. 02-19-00413-CV, 2020 WL 370578, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 23,
2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s order did not state with
unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and parties or actually dispose of
all claims and parties then before the court. See Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at 163. Accordingly, we
hold that the order is not a final or otherwise appealable interlocutory order. See id., see also
Dowtech Specialty Contractors, Inc. v. City of Nacogdoches, No. 12–15–00236–CV, 2016 WL
3050061, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 27, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal
for want of jurisdiction when judgment was not final or otherwise appealable); see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (West Supp. 2023). For this reason, we lack jurisdiction to
consider Beasley’s and Henderson’s appeal. See Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at 163; see also Dowtech
Specialty Contractors, Inc., 2016 WL 3050061, at *3.

DISPOSITION
Having held that the trial court’s order granting Allied’s motion for partial summary
judgment is not a final judgment or otherwise appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss this
appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Opinion delivered August 29, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Bass, Retired J., Twelfth Court of Appeals,
sitting by assignment.

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COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

AUGUST 29, 2024

NO. 12-24-00199-CV

YASHICA BEASLEY AND MURPHY HENDERSON,
Appellants
V.
ALLIED TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellee

Appeal from the County Court at Law No 3
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 75441-B)

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the appellate record, and the same
being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that it is without jurisdiction of the appeal, and
that the appeal should be dismissed.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this Court that
this appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction; and that this decision
be certified to the court below for observance.
By per curiam opinion.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Bass, Retired J., Twelfth Court of Appeals,
sitting by assignment.