Charles Johnson A/K/A Charles Daniel Johnson, Jr. v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed December 18, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00033-CR
__________

CHARLES JOHNSON A/K/A CHARLES DANIEL JOHNSON,
JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 35th District Court
Brown County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR29721

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Charles Johnson a/k/a Charles Daniel Johnson, Jr., was convicted
by a jury of stalking, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072(a),
(b) (West Supp. 2024). Appellant pled “true” to the enhancement allegation—
Appellant’s prior felony conviction involved the same offense as charged in this case
and the same victim—and the jury assessed his punishment at imprisonment in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for twenty years
and a $10,000 fine. See id. § 12.33 (West 2019), § 12.42(a).
In four issues on appeal, Appellant contends that: (1) his right to a unanimous
jury verdict was violated; (2) the trial court’s charge impermissibly allowed a
conviction based on conduct not “specifically directed at” Melissa Murray, the
victim named in the indictment; (3) a variance between the charging instrument and
the proof at trial of a “material non-statutory allegation” rendered the evidence
legally insufficient to support his conviction; and (4) the jury’s guilty verdict “is not
supported by sufficient evidence because not all of [Appellant’s] course of conduct
relied upon to convict was ‘directed specifically toward the complainant’ in [the]
indictment.” We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Appellant’s relentless pursuit of Murray began as an uninvited interaction in
2006, while they were parishioners of Victory Life Church 1 in Brownwood. Murray
was an active volunteer from 2003 until she was hired as a full-time worship leader
in 2008. Even after she transitioned to a career in clinical social work in 2017,
Murray continued to volunteer on the church’s worship team through 2021. Her first
interaction with Appellant, who is over ten years her senior, was in May 2006 during
her volunteer shift at the church’s radio station. Murray testified that “he was kind
of upset,” so Murray offered to pray for him. When Murray turned twenty-three
later that month, Appellant gave her flowers and a toy tiara, which she found “really
bizarre,” “weird,” and “kind of creepy.” But Appellant declared himself to be on a
mission—he believed that “God put [Murray] in [his] dreams,” and that their union
was preordained.

1
Prior to 2006, Victory Life Church was called Living Word Church. There are twelve campuses
under the Victory Life Church banner as well as the online campus. Because the location in Brownwood
is where most of the relevant events occurred, we will refer to that location as “Victory Life Church” or
“the church,” and explicitly distinguish other campuses for clarity.
2
Murray politely declined Appellant’s propositions, ignored the notes he left
on her car, avoided him when he waited for her after services, and sometimes hid
when she saw him approaching. Murray’s family members, other parishioners, and
church staff intervened upon observing Appellant’s obsessive behavior, and
demanded that he respect Murray’s boundaries. Emboldened by discouragement,
Appellant construed Murray’s rejection as a spiritual test. As Murray walked to her
car one night after an event at the church, Appellant accosted her in a “very
threatening” manner and asked, “What do you want from me? Do you want to marry
me?” Murray “felt very attacked” by Appellant’s aggressiveness.
In June 2008, Murray called the police when she noticed Appellant following
her as she ran errands. Chief David Mercer with the Early Police Department spoke
to Murray and observed that she “was very scared.” He then found Appellant and
informed him “that he needed to avoid [Murray] and to quit contacting her.” Chief
Mercer perceived that Appellant “did not believe in the laws set forth by
the . . . government”—“it was only a matter of what God wanted for him and
[Murray].” In the days that followed, the Brown County Sheriff’s Office issued a
criminal trespass warning that prohibited Appellant from being on church premises.
Appellant went to the church a week later with an engagement ring intended for
Murray, and he was arrested for trespassing.
Appellant was indicted for stalking Murray in January 2009; he pled guilty in
March 2009 and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision. When
he continued to contact Murray in violation of his conditions of community
supervision, he was adjudicated guilty in November 2009 and sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment. In a letter to fellow parishioner Dusty Wilson and her husband,
Appellant reflected on his adjudication hearing: “I would rather be in prison than
just walk away from God[’]s plan for my life. . . . [O]ne thing I couldn’t do was just
walk away.” He maintained his innocence and recalled “get[ting] to see [Murray]
3
and ask her why she was so afraid.” Wilson later revealed that she “did not know
what to do with [the] information” in Appellant’s letter: “I felt like, okay, this is still
going on. It really hurt my heart for [Appellant] and for [Murray] . . . it scared me.”
Murray likewise felt “scared,” “violated,” and “harass[ed]” upon receiving
Appellant’s letters that he sent to her home address. From prison, he wrote “that
God told him that [they] were supposed to be together” in a dream, and “he hoped
eventually [she] would see it.”
When Appellant was released on parole in June 2016, he purchased another
engagement ring, attempted to connect to Murray through social media, and joined
Victory Life Church’s online campus. As a member of the online church, Appellant
viewed prerecorded and livestreamed worship services and engaged in online
discussions with assistant pastors. According to Dr. Craig Smee, the online campus
pastor from 2016 to 2020, Appellant’s virtual exchanges “followed the same pattern
over and over again”; he steered every conversation toward Murray and stated how
she was “somebody that he was supposed to have.” Dr. Smee counseled Appellant
to seek a relationship with God rather than with Murray and advised him to find
another church. Dr. Smee surmised that Appellant “wasn’t [t]here just to deepen his
relationship with God” but instead to only gain access to Murray, so he removed
Appellant from the online platform.
Appellant trespassed onto Victory Life Church property in November 2017,
and his parole was subsequently revoked. He resumed writing letters to Murray and
the church while incarcerated. In March 2020, he asked Murray for forgiveness and
promised to “respect[] [her] as an individual and as a woman.” Yet in July 2020, he
wrote a letter to the church referring to his dreams as a message from God about
Murray. Dr. Smee, who became the lead pastor of the church in August 2020, read
a “[s]ignificant amount[]” of letters from Appellant in which Appellant expressed
his genuine belief that being with Murray “is God’s calling.”
4
Appellant was released from prison in mid-2020 no less resolute that Murray
was “supposed to be [his] wife.” For a few months, he was content to watch the
online services that frequently featured Murray on the worship team. But those
ultimately failed to satisfy his “longing for purpose and direction.” On the morning
of Sunday, September 6, 2020—when it was highly likely that Murray would have
been leading worship 2—he walked inside the church. Church “safety team”3
members, Troy Henderson and Tommy Valencia, quickly intercepted Appellant and
escorted him from the church. Valencia, who had known Appellant for nearly
eighteen years, advised Appellant to “stay away out of love for [Murray]” because
she did not want to marry him. Appellant’s defiance concerned Valencia—
Appellant refused to accept Murray’s feelings because, in his mind, “that’s not the
way it’s supposed to be.” Valencia “finally talked [Appellant] into getting in his car
and leaving” without involving law enforcement.
Murray was granted a lifetime protective order in December 2020 that
prohibited Appellant from being within 500 yards of her, her residence, and Victory
Life Church. Although Appellant kept his distance until July 2021, he called the
church office incessantly in the interim. In July 2021, he called after he saw
Murray’s sister, Angela Bishop, on stage during a livestreamed worship service. He
confused Bishop for Murray, noticed that Bishop was wearing her wedding ring, and
he called the church office to inquire whether Murray was married. Appellant
subsequently explained that he “was just curious . . . [w]hether or not [Murray] was
married,” so that he “could drop [her] out of [his] life, [his] mind, [his] head.”

2
Troy Henderson testified that Murray was not at the church that day, but Leann Smee and Dr. Smee
testified that Murray was there most Sunday mornings as a worship leader who is “very involved in the
entire team.”
3
Church leaders assembled parishioners—some with law enforcement experience—to act as
security for the protection and safety of everyone on the church’s property.
5
Appellant went to the church on July 18, August 22, and August 25, 2021.
Valencia’s conversation with Appellant on July 18 “was almost a replay” of their
exchange in September 2020. Valencia told Appellant that he was not allowed on
church property, in which Appellant retorted, “Isn’t this a church? . . . Aren’t people
welcome here?” Appellant believed that Murray was “supposed to be [his] wife.”
Valencia again convinced Appellant to leave without calling the police but sensed a
growing discomfort and danger during this interaction.
Appellant approached the church entrance on Sunday afternoon, August 22,
2021. He interrupted a women’s bible study group to inquire whether any pastors
were present. The group leader met him at the front door and sensed an unpleasant
tension from Appellant’s “cocky manner.” She informed him that all pastors had
left for the day, then locked the doors when Appellant walked away because she
“just didn’t get a good vibe.”
Appellant’s final unlawful visit to the church was three days later, on
Wednesday, August 25. Dr. Smee alerted the safety team when he saw Appellant
enter the crowded lobby before a service. Valencia, disappointed and frustrated with
Appellant, once again escorted him from the church and told him: “You can’t be
here. . . . [Y]ou’ve got to stay away from here. This is not good for you. This is not
good for [Murray]. This is not good for anyone here.” Their discussion was
“[b]asically the exact same thing”—Valencia recounted his concern:
I’m to the point where I worry about my safety, the safety of the people
around us, the safety of [Murray]. You know, you hear all kinds of
things that happen, you see things on TV, and that stuff plays in your
head, and you go, man, when is this gonna stop? . . . [I]t’s just reached
the point where . . . it’s got to stop.
....
[Appellant] persists and persists, and you just -- you have to draw a line
somewhere. . . . I just don’t want to see things escalate worse.

6
Appellant again conceded that he was not permitted on church premises. When he
was arrested that day, he had the engagement ring that he bought in 2016 while on
parole.
Based on Appellant’s unauthorized appearances at the church between
September 6, 2020, and August 25, 2021, and his phone call to the church in
July 2021, Appellant was indicted, for the second time, for stalking Murray. At trial,
he invoked his right to self-representation and proceeded pro se.4 The State
presented fifteen witnesses, three of whom Appellant recalled during his case-in-
chief, including Murray. Appellant then presented twelve additional witnesses
before testifying.
Murray testified that Appellant’s conduct has caused her “a lot of
psychological anguish,” that she feared he would kidnap, rape, kill, or hurt her or
her family, and she referred to specific instances of Appellant’s aggression. Murray
still “look[ed] over [her] shoulder all the time.” While questioning Murray,
Appellant implied that her perception of his aggression was irrational and incorrect.
Murray responded:
I still have a lot of fear of you. . . . I’ve asked you to leave me alone
more than once, repeatedly to your face, it may have been years ago,
but I did it multiple times, you haven’t listened to a word I’ve said.
Multiple church members and my family have told you the same thing,
and you haven’t listened to a word they’ve said.
Murray emphasized that Appellant continued writing and sending letters to her, the
content of which “remains the same that . . . God has given . . . [him] this dream”
that Murray was meant for him. He also sent letters to the church requesting that
they be forwarded to Murray. When Appellant suggested that his return to Victory

4
The trial court denied Appellant’s first request to proceed pro se. After Appellant reasserted his
right to self-representation on the second day of trial, the trial court, after thorough admonishments, granted
his request and permitted his court-appointed attorney to sit as standby counsel and assist Appellant, if
requested to do so. He is represented by a court-appointed attorney on appeal.

7
Life Church was unrelated to her, she reminded him that “[t]here’s many, many other
churches [he] could go to,” but he chose the one at which she was heavily involved.
Appellant then recalled Valencia, who restated that Appellant “never
relented.” Appellant attempted to characterize his version of events as “the Word of
God,” by comparing a parallel between his conduct and the biblical tale of divine
protection in “refus[ing] to bow down to the king.” 5
Appellant presented Stan Roberts, Dr. Smee’s predecessor, who was the lead
pastor of the church when the criminal trespass warning was issued. Roberts recalled
counseling Appellant “many times” to leave Murray alone, and he “had to get blunt
about it.” But, due to Appellant’s recalcitrance, Roberts staged an intervention by
gathering a group of men to dissuade Appellant from further pursuing Murray. Even
those efforts were futile. During a subsequent discussion, Appellant told Roberts
that: Murray “just doesn’t understand, [that he’s] got to get her by herself, [he’s] got
to get her away from all this to where it’s just [him] and her, and she can understand.”
At that point, Roberts “felt it was [his] responsibility to protect [Murray]” because
it “was getting scary.”
Roberts’s wife, Kathy Roberts, explained that the church supported the
issuance of the criminal trespass warning because Murray, who was a staff member
at the time, “was so adamant and actually fearful” of Appellant. After the criminal
trespass warning was issued, Roberts advised the safety team that Appellant was
barred from church property.
Appellant was the final witness during the guilt/innocence phase of trial, and
he did not dispute that he went to the church in violation of the protective order and
criminal trespass warning. He testified: “I am not refuting the fact that I went to the

5
The story is from Chapter 3 of the Book of Daniel: Three Israelites, Shadrach, Meshach, and
Abednego, were cast into a blazing furnace after they refused to bow to King Nebuchadnezzar’s golden
idol. Daniel 3:3-23. When the three men emerged miraculously unharmed, even the king proclaimed it as
evidence of divine deliverance. Daniel 3:24-29.
8
church that I wasn’t supposed to go to.” Appellant also acknowledged that he scared
Murray in the past. In a 2018 letter to Murray, he wrote that he “noticed fear on
[her] face” in 2008 when he followed her in a store, which, he claimed, was “why
[he] never went near [her]” again. He further testified that “[n]obody ever told [him]
what to do, except for God,” and he “always followed the law of love.” Appellant
fervently denied any wrongdoing throughout trial and maintained that “[n]o []
human authority ought in any case to interfere with matters of religion.” In addition
to rationalizing his behavior against Murray, he argued that Murray “was not [his]
overriding purpose or [his] main focus ever, ever. . . . [He] had already let it go.”
II. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence and Variance
Appellant asserts in his fourth issue that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support his stalking conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that his conduct was “directed specifically” at Murray. In his third issue, he
argues that there was a material variance between the indictment and the proof at
trial that rendered the evidence legally insufficient to support his stalking conviction.
In support of each issue, Appellant emphasizes that Murray was the victim alleged
in the indictment, whereas the evidence showed that his unlawful conduct was
perpetrated against the church.
A. Standards of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d

9
756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010).
In conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at
trial, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State,
393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at
899; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “We do not sit
as the thirteenth juror, and we do not substitute our judgment for that of the
factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Fraser v.
State, No. PD-0964-24, 2025 WL 2543457, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 3, 2025)
(citing Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023)). “[T]he jury
may use common sense, common knowledge, personal experience, and observations
from life when drawing inferences.” Id. (citing Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621,
625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). In this regard, we defer to the factfinder’s role as the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be
afforded. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235
S.W.3d at 778. Thus, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that
the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
The evidence need not directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial
evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the defendant’s guilt, and
circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State,
414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d
9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not point directly and independently
to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we treat direct and
10
circumstantial evidence equally, and we must consider the cumulative force of all
the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Isassi,
330 S.W.3d at 638; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
“We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the hypothetically-
correct jury charge, defined by the statutory elements as modified by the charging
instrument.” Edwards, 666 S.W.3d at 574 (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234,
240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The hypothetically-correct jury charge is one that
accurately states the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not increase the
State’s burden of proof, and adequately describes the offense with which the
defendant is charged.” Id. at 574–75. “When a Texas statute lists more than one
method of committing an offense or definition of an element of an offense, and the
indictment alleges some, but not all, of the statutorily listed methods or definitions,
the State is limited to the methods and definitions alleged.” Ramjattansingh v. State,
548 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
“A variance occurs when the proof at trial differs from the allegations in the
charging instrument.” Delarosa v. State, 677 S.W.3d 668, 680 (Tex. Crim. App.
2023) (citing Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). A
variance that prejudices a defendant’s substantial rights is deemed “material,” and
will render the evidence in support of the conviction insufficient. Ramjattansingh,
548 S.W.3d at 547. This occurs “when the indictment, as written, 1) fails to
adequately inform the defendant of the charge against him, or 2) subjects the
defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime.” Id. Variances
involving immaterial non-statutory allegations do not render the evidence legally
insufficient provided “they are not so great that the proof at trial ‘shows an entirely
different offense’ than what was alleged in the charging instrument.” Id. (quoting
Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).
11
B. Governing Law & Application
Section 42.072 requires proof that the defendant knowingly engaged in the
offending conduct “pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct that is directed
specifically at another person.” PENAL § 42.072(a)(1)(A). Thus, when evaluating
whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a stalking conviction, we “take
into account the unique elements of a stalking offense, a crime that depends upon
proof of a pattern of conduct.” Werner v. State, 412 S.W.3d 542, 549 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.46 (West Supp. 2025)
(“[F]acts and circumstances surrounding any existing or previous relationship
between the actor and the alleged victim” or a member of the victim’s family or
household are admissible to aid the factfinder in determining whether the
defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to experience fear.). Neither
direct contact with the victim nor an overt threat of violence is required. See, e.g.,
Hansen v. State, 224 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet.
ref’d) (A stalking scheme and course of conduct may include conduct that the victim
would regard as threatening bodily injury to a family member.); Hayes v. State,
No. 05-23-01291-CR, 2025 WL 2988740, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 23, 2025,
no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Whether a person’s course of
conduct amounts to stalking is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry. See, e.g., Sisk v.
State, 74 S.W.3d 893, 898–900 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (evidence
that appellant followed the victim in violation of a protective order was legally
sufficient to sustain a conviction for stalking, considering that “the relationship
between appellant and [the victim] was at times confusing, confrontational, and
tumultuous”). Even acts that are ostensibly lawful when considered in isolation may
amount to a course of conduct that constitutes stalking. See, e.g., Ploeger v. State,
189 S.W.3d 799, 808–09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (stalking
conviction was supported by legally sufficient evidence that the defendant
12
repeatedly sent flowers, letters, gifts, and cards to the victim, and called and went to
her mother’s place of business).
To sustain Appellant’s conviction, the evidence must have demonstrated
beyond a reasonable doubt that, on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same
scheme or course of conduct that was directed specifically at another person—in
this case, Murray—Appellant knowingly engaged in conduct that (1) he knew or
reasonably should have known that Murray would regard as threatening her with
bodily injury or death, (2) caused her to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death,
and (3) would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death. PENAL
§ 42.072(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (a)(3)(A); see Griswold v. State, 673 S.W.3d 423, 432
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.).
1. The Indictment: No Variance
We first observe that Appellant failed to identify a variance of any kind
between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. The proof at trial was
consistent with the indictment,6 which alleged that Appellant, on more than one

6
The indictment read:

[Appellant], hereinafter styled Defendant, . . . on more than one occasion:
Did then and there, and pursuant to the same scheme and course of conduct that was
directed specifically at Melissa Murray, hereafter styled the complainant, on or about the
6th day of September, 2020, knowingly engage in conduct that the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the complainant would regard as threatening bodily
injury or death to the complainant, namely going within 500 feet of Victory Life Church
or violating a criminal trespass warning, and the defendant’s conduct would cause a
reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death, and the defendant’s conduct caused the
complainant to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death.
Did then and there, and pursuant to the same scheme and course of conduct that was
directed specifically at Melissa Murray, hereafter styled the complainant, on or about the
1st day of July, 2021[,] knowingly engage in conduct that the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that the complainant would regard as threatening bodily injury or death
to the complainant, namely calling Victory Life Church or commenting regarding seeing
Melissa Murray wearing a wedding ring, and the defendant’s conduct would cause a
reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death, and the defendant’s conduct caused the
complainant to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death.

13
occasion and pursuant to the same scheme and course of conduct that was directed
specifically at Murray, knowingly engaged in conduct that Appellant knew or
reasonably should have known that Murray would regard as threatening her with
bodily injury or death, namely:
1. on or about September 6, 2020, going within 500 feet of Victory Life
Church or violating a criminal trespass warning;
2. on or about July 1, 2021, calling Victory Life Church or commenting about
seeing Murray wearing a wedding ring;
3. on or about July 18, 2021, violating a protective order, going within 500
feet of Victory Life Church, or violating a criminal trespass warning;
4. on or about August 22, 2021, calling Victory Life Church, violating a
protective order, going within 500 feet of Victory Life Church, or violating
a criminal trespass warning; and

....
Did then and there, and pursuant to the same scheme and course of conduct that was
directed specifically at Melissa Murray, hereafter styled the complainant, on or about the
18th day of July, 2021[,] knowingly engage in conduct that the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the complainant would regard as threatening bodily
injury or death to the complainant, namely violating a protective order, going within 500
feet of Victory Life Church or violating a criminal trespass warning, and the defendant’s
conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death, and the defendant’s
conduct caused the complainant to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death.
Did then and there, and pursuant to the same scheme and course of conduct that was
directed specifically at Melissa Murray, hereafter styled the complainant, on or about the
22nd day of August, 2021[,] knowingly engage in conduct that the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the complainant would regard as threatening bodily
injury or death to the complainant, namely calling Victory Life Church, violating a
protective order, going within 500 feet of Victory Life Church or violating a criminal
trespass warning, and the defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear
bodily injury or death, and the defendant’s conduct caused the complainant to be placed in
fear of bodily injury or death.
Did then and there, and pursuant to the same scheme and course of conduct that was
directed specifically at Melissa Murray, hereafter styled the complainant, on or about the
25th day of August, 2021, knowingly engage in conduct that the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the complainant would regard as threatening bodily
injury or death to the complainant, namely violating a protective order, going within 500
feet of Victory Life Church or violating a criminal trespass warning, and the defendant’s
conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death, and the defendant’s
conduct caused the complainant to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death.

14
5. on or about August 25, 2021, violating a protective order, going within 500
feet of Victory Life Church, or violating a criminal trespass warning.
Each paragraph further alleged that Appellant’s conduct would cause a reasonable
person to fear bodily injury or death and did cause Murray to be placed in fear of
bodily injury or death.
The undisputed evidence shows that Appellant repeatedly called and visited
the church between September 2020 and August 2021 with knowledge that such
conduct was prohibited. Although he conceded that his actions caused Murray to be
fearful, he nevertheless asserted that he was “just curious” when he called the church
to ask whether Murray was married, and that Murray “was not [his] overriding
purpose or [his] main focus” when he went to the church. Because the indictment
clearly articulated the precise acts for which Appellant was charged and tried, there
was no variance between the indictment and the proof at trial. See Holguin v. State,
No. 11-20-00143-CR, 2022 WL 1040935, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 7, 2022,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
2. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supports the Conviction
Appellant’s insufficiency contention rests on the sole premise that the conduct
alleged in the indictment was not “directed specifically” at Murray. Specifically,
Appellant submits that because the criminal trespass warning was designed to
protect the church, his violations were acts that were perpetrated against the church,
not Murray.
That the church is the property protected by the criminal trespass warning is
inconsequential, as Appellant was not indicted or tried for criminal trespass.
Repeatedly appearing at a victim’s place of employment or a location the victim is
known to frequent, especially if direct or indirect contact is prohibited by a court
order, can be sufficient to support a stalking conviction. Bevers v. Mabry, No. 05-
22-00713-CV, 2024 WL 469550, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 7, 2024, pet.

15
denied) (mem. op.); see also Ploeger, 189 S.W.3d at 808–09. Appellant’s
knowledge and intent are relevant considerations in determining whether his course
of conduct was directed at Murray. See Griswold, 673 S.W.3d at 432–33 (appellant
reasonably should have known that his decade-long barrage of letters, messages, and
contacts would cause the victim to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death); see
also Davidson v. State, No. 12-24-00360-CR, 2025 WL 2985037, at *9–11 (Tex.
App.—Tyler Oct. 22, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(there was sufficient evidence that appellant’s course of conduct was directed at the
victim, despite not having sent any communication directly to the victim). Further,
proof of Appellant’s culpable mental state invariably depends on circumstantial
evidence and may be inferred from any facts that tend to prove its existence,
including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d
45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); McGowan v. State, 375 S.W.3d 585, 591 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (citing Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
Importantly, it was Appellant’s obsession with Murray, which persisted until
his arrest in 2021, that prompted the issuance of the criminal trespass warning in
2008. While Murray was employed as a worship leader, she notified church
leadership that Appellant continuously bothered and pursued her even after she
ignored him, hid, and had her friends and family tell him to leave her alone. After
Appellant followed Murray in 2008, an associate pastor contacted the police to issue
the criminal trespass warning. Roberts and his wife Kathy testified that the church
requested the criminal trespass warning to support Murray because Appellant “[kept]
doing it, no matter what anybody said . . . showing up where [Murray] was at all
times when she asked [him] not to.”
Contrary to the warnings that he received, Appellant chose to return to the one
church where Murray had a longstanding and visible role. Particularly noteworthy
16
are the dates and times of Appellant’s trespasses in 2020 and 2021, which occurred
during worship services and a women’s bible study, when it was highly likely that
Murray would be present. In fact, she was present on at least two of those occasions.
Appellant knew that Murray had been an integral part of the church for nearly two
decades—as a member of the congregation since 2003, a full-time worship leader
for nine years, and a volunteer on the worship team through 2021. It was thus
reasonable for the jury to infer and conclude that Appellant’s appearances at the
church were calculated to coincide with Murray’s presence there. His continuous
attempts at unwanted contact with Murray, which Appellant facilitated by
trespassing onto church property, is evidence from which a rational juror could have
reasonably inferred and found that Appellant acted on each occasion pursuant to a
scheme or course of conduct that was directed specifically at Murray. See
McGowan, 375 S.W.3d at 590; see also Ploeger, 189 S.W.3d 808–09.
Furthermore, in the months preceding his arrest for the instant offense,
Appellant expressed to several people his intent to return to the church, and he
ultimately mentioned Murray in connection with that intent. Martin Venegas,
Appellant’s acquaintance, testified that Appellant expressed his intent to continue
pursuing a relationship with Murray, and he showed Venegas the engagement ring
that he intended to give Murray when he proposed. Venegas told him that it “didn’t
make sense” to put himself at risk “after all that time [and] after everything that [had]
happened.” But Appellant refused to “give up on his dream or what God had told
him.” He reasoned that “he [had] waited this long . . . had gone through all this
suffering, trouble . . . why give up now?” Appellant denied at trial that he purchased
the ring for Murray, and he claimed that he “may have been joking” when he told
Venegas that the ring was for Murray. However, Appellant admitted that he “may
have” contemplated giving it to Murray as another proposal.

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Despite his insistence that his fixation on Murray ended in early 2020,
Appellant explicitly stated to Valencia on at least two occasions that he trespassed
onto church property under divine direction because “the Lord told [him] that
[Murray was] supposed to be [his] wife.” During each encounter, including on
September 6, 2020, Appellant acknowledged that he was forbidden by law from
being near Murray or entering the church’s premises. Valencia “[didn’t] have a good
feeling” because it “[didn’t] feel safe for [Murray], or potentially for anyone else.”
Appellant’s decision to repeatedly violate the criminal trespass warning, the
protective order, and to ignore verbal directives from many, including Murray, to
leave her alone shows that his conduct was directed specifically at Murray rather
than the church. See McGowan, 375 S.W.3d at 591; Pomier v. State, 326 S.W.3d
373, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
Considering “the combined and cumulative force of all admitted evidence and
[the] reasonable inferences therefrom,” a rational juror could have reasonably found
that, in Appellant’s mind, Murray and the church were effectively indistinguishable.
See Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Appellant’s
conduct in repeatedly calling the church and inquiring about Murray, and trespassing
onto the church’s premises when Murray would likely be there, was part of a
common scheme or course of conduct that was directed specifically at Murray.
Accordingly, we conclude that there was no variance between the charging
instrument and the proof adduced at trial, and that the evidence is legally sufficient
to sustain Appellant’s conviction for stalking.
We overrule Appellant’s third and fourth issues.
III. Charge Error
Appellant asserts in his first issue that the trial court’s charge permitted a less
than unanimous verdict because the manner and means alleged were “not necessarily
directed specifically at [Murray].” In his second issue, he again raises a general
18
complaint that the indictment and the charge failed to properly state that Appellant’s
conduct “had to be specifically directed at Murray.”
A. Standard of Review
Reviewing complaints of charge error is a two-step process. Campbell v.
State, 664 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d
738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). First, we must determine whether error
exists. Id. If there is none, our analysis ends. See id.; Loza v. State, 659 S.W.3d
491, 497 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.) (citing Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d
645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). Second, if there is error, we must decide whether
the appellant was harmed and if the harm is sufficient to require reversal. Cyr v.
State, 665 S.W.3d 551, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Wooten v. State, 400
S.W.3d 601, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)); Ybarra v. State, 621 S.W.3d 371, 384
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). The applicable standard of review to be
utilized for charge error depends on whether the claimed error was
preserved. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
The purpose of the trial court’s charge “is to inform the jury of the applicable
law and guide them in its application to the case.” Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d
244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996)). Charge error stems from the denial of a defendant’s right to have
the trial court provide the jury with instructions that correctly set forth the “law
applicable to the case.” Bell v. State, 635 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021) (quoting CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14 (West 2007)). Because the trial court is
obligated to correctly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, it is
ultimately responsible for the accuracy of its charge and the accompanying
instructions. Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018) (citing Delgado, 235 S.W.3d at 249). Therefore, when the charge is

19
inaccurate, the trial court errs, and the error is subject to the appropriate harm
analysis. See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645.
B. Jury Unanimity and the Trial Court’s Charge
In our analysis, we first consider whether the charge’s application paragraph
violated the unanimity requirement. See Baker v. State, No. 01-19-00694-CR, 2021
WL 785336, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 2, 2021, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication). The application paragraph provided in
relevant part:
You must determine whether the state has proved, beyond a reasonable
doubt, four elements. The elements are that—
1. [Appellant], in Brown County, on more than one occasion
knowingly engaged in conduct, specifically
a. on or about the 6th day of September, 2020, going within 500
feet of Victory Life Church or violating a criminal trespass
warning;
b. on or about the 1st day of July, 2021, calling Victory Life Church
or commenting regarding seeing [Murray] wearing a wedding
ring;
c. on or about the 18th day of July, 2021, violating a protective
order, going within 500 feet of Victory Life Church, or violating
a criminal trespass warning;
d. on or about the 22nd day of August, 2021, calling Victory Life
Church, violating a protective order, going within 500 feet of
Victory Life Church, or violating a criminal trespass warning;
e. on or about the 25th day of August, 2021, violating a protective
order, going within 500 feet of Victory Life Church, or violating
a criminal trespass warning.
2. the conduct was pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct;
3. the scheme or course of conduct was directed specifically at
[Murray], another person; and
4. the conduct on each occasion—

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a. was conduct the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that [Murray] would regard as threatening bodily injury
or death upon [Murray];
b. was conduct that did cause [Murray] to be in fear of bodily injury
or death upon [her]; and
c. was conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily
injury or death upon [Murray].
You must all agree on elements 1 through 4 listed above.
You need not all agree on whether the [S]tate has proved 1.a, 1.b, 1.c,
1.d, or 1.e, but you must all agree that the [S]tate has proved [that
Appellant] engaged in conduct meeting the descriptions on more than
one occasion during the specified period.
Texas law requires that a jury reach a unanimous verdict about the specific
crime with which the defendant has been charged and committed. TEX. CONST.
art. V, § 13; Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (citing Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
Allowing a jury to choose from several separate acts, each of which is a violation of
a specific statute, without requiring the jury to agree on which specific act was
committed by the defendant, violates the unanimity requirement. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d
at 747–48. However, the unanimity requirement is not violated when the jury is
instructed on alternative theories of committing the same offense, as opposed to
instructing the jury on two separate offenses that involve separate
incidents. Martinez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Thus,
“[i]f an indictment alleges differing means of committing an offense, a trial court
does not err by charging the jury in the disjunctive.” Jones v. State, 184 S.W.3d 915,
922 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (citing Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d
256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
“[I]t has long been the general rule that when a single crime can be committed
in various ways, jurors need not agree upon the mode of commission.” Francis v.
State, 36 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When, as here, the factfinder
21
returns a general guilty verdict based on an indictment that charged alternative
theories of committing the same offense, the verdict stands if the evidence supports
any of the theories charged. Kitchens, 823 S.W.2d at 258.
As discussed, the State alleged and presented five different ways in which
Appellant committed the offense of stalking between September 2020 and August
2021. See Floyd v. State, 714 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Baker v. State,
No. 01-19-00694-CR, 2021 WL 785336, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Mar. 2, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The State was
permitted to plead alternative manners and means of committing this offense. See
Floyd, 714 S.W.3d at 15; Hayes, 2025 WL 2988740, at *5. Because the offense
could be committed in various ways, it was not necessary for the jurors to
unanimously agree upon the mode of commission; as such, it was appropriate for the
jury to return a general verdict. Lafaitt v. State, No. 12-18-00351-CR, 2020
WL 827136, at *7 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); see also Alfaro v. State, No. 14-18-00923-CR, 2020
WL 548219, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 4, 2020, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (it is not necessary that the jurors agree on the
same incidents of stalking and “[i]t is a correct statement of the law that the jury
need not unanimously agree on alternate modes or means of committing an
offense”). Having determined that the evidence is legally sufficient to support
Appellant’s conviction under all five incidents as alleged in the indictment, the
unanimity requirement is satisfied in this case. See Lafaitt, 2020 WL 827136, at *7.
We therefore conclude that there was no charge error, as Appellant suggests.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.

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C. No Other Charge Error
In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the charge “allowed [the] jurors to
base a decision of guilt on conduct against a third party 7 not named in the actual
indictment.” But as we have said, the charge required that Appellant’s conduct be
specifically directed at Murray. Accordingly, and for the same reasons that we have
overruled Appellant’s first issue, we overrule his second issue.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

December 18, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

7
The third party to which Appellant refers is the church.
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