Rufino Palma Flores and Jose Luis Arellano Quinones v. Red Arrow Company, LLC; Garmuz, LLC; Jesus Garcia Munoz: And Sindy Almendares

Opinion filed December 11, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00289-CV
__________

RUFINO PALMA FLORES AND JOSE LUIS ARELLANO
QUINONES, Appellants
V.
RED ARROW COMPANY, LLC; GARMUZ, LLC; JESUS
GARCIA MUNOZ; AND SINDY ALMENDARES, Appellees

On Appeal from the 358th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-23-02-0202-CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants, Rufino Palma Flores and Jose Luis Arellano Quinones,
proceeding pro se, appeal the summary judgments rendered by the trial court. Flores
raises one issue on appeal. Quinones raises two issues. We affirm.
Background Facts
Appellees, Red Arrow Company, LLC (Red Arrow), Garmuz, LLC (Garmuz),
Jesus Garcia Munoz (Garcia), and Sindy Almendares, individually, brought suit
against Flores and Quinones in February 2023. In their original petition, Appellees
alleged causes of action for breach of contract, common law fraud, interference with
a contractual relationship, civil conspiracy, and defamation. Appellees sought
monetary damages, a declaratory judgment, a temporary restraining order, and an
injunction against Flores and Quinones.
Appellees alleged that the events giving rise to the underlying dispute
occurred after Garcia, as manager of Garmuz, entered into a business agreement with
Flores to purchase Red Arrow. Appellees further alleged that, after the purchase
was complete, Flores interfered with Red Arrow’s operations in many ways,
including by attempting to remove Garcia from the Secretary of State’s business
listing; contacting the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and suspending
necessary registration numbers for Red Arrow’s vehicles; and sending disparaging
communications to Red Arrow’s employees, Red Arrow’s clients, and third parties.
As a result, Red Arrow’s largest client cancelled its agreement with Red Arrow.
Appellees also alleged that Flores and Quinones made misrepresentations to drivers,
clients, and customers of both Red Arrow and Garmuz, and that they sent harassing
text messages and e-mails containing vulgar content and threats to Appellees and
Appellees’ employees.
Appellees filed a traditional motion for summary judgment in October 2023.
The trial court scheduled the hearing on the motion for November 17, 2023. At the
outset of the hearing, Appellees’ attorney announced that Appellees had reached an
agreement with Flores. Appellees’ attorney presented the trial court with an Agreed
Interlocutory Summary Judgment signed by Flores and Appellees’ attorney.
Appellees’ attorney discussed the Agreed Interlocutory Summary Judgment with
2
Flores on the record. Flores stated that he understood that Appellees’ attorney was
not his attorney, that he had not been made to sign the judgment through any
unlawful threats, and that he was not operating under duress or otherwise
incapacitated. Flores agreed that he had seen everything in the document and that
the document bore his signature. Flores further stated that he understood that the
agreement resolved all matters between himself and Appellees, and that the
agreement made clear he did not own Red Arrow and prohibited him from interfering
in the business or contacting Appellees.
The trial court then accepted the Agreed Interlocutory Summary Judgment
and, after again confirming Flores’s signature, asked Flores, “And you understand
this resolves all the cases between you and the plaintiff[s]; do you understand that?”
Flores responded in the affirmative to the trial court’s inquiry. The trial court then
remarked, “Very well. Sir, your case is now resolved.” The trial court signed the
Agreed Interlocutory Summary Judgment pertaining to Flores on that day at the
hearing.
The trial court then considered the motion for summary judgment as it related
to claims pending against Quinones. After a brief recess, Appellees’ attorney
announced that Appellees had also reached an agreement with Quinones. On the
record, Appellees’ attorney confirmed that Quinones had seen the Agreed Final
Summary Judgment and that he had signed it. When asked whether he understood
that the document made clear he was not an owner of Red Arrow and prohibited
certain acts by him, Quinones responded that he did. Quinones agreed that
Appellees’ attorney had not threatened him in any way. Appellees’ attorney then
sought to confirm Quinones’s capacity to sign, asking, “So -- but you’re not -- you
don’t have a mental incapacity or you’re not declared incompetent or anything, are
you?” Quinones responded, “No. Only thing, I’m on medicine on [sic], that is the
only thing I got.” Appellees’ counsel examined Quninoes on his response, asking,
3
“Is that affecting your ability to sign? Do you believe you could still sign?”
Quinones responded, “I believe I can still sign it” and he signed the Agreed Final
Summary Judgment at that time.
The trial court confirmed that the signature was Quinones’s signature. At that
time, the trial court stated, “Very well. I am going to go ahead and sign this and date
it today, 11/17/23. Gentlemen, I believe that resolves all matters in this case; is that
correct?” Appellees’ attorney answered in the affirmative, while Quinones did not
respond.
The Agreed Interlocutory Summary Judgment only applied to Flores.
However, its terms were essentially incorporated into the Agreed Final Summary
Judgment so that it applied to Flores and Quinones. Both judgments made clear that
Garmuz is the sole owner of Red Arrow and that Flores and Quinones have no
ownership rights or interest in Red Arrow or any of its property or claims. The
judgments also enjoined Flores and Quinones from, among other things, contacting
Appellees, representing any interest in Red Arrow, or otherwise interfering in
Appellees’ business operations.
Analysis
In Flores’s sole issue and Quinones’s first issue, they both contend that the
trial court “abuse[d] its discretion when it rendered judgment by agreement despite
lacking the power to do so.” In his second issue, Quinones contends that the Agreed
Final Summary Judgment is void as to him because he was “incapacitated” when he
signed the judgment.
On some level Flores and Quinones are asserting in their first issue a lack of
consent to the agreed judgment. For a valid consent judgment to exist, it is not
sufficient that the parties may have at some time consented; the parties must
explicitly and unmistakably give consent, and their consent must exist at the very
moment the trial court undertakes to make the agreement the judgment of the trial
4
court at rendition. Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. 1984). A party has
the right to revoke his consent at any time before the trial court renders judgment.
Samples Exterminators v. Samples, 640 S.W.2d 873, 874–75 (Tex. 1982). “The
proper inquiry is whether the information in the trial court’s possession is clearly
sufficient and of such a nature as to put the court on notice that a party’s consent is
lacking and to require the court to make further inquiry before rendering judgment.”
Sohocki v. Sohocki, 897 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
1995, no writ). “When a consent judgment is rendered without consent or is not in
strict compliance with the terms of the agreement, the judgment must be set aside.”
Chisholm v. Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. 2006) (citing Burnaman v. Heaton,
240 S.W.2d 288, 291–92 (Tex. 1951)).
“Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision
in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk.” S & A Rest. Corp. v.
Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995) (first citing Samples, 640 S.W.2d at 875; and
then citing Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1970)). Flores
contends that the trial court, in stating, “Very well. Sir, your case is now resolved,”
did not clearly indicate an intent to render judgment as to the Agreed Interlocutory
Summary Judgment. Quinones similarly contends that the trial court, in stating, “I
am going to go ahead and sign this and date it today. . . . I believe that resolves all
matters in this case,” did not clearly indicate an intent to render judgment as to the
Agreed Final Summary Judgment.
Unlike in Leal, the trial court’s statements in this case do not indicate an intent
to render judgment at a time in the future rather than during the hearing. Id. at 858.
Further, the trial court went beyond merely making these statements; the trial court
signed and dated both the Agreed Interlocutory Summary Judgment and the Agreed
Final Summary Judgment on the day of the hearing. The trial court further stated on
the record, as to the Agreed Final Summary Judgment, “I am going to go ahead and
5
sign this and date it today, 11/17/23.” The Agreed Interlocutory Summary Judgment
and the Agreed Final Summary Judgment both state that, “the Court . . . renders the
following judgment.” We conclude that the trial court’s statements, when combined
with the trial court’s prompt signing and dating of both documents, clearly indicated
an intent to render judgment on the date of the hearing. And at no time prior to the
trial court’s rendition of judgment did either Flores or Quinones withdraw their
consent to the agreed judgment.
Flores and Quinones additionally contend that the trial court lacked power to
render an agreed judgment because an “essential feature” was missing from the
judgment. “To constitute an enforceable agreement for judgment, there should be
left nothing for adjustment between the parties relating to the subject-matter of the
agreement.” Wyss v. Bookman, 235 S.W. 567, 569 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921,
holding approved, judgm’t adopted). 1 Where “one essential feature” is left
undecided or not embodied in the judgment, then the negotiations of the parties never
reached the “final stage of meeting of minds upon all matters,” which is necessary
before an agreed judgment can be rendered. Id. A term in an agreement may be
seen as “essential” where neither party is willing to agree to the other’s proposed
judgment that differs as to that term. See Reppert v. Beasley, 943 S.W.2d 172, 174
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ).
Flores and Quinones assert that the “essential feature” left undecided by the
agreement was whether the judgment would be self-enforcing through the trial
court’s contempt power or enforceable only through a breach-of-contract action.
They both assert that they did not consent to a self-enforcing judgment. As set forth
below, Flores and Quinones are incorrect in making this assertion.

1
Flores and Quinones cite Wyss and Matthews v. Looney, 123 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. 1939) in
support of their argument.
6
In Reppert, the parties disagreed as to whether an agreed judgment would be
self-enforcing through the trial court’s contempt power or enforceable only through
a breach-of-contract action. Id. at 173. The Fourth Court of Appeals determined
that the manner in which the agreed judgment would be enforced was “essential” to
the parties because one party refused to agree to a judgment that was not self-
enforcing while the other party refused to agree to one that was. Id. at 174. Because
this essential element was left undecided by the agreement, the trial court was
without power to render judgment as to the agreement. Id.
Reppert is distinguishable from the facts in this appeal. In Reppert, the
parties’ disagreement occurred prior to the entry of judgment. Id. But in the present
case, the parties agreed to the express terms of the final judgment signed by the trial
court as evidenced by both their oral responses to the trial court and their signatures
on the judgments. See Gregory v. White, 604 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (finding consent where “the evidence conclusively
establishes that the appellant signed the settlement agreement and that the judge had
no reason to know of any dissatisfaction that the appellant might have had with the
agreement at the time the interlocutory judgment was rendered”); see also Arriaga v.
Cavazos, 880 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ) (per
curiam) (finding consent where the trial court questioned the appellants about their
understanding of the arrangement, appellants did not express any disagreement with
the settlement, and the agreement was made in open court).
Both the Agreed Interlocutory Summary Judgment and the Agreed Final
Summary Judgment provided for a permanent injunction against Flores and
Quinones, which enjoined them from eighteen enumerated acts. Thus, Flores and
Quinones expressly agreed to the entry of a judgment that provided for a permanent
injunction against them. Under Rule 692 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
proceedings for the violation of an injunction are in the nature of a contempt
7
proceeding. TEX. R. CIV. P. 692 (“Disobedience of an injunction may be punished
by the court . . . as a contempt.”); see Grimes v. Brown Cnty., No. 11-06-00247-CV,
2008 WL 1723192, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 10, 2008, no pet.). By agreeing
to the entry of a permanent injunction, Flores and Quinones agreed to the
enforcement mechanism for the agreed judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 692.
We further note that a party cannot appeal from a judgment to which he has
agreed absent an allegation of fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation. See Baw v.
Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ) (citing Gillum v.
Republic Health Corp., 778 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ));
see also Dunman v. Hartwell, 9 Tex. 495, 496 (1853) (“The appellants are concluded
by their own consent, and their appeal cannot be sustained.”). A party’s consent to
the trial court’s entry of judgment waives any error in the judgment except for
jurisdictional error, so that party has nothing to properly present for appellate review.
Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 766 (citing Gillum, 778 S.W.2d at 562). However, for a waiver
to be valid, each party must explicitly and unmistakably consent to the judgment.
Id. (first citing First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied); and then citing Bexar Cnty. Crim. Dist.
Attorney’s Off. v. Mayo, 773 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no
writ)). Here, Flores and Quinones consented to the judgment at the time of its entry
by the trial court.
The trial court did not err in rendering the judgment because Flores and
Quinones consented to the judgment. Further, they agreed to the terms of the
judgment. We overrule Flores’s sole issue and Quinones’s first issue.
Quinones asserts in his second issue that the trial court abused its discretion
by rendering judgment while he lacked the mental capacity to consent because he
was under the influence of prescription medication.

8
“Documents executed by one who lacks sufficient . . . mental capacity may be
avoided.” Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tex. 2017) (citing In re Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 182, 193 (Tex. 2009)). The law presumes that every
party to a legal contract had sufficient mental capacity to understand his legal rights.
See Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 94 (Tex. 2021) (citing Swink v. City of
Dallas, 36 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1931, holdings approved)). A
person has the mental capacity to contract if, at the time of contracting, he
“appreciated the effect of what [he] was doing and understood the nature and
consequences of [his] acts and the business [he] was transacting.” Estate of Riefler,
540 S.W.3d 626, 636 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, no pet.) (quoting Mandell &
Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. 1969)). The question of whether a
person, at the time of contracting, knows or understands the nature and consequences
of his actions is generally a question of fact for the factfinder. Id. (citing Fox v.
Lewis, 344 S.W.2d 731, 739 (Tex. App.—Austin 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). In this
instance, the trial court was the factfinder and was the sole judge of the credibility
of the witnesses. See George Joseph Assets, LLC v. Chenevert, 557 S.W.3d 755,
765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
At the hearing, Appellees’ attorney asked about Quinones’s capacity to sign
the Agreed Final Summary Judgment. Quinones responded that he did not have “a
mental incapacity,” but he stated that he was on medication. Quinones did not state
that the medication affected his mental capacity. Instead, when asked if it was
affecting his ability to sign, he stated, “I believe I can still sign it,” and subsequently
signed the Agreed Final Summary Judgment.
The trial court was the sole judge of Quinones’s capacity to agree to the terms
of the agreed judgment. See id. “In assessing the evidence, we do not act as a
factfinder; we may not pass on the credibility of the witnesses or substitute our
judgment for that of the factfinder.” Chenevert, 557 S.W.3d at 765. Here, the record
9
does not establish that the trial court’s implicit determination that Quinones
possessed the requisite capacity was error. We overrule Quinones’s second issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

December 11, 2025

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

10