Ex Parte Frederick Lamonn Hunter v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed March 20, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-24-00270-CR

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EX PARTE FREDERICK LAMONN HUNTER

On Appeal from the 42nd District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 52012-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s
pretrial writ of habeas corpus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 31. In his writ application,
Appellant, Frederick Lamonn Hunter, sought (1) a bail reduction for his charged
offenses claiming that the amount set was excessive, or, alternatively, (2) to be
released on his own recognizance. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On May 7, 2024, Appellant was arrested for the offense of murder; bail for
this offense was set at $200,000. Appellant was subsequently indicted on August 1,
2024, for the offenses of felony murder by the delivery of a controlled substance that
caused the death of Joanna Nicole Bryant (Count One) and the delivery of fentanyl
that caused Bryant’s death (Count Two). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3)
(West Supp. 2024); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.1022, 481.1123,
481.141 (West Supp. 2024).
Appellant filed his writ application on September 3, 2024. In addition to
challenging the bail set by the magistrate, Appellant contended that he was entitled
to a bond that he could afford to make, or, alternatively, to be released from pretrial
confinement on his own recognizance, because the State was not ready for
trial within ninety days of his arrest or detention. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 17.151, § 1(1) (West 2022). The trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s
writ application on October 4, 2024. After considering the evidence presented, the
trial court denied Appellant’s application. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
A. The Factors for Setting Bail
We review the trial court’s ruling on a request to reduce bail under an abuse
of discretion standard. See Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013); Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981);
see also CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15 (giving trial courts the discretion to set the amount
of bail). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court “acts ‘arbitrarily or
unreasonably’ or ‘without reference to any guiding rules and principles.’” State v.

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Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Montgomery v. State,
810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
Article 17.15(a) provides that the amount of bail, and any conditions of bail,
shall be regulated by the judicial officer who sets the bail and be governed by the
Constitution and, in part, the following considerations:
1. The bail, and any conditions of bail, shall be sufficiently high to give
reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.
2. The power to require bail is not to be used as to make it an instrument of
oppression.
3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was
committed.
4. The ability to make bail, and proof may be taken upon this point.
5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community.
6. The defendant’s criminal history, including acts of family violence and
other pending criminal charges.
CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15(a). While a defendant’s ability to make bail is only one of
several factors to be considered by the judicial officer in its bail determination, this
factor alone does not dictate the bail that is appropriate and will not automatically
render the amount that is set as excessive. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849–50; Ex parte
Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Ex parte
Branch, 553 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
In addition to the guidelines listed in Article 17.15(a) above, other factors may
also be considered in setting the amount of bail: (1) the possible punishment to be
imposed and any aggravating factors associated with the charged offense(s); (2) the
accused’s work record; (3) his family and community ties; (4) the length of his
residency in the community; (5) his citizenship; (6) his prior criminal record; (7) his
compliance with prior bond conditions; and (8) the existence of any outstanding

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bonds. Ex parte Melartin, 464 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, no pet.); Clemons v. State, 220 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007,
no pet.); see also Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d at 317; Ex
parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The accused has the
burden to prove that the bail amount is excessive. Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d at 479.
In his writ application, Appellant requested relief on two grounds: (1) a
reduction of the “excessive” bail that was set upon his arrest, or (2) his immediate
release from pretrial detention because the State, he contends, was not ready for trial
within the ninety-day deadline prescribed by Article 17.151, Section 1(1). As to
Appellant’s first point, we recognize that the “complete record” must show that the
trial court considered the required “public safety report” before it ruled on
Appellant’s bail reduction request. See CRIM. PROC. arts. 17.15(a)(6), 17.022(a),
(d)(1) (the magistrate must consider the “public safety report” before setting bail);
see also Ex parte Gayosso, 685 S.W.3d 100, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). In this
case, Appellant did not assert in his writ application that the trial court failed to do
so, nor did he present this argument to the trial court for a determination either during
his writ application hearing or in a post-hearing filing. Moreover, Appellant has not
raised a complaint on appeal that the trial court erred in this regard or that he was
harmed by the trial court’s inaction. As such, because Appellant has never
complained—in the trial court or on appeal—that the trial court failed to consider
the “public safety report” in its bail determination, we conclude that Appellant has
waived this issue, and we need not address it. See Ex parte Segovia, 690 S.W.3d
771, 776 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2024, no pet.) (the issue of the trial court’s failure
to consider the “public safety report” was not preserved for appellate review because
the appellant failed to raise it before the trial court); Ex parte Chavez, No. 02-24-

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00025-CR, 2024 WL 1207302, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 21, 2024, no
pet.) (same).
Here, Appellant only complains on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his request for an Article 17.151, Section 1(1) release.
Therefore, we will limit our review to this complaint.1
B. Article 17.151
As with the trial court’s bail determination, we review the trial court’s
decision to deny a habeas applicant’s complaint that the State violated the
Article 17.151 readiness requirement for an abuse of discretion. Gill, 413 S.W.3d at
431; Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 71, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision and we will not
disturb its decision if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Johnson v.
State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d
317, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Clemons, 220 S.W.3d at 178. The trial court does
not abuse its discretion if it decides a matter within its discretion differently than the
appellate court would under similar circumstances. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at
380.

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Nevertheless, we note that in situations such as this, reviewing courts have compared bail amounts
set in cases that involved offenses within the same range of punishment. For instance, in cases where the
accused was charged with the offense of murder, we and several of our sister courts have upheld bail
amounts that were substantially higher than the bail set in the case before us. See, e.g., Ex parte Barrera,
No. 11-21-00131-CR, 2021 WL 5934626, at *1, *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 16, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) ($1,000,000); Ex parte Garner, No. 10-18-00129-CR, 2018 WL
3469834, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco July 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
($1,000,000); Ex parte Green, No. 02-13-00474-CR, 2014 WL 584960, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb.
13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ($1,000,000); Ex parte Garcia, No. 09-06-
00543-CR, 2007 WL 846571, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 21, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) ($950,000).

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When a defendant accused of a felony offense is detained pending trial for
such accusation, and the State is not ready for trial within ninety days from the date
the defendant’s detention commenced, the trial court must release the defendant on
a personal recognizance bond or reduce the defendant’s bail to an amount that he
can afford to make. CRIM. PROC. art. 17.151, § 1(1); Ex parte Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d
923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Gill, 413 S.W.3d at 430. If a defendant raises an
Article 17.151 complaint that the State was not ready for trial within the requisite
statutory time period, as Appellant has here, the State must then make a prima facie
showing that it was ready for trial within the time prescribed by Article 17.151.
Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In a felony context,
the State may do so by either announcing that it is ready for trial within the ninety-
day window, or retrospectively announcing that it was ready for trial within the same
timeframe. Id.; Ex parte Ragston, 422 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Ex parte Brosky, 863 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1993, no pet.). The State may satisfy its initial burden if it “in good faith” announces,
as it did in this case, that it is or was ready for trial in compliance with Article 17.151.
See Behrend v. State, 729 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
If the State makes a prima facie showing of readiness for trial, the defendant
must rebut it. Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1979); Brosky, 863 S.W.2d at 778; Carter v. State, 664 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex.
App.—Waco 1983, no pet.). Evidence with which to rebut the State’s prima facie
showing of readiness may be derived from any source. Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 718;
Barfield, 586 S.W.2d at 542. In this regard, there is no definitive rule as to the
amount or type of evidence that the State must have available to it to be considered
“ready for trial.” Behrend, 729 S.W.2d at 719; Brosky, 863 S.W.2d at 779.
Agent Jerimiah Torrez of the Abilene Police Department testified at the writ
hearing that the evidence his department accumulated during their investigation of
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the charged offenses was forwarded to the Taylor County District Attorney’s office
in early May 2024; however, the autopsy report prepared and signed by Dr. Luisa
Flores on February 3, 2023 (which also contained Bryant’s blood toxicology results)
and referenced in the police report, was not included in those materials. The medical
certification of cause of death signed by the medical examiner stated that Bryant’s
cause of death was a fentanyl overdose; Dr. Flores’s autopsy report stated the same
finding and that two containers of Bryant’s blood were submitted for toxicology
analysis. According to Agent Torrez, his department subsequently sent the autopsy
report to the district attorney’s office after it was determined that the report had not
yet been disclosed to Appellant’s trial counsel.
Appellant complains that the State was not ready for trial within the ninety-
day period mandated by Article 17.151, Section 1(1) because the “evidence” that
was necessary and vital to the State’s ability to establish his guilt of the charged
offenses and Bryant’s cause of death—namely, Dr. Flores’s autopsy report and
accompanying blood toxicology results—was not in the State’s possession within
the statutory ninety-day window. We disagree. It is undisputed that the Abilene
Police Department possessed this “evidence” within the applicable statutory
timeframe. Because evidence in the possession of the State also includes evidence
that is in the possession of a law enforcement agency that is involved in the
investigation of the charged offense(s), see State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 693
(Tex. Crim. App. 2024), the State in this case possessed the “evidence” of which
Appellant complains within the deadline set forth by Article 17.151, Section 1(1).
Agent Torrez and the prosecutor prepared the probable cause statement and
warrant on May 1, 2024. In doing so, they reviewed and relied on the findings in
the medical examiner’s certification and Dr. Flores’s autopsy report. Indeed, the
probable cause statement, which could not have been sufficiently drafted without the
benefit of the autopsy report and the blood toxicology results, detailed Dr. Flores’s
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autopsy findings that Bryant’s death was caused by a fentanyl overdose. Further,
the medical examiner’s certification of cause of death (which recites the autopsy
results as found by the medical examiner), the death certificate, and the autopsy
report were filed with the Taylor County justice court on February 8, 2023, and
became public records upon their filing. In this instance, there was an inadvertent
oversight by the State, and nothing more, when it initially failed to disclose the
autopsy report to Appellant’s trial counsel, an oversight that was subsequently cured.
Despite this, we note that the State’s disclosure obligations under Article 39.14 do
not affect its readiness-for-trial requirement under Article 17.151. See CRIM. PROC.
arts. 17.151, 39.14 (West Supp. 2024); Ex parte Highsmith, 652 S.W.3d 850, 857
(Tex. App.—Austin 2022, pet. ref’d).
Moreover, even if we assume that the State did not have a copy of the autopsy
report in its possession before the ninety-day window expired, as Appellant
contends, the absence of this report would not prevent the State from being “ready
for trial.” “It is not unusual for litigants to have to go to trial without every witness
or every piece of evidence that they would like to present.” Ex parte Anderson,
No. 01-20-00572-CR, 2021 WL 499080, at *21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Feb. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Ex parte
Jackson, No. 03-17-00301-CR, 2018 WL 1598919, at *2–5 (Tex. App.—Austin
Apr. 3, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). Here, as in all
cases, the State could simply present the testimony of Dr. Flores and the medical
examiner to establish a causal link between Appellant’s conduct and Bryant’s death.
The availability of their reports would not be required to clear this threshold, and the
State’s failure to physically possess these reports would not negate the State’s
readiness-for-trial obligation under Article 17.151.
Giving appropriate deference, as we must, to the trial court’s decision that the
State complied with its readiness-for-trial obligation, and viewing the facts in the
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light most favorable to its ruling, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Appellant’s pretrial writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly,
we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

March 20, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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