Alexander J. Klein v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued May 12, 2026.

In the

Court of Appeals
for the

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-23-00717-CR
———————————
ALEXANDER J. KLEIN, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 185th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1682713

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Alexander J. Klein was indicted for the offense of capital murder. See TEX.

PENAL CODE § 19.03. Appellant pled guilty to the lesser charge of murder and was

sentenced to life with parole. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court

(1) erred in failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law following its
denial of appellant’s motion to suppress his custodial statement and (2) abused its

discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Appellant concedes that his first issue

has been mooted by the trial court’s issuance of findings of fact and conclusions of

law after appellant filed his appellate brief. Further, we conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellant’s waiver of his rights and

custodial statement were knowing and voluntary and, on that basis, denying

appellant’s motion to suppress.

Background

On July 17, 2020, police took appellant into custody in connection with the

April 14, 2020 murder of Jonathan Carmona. Later that day, appellant gave a

videotaped custodial statement. Appellant was 19 years old at the time.

On October 7, 2020, appellant was indicted in Harris County for the capital

murder of Carmona. The indictment alleged that appellant “did then and there

unlawfully, while in the course of committing and attempting to commit the

robbery of Jonathan Carmona, intentionally cause the death of Jonathan Carmona

by shooting Jonathan Carmona with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm.”

On September 28, 2023, appellant moved to suppress his custodial

statement, claiming that appellant did not make the statement freely and

voluntarily. At an October 3, 2023 hearing, the trial court denied the motion. At the

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same hearing, immediately following the denial of his motion to suppress,

appellant pled guilty to the first-degree felony offense of murder, and the trial court

sentenced him to life in prison. The trial court certified his right to appeal the

denial of his motion to suppress, and appellant timely filed his notice of appeal.

Custodial Statement

In his second point of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress his April 17, 2020 custodial

statement. Appellant claims that he did not make the statement freely and

voluntarily because, at the time he waived his rights and gave the statement, he

was under the “amnesia-inducing” influence of approximately 3 milligrams of

Xanax and 60 milligrams of Adderall that he had ingested before being taken into

custody. Appellant asserts that, during his police interview, the Xanax and

Adderall “rendered him in a ‘blacked out’ state of mind.” More specifically, he

claims that “the Xanax made him black out and the Adderall, which helps with

focus, made him look ‘sharp,’ or coherent.” Appellant asserts that he has no

memory of any part of his police interview, including being read his rights under

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or waiving those rights.1

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Appellant argues on appeal that his age at the time he was taken into custody
should also be taken into consideration in assessing the voluntariness of his
confession, which he argues we must assess under the totality of the
circumstances. However, while appellant testified to his age at the hearing on his
motion to suppress, nothing in appellant’s written motion or his arguments at the
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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a

bifurcated standard of review. Ferguson v. State, No. 01-23-00557-CR, 2025 WL

1298259, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (citing Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147,

150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an

abuse of discretion and review de novo its application of the law to the facts. Id.

(citing Turrubiate, 399 S.W.3d at 150). At a suppression hearing, the trial court is

the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witness’s credibility and may

choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of the witness’s testimony. Id. (citing

Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). If the trial court

makes express findings of fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable

to the trial court’s ruling and determine whether the evidence supports the fact

hearing would have placed the trial court on notice that appellant was challenging
the voluntariness of his waiver or statement based on his age. See Douds v. State,
472 S.W.3d 670, 674-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (holding that appellant failed to
preserve error with respect to factual grounds for suppression where appellant
made only isolated references to those grounds in suppression proceedings in trial
court; appellant’s motion, arguments, and evidence were otherwise narrowly
focused on other factual grounds; and trial court thus was not placed on notice of
complaint). Indeed, the trial court noted in its findings of fact and conclusions of
law that: “While [appellant’s] written motion [to suppress] is general, at the
hearing [appellant] indicated that [he was] alleging a sole ground for relief - his
waiver of rights was not knowing due to voluntary intoxication after taking 3mg of
Xanax and 60mg of Adderall.”

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findings. Id. (citing Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010)).

We review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit findings

that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. (citing

State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). We will sustain the

trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any

theory of law applicable to the case. Id. (citing Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447-48).

“The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the

government from compelling a criminal suspect to bear witness against himself.”

Acosta v. State, No. AP-77,092, 2024 WL 2845498, at *12 (Tex. Crim. App. June

5, 2024) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (citing U.S. CONST. amend.

V), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 779 (2024). The right against self-incrimination is

satisfied only when a defendant’s statements are given voluntarily. Id.; Lopez v.

State, 610 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (observing that defendant’s

statement or confession must be voluntary to be admissible); see also TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 38.21 (“A statement of an accused may be used in evidence

against him if it appears that the same was freely and voluntarily made without

compulsion or persuasion, under the rules hereafter prescribed.”).

A defendant may claim that his statement was involuntary, and is therefore

inadmissible, under one or more of three different theories: (1) the statement was

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involuntary under section 6 of article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure, (2) the taking of the statement did not comply with the dictates of

Miranda and sections 2 and 3 of article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure, or (3) the statement was made in violation of the Due Process Clause

because it was not freely made. Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008); Ferguson, 2025 WL 1298259, at *7. Federal constitutional

claims of involuntariness “involve an objective assessment of police behavior”; the

Constitution “leaves voluntariness claims based on the defendant’s state of mind

‘to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence.’” Oursbourn,

259 S.W.3d at 171 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)). In

Texas, the relevant state law is article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure. Id.

A confession given under the duress of medications, or because the suspect

did not know what he was signing due to intoxication, could be involuntary under

articles 38.21 and 38.22. Id. at 172-73. However, “youth, intoxication, mental

retardation, and other disabilities are usually not enough, by themselves, to render

a statement inadmissible” under article 38.22, and are instead “factors that a jury,

armed with a proper instruction, is entitled to consider.” Id. at 173.

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B. Analysis

Here, appellant pled guilty to the lesser charge of murder, and the trial court

sentenced him to life with parole, immediately following the trial court’s hearing

on and denial of appellant’s motion to suppress his custodial statement.

Appellant testified at the suppression hearing that he had ingested

approximately 3 milligrams of Xanax and 60 milligrams of Adderall before being

detained by officers. He said the drugs “hit [his] system” after he was taken into

custody and being driven to the Houston Police Department (HPD) headquarters,

after which “everything kind of went out.” The next thing appellant remembered

was waking up the next morning. Appellant stated he had no recollection of the

events in between, including his interview with police and confession. Appellant

testified that Xanax causes him to “black out,” and that he was blacked out during

his waiver of his rights and custodial statement. He acknowledged that, in his

videotaped custodial statement, he was “awake and talking to the police officer.”

But he attributed that to the Adderall. He said that the Adderall “may have helped

me to be sharp,” but that he did not remember because “Xanax makes me black

out.”

At the suppression hearing, HPD Sergeant Lance Osborn testified that he

had obtained a “pocket warrant” for appellant’s arrest, which he executed on July

17, 2020. Sergeant Osborn, accompanied by Officer Andrew Henderson,

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interviewed appellant at the HPD headquarters in downtown Houston. According

to Sergeant Osborn, after he read appellant his Miranda rights, appellant waived

his rights and consented to speak to the officers. Sergeant Osborn testified that,

during the approximately 90-minute interview, appellant made a confession to the

officers that was “consistent with both the physical evidence and the witnesses.”

Sergeant Osborn and Officer Henderson both testified that they observed no sign

that appellant was impaired during his interview.2

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court noted that, at the

suppression hearing, appellant alleged that “his waiver of rights was not knowing

due to voluntary intoxication after taking 3mg of Xanax and 60mg of Adderall.” At

the hearing, the trial court watched an audio/video recording of Sergeant Osborn’s

interview of appellant, including the “the warnings provided, [appellant’s]

2
Klein argues that Sergeant Osborn “admitted that assessment of intoxication on a
combination like Xanax and Adderall is not necessarily obvious to the naked eye”;
and that, “while Xanax, like alcohol is a central nervous system depressant, and
while it can present like alcohol, unlike alcohol, the Xanax/Adderall combination
is not detectable by simple means such as smell.” Sergeant Osborn testified that,
unlike alcohol use, Xanax or Adderall use could not be determined by smell. But
when asked if slurred speech is something he would normally associate with
someone who might be under the influence of Xanax or Adderall, he responded,
“[y]es, sir.” When asked if, absent other physical evidence of Xanax or Adderall
use, “you would agree with me that that is something that would have to be
confirmed or eliminated, if you will, as a possibility by way of chemical testing,”
Sergeant Osborn responded: “To the degree of beyond a reasonable doubt,
certainly. To the degree of many other standards, I would disagree with you.”

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waiver(s), [appellant’s] statements, and [appellant’s] actions and demeanor

throughout the statement.”

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that

appellant was “read his Texas Statutory Warnings under the Texas Constitution

and Miranda v Arizona by the interviewing officer, Officer Lance Osborn.” After

each of the warnings, “Officer Osborne asked [appellant] if he understood and

[appellant] verbally acknowledged that he understood the warnings.” Appellant

“made an unequivocal statement that he understood the warnings and agreed to

waive them and talk to Officer Osborn.” Appellant “did not inform law

enforcement of any intoxication at the time of the interview and did not tell

officers he had ingested any intoxicating or controlled substances.” In addition,

“[d]uring the interview, [appellant] had clear speech and was able to make clear

and lengthy statements which followed a linear storytelling path.” Based on the

trial court’s own observation and Sergeant Osborn’s testimony, the trial court

found further that appellant “stood for minutes at a time while viewing

photographs and was able to stand without swaying or stumbling.” Appellant

“appeared alert and engaged” and “showed no outward signs of a lack of the

normal use of his mental or physical faculties.”

The trial court thus found that appellant’s “claim that he was intoxicated to

the point of not being able to make a knowing waiver of his rights and give a

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voluntary statement is not credible.” The trial court found further that the

testimony of Sergeant Osborn and Officer Henderson was credible. The trial court

found, and also made the legal conclusion, that appellant’s “waiver of his Texas

Statutory Warnings and Miranda Rights was knowing and voluntary.”

At the suppression hearing, the trial court was the sole judge of appellant’s

credibility and could choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of his testimony.

See Ferguson, 2025 WL 1298259, at *7 (citing Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281). We

conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

findings, reasonably supports the trial court’s ruling.3 We thus overrule appellant’s

second point of error. See id. (citing Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447-48).

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The trial court also stated as part of its legal conclusions that appellant had
“fail[ed] to show that he was in-fact under the influence of any controlled
substance and that if he in-fact was, that it prevented him from making an
informed and independent choice when he waived his statutory rights.” Appellant
argues for the first time in his reply brief that this statement indicates that the trial
court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the accused. See Zoanni v.
Hogan, 715 S.W.3d 47, 97 n.30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet.
denied) (“[A] party may not present arguments for the first time in its reply brief.”
(quoting Cebcor Serv. Corp. v. Landscape Design & Constr., Inc., 270 S.W.3d
328, 334 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.))); see also Chambers v. State, 580
S.W.3d 149, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (noting that, while appellant generally
may not raise new issue in reply brief, courts of appeals can consider arguments
and authorities in reply brief that are related to arguments in original brief). Once a
defendant establishes that the setting is one of custodial interrogation, the State has
the burden to establish that Miranda warnings were given and that the defendant
voluntarily waived those rights and voluntarily responded to custodial questioning.
Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Cochran, J.,
concurring). However, even if we were to conclude that appellant’s argument
relates to arguments in his original brief, the trial-court language on which
appellant relies comes after its findings that appellant’s involuntariness claims
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Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Amparo “Amy” Guerra
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Guiney.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

were not credible, that the officers’ testimony was credible, and that appellant’s
waiver was knowing and voluntary, which findings were reasonably supported by
the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the findings and thus supported
the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress.

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