Prasla Property, Inc. Navroz K. Prasla, Media Films Craft, Inc., and Navrozmedianetwork, Inc. v. Spark Wealth Investment, LLC

Opinion issued March 30, 2026

In The
Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00920-CV
———————————
PRASLA PROPERTY, INC., NAVROZ K. PRASLA, MEDIA FILMS
CRAFT, INC., AND NAVROZMEDIANETWORK, INC., Appellants
V.
SPARK WEALTH INVESTMENTS, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 400th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 24-DCV-319828

CONCURRING OPINION

Regarding discretion, we’re usually deferentially reviewing a trial court’s

exercise of it. But we do have some discretion related to things like extending

appellate deadlines, allowing additional words in briefs, and whether to reinstate an

appeal dismissed on procedural grounds while our plenary power exists.
On January 27, 2026, we properly dismissed this appeal after appellants failed

to respond to our notice warning of dismissal if the filing fee was not paid. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 42.3(b). Through a verified (albeit untimely) motion for rehearing and

supporting verified reply, appellants presented evidence supporting that they

(1) personally paid $1,447 for the clerk’s record on January 27, 2026, which was

filed with us the next day, (2) failed to pay the filing fee due to a lack of

communication with prior counsel, and (3) intend to prosecute this appeal.

Things could’ve been handled better to keep this appeal on track. Even so,

based on appellants’ express desire to proceed, corroborated by their payment for

the clerk’s record on the day we dismissed the appeal (in an amount far more than

the $205 filing fee), I’m for exercising our discretion before plenary power expires

to give them a shot at the merits. See Kuo v. Regions Bank, 722 S.W.3d 15, 16 (Tex.

2025) (courts of appeals should avoid procedural default and reach the merits

whenever reasonably possible). The Rules allow us to do so. See, e.g., Polinard v.

Karambis, No. 04-21-00251-CV, 2021 WL 4073301, at *1 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Aug. 30, 2021, no pet.) (order) (per curiam) (“[W]e issued an opinion and

judgment dismissing this appeal for want of prosecution based on appellant’s failure

to pay the filing fee[.] Appellant thereafter paid the filing fee and requested

reinstatement of the appeal, citing oversight by his counsel. Accordingly, on our own

motion, we WITHDRAW our prior opinion and judgment . . . and REINSTATE this

2
appeal on our docket,” citing TEX. R. APP. P. 19.1); Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. v.

Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d 869, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)

(withdrawing opinion and judgment sua sponte within plenary power, citing Rule

19.1).

No one should construe our order to promote defiance of the Rules. That

would be a perilous interpretation. We routinely dismiss appeals for failures to file

timely notices of appeal, to pay filing fees and for clerk’s records, and to file briefs,

and no one is guaranteed reinstatement.

Andrew Johnson
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Johnson.

Justice Johnson, concurring.

3

Opinion issued March 30, 2026

In The
Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00920-CV
———————————
PRASLA PROPERTY, INC., NAVROZ K. PRASLA, MEDIA FILMS
CRAFT, INC., AND NAVROZMEDIANETWORK, INC., Appellants
V.
SPARK WEALTH INVESTMENTS, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 400th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 24-DCV-319828

DISSENTING OPINION

Everyone agrees that between a court’s inherent power and the applicable

rules of procedure, judges have broad discretion in handling the cases that come

before them while they still have plenary jurisdiction. See Eichelberger v.
Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398–99 (Tex. 1979); see also Porras v. Jefferson,

409 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

It is equally clear that the broad discretion associated with a court’s inherent

power is not boundless. Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Products, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704,

718 (Tex. 2020). “Because inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic

controls, and [b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised

with restraint[,] discretion, and great caution.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Indeed, our exercise of these powers is defined by the boundaries of the laws

that we are required to follow. See Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398–99 (“Under our

system there is no such thing as the inherent power of a court, ‘if, by that, be meant

a power which a court may exercise without a law authorizing it.’” (quoting Messner

v. Giddings, 65 Tex. 301, 309 (1886))). And our rules of civil and appellate

procedure have the same force and effect as statutes. See In re City of Georgetown,

53 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. 2001).

In applying the rules of appellate procedure, we are instructed to construe

them “reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing

requirements not absolutely necessary to effect the purpose of a rule.” Verburgt v.

Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616–17 (Tex. 1997). Accordingly, we must imply a

motion for extension of time whenever a party files a document beyond the specified

deadline—but within any additional time provided by the rules for moving to extend

2
that deadline. Id. at 617; see Miller v. Metro Health Found., 968 S.W.2d 337, 338

(Tex. 1998).

Conversely, if the document is filed after any additional time provided for in

the rules for seeking an extension—then we lack authority to consider it. See B.D.

Click v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1982); see also Nwora v.

Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 252 S.W.3d 417, 418 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1997, no pet.). In that circumstance, to still consider such a motion would be

tantamount to reading new language into the rules or, worse yet, choosing not to

follow the law and the language in the rules that does exist. In either event, we

would be legislating from the bench to do justice in an individual case—and

abandoning our duty as an intermediate appellate court to apply the law consistently

and predictably for all Texans.

Regrettably, that is the situation here.

Our Court’s judgment in this case was issued on January 27, 2026. Appellants

did not file a motion for rehearing within the 15-day time period set forth in Rule of

Appellate Procedure 49.1 or even within the additional 15-day time period in Rule

49.9 for seeking an extension of time. On March 10, 2026—nearly a month after

the filing deadline and 12 days after the last day for seeking an extension of time—

appellants filed a motion for rehearing seeking to reinstate this appeal. Notably, the

motion provides no explanation for missing both 15-day time periods.

3
The majority here correctly dismisses the untimely motion for rehearing—but

still reinstates the appeal. The concurrence states that this anomaly is justified by

the Court’s plenary power that expires today. But the existence of our plenary power

over a case does not permit us to do what the law otherwise forbids. And the

concurrence cites to no authority that allows us to circumvent these principles and

grant the relief sought in an untimely motion for rehearing (filed well beyond all of

the deadlines in the rules) simply because we feel like it.

For that reason, I must respectfully dissent to the reinstatement of this appeal

based on our plenary power alone. And I urge our en banc Court, and the Supreme

Court of Texas if necessary, to weigh in on this important reoccurring issue.

Terry Adams
Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Johnson.

Chief Justice Adams, dissenting.

4