Zaeveion Zuiquae Denson v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued July 29, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-23-00743-CR
———————————
ZAEVEION ZUIQUAE DENSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 78th District Court1
Wichita County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. DC78-CR2020-0388

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Pursuant to its docket equalization authority, the Supreme Court of Texas
transferred this appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
to this Court. See Misc. Docket No. 23–9079, Transfer of Cases from Courts of
Appeals (Tex. Sept. 26, 2023); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001 (authorizing
transfer of cases). We are unaware of any conflict between precedent of that court
and that of this court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Zaeveion Zuiquae Denson of capital murder. See TEX.

PENAL CODE §§ 19.03 (stating person commits capital murder if he intentionally

commits murder while committing robbery); 29.02 (defining robbery). Denson was

17 at the time of the offense, and he was sentenced, as statutorily mandated, to life

with the possibility of parole. Id. § 12.31(a)(1) (stating penalty for committing

capital murder under age 18 is life sentence with possibility of parole). On appeal,

he asserts that section 12.31 of the Texas Penal Code is both facially

unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him. We affirm.

Background

Denson and three other people decided to rob someone. They drove together

to a nightclub parking lot to look for a target. They followed a woman as she drove

away from the club. When the woman, later identified as Carolyn High, got out of

her car at home, Denson and another man confronted her and demanded cash.

When Carolyn said she did not have any, the other man tried to grab her purse.

Carolyn and the other man struggled until he eventually grabbed her wallet.

Denson shot Carolyn in the chest. Carolyn’s daughter discovered her mother’s

body the next afternoon.

Denson was indicted by a grand jury and charged with capital murder for

intentionally killing Carolyn while robbing her. See TEX. PENAL CODE

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§§ 19.03(a)(2), 29.02(a)(1). Denson was 17 years old at the time. He proceeded to

a jury trial.

Before trial, Denson filed a motion to declare section 12.31(a)(1) of the

Texas Penal Code unconstitutional. The trial court held a pretrial hearing on

Denson’s constitutional challenge. At the conclusion of the hearing, Denson

recognized that the constitutionality of the punishment scheme found in section

12.31(a)(1) “has been specifically addressed by the courts and found to be

constitutional.” He averred that he challenged the constitutionality of the statute

because the United States Supreme Court has yet to address section 12.31(a)(2).2

The trial court overruled Denson’s constitutional challenge. Denson reurged the

challenge in another pretrial hearing, and the trial court denied it. After the jury

found Denson guilty of capital murder, but before the trial court sentenced him,

Denson objected to his impending sentence as unconstitutional. The trial court

overruled the objection. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for life with

the possibility of parole. He appealed.

Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentence

In a single issue, Denson challenges the constitutionality of the statutory

scheme imposing a mandatory punishment for juvenile offenders who have

2
Section 12.31(a)(2) states that an individual who is over the age of 18 when he
commits a capital felony shall be sentenced to life without parole. This section is
inapplicable to Denson because Denson was 17 at the time of the crime, and his
life sentence includes the possibility of parole.
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committed a capital felony. Section 12.31(a) of the Texas Penal Code sets out the

punishment options for an individual “adjudged guilty of a capital murder in a case

in which the state does not seek the death penalty” and explains that the

punishment options are as follows:

(1) life, if the individual committed the offense when younger than
18 years of age; or

(2) life without parole, if the individual committed the offense when
18 years of age or older.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.31(a). Accordingly, for juvenile offenders, the Penal Code

allows for the possibility of parole, see id., and subsection 508.145(b) of the

Government Code, which addresses an individual’s eligibility for release on

parole, states that juvenile inmates serving a life sentence for a capital murder are

“not eligible for release on parole until the actual calendar time the inmate has

served, without consideration of good conduct time, equals 40 calendar years,”

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.145(b).

On appeal, Denson argues that section 12.31(a)(1) is unconstitutional

because it is functionally indistinguishable from a sentence of life without parole, it

does not allow for an individualized sentencing determination, and it violates

principles relating to cruel and unusual punishment and due process. We disagree.

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B. Standard of Review

A determination regarding whether a statute is facially unconstitutional is a

question of law subject to de novo review. Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013). A facial challenge is essentially “a claim that ‘the statute, by its

terms, always operates unconstitutionally.’” Lebo v. State, 474 S.W.3d 402, 405

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Gillenwaters v. State, 205

S.W.3d 534, 536 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). When assessing a statute’s

constitutionality, reviewing courts “presume that the statute is valid and that the

legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily” when enacting the statute.

Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Moreover, the party

presenting the statutory challenge has the burden of establishing that the statute is

unconstitutional. Id.

For as-applied challenges, appellate courts review the constitutionality of a

criminal statute under a de novo standard of review. Modarresi v. State, 488

S.W.3d 455, 465 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (setting out

standard for as-applied challenge). When presenting an as-applied challenge, a

defendant “concedes the general constitutionality of the statute but asserts it is

unconstitutional as applied to [his] particular facts and circumstances.” Id. “The

burden rests on appellant to establish the statute’s unconstitutionality as applied to

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him.” Eugene v. State, 528 S.W.3d 245, 249 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2017, no pet.).

C. Analysis

Denson argues that Texas’s statutory scheme, which does not allow for

parole until 40 years have been served, is unconstitutional. In support of his

argument, Denson primarily relies on Miller v. Alabama, which addressed whether

statutory sentencing schemes that mandated a sentence of confinement for life

without the possibility of parole for juvenile defendants convicted of capital

felonies violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (holding Eighth

Amendment forbids sentencing scheme for juvenile homicide offenders in which

life without parole is mandatory rather than based upon individualized sentencing

assessment).

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has rejected claims that section

12.31(a)(1) is facially unconstitutional or violates Miller. See Lewis v. State, 428

S.W.3d 860, 863–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (discussing Miller and rejecting

constitutional challenge to section 12.31). The Court of Criminal Appeals has also

rejected as-applied constitutional challenges to the statute. See Turner v. State, 443

S.W.3d 128, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reversing as-applied challenge to section

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12.31(a)(1)). “[J]uvenile offenders sentenced to life with the possibility of parole

are not entitled to individualized sentencing under the Eighth Amendment.” Id.

Several intermediate courts have rejected both facial and as-applied

challenges to the statutory scheme imposing mandatory sentences of life with the

possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted of capital murder. See Criner

v. State, No. 03-18-00528-CR, 2019 WL 6042277, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin

Nov. 15, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing cases

from the First, Third, and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals that rejected facial and as-

applied challenges to imposing mandatory sentences of life with possibility of

parole for juvenile capital murder offenders); Guzman v. State, 539 S.W.3d 394,

403–06 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (rejecting Eighth

Amendment challenge to section 12.31(a)(1) and collecting similar decisions from

other courts). Courts have also rejected Denson’s argument that the 40-year

confinement period before the possibility of parole is a de facto life sentence. See

Shalouei v. State, 524 S.W.3d 766, 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,

pet. ref’d) (holding statutory requirement of 40 years’ time served before parole

eligibility does not equate to sentence of life without parole).

“When the Court of Criminal Appeals has deliberately and unequivocally

interpreted the law in a criminal matter, we must adhere to its interpretation under

the dictates of vertical stare decisis.” Mason v. State, 416 S.W.3d 720, 728 n.10

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(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d); see also Lewis v. State, 448

S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (“We are

bound in criminal cases to follow decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals.”).

We overrule Denson’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Susanna Dokupil
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Dokupil.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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