CourtListener 10647003•Mary F. Masterson v. SCI Texas Funeral Services, LLC. D/B/A Earthman Resthaven Cemetery
Mary F. Masterson v. SCI Texas Funeral Services, LLC. D/B/A Earthman Resthaven Cemetery
CourtListener 10647003Txctapp131 de jul. de 2025
Texto completo
Opinion issued July 31, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-23-00496-CV
———————————
MARY F. MASTERSON, Appellant
V.
SCI TEXAS FUNERAL SERVICES, LLC D/B/A EARTHMAN
RESTHAVEN CEMETERY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 295th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2022-01444
DISSENTING OPINION
Appellant “Mary F. Masterson, as Executor of the Estate of John C.
Masterson,” has made it clear that her notice of appeal reflecting the same capacity
was no mistake. Appellant’s principal argument on appeal is that she has always
brought the claims in this suit in her capacity as executor on behalf of her father’s
estate, meaning the contracts “Mary F. Masterson” signed in her individual
capacity with Appellee SCI Texas Funeral Services, LLC d/b/a Earthman
Resthaven Cemetery, and which contain the subject arbitration provisions, are
irrelevant.
In its briefing, SCI argued that Appellant filed this appeal in an improper
capacity and requested that we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, further
contending Appellant should not be afforded leave to amend her notice of appeal
because it is clear she appealed precisely in the capacity in which she intended. In
her reply brief, Appellant continued to assert that she has always brought this suit
as the executor of her father’s estate, did not express that she alternatively desires
to appeal in her individual capacity, and did not request leave to amend the notice
of appeal.
I agree with the majority’s conclusions that Mary F. Masterson individually
brought this suit and its claims. The Third Amended Petition—which attempted to
modify the claims to be brought in Mary F. Masterson’s capacity as executor of the
estate and to avoid arbitration—was filed while Mary F. Masterson’s claims were
abated and the arbitration was proceeding. This filing was ineffective, if not for
the abatement, at least because it was filed after the pleadings deadline. See G.R.
Auto Care v. NCI Group, Inc., No. 01-17-00068-CV, 2018 WL 4087295, at *11
2
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding
petitions filed after pleadings deadline were not part of record).
Because Appellant brought this appeal in the capacity of one not a party to
this suit, I would stop our analysis there and dismiss the appeal for want of
jurisdiction. See Foreman v. Tex. Indep. Plaza, LLC, No. 01-24-00274-CV, 2024
WL 4268025, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 24, 2024, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (“When a person who was not a party below files a notice of appeal, we
lack subject-matter jurisdiction.”).1 Because the majority does not, I respectfully
dissent.
Andrew Johnson
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
Justice Johnson, dissenting.
1
See also McMahan v. Izen, No. 01-20-00233-CV, 2021 WL 3919219, at *4 n.2
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 2, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining
court would not consider appellant’s arguments challenging his liability in
capacity as trustee because appellant did not file a notice of appeal in such
capacity; “an individual acting in an official or representative capacity, such as a
trustee, is, in law, a distinctly separate individual from the same person acting as
an individual”); Funmilayo v. Aresco, LP, No. 05-20-00492-CV, 2021 WL
5578019, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying
McMahan); White v. White, No. 12-11-00107-CV, 2012 WL 1744977, at *2–3
(Tex. App.—Tyler May 16, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal for
want of jurisdiction because judgment was entered against estate but appellant
signed notice of appeal in individual capacity).
3
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