TAYLOR, LANCE v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0660-22

LANCE TAYLOR, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
NUECES COUNTY

Per curiam.

OPINION

Appellant was convicted of murder and tampering with evidence. On appeal, he

complained that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals found that

it was unable to review the issue “as the trial court did not conduct a meaningful hearing.”

Taylor v. State, 655 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi–Edinburg October 6, 2022).
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It found that the balancing test provided for in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct.

2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), “requires a full development of the facts,” which did not

occur here. Id. The appellate court relied on State v. DeLeon, 975 S.W.2d 722 (Corpus

Christi-Edinburg 1998, no pet.); State v. Reyes, 162 S.W.3d 267 (San Antonio 2005, no pet.);

Newcomb v. State, 547 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); and Grimaldo v. State, 130

S.W.3d 450 (Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2004, no pet.).

Appellant has filed a petition for discretionary review arguing, inter alia, that the

Court of Appeals erred in failing to conduct a de novo review. We agree.

The cases on which the appellate court relied are distinguishable. In DeLeon, the case

was delayed nine years and the trial court sua sponte dismissed for lack of a speedy trial; the

defendant never raised the issue and it was not litigated. The Corpus Christi Court found it

was error to dismiss a case on speedy trial grounds without a “meaningful hearing” on the

issue because the only evidence in the record was the length of the delay. Similarly, in Reyes,

the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on the morning of trial, and the trial

court summarily granted the motion without hearing any evidence. The San Antonio Court

also spoke of the need for a “meaningful hearing.” See also Grimaldo (defendant presented

speedy trial motion on day of trial and presented no evidence).

In Newcomb, this Court reviewed a request to set a firm time limit on when a motion

to revoke probation could be heard. We declined to do so, stating instead that the Barker

factors should be weighed. We said that “no judgment on the merits of the issue sua sponte
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should be entered without an evidentiary hearing.”

The Court of Appeals misunderstood this case law to mean that some type of

specially-designated “Speedy Trial Hearing” is required before an appellate court can weigh

the Barker factors. But neither this Court nor the lower courts have required that. Instead, the

only requirement is that the relevant information be in the record – the length of the delay,

reason for the delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice. In all the cases cited by the

appellate court, the only information in the record was the length of the delay. That alone is

insufficient to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial or to reverse the denial of

one on appeal.

In this case, the record shows the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and

Appellant’s assertion of the right. The only thing the record might not show is whether and

what type of prejudice Appellant suffered. But that potential deficiency does not prevent an

appellate court from weighing the factors; it merely affects how they will be weighed. See,

e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992).

The Court of Appeals erred in failing to conduct the Barker balancing test and instead

requiring some kind of formal speedy trial hearing. This record is sufficient to conduct the

balancing test and the appellate court should have done so.

We grant review of grounds one, two, and four of Appellant’s petition, vacate the

judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to that court for proceedings

consistent with this opinion. Ground three is refused.
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DATE DELIVERED: May 17, 2023

PUBLISH