Martinez, Ramiro

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR-97,185-01

EX PARTE RAMIRO MARTINEZ, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NO. 1256679-A IN THE 182ND DISTRICT COURT
HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam. SCHENCK, P.J., filed a concurring opinion.

OPINION

Applicant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole in October 2011. The First Court of

Appeals affirmed his conviction. Martinez v. State, No. 01-11-00902-CR (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 28, 2013). Applicant filed this application for a

writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded

it to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.
2

Applicant contends that his sentence of automatic life without parole

violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because he was a juvenile

at the time of the offense. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). This Court held

in Ex parte Maxwell that Miller applies retroactively in Texas. Ex parte Maxwell,

424 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Applicant was sixteen years old at the time of the offense. After being found

guilty by a jury, he was automatically sentenced to life in prison without the

possibility of parole under the law at the time. TEX. PENAL CODE §12.31(a)(2007).

The current version of Penal Code section 12.31 requires that a person who

commits a capital felony be sentenced to “life, if the individual committed the

offense when younger than 18 years of age.” TEX. PENAL CODE

§12.31(a)(1)(2013). The savings clause for the 2013 amendment provides that the

change in law “applies to a criminal action pending, on appeal, or commenced on

or after the effective date of this Act, regardless of whether the criminal action is

based on an offense committed before, on, or after that date.” Acts 2013, 83rd

Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 2 (S.B. 2), § 3(1). Applicant’s appeal was still pending when

the current statute became effective. Consequently, under the savings clause,

Applicant is entitled to have his sentence reformed to “life.”
3

Relief is granted. The sentence in Cause No. 1256679-A in the 182nd

District Court of Harris County is reformed to life with parole.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice–Correctional Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Delivered: February 12, 2026
Do not publish

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. WR-97,185-01

EX PARTE RAMIRO MARTINEZ, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NO. 1256679-A IN THE 182ND DISTRICT COURT
HARRIS COUNTY

SCHENCK, P.J., filed a concurring opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION

Applicant Ramiro Martinez was sixteen years old when he killed Derrick

Desmond Godfrey, and eighteen years old when a Harris County jury convicted him

of capital murder, resulting in his sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

The Court is correct to reform his sentence to reflect a mandatory sentence of life
MARTINEZ CONCURRENCE – 2

given the development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and corresponding

legislative changes to Texas Penal Code section 12.31(a).

I write separately to note the question, which might be raised in a future case, 1

of whether our State Constitution permits a mandatory life sentence for a juvenile

offender, including and especially, in circumstances where culpability rests on the

doctrines approximating transferred intent or where the juvenile offender lacked the

specific intent to kill. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010) (providing a

multi-factor test for whether a sentence is categorically disproportionate to the crime

prosecuted, in addition to a comparative analysis); State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (assessing Simpson’s claims of sentencing

disproportionality in light of Graham).

DISCUSSION

“[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in

prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller v. Alabama, 567

U.S. 460, 479 (2012). Some thirty years before Miller, the Supreme Court

considered the Eighth Amendment’s authority on sentencing proportionality,

The concerns I highlight here would likely require recognition of a new rule. As this
1

case does not present those concerns — or at least not in there most acute form — I find it
proper at this stage simply to highlight them here.
MARTINEZ CONCURRENCE – 3

generally deferring to the States when addressing the constitutionality of a

sentence’s length. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (“We believe that

Texas is entitled to make its own judgment . . . subject only to those strictures of the

Eighth Amendment that can be informed by objective factors.”); see also Hutto v.

Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (“Rummel stands for the proposition that federal

courts should be ‘reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of

imprisonment’”). 2

In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Justices distinguished a sentence of

life without parole as “far more severe” than a life sentence involving parole

eligibility, as in Rummel, where the petitioner would likely “have been eligible for

parole within twelve years of his confinement.” See Helm, 463 U.S. at 297, 303. By

my understanding, Martinez may first become eligible for parole some forty years

after his sentence began. TEX. GOV’T CODE §508.145(b).

Our Texas Constitution’s Article 1, Section 13 largely mirrors the federal

Eighth Amendment and would be identical but for an additional clause regarding

open courts following its first sentence. Chronologically, it can be inferred that the

2
The Justices have treated death penalty cases differently. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272;
see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“It is now settled that the death penalty is not
invariably cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not
inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always
disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed.”).
MARTINEZ CONCURRENCE – 4

framers of our 1876 Texas Constitution were aware of the Eighth Amendment’s text

at the time of its drafting.

Given the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as it

applies to minors and to disproportionate sentencing, I pause to pose the distinct

question of whether our own Texas Constitution might prohibit the mandatory life

sentences for a juvenile defendant as a general matter, insofar as it results in the

sentencing judgment being completely supplanted at trial and effectively replaced by

the prosecutor’s charging decision. Whether such sentences would track the

culpability of the juvenile offender as it should, see Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, may be

more a product of coincidence than of informed judgment of the fact-finder relative

to the juvenile involved.

To that end, I will also note that our Constitution provides those tried in Texas

a right to a jury trial. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. I have no doubt that our

Constitution leaves the Legislature free to permit waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and

the resultant transfer to the adult trial and sentencing system. TEX. FAMILY CODE

ANN. § 54.02 (describing waiver of exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction). That said,

I am not aware of any decision of this Court addressing the question of whether that

transfer of jurisdiction, when combined with the resultant mandatory sentencing,

would fit within the Constitution’s directive that the “[t]he Legislature shall pass
MARTINEZ CONCURRENCE – 5

such laws as may be needed to regulate the [right to a jury trial] . . . to maintain its

purity and efficiency.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.

Any tailoring or proportionality concern may become more acute when, unlike

here, the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction infiltrates the rules governing the law of

parties or, perhaps, felony murder, by which an underage actor becomes liable for

participating in a criminal event culminating in an unintended result. See TEX.

PENAL CODE § 19.02(b) (describing the crime of capital murder); id. §§ 7.01, 7.02,

7.03.

That said, I concur in today’s decision.

Filed: February 12, 2026

Publish