HERNANDEZ, ISRAEL GARCIA v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0176-25

ISRAEL GARCIA HERNANDEZ, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY
REVIEW FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
WILLACY COUNTY

Finley, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Richardson, Newell, Keel, Walker, and McClure, JJ.,
joined. McClure, J., filed a concurring opinion. Schenck,
P.J., filed a dissenting opinion. Yeary, J., filed a dissenting
opinion. Parker, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Yeary,
J., joined.
HERNANDEZ — 2

OPINION

Appellant was convicted of evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle

and was sentenced to two years’ confinement, probated for three years’ community

supervision. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction and contends that the initial traffic stop was unlawful. We conclude that

a rational juror could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the initial traffic stop

was lawful. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and

render a judgment of acquittal.

I. Background

a. Trial

On March 17, 2020, at 10:16 p.m., a woman called 9-1-1 to report a suspicious

four-door Chevrolet Silverado driving at a slow speed in a rural area of Willacy

County. At 10:46 p.m., Officer Marcos Garcia arrived at the area the caller described

and noticed only Appellant’s pickup truck in the vicinity, driving down a dirt road.

Appellant’s truck was not a four-door Chevrolet Silverado. Officer Garcia turned

onto the same dirt road and activated his emergency lights. 1 Appellant did not stop

his vehicle in response to the emergency lights and continued driving down the dirt

1
The unit that Officer Garcia was driving at this time only had interior emergency lights and did
not have a dash camera.
HERNANDEZ — 3

road at the same slow rate of speed. At 10:50 p.m., Appellant stopped and exited his

vehicle to open a gate at the entrance of his brother’s property. Officer Garcia also

exited his vehicle, approached Appellant with his firearm drawn, and asked

Appellant to identify himself. Appellant told Officer Garcia his name but did not

provide physical identification. Appellant and Officer Garcia argued for

approximately five minutes, and, after Officer Garcia unsuccessfully tried to take

Appellant down by force, Officer Garcia tased Appellant and arrested him.

Appellant was charged by indictment with evading arrest or detention with a

motor vehicle. TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(a). At trial, Officer Garcia testified that he

knew this particular area to have “had a lot of incidences of human smuggling” of

late. Officer Garcia also testified that he observed several residences in the area but

no vehicles except Appellant’s, which was driving on a rural road. Officer Garcia

admitted he did not know for certain that Appellant’s vehicle was the “suspicious”

Chevrolet Silverado described by the 9-1-1 caller, but he “figured” it must be,

because there were no other vehicles around, and Appellant was driving a pickup

truck, though not a Chevrolet Silverado. Officer Garcia acknowledged that the thirty

minutes it took him to arrive at the scene was “a lot of time for a vehicle to move in

and out of the area.” Officer Garcia also confirmed that Appellant did not “floor it”
HERNANDEZ — 4

after Officer Garcia turned on his emergency lights, and he had not witnessed any

“violation of law.”

Appellant did not file a motion to suppress and instead argued that the State

could not meet its burden on the “lawful arrest” element. 2 After the State rested,

Appellant moved for a directed verdict on the basis that the State had failed to meet

its burden to prove the attempted detention was lawful. The trial court denied

Appellant’s motion. At the jury charge conference, Appellant did not ask for an

Article 38.23 instruction.3 The jury deliberated for several hours and sent eight notes

to the trial court during its deliberations, two of which indicated they could not reach

a unanimous verdict. The trial court gave the jury an Allen 4 charge and sent the jury

back for further deliberations. The jury ultimately found Appellant guilty as alleged

in the indictment.

2
We have held that a pretrial motion to suppress is not the proper way to challenge an unlawful
detention when lawful detention is an element that the State is required to prove. Woods v. State,
153 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
3
We have also held that the Texas exclusionary rule is not appropriate in the context of evading
arrest, because evidence of evading does not exist before the attempted arrest. An Article 38.23
instruction is appropriate to exclude illegally obtained evidence of a prior crime. Day v. State, 614
S.W.3d 121, 128–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
4
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
HERNANDEZ — 5

b. Appeal

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. 5 Appellant argued that the evidence

was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the detention was lawful.6 Relying on Derichsweiler v. State, 7

the court of appeals found that Officer Garcia’s testimony was sufficient for a

rational juror to “have found that the detention was lawful beyond a reasonable

doubt.”8 Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that although Appellant was

not driving a Chevrolet Silverado, Officer Garcia’s testimony established that

Appellant was driving a pickup truck; that Appellant’s truck was the only vehicle in

the rural area described by the 9-1-1 caller; and that there had been “a lot of

incidences of human trafficking” in the area at that time. 9 The court of appeals also

pointed to evidence showing that Appellant fled from Officer Garcia’s show of

authority—both by vehicle and then on foot prior to the physical struggle—from

5
Hernandez v. State, No. 13-24-00036-CR, 2025 WL 555779, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Feb. 20, 2025).
6
Id. at *1.
7
348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (finding reasonable suspicion existed where the
appellant’s conduct was “not overtly criminal in any way” but was “bizarre to say the least”).
8
Hernandez, 2025 WL 555779, at *4.
9
Id. at *3.
HERNANDEZ — 6

which a juror could infer that Appellant was involved in criminal activity. 10 “[B]ased

on the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence,” the court of appeals

concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the initial detention was lawful. 11 We granted Appellant’s

petition for discretionary review. 12

II. Applicable Law

a. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction if, when viewing all of the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational juror could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. McPherson v.

State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979). When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence

admitted at trial. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We do not sit as the

thirteenth juror, and we do not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by

10
Id. at *4.
11
Id.
12
Appellant’s ground for review states: “Whether the 13th Court of Appeals’s [sic]
mischaracterization of evidence resulted in an erroneous decision which has ‘so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of the Court of
Criminal Appeals’ power of supervision.’”
HERNANDEZ — 7

reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d

571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

The jury is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence

adduced at trial. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

Additionally, the jury may use common sense, common knowledge, personal

experience, and observations from life when drawing inferences. Acosta v. State, 429

S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the hypothetically correct

jury charge, defined by the statutory elements as modified by the charging

instrument. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The

hypothetically correct jury charge is one that accurately states the law, is authorized

by the indictment, does not increase the State’s burden of proof, and adequately

describes the offense with which the defendant is charged. Id.

An individual evades arrest “if he intentionally flees from a person he knows

is a peace officer . . . attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.” TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 38.04(a). “The text of the statute is plain: it requires proof that an attempted arrest

or detention is lawful at the time the person flees.” Day v. State, 614 S.W.3d 121, 127

(Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “[W]hen a lawful detention is an element of the crime, a
HERNANDEZ — 8

failure of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the detention was lawful

must result in an acquittal of the defendant.” Id. at 125.

b. Investigative Detention

We review de novo whether the totality of circumstances is sufficient to

support an officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Crain v. State, 315

S.W.3d 43, 48–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An investigative detention is a seizure

under the Fourth Amendment and is unreasonable unless “supported by reasonable

suspicion to believe that ‘criminal activity’ may be afoot.” United States v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 362 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)); State v.

Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 466–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Reasonable suspicion

exists when law enforcement has “specific, articulable facts that, when combined

with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that

the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Wade

v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion for a

detention, we look to the totality of the circumstances and “whether there was an

objectively justifiable basis for the detention.” Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914. In

assessing whether he has reasonable suspicion for a detention, an officer may “draw

on [his] own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
HERNANDEZ — 9

deductions about the cumulative information available to [him] that ‘might well

elude an untrained person.’” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). The information known to the officer at the time

of the warrantless detention must support more than a mere hunch. Ramirez-Tamayo

v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

c. The proper standard of review

In sum, the proper standard of review for whether the evidence was sufficient

to enable a rational juror to find that Officer Garcia’s traffic stop was supported by

reasonable suspicion is the same as the one we set forth in Long v. State:

In the context of this case, if we are to make a legal determination of
[the reasonableness of a detention], we have to rely upon the jury’s
verdict. For determinations of historical fact, we apply the traditional
standard of review for legal sufficiency to determine what the totality of
the circumstances are, deferring to the jury’s rational factual
determinations and inferences. Then, we evaluate de novo the purely
legal question of whether [the detention was reasonable].

535 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (internal citations omitted). 13

13
Contrary to Presiding Judge Schenck’s contention, the question of the proper standard
of review is a “simple” one. Post at 13 n.12 (Schenck, P.J., dissenting). In Guzman, we held that
a reviewing court “should afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of the
historical facts that the record supports,” but we review de novo the application of the law to fact
questions. 955 S.W.2d at 89 (emphasis added). When an element of an offense requires a legal
determination, we apply the standard set out in Long that requires deference to the historical facts
implicitly found by the jury, but no deference to their legal determinations. 535 S.W.3d at 519.
Judge Yeary posits that “[i]t is also arguable that the majority is mistaken to rely on Long . . .
as authority for the proposition that our review of the jury’s reasonable suspicion determination
HERNANDEZ — 10

III. Discussion

Appellant first contends that the court of appeals relied on facts that are not

supported by the record in reaching its conclusion that a rational juror could find,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the attempted detention was lawful. Disregarding

the unsupported evidence, Appellant argues that no rational juror could find, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that Officer Garcia’s detention was lawful. We first examine the

contested evidence and then turn to the ultimate sufficiency question.

a. Contested Evidence

In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals relied on the following facts:

Officer Garcia was dispatched to a rural area of Willacy County to respond to a 9-1-

1 call reporting a suspicious vehicle driving slowly; the 9-1-1 caller described a four-

door Chevrolet Silverado driving west; when Officer Garcia arrived at the area, he

should be de novo.” Post at 5 (Yeary, J., dissenting). This is so, in Judge Yeary’s view, because
Long was a statutory interpretation case—“a pure question of law, subject to our de novo review”—
but “[h]ere, in contrast, the definition of reasonable suspicion is undisputed.” Id. Judge Yeary
misrepresents our holding in Long. Certainly, the preliminary question in Long was one of statutory
construction: “First, we consider whether the Article 18.20 definition of ‘oral communication’
incorporates the ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ standard.” 535 S.W.3d at 520. But that was
not the end of the analysis in Long. Rather, we then turned to the legal determination of “whether
the State actually proved that Coach Townsend’s speech was ‘oral communication,’” in other
words, “whether Coach Townsend harbored a subjective expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to regard as objectively reasonable.” Id. That, we said, was subject to de novo review. Id.
at 519. The same is true here: the legal determination of whether Officer Garcia had reasonable
suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop is “subject to our de novo review.” Contra post at 5 (Yeary,
J., dissenting).
HERNANDEZ — 11

observed a vehicle “close to the mailbox belonging to the address given by the [9-1-

1] caller”; there were no other vehicles in the area; when Officer Garcia activated his

emergency lights, Appellant “did not stop his vehicle and continued to drive away

from Officer Garcia, turning north on a dirt road”; and Appellant ultimately arrived

at a gate and stopped his vehicle. 14 Appellant asserts that the court of appeals’

statements (1) that Officer Garcia observed a vehicle “close to the mailbox belonging

to the address given by the [9-1-1] caller”; and (2) that Appellant “did not stop his

vehicle and continued to drive away from Officer Garcia, turning north on a dirt

road” are not supported by the record.

i. Proximity to the Mailbox

Officer Garcia testified that the vehicle was “in close proximity to the

residence” and “in the vicinity that the caller had advised.” But this testimony is

not supported by the evidence in the record. The photographic evidence in the

record shows that the dirt road that Appellant was driving on was south of “several

residences,” and the residence and mailbox belonging to the 9-1-1 caller was the

northernmost. 15 As explained by Officer Garcia, State’s Exhibit 7 depicts a sign

14
Hernandez, 2025 WL 555779, at *4–5.
15
See infra at Appendix A. Appendix A is State’s Exhibit 1 admitted at Appellant’s trial. The 9-1-1
caller described a suspicious vehicle driving at a slow speed in a rural area of Willacy County,
specifically near the area of FM 1420 and FM 498. FM 1420 is a road that runs north-south and is
located at the bottom of Appendix A. The dirt road where Officer Garcia turned on his lights runs
HERNANDEZ — 12

behind which he saw Appellant’s taillights as well as two other residences between

the 9-1-1 caller’s and the dirt road. Furthermore, there was no testimony that

Appellant’s truck was observed at any time by Garcia to be close to the caller’s house

or mailbox. Considering all of this evidence, the record does not support the court of

appeals’ statement that Appellant’s truck was “close to the mailbox belonging to the

address given by the [9-1-1] caller.”

ii. Driving Away

Officer Garcia testified that when he arrived at the scene, he observed

Appellant’s vehicle already on the dirt road. Officer Garcia followed Appellant and

activated his emergency lights after he “had already turned onto that road.” The

court of appeals noted that flight from an officer before the officer has attempted an

arrest or detention can be the “key ingredient justifying the decision of a law

enforcement officer to take action.” 16 But the record here belies the applicability of

this scenario to the instant case: Appellant’s vehicle was already driving down the

dirt road, as Officer Garcia testified, and there was no evidence to suggest he

east-west and is located down the middle of Appendix A. As Officer Garcia testified, Appellant’s
vehicle was “already on the dirt road” when the traffic stop was initiated. See 3 RR 23. That
testimony belies the court of appeals’ assertion that the vehicle was “in close proximity to the
residence” of the 9-1-1 caller or “close to the mailbox belonging to the address given by the [9-1-1]
caller.”
Hernandez, 2025 WL 555779, at *8–9 (citing Washington v. State, 660 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex.
16

Crim. App. 1983) (determining whether probable cause to search or arrest existed)).
HERNANDEZ — 13

intentionally fled the police vehicle before Officer Garcia activated his emergency

lights. Given that these facts are not supported by the record, we do not consider

them in our analysis.

b. Analysis

The sum total of the evidence known to Officer Garcia at the time of

Appellant’s detention was as follows: (1) a woman had called 9-1-1 thirty minutes

prior to Officer Garcia’s arrival and reported a “suspicious” Chevrolet Silverado;

(2) there were several residences in the area, but no other cars driving at that time;

(3) the area had experienced incidences of human trafficking; and (4) Appellant was

already driving down the dirt road when Officer Garcia arrived, but not near the area

where the 9-1-1 caller described.

As Officer Garcia himself testified, driving a truck driving slowly on a dirt road

at night is not on its own suggestive of criminal activity. Furthermore, Officer Garcia

testified that he did not witness Appellant violate any law. And Appellant’s conduct

was not “bizarre” so as to suggest “someone who was looking to criminally exploit

some vulnerability.” Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917. In fact, Officer Garcia testified

on cross-examination that there were residences as well as ranch land down the dirt

road where the traffic stop was initiated, and that it would not be uncommon for
HERNANDEZ — 14

people to go out to that area. 17 Furthermore, Officer Garcia also testified that the

road was not the smoothest of roads and that it would not be uncommon for someone

to drive slower on an unpaved road like the one Appellant’s vehicle was on.

Officer Garcia needed to establish “specific, articulable facts that, when

combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably

conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal

activity.” Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668. As Officer Garcia admitted at trial, he arrived

on scene thirty minutes after the 9-1-1 call which would have been “a lot of time for

a vehicle to move in and out of the area.” Furthermore, Appellant’s vehicle did not

17
Judge Parker also emphasizes Officer Garcia’s testimony that he did not see another vehicle
for maybe miles in the thirty minutes on the way to the caller’s residence. Post at 6–7 (Parker,
J., dissenting). Presiding Judge Schenck appears to also emphasize this point. Post at 3
(Schenck, P.J., dissenting) (“He spotted no other vehicles on the road.”); see also id. at 12
(“. . . . when Deputy Garcia arrived thirty minutes later, the same or a similar vehicle appeared to
remain lurking in that same vicinity. . . .”) (original emphasis). Speculation, unlike a reasonable
inference, is not sufficiently based on the evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A rational jury could not reasonably
infer that Appellant’s vehicle was the same vehicle described by the 9-1-1 caller because the
absence of vehicles on Officer Garcia’s drive to the location of the 9-1-1 call does not provide
specific, articulable facts about Appellant’s particular vehicle. Moreover, Officer Garcia admitted
at trial that thirty minutes was sufficient time for the vehicle in question to have left the scene.
Presiding Judge Schenck also asserts that the “fact that the vehicle appeared to remain
thirty minutes hardly detracts [from the reasonable suspicion analysis]—if anything, it adds to the
suspicion that prompted the call.” Post at 7 (Schenck, P.J., dissenting). But this assertion lacks
any foundation in the record. There is simply no record evidence that the vehicle that Officer
Garcia saw “appeared to remain thirty minutes” at the scene of the 9-1-1 call.
HERNANDEZ — 15

match the specific description provided to Officer Garcia by the 9-1-1 caller. In sum,

there was nothing to link Appellant’s vehicle to any criminal activity. 18

A seminal case on point is Derichsweiler, which we called “admittedly a close

call” on the issue of reasonable suspicion. 348 S.W.3d at 917. There, a 9-1-1 caller

and his wife reported that a man pulled up next to them in the drive-thru lane at

McDonald’s “kind of grinning . . . and looking straight at us.” Id. at 909. The man

lingered and then drove off but returned minutes later acting in the same way. Id.

The couple felt “threatened” and “intimidated” by the man’s conduct, so they

called 9-1-1. Id. As the husband called, the couple observed the man leaving the

McDonald’s parking lot and driving to the adjacent Wal-Mart, “pulling up beside at

least two parked cars . . . and tarrying there.” Id. at 910. We concluded that the

defendant’s conduct “was bizarre to say the least,” and that “the repetition of

18
Judge Parker posits that “[a]nother explanation could be a possible trespass.” Post at 11
(Parker, J., dissenting). Judge Parker asserts that the 9-1-1 caller’s description of the vehicle
was “behavior that a reasonable officer could reasonably suspect to be the ‘casing’ of the caller’s
home.” Id. at 11. Contrary to Judge Parker’s argument, there are no specific, articulable facts
to suggest that the 9-1-1 caller believed the “suspicious” Chevrolet Silverado was “casing” her
home. Second, Officer Garcia never testified that he considered this theory. Nor did either of the
parties or the court of appeals consider this theory. And third, as Officer Garcia testified, the dirt
roads in this area lead to “ranchland and rural land” where people “go out there . . . for work” and
“live.” This case may have been different if, for example, there was evidence of multiple passes by
the 9-1-1 caller’s home. See infra at 15 (citing Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917). But without
“specific, articulable facts,” there is no support for Judge Parker’s assertion that the vehicle
that Officer Garcia pulled over was about to or had been trespassing anywhere. See Wade, 422
S.W.3d at 668.
HERNANDEZ — 16

similar, apparently scrutinizing, behavior directed at parked cars in the adjacent

Wal–Mart parking lot reasonably suggests a potential criminal motive.” Id. at 917.

This was so because the conduct “reasonably suggests someone who was looking to

criminally exploit some vulnerability—a weak or isolated individual to rob or an

unattended auto to burgle.” Id.

We found the evidence in other cases to be weaker than the “close call” in

Derichsweiler. Id. at 917. For example, in Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013), “a male subject in a tan Ford Taurus” was observed by a 9-1-1

caller “taking photos at the city pool . . . parked beside the fence.” Id. at 659 (cleaned

up). Officers responded and saw a vehicle fitting that description “pulling away from

the side of the pool.” Id. at 659–60. The 9-1-1 caller even confirmed that the patrol

car was behind the correct vehicle. Id. at 660. On appeal, the defendant challenged

whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify his stop and investigative

detention. Id. at 661. We concluded:

The totality of circumstances, including the cumulative information
known to the cooperating officers at the time of the stop, was that an
unknown male in a described vehicle was taking photographs at a public
pool. Photographs are routinely taken of people in public places,
including at public beaches, where bathing suits are also commonly
worn, and at concerts, festivals, and sporting events. Taking
photographs of people at such public venues is not unusual, suspicious,
or criminal.
HERNANDEZ — 17

The generally matching description of the vehicle simply connects
appellant to the “suspicious” photography, but does not in any way
suggest that, by taking pictures in a public place, appellant was, had
been, or soon would be, engaged in criminal activity. And since there
was no indication of crime being afoot, leaving the scene of such
photography does not constitute flight or evasion. Likewise, the fact
that the pool manager remained in contact with the dispatcher and
confirmed that the initial officer was behind the suspect vehicle does
not in any way indicate that crime was afoot.

Id. at 664.

Likewise, in Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), “the

police dispatcher radioed that an anonymous caller reported that a male driving a

blue Ford pickup truck stopped at [an intersection], put two bicycles into the back of

the truck, and drove away westbound.” Id. at 922. The officer, who was on patrol in

the general area, “spotted a green Ford F-250 truck that ‘looked like it was blue’

approximately three quarters of a mile away from the site of the reported incident.”

Id. The officer trailed the truck for four blocks without observing any traffic

violations, then stopped the vehicle. Id. After stopping the vehicle, the officer

observed evidence of driving while intoxicated. See id. While we noted that the

activity described was “unusual,” we concluded that “[m]ore than the officer’s

opinion that an activity is ‘suspicious’ was needed to relate the activity to a criminal

act.” Id. at 925. To reach this conclusion, we emphasized that “there was neither a

complainant nor a report of stolen bicycles. The anonymous caller did not report
HERNANDEZ — 18

contextual factors that reasonably connected the unusual activity to a theft.” Id. We

further emphasized had that the officer had “very little information, corroborated or

otherwise,” to connect the defendant to unusual activity “other than the fact that

[the defendant] was driving a Ford pickup truck, similar in color to the described

truck, close to the time that the unusual activity occurred, and within three quarters

of a mile west of the reported incident.” Id. We distinguished Derichsweiler and held

that the officer in Martinez “had significantly less, and less reliable, information: a

minimal, somewhat inaccurate description of the suspect vehicle, an anonymous

caller, a larger search area, and no suspicious behavior observed by the officer.” Id.

at 926.

In sum, the evidence in both Arguellez and Martinez fell short of the

“admittedly . . . close call” that was Derichsweiler. 348 S.W.3d at 926. The evidence

in this case falls even shorter. 19 Like in Arguellez, there was nothing “unusual,

19
Presiding Judge Schenck analogizes this case to the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). Post at 9 n.6 (Schenck, P.J.,
dissenting). But Presiding Judge Schenck’s recitation of Cortez ignores important facts
that were key to the Supreme Court’s analysis. To start, the border patrol agents had found sets of
human footprints, from 8 to 20 persons, walking in a well-defined path, in the desert, which ended
at “an isolated point on Highway 86.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 413. The footprints would follow
Highway 86 until approximately highway milepost 122, where the tracks disappeared “at the
road.” Id. This behavior, to the officers, amounted to a “particular pattern of operations.” Id. at
419. The officers also knew that the smuggling only occurred on clear weeknights, id., and the night
in question was the only such night on the week in question, see id. The officers staked out a location
approximately forty-five minutes from milepost 122 and tracked vehicles that passed them in one
direction and, an hour-and-a-half later, returned in the opposite direction. Id. at 419–20. And,
HERNANDEZ — 19

suspicious, or criminal” about an individual driving slowly on a dirt road at night.

See 409 S.W.3d at 664. Nor was there any evidence that “[A]ppellant was, had been,

or soon would be, engaged in criminal activity.” See id.20 And like in Martinez, the

same “significantly less, and less reliable, information” is evidenced here. See 348

S.W.3d at 926. Prior to initiating the traffic stop, Officer Garcia made no attempt to

verify whether the vehicle in question matched the description of the vehicle

described by the 9-1-1 caller. In fact, as Officer Garcia testified, he saw a vehicle’s

taillights and initiated a traffic stop. Even if we were to credit Officer Garcia’s

conclusion that Appellant’s vehicle was driving suspiciously, “[m]ore than the

officer’s opinion that an activity is ‘suspicious’ was needed to relate the activity to a

criminal act.” See id. at 925. That evidence is lacking from the record.

To the extent that the State relies on Officer Garcia’s personal knowledge that

this particular area was known for human trafficking, that argument is not

persuasive. If that were sufficient, any vehicle driving slowly in an area with known

based on the number of footprints, only certain vehicles capable of transporting a large number of
illegal immigrants could qualify. Id. at 420. It is no wonder than the Supreme Court concluded that
reasonable suspicion was met in Cortez. See id. at 421. Put simply, the law enforcement officers in
Cortez had a great deal more information about the car in question at their disposal than Officer
Garcia had about Appellant’s vehicle in this case.
20
The facts of this case are likely weaker than those in Arguellez: (1) Officer Garcia did not stop the
same vehicle that was specifically described in the 9-1-1 call; and (2) Officer Garcia arrived thirty
minutes after the 9-1-1 call, rather than while the 9-1-1 caller was still on the phone with dispatch.
HERNANDEZ — 20

activity of human trafficking could be detained on suspicion that that vehicle was

engaged in human trafficking. There were no “specific articulable facts” that Officer

Garcia could rely upon to distinguish the ordinary driver on the dirt road from the

one possibly engaged in human trafficking. See Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668. And the 9-

1-1 call does not move the needle: all it describes is a “suspicious” vehicle but

provides no indication that human trafficking was at play. Worse for this theory, the

9-1-1 caller identifies a vehicle that ultimately was not the vehicle that Officer Garcia

stopped. Put plainly, the facts necessary to support reasonable suspicion are not in

the record.

Examining the record as a whole, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient

to sustain Appellant’s conviction for evading arrest. The record is devoid of evidence

upon which Officer Garcia could have reasonably concluded that Appellant was, had

been, or soon would be engaged in criminal activity. 21

21
Presiding Judge Schenck also argues that Appellant’s detention might have been
justified under the community caretaking function. Post at 14 (Schenck, P.J., dissenting) (citing
Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). This is so because “[s]low speeds might
also signal distress.” Id. at 16. But this recrafts the entire State’s case from whole cloth. We have
previously held that “a police officer may not properly invoke his community caretaking function
if he is primarily motivated by a non-community caretaking purpose.” Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d
272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (1999)). In his testimony
at Appellant’s trial, Officer Garcia expressly disclaimed community caretaking as a basis for the
traffic stop and the State never argued community caretaking either at trial to the jury or to the
court of appeals below. Consequently, community caretaking is not a valid basis for the traffic stop
in light of the evidence admitted at Appellant’s trial.
HERNANDEZ — 21

IV. Conclusion

We conclude that no rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Officer Garcia’s attempted detention of Appellant was supported by reasonable

suspicion. Because the evidence is insufficient to sustain the lawful-arrest element of

Appellant’s conviction, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render

a judgment of acquittal.

Delivered: December 19, 2025
Publish
HERNANDEZ — 22

Appendix A