Barrett v. Barrett

FILED IN
BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS
BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK
ENTERED
9/23/2025
2025 Tex. Bus.37

The Business Court of Texas,
Fourth Division

CHARLOTTE ROGERS BARRETT, §
Plaintiff, §
§
v. §
MARCUS T. BARRETT, IV, §
MARCUS T. BARRETT, III, MARY §
ROGERS-BARRETT, WILLIAM §
OSBORN BARRETT, §
SUNFLOWER DRIVE § Cause No. 25-BC04A-0013
PARTNERSHIP, L.P., MRB ISLA, §
LLC, LAS RAICES LAND §
COMPANY, L.P., MTB HOLDINGS, §
LLC, MTB PROPERTIES, LTD., §
MTB INTERESTS, INC., CAMMOH §
SA, LTD., §
§
Defendants. §

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OPINION AND ORDER
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Syllabus ∗
This opinion addresses whether a party may remove a case concerning trusts from
statutory probate court to the business court. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction

∗
NOTE: The syllabus was created by court staff and is provided for the convenience of the reader.
It is not part of the Court’s opinion, does not constitute the Court’s official description or statement, and
should not be relied upon as legal authority.
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because the claims asserted by the plaintiff arise out of Title 9 of the Property Code, and under
section 25A.004(g) of the Texas Government Code, this court does not have jurisdiction over
such claims unless they are part of the court’s supplemental jurisdiction, which requires
agreement of the parties. Here, the parties disagreed.
OPINION
¶1 Before the court is an objection filed by Plaintiff Charlotte Rogers Barrett

requesting the court to remand this case to Bexar County Probate Court No. 1. After

consideration, the court sustains Plaintiff’s objection and orders the case remanded to the

statutory probate court.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff, individually and as beneficiary and current trustee

of the Charlotte Rogers Barrett Trust (“CRB Trust”), sued the following Defendants: (1)

Marcus T. Barrett, III, individually and as former trustee of the CRB Trust; (2) Mary Rogers

Barrett, individually, as trustee of the now terminated Mary Rogers Barrett Children’s

Trust, and as former trustee of the CRB Trust; (3) William Osborn Barrett, as former

trustee of the CRB Trust and trustee of the Marcus Thurman Barrett IV Trust; (4) Marcus

T. Barrett, IV; (5) Sunflower Drive Partnership, L.P.; (6) MRB Isla, LLC; (7) Las Racias

Land Company, L.P.; (8) MTB Holdings, LLC; (9) MTB Properties, Ltd.; (10) MTB

Interests, Inc.; and (11) Cammoh SA, Ltd. Plaintiff filed her original petition in Bexar

County Probate Court No. 1.

¶3 In her petition, Plaintiff states she was the beneficiary of two trusts

established thirty-five years ago, the CRB Trust and the Mary Rogers Barrett Children’s

Trust. The CRB Trust is currently in existence while the Mary Rogers Barrett Children’s

Trust was terminated in 2021. Plaintiff states three family members, each named as a

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defendant in this case, have served as a trustee of the trusts. Plaintiff alleges as trustees,

these defendants have breached fiduciary duties owed to her by making self-serving

investments of trust assets in family-run business entities they control through ownership

of managing member or general partnership interests. Plaintiff requests: (1) modification

of the CRB Trust; (2) monetary damages to recoup loss or depreciation in value of the trust

estates, profits made by the trustees through their breaches of fiduciary trusts, and any loss

profits that would have accrued if no breaches had occurred; (3) judicial dissolution of Las

Racias Land Company, L.P.; (4) attorney’s fees; (5) a declaration that the trustees cannot

use trust funds for payment of their expenses, attorney’s fees, or costs associated with this

matter, and (6) a second declaration that section 114.064 of the Property Code is the

controlling statute for Defendants to recover their fees and expenses.

¶4 On August 14, 2025, Defendant Marcus T. Barrett, IV, removed this case to

this court. In his notice of removal, he pleads this court has authority and jurisdiction over

this case pursuant to sections 25A.004(b)(1), (2), (5), (7), and 25A.004(e) of the

Government Code. Specifically, he argues Plaintiff’s case directly regards the governance

and internal affairs of two of the corporate defendants. Plaintiff also brings her suit in

several capacities, including derivatively on behalf of one of the corporate defendants, and

she states many of her claims are derivative in nature. Additionally, Plaintiff’s suit

contains numerous allegations that Defendants, acting in certain capacities on behalf of the

business entities, breached fiduciary duties owed to the partnerships and their owners. And

finally, Plaintiff’s suit arises out of the Business Organization Code because it seeks a

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judicial dissolution of one of the corporate defendants, and Plaintiff’s claims include

requests for declaratory relief.

¶5 Plaintiff timely objected, arguing removal is improper and this court lacks

jurisdiction over the action. According to Plaintiff, removal is improper because section

25A.006(d) of the Government Code authorizes a party to remove actions to this court only

if the action was originally filed in district court or county court at law—not statutory

probate court. Plaintiff also contends this court lacks jurisdiction because all her claims

arise out of the handling of trusts, and the business court does not have jurisdiction over

claims arising out of either the Estates Code or Chapter 53 and Title 9 of the Property Code.

Finally, Plaintiff argues Defendant is improperly relying solely on the dispute concerning

one of the corporate defendants to establish the amount in controversy requirement.

¶6 In addition to her objection, Plaintiff amended her original petition

requesting the court to void certain actions by the trustees, which ultimately resulted in the

conversion of trust property to limited partnership interests in the corporate defendants

pursuant to section 114.008(a)(9) of the Property Code. Plaintiff requests the court to

compel the trustees to restore said property as well as their breaches of trust by paying

money to Plaintiff pursuant to section 114.008(3) of the Property Code.

LEGAL STANDARD

¶7 Section 25A.006(d) of the Government Code provides: “A party to an action

filed in district court or county court at law that is within the jurisdiction of the business

court may remove the action to the business court.” Acts of May 25, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S.,

Ch. 380, §§1-9, 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 919. 919–929 (amended 2025) (current version

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at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(d)). However, if this court lacks jurisdiction over the

removed action, then this court must remand the action to the original court in which the

action was filed. Id.

¶8 As recognized by this court’s removal statute, subject matter jurisdiction is

essential to this court’s power to hear a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d

547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law.

Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex.

2024).

ANALYSIS

¶9 This court’s jurisdiction is established by statute. As previously recognized

by this court, to determine whether this court has jurisdiction over a case, it must conduct

a statutory construction analysis. Slant Operating, LLC v. Octane Energy Operating, LLC,

2025 Tex. Bus. 22, ¶15, 717 S.W.3d 409, 416 (8th Div.). “Statutory construction is a

question of law.” Id. (citing Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage

Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Tex. 2017)). When reading a statute, this court’s goal “is

to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Cadena, 518 S.W.3d at 325

(quoting Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012)); see Baumgardner

v. Brazos River Auth., 714 S.W.3d 597, 602 (Tex. 2025). This goal is accomplished by

giving words their plain and common meaning unless a different meaning is supplied by the

Legislature, is apparent from the context, or would lead to an absurd or nonsensical result.

Baumgardner, 714 S.W.3d at 602; Cadena, 518 S.W.3d at 325. “Words and phrases ‘shall

[also] be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common

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usage.’” Cadena, 518 S.W.3d at 325 (quoting Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc.,

430 S.W.3d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 2014)). Presuming the Legislature chooses words

carefully, this court must refrain from rewriting the Legislature’s text. Id.

¶10 Section 25A.004 of the Government Code outlines this court’s jurisdiction

and powers. Specifically, as pointed out by Defendant, subsections 25A.004(b) and (e) of

the Government Code provides this court has civil jurisdiction concurrent with the district

court over certain actions with a specific amount in controversy. See Acts of May 25, 2023,

88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 380, §§1-9, 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 919, 919–929 (amended 2025)

(current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 25A.004(b) & (e)).

¶11 Additionally, Subsection (f) outlines this court’s supplemental jurisdiction,

which requires “agreement of all parties to the claims and a judge of the division of the

court before which the action is pending.” Id. (current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE §§

25A.004(f)). Relevant here, subsection (g) expressly states this court does not have

jurisdiction over certain claims unless they fall within the court’s supplemental

jurisdiction. See id. (current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 25A.004(g)). It states:

Unless the claim falls within the business court’s supplemental
jurisdiction, the business court does not have jurisdiction of . . .
(2) a claim arising out of:
(A) Subchapter E, Chapter 15, and Chapter 17, Business
& Commerce Code;
(B) the Estates Code;
(C) the Family Code;
(D) the Insurance Code; or
(E) Chapter 53 and Title 9, Property Code[.]

Id. (current version TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.004(g)) (emphasis added).

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¶12 Here, we agree with Plaintiff that each of her claims arise directly out of Title

9 of the Property Code. The statute does not define the phrase “arising out of,” but the

Texas Supreme Court has made clear that the plain and common meaning of the phrase

means “originating from,” “stemming from,” “flowing from” or “resulting from.” See

Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 437 (Tex. 2017). When applying

this meaning, subsection (g) expressly states this court does not have jurisdiction over

claims originating from, stemming from, flowing from, or resulting from Title 9 of the

Property Code unless they fall within our supplemental jurisdiction.

¶13 Subtitle B of Title 9 of the Property Code comprises sections 111.001 through

117.012 of the Property Code, and it governs trust matters. See Matter of Troy S. Poe Trust,

646 S.W.3d 771, 774 n. 5 (Tex. 2022). This case is a trust matter. A review of Plaintiff’s

amended petition shows all her claims have been asserted by her in not only her individual

and beneficiary capacity, but also in her capacity as trustee of the CRB Trust. Plaintiff’s

suit is also against several family members in their capacities as either former trustee of the

CRB Trust or current trustee of the Mary Rogers Barrett Children’s Trust or Marcus

Thurman Barrett IV Trust.

¶14 Additionally, each of Plaintiff’s claims concerns a trust, and throughout her

petition, she repeatedly cites Title 9 of the Property Code. See id. Plaintiff alleges several

of the trustee defendants have conspired and breached fiduciary duties by making self-

serving investments of trust assets in several of the business entities. Plaintiff also seeks

to modify the CRB Trust and to recoup monetary damages against the trustee defendants

for their breaches of fiduciary duties. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims against the corporate

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defendants all originate from, stem from, flow from, or result from actions conducted by

the defendant trustees and matters concerning the subject trusts.

¶15 When considering the capacity in which Plaintiff brought this suit, who

Plaintiff sued, and the crux of Plaintiff’s claims in light of the various sections of Title 9, it

follows that each of Plaintiff’s claims arise directly out of Title 9 of the Property Code. See

TEX. PROP. CODE § 112.051 et seq. (outlining modification of trusts); id. § 113.001 et seq.

(outlining the powers and duties of trustees); id. § 114.001 et seq. (detailing the liabilities,

rights, and remedies of trustees, beneficiaries, and third parties); id. § 115.001 (providing

probate court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings by or against a

trustee and all proceedings concerning trusts). Thus, under subsection (g), this court does

not have jurisdiction over these claims unless they fall within our supplemental

jurisdiction. See Acts of May 25, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 380, §§1-9, 2023 Tex. Sess.

Law Serv. 919, 919–929 (amended 2025) (current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE §§

25A.004(g)). And here, even if presuming the claims fall within our supplemental

jurisdiction, the parties do not agree with the claims proceeding in this court as required by

subsection (f). See id. (current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 25A.004(f)). Accordingly,

this court lacks jurisdiction over each of Plaintiff’s claims.

CONCLUSION

¶16 Based on the foregoing, the court remands this case to Bexar County Probate

Court No. 1.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Marialyn Barnard
Judge of the Texas Business Court,
Fourth Division

SIGNED ON: September 23, 2025

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Envelope ID: 105968784
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Status as of 9/23/2025 2:11 PM CST

Associated Case Party: MarcusT. Barrett

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Marvin Pipkin 16026600 mpipkin@pipkinlawsatx.com 9/23/2025 2:03:19 PM SENT

Miranda RoseSalazar msalazar@gcaklaw.com 9/23/2025 2:03:19 PM SENT

Nadeen Abou-Hossa nabou-hossa@gcaklaw.com 9/23/2025 2:03:19 PM SENT

Steve Chiscano schiscano@gcaklaw.com 9/23/2025 2:03:19 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Charlotte Rogers-Barrett

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Adrianna LaFuente ALaFuente@dykema.com 9/23/2025 2:03:19 PM SENT

Sarah Maldonado smaldonado.eservice@outlook.com 9/23/2025 2:03:19 PM SENT

Matthew Pepping mpepping@dykema.com 9/23/2025 2:03:19 PM SENT

Katie Oldham kaoldham@dykema.com 9/23/2025 2:03:19 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Mary Rogers-Barrett

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Forrest Seger 24070587 tseger@clarkhill.com 9/23/2025 2:03:19 PM SENT