Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion: KP-0488

KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

March 5, 2025

The Honorable Bob Hall
Chair, Senate Committee on Administration
Texas State Senate
Post Office Box 12068
Austin, Texas 78711-2068

Opinion No. KP-0488

Re: Whether a vote by the board of a school district or governing body of an open-
enrollment charter school affirming the existing policy to permit a chaplain to be hired by
or volunteer at a school complies with the Eighty-eighth Legislature’s Senate Bill 763
(RQ-0553-KP)

Dear Senator Hall:

You ask about the responsibility under recently passed legislation for school district boards
of trustees (“school boards”) and open-enrollment charter school governing bodies (“charter
governing bodies”) to vote on whether to adopt a policy that authorizes employee or volunteer
chaplains. 1 In particular, you express concern that some “[s]chool districts appear to be skirting”
a statutory mandate the Eighty-eighth Legislature included in Senate Bill 763 (“SB 763”) 2 and
provide as an example specific language from a guidance document issued by the Texas
Association of School Boards. 3 Request Letter at 1. Given this concern, you ask whether three
hypothetical scenarios would prove noncompliant:

1. A vote acknowledging a policy that is silent about prohibiting
chaplains from being hired for any position,

1
Letter from Hon. Bob Hall, Chair, S. Comm. on Admin., to Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. at 1–2 (rec’d
July 26, 2024), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/request-files/request/2024/RQ0553KP.pdf
(“Request Letter”).
2
Act of May 24, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 1142, 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws 3509, 3509–10.
3
With this in mind, we generally caution school districts and other governmental entities against relying on
legal analysis distributed by legal advocacy groups—like the Texas Association of School Boards—with whom there
is no attorney-client relationship that would compel reasonably prudent counsel. Such organizations often base their
advice on ideology instead of sound legal principals. Following such unsound advice can incur needless liability, as
demonstrated by the variety of successful suits brought by the Office of the Attorney General against school districts
in recent years.
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2. A vote on a policy allowing chaplains to be hired for any open
position at a school, and

3. A vote authorizing a chaplain to be hired for a school chaplain
position, as created by SB 763.

Id. at 2. Key to your inquiry is that the first two scenarios involve hiring for “any position” and
“any open position,” respectively, while the third specifically refers to “a school chaplain
position.” Id. You state that the term “chaplain” in this context refers to “a new position created in
a new chapter of the Education Code.” Id. at 1. A brief received in response to your request
counters that “[t]he law does not require the creation of any ‘new position’—and those words are
entirely absent from the statute’s text.” 4 We therefore focus on whether SB 763 uses the term
“chaplain” to reference the substantive title of a new position or a preexisting role unrelated to that
for which an individual is hired or volunteers.

SB 763 directs school boards and charter governing bodies to vote on whether to
authorize employee or volunteer chaplains.

We begin by reviewing relevant portions of SB 763 and the Education Code. Section 1 of
SB 763 added Chapter 23 to the Education Code, which contains a single statutory provision.
SB 763, supra, at 3509 (codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE § 23.001). Section 23.001 of the Education
Code states that a school district or open-enrollment charter school “may employ or accept as a
volunteer a chaplain to provide support, services, and programs for students as assigned by the
board of trustees of the district or the governing body of the school.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 23.001(a).
Section 23.001 also makes such institutions responsible for ensuring that the chaplain complies
with certain requirements, and it prohibits registered sex offenders from serving as chaplains. Id.
§ 23.001(b)–(c).

Section 2 of SB 763 amended an Education Code provision pertaining to funds for the
improvement of school safety and security. SB 763, supra, at 3509–10 (codified at TEX. EDUC.
CODE § 48.115(b)). In relevant part, funds allocated under Section 48.115 of the Education Code
may be used to cover costs associated with “school safety and security measures” that include “the
prevention, identification, and management of emergencies and threats, using evidence-based,
effective prevention practices.” TEX. EDUC. CODE § 48.115(b)(3)(C) (containing a non-exhaustive
list of such practices). Those funds may also be used for “providing programs related to suicide
prevention, intervention, and postvention, including programs provided by chaplains.” Id.
§ 48.115(b)(4).

The provision about which you ask—Section 3 of SB 763—does not amend the Education
Code. Rather, it directs school boards and charter governing bodies as follows:

Each board of trustees of a school district and each governing body
of an open-enrollment charter school shall take a record vote not
4
Brief from Brian Klosterboer, Att’y, Am. Civ. Liberties Union Found. of Tex. at 2 (Aug. 19, 2024) (on file
with the Op. Comm.) (referring also to individuals who “have likely worked and volunteered in Texas schools for
years while also serving as chaplains of various faiths and backgrounds”).
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later than six months after the effective date of this Act on whether
to adopt a policy authorizing a campus of the district or school to
employ or accept as a volunteer a chaplain under Chapter 23,
Education Code, as added by this Act.

SB 763, supra, at 3510. Neither SB 763 nor relevant portions of the Education Code define
“chaplain.” See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE § 5.001 (“Definitions”).

The absence of a statutory definition requires us to assess the “common, ordinary meaning”
of the term “chaplain” by consulting relevant dictionaries and the term’s “usage in other statutes,
court decisions, and similar authorities.” Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists
v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 34–35 (Tex. 2017). We must also consider the context in which
the term “chaplain” is used and draw from traditional canons of statutory construction, both of
which inform the term’s usage and meaning. See, e.g., Greater Hous. P’ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d
51, 59 (Tex. 2015) (embracing both as tools of construction).

Dictionary definitions of “chaplain” consistently use the term in reference to a person
who provides religiously oriented services for a specified group or organization.

Relevant sources feature a variety of definitions for the term “chaplain.” One authority
provides that the term may refer to “a clergyman in charge of a chapel” or “a clergyman appointed
to assist a bishop (as at a liturgical function).” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
207 (11th ed. 2019). Another defines the term as “[a] member of the clergy who conducts religious
services for an institution, such as a prison or hospital” as well as “[a] member of the clergy
attached to a branch of the armed forces.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 311 (5th ed. 2011). But a chaplain need not be a member of the clergy, as the term may
also apply to “[a] lay person who is appointed to provide spiritual leadership and counseling to
members of an institution, as at a university.” Id.

There is, however, a common denominator in each of these definitions; the term “chaplain”
ordinarily refers to a person who provides religiously oriented services for a specified group or
organization. This suggests that SB 763 uses the term to reference a person who is either employed
or volunteers to provide those services for an educational institution. Still, these definitions do not
preclude a reading that instead uses “chaplain” to informally describe a generalized title one carries
throughout unrelated areas of life or employment. We thus proceed to other sources of meaning.

Statutes, regulations, and court decisions commonly use “chaplain” to refer to the
title of a particular position.

Traditional usage in other laws, regulations, and court decisions provides additional
guidance in construing the term “chaplain.” We begin with the use of “chaplain” in subsection
48.115(b), which is one of only two Education Code provisions addressed in SB 763. SB 763,
supra, at 3509–10. Subsection 48.115(b) specifically refers to chaplains as “mental health
personnel” for whom school safety funds may be allocated. TEX. EDUC. CODE
§ 48.115(b)(3)(C)(ii). That provision also indicates the term’s usage as a substantive, education-
related title by placing chaplains among an illustrative list of professionals likely to be “trained in
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restorative discipline and restorative justice practices.” Id. § 48.115(b)(3)(C)(i) (listing “licensed
counselors, social workers, [and] chaplains”); see also Finley Res., Inc. v. Headington Royalty,
Inc., 672 S.W.3d 332, 343 (Tex. 2023) (providing that “when words are associated in a context
that suggests they share a common quality, ‘they should be assigned a permissible meaning that
makes them similar’ but consistent with their ordinary meaning” (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 195 (2012))). The use
of chaplain in Section 2 of SB 763 should ultimately prove consistent with that in Section 3. See
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Xerox State & Loc. Sols., Inc., 663 S.W.3d 569, 578 (Tex. 2023) (“In
considering the context, there is a presumption of consistent usage: ‘A word or phrase is presumed
to bear the same meaning throughout a text.’” (quoting READING LAW, supra, at 170)).

Statutes and regulations not associated with SB 763 also demonstrate that “chaplain”
commonly refers to a named position within a given entity. For example, the Texas Government
Code authorizes financial assistance to the survivors of “an individual who is employed or formally
designated as a chaplain for” certain firefighting entities, law enforcement agencies, and the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 615.003(14). The deferred compensation
rules for state employee retirement define a “[p]ublic safety employee” to “include a chaplain” but
expressly exclude certain other named positions like “judges” and “guards.” 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 87.1(47). The Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes “the chaplains of the Department of
Corrections” 5 to be present at an inmate’s execution. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 43.20 (emphasis
added). And the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s regulations expressly provide that a
spiritual advisor witnessing an execution “must be currently employed as a TDCJ chaplain or have
an established ongoing spiritual relationship with the inmate.” 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 152.51(c)(1)(D). In each instance, “chaplain” clearly refers to a particular position—consistent
with its ordinary usage—suggesting that the term is used similarly in the Education Code.

Section 23.001’s statement that school districts and open-enrollment charter schools “may
employ or accept as a volunteer a chaplain to provide support, services, and programs for students,”
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 23.001(a), should also be read in light of similar “may employ” language in
other Texas statutes. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 866–71 (Tex. 2014) (analyzing a
term in the Business Organizations Code by looking to other statutory usage elsewhere). Providing
that “[a] school district may employ or contract with one or more nonphysician mental health
professionals,” for example, is not reasonably read to mean that such individuals may be hired for
a service unrelated to mental health. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 38.0101. Likewise, stating that higher
education boards “may employ private legal counsel to represent the health care professional staff
members or students covered by this subchapter under the rules of the board” is naturally read to
refer to legal representation. See id. § 59.05. And imposing a limitation that the Texas Commission
on Fire Protection “may employ not more than one attorney” indicates that only one individual
may serve as the commission’s attorney, not that licensed attorneys are prohibited from being hired
for non-legal roles. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 419.0091. So too here: Section 23.001’s reference to
support, services, and programs is naturally read in reference to the person who provides them. In
other words, “support” means chaplain-related support, “services” means chaplain-related
services, and “programs” means chaplain-related programs. Cf. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 48.115(b)(3)–

5
The Texas Department of Corrections is now known as the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–
Institutional Division. Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 235 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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(4) (including chaplains among those who provide “mental health support,” “behavioral health
services,” and “programs related to suicide prevention, intervention, and postvention”). Reading
the text to instead mean that a chaplain may provide students with any services, support, and
programs would divorce the word “chaplain” from its context and traditional usage.

Courts also commonly use “chaplain” to reference a position’s substantive title rather than
the demographic from which that position is drawn. For example, the Texas Supreme Court
decided a case involving a chaplaincy program where “volunteer chaplains must remain members
in good standing of a local church” in order “[t]o maintain their positions” with a county jail
facility. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Tex. 2001). The United States Supreme Court has
used “clergyman” to refer to an individual’s preexisting role while separately using “chaplain” to
reference the substantive title of an individual who performs prayer before a legislative body. See,
e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983) (discussing whether “choosing a clergyman of
one denomination advances the beliefs of a particular church” while observing that “guest
chaplains have officiated at the request of various legislators”). The Court also recounted that
“[t]he First Congress made it an early item of business to appoint and pay official chaplains,” later
“reevaluated the practice of official chaplaincies,” and ultimately maintained the “office” of
chaplain since the founding. Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 575–76 (2014). The
long-established convention of using “chaplain” to reference a substantive position further bolsters
construing Section 3 of SB 763 in a similar manner.

The grammatical context in which “chaplain” is used in SB 763 indicates that the
term refers to the official title for a substantive position at a school district or open-
enrollment charter school.

We also consult the grammatical context in which “chaplain” appears. See Tex. Health
Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton v. D.A., 569 S.W.3d 126, 132 (Tex. 2018) (recognizing that
“grammar rules can be crucial to proper construction”); TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs,
340 S.W.3d 432, 441 (Tex. 2011) (“Language cannot be interpreted apart from context.”).
Section 23.001 states that school districts and open-enrollment charter schools “may employ or
accept as a volunteer a chaplain to provide support, services, and programs for students.” TEX.
EDUC. CODE § 23.001(a) (emphasis added). The words “to provide” serve as an infinitive phrase,
which expresses the specific purposes for which a chaplain may be employed or accepted as a
volunteer—namely, providing student-related “support, services, and programs” as a chaplain.
See, e.g., Tejero v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C., 993 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2021) (“An
infinitive phrase expresses purpose.”). No other purposes are implicated by the statute, and thus
Section 23.001 does not countenance employment or volunteer acceptance “for any position” or
“for any open position at a school.” 6 See Request Letter at 2.

6
Relevant statutory headings also confirm the contextual meaning of “chaplain” as the title for an education-
related position. See Ad Villarai, LLC v. Chan Il Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132, 138 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (“The title and
headings are permissible indicators of meaning.” (quoting READING LAW, supra, at 221)). Both Chapter 23 and
Section 23.001 are titled “School Chaplains,” and the subtitle containing Chapter 23 is titled “Educators and School
District Employees and Volunteers.” This further indicates that Chapter 23 substantively pertains to those three
statuses.
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Section 3 of SB 763 requires a record vote for a school chaplain position.

With this backdrop in mind, we return to your three hypothetical resolutions. See id. The
sources of both syntactic and semantic meaning discussed above uniformly suggest that SB 763
uses “chaplain” to mean a substantive position within a school district or open-enrollment charter
school. The alternative conception of this term—that “chaplain” serves as a general, demographic
reference—inappropriately subverts the fair reading of SB 763 for a “hyperliteral” construction.
READING LAW, supra, at 356. But employing such “sterile literalism . . . loses sight of the forest
for the trees” and “is not a doctrine to be taken seriously.” Id. (quoting N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 68
F.2d 19, 20 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d sub. nom., Helvering v. N.Y. Tr. Co., 292 U.S. 455
(1934)). We therefore conclude a vote that either acknowledges a policy’s silence about hiring a
“chaplain” for “any position” or “allow[s] chaplains to be hired for any open position” would fail
the requirements of Section 3 of SB 763. See Request Letter at 2. By contrast, a vote on whether
to authorize a school district or open-enrollment charter school to hire “for a school chaplain
position” would comply with Section 3. See id.
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S U M M A R Y

Section 3 of Senate Bill 763, enacted by the Eighty-eighth
Legislature, directs the board of trustees of a school district and
governing body of an open-enrollment charter school to vote on
whether to authorize employee or volunteer chaplains. The term
“chaplain” refers to the official, substantive title for a particular
position with a school district or open-enrollment charter school.
The support, services, and programs authorized must be related to
the individual’s role as a school chaplain.

Ultimately, a school board or charter governing body does
not comply with Section 3 by voting on whether to authorize hiring
certain individuals for “any position” or “any open position” but
does comply by voting on whether to authorize hiring “for a school
chaplain position.”

Very truly yours,

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KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General

LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff

D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JOSHUA C. FIVESON
Chair, Opinion Committee

J. AARON BARNES
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee