In Re Steve Smith

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 25-1107
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In re Steve Smith,
Relator

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
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PER CURIAM

Chief Justice Blacklock and Justice Busby did not participate in
the decision.

On the last day of the filing period, Relator filed an application to
appear on the 2026 Republican primary ballot as a candidate for chief
justice of the Texas Supreme Court. Among various statutory
requirements to appear on the ballot for this office, candidates must
include with their application fifty signatures “from each court of
appeals district.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.021(g). After receiving a
challenge to the application, id. § 172.0223, Respondent, the chair of the
Republican Party of Texas, rejected Relator’s application on
December 12 because his application did “not contain fifty valid
signatures from each of the fifteen courts of appeals districts.” See id.
§ 172.021(g). Relator has brought an original proceeding in this Court
and claims entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus on
the ground that the Election Code’s signature requirement violates the
Texas Constitution. Relator does not ask us to declare that he satisfied
the requirement, nor does he request an opportunity to cure any
deficiencies Respondent might have identified in his application
materials. Instead, his sole request is that we declare, in an emergency
posture of Relator’s own creation and based on threadbare and
extremely expedited briefing, that Section 172.021(g) is facially
unconstitutional. And he requests no narrower a remedy than an order
directing Respondent to add his name to the ballot regardless of whether
he met the statutory requirements. For multiple reasons, we conclude
that Relator has not shown entitlement to mandamus relief.
First, in this posture, we need not formally resolve the facial
constitutionality of Section 172.021(g) of the Election Code to conclude
that this mandamus petition is an unsuitable vehicle to resolve such a
weighty question. As we have repeatedly stated, “although mandamus
is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable
principles.” In re Walker, 683 S.W.3d 400, 402 (Tex. 2024) (citing
Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993)). A facial
constitutional challenge to a longstanding statutory provision is a
serious matter that should not be brought at the last possible minute,
as this was, without an unusual justification. Reading the petition
liberally, Relator’s only apparent justification is his own failure to secure
a sufficient number of valid signatures even though he waited until the
very last day of the filing period to file his application. But his
contention is that he need not secure any. That claim could have been
brought long before it was, on a timeline that would have allowed an

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orderly resolution without upending the rules governing primary
elections in the midst of an election season. Cf. In re Khanoyan, 637
S.W.3d 762, 764 (Tex. 2022) (cautioning that “invoking judicial
authority in the election context requires unusual dispatch—the sort of
speed not reasonably demanded of parties and lawyers when interests
less compelling than our society’s need for smooth and uninterrupted
elections are at stake”). Equitable principles require reasonable
swiftness by the party seeking relief, and that requirement is especially
heightened if the party is asking a court to undertake the grave task of
declaring unconstitutional a duly enacted state law. See id.
Second, even if this Court were inclined to be the first court to
consider this significant question of constitutional law despite it
unnecessarily arising on an emergency basis, Relator would be unlikely
to succeed on the merits and to establish “a clear abuse of discretion” to
be entitled to mandamus relief. See In re Dall. HERO, 698 S.W.3d 242,
247 (Tex. 2024). We need not conclusively resolve the merits to observe
that Relator’s contention—that Section 172.021(g)’s signature
requirement is facially unconstitutional because it imposes additional
eligibility requirements for office beyond what is required under the
Texas Constitution—faces a number of serious problems.
True, as Relator observes, the Texas Constitution enumerates the
eligibility requirements for a person to serve in the office of the chief
justice or justice of the Texas Supreme Court, see TEX. CONST. art. 5,
§ 2(b), and “it is beyond the power of the Legislature to add another
ground of disqualification” beyond those listed in the Constitution. State
ex rel. Candler v. Ct. of Civ. Appeals, Fourth Sup. Jud. Dist., 75 S.W.2d

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253, 257 (Tex. 1934) (quoting Kilday v. State ex rel. Candler, 75 S.W.2d
148, 150 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1934, no writ)). For this principle to
play a role in this case, however, we would have to embrace Relator’s
assumption that anything that affects placement on the ballot
constitutes an “eligibility requirement.” If that were so, then the filing
fee—which Relator paid and does not challenge—would constitute an
eligibility requirement. And so, perhaps, would compliance with any
date restrictions until ballots had to be printed. Section 172.021(g)’s
signature requirement at least plausibly constitutes a procedural
requirement for orderly election administration rather than an
additional ground of disqualification from holding public office wholly
aside from compliance with statutory procedures. Cf., e.g., Dickson v.
Strickland, 265 S.W. 1012, 1015-16 (Tex. 1924) (concluding, as part of
its analysis of the trial court’s jurisdiction, that the Legislature could
not add a statutory residency requirement to the constitutional
eligibility requirements for the office of Governor). A legal requirement
that foreclosed a citizen’s ability to serve at all would implicate the
constitutional principle, but the signature requirement is at least
plausibly merely part of the broader procedure for a candidate to be
placed on the primary election ballot.
“Our Court has long held that ‘a candidate’s access to the ballot
is an important value to our democracy.’” In re Morris, 683 S.W.3d 396,
397 (Tex. 2024) (quoting In re Green Party of Tex., 630 S.W.3d 36, 40
(Tex. 2020)). It follows that for “the people [to] decide who their leaders
will be,” id., there must be an orderly process for elections, whether the
primary or general, to present to the people the qualifying candidates

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for each relevant office. Cf. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
n.9 (1983) (“The State has the undoubted right to require candidates to
make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify
for a place on the ballot, because it is both wasteful and confusing to
encumber the ballot with the names of frivolous candidates.”); Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (“Moreover, a State has an interest,
if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from
frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.”). Accordingly, just as the
Legislature provides regulations for voter registration to “preserve the
purity of the ballot box,” TEX. CONST. art. 6, § 4, the Legislature also
enacts statutory provisions governing the procedure a candidate must
follow to be included on the primary election ballot. Given Relator’s
inability to establish a likelihood of success, it would be especially
improvident for the Court to exercise its discretion to authoritatively
address the constitutional question he presents.1
Third, Relator has not provided his complete application and
petition that would allow us to examine the record. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 52.7(a) (requiring relator to include a copy “of every document that is
material to the relator’s claim for relief”). True, a facial constitutional
challenge may require less by way of a record than other kinds of claims.

1 Relator also contends that the Republican Party of Texas’s chair failed

to adequately notify him of his application’s deficiencies. See TEX. ELEC. CODE
§ 172.0222(b) (requiring the political party to review an application “to
determine whether it complies with the requirements as to form, content, and
procedure that it must satisfy for the candidate’s name to be placed on the
general primary election ballot”). Contrary to Relator’s assertion, however, a
representative of the Republican Party’s chair did in fact “deliver to [him]
written notice of the reason for the rejection.” Id. § 172.0222(g).

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For example, Relator does not contend that the party has wrongly
excluded signatures that were in fact valid or that he should be entitled
to cure any deficiency. Claims like that would require a full record.
Nonetheless, the failure to provide a meaningful record at all only
emphasizes that this petition is poorly suited to generate the kind of
constitutional decision that it demands.2
Fourth, the nature of Relator’s claim and the relief he seeks
implicate a host of other constitutional issues that Relator does not
acknowledge, including the associational rights of political parties under
the United States and Texas Constitutions. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477
(1975). We do not purport to identify all such issues, much less analyze
them. But the existence of these downstream, unaddressed
considerations only further underscores the serious impropriety of
creating a needless emergency to seek relief for claims that could have
been considered and resolved long ago. Cf. Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at
764.

2 On December 18—nearly a week after he submitted this mandamus

petition—Relator submitted a new motion asking the Court to “order
Respondent to immediately transfer to the clerk of the court the ballot access
petition that Relator filed with Respondent.” Our rules require a relator to
supply the mandamus record when seeking relief in this Court rather than, at
some later point, shifting that obligation to an adverse party. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 52.7(a). We need not opine as to the proper procedure when an essential
part of a record is uniquely within another party’s possession because Relator
offers no explanation as to why he cannot submit to us his own copy of his
complete application. In any event, our decision today would not change even
if Respondent unilaterally supplied the application. The December 18 motion
is denied.

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We therefore formally reserve any constitutional decision until a
proper case comes, if one ever does. We hold only that, on the narrow
issue presented, Relator is not entitled to mandamus relief.
Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we deny his petition.

OPINION DELIVERED: December 22, 2025

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