Hyundam Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Paul Swacina, as Successor Guardian of the Person and Estate of Johari Kibibi Powell, an Incapacitated Person, and Paul Swacina as Next Friend of D.A.P., D.A.C., and D.A.C., Minor Children

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 24-0207
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Hyundam Industrial Company, Ltd.,
Petitioner,

v.

Paul Swacina, as Successor Guardian of the Person and Estate of
Johari Kibibi Powell, an Incapacitated Person, and Paul Swacina
as Next Friend of D.A.P., D.A.C., and D.A.C., Minor Children,
Respondents

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas
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PER CURIAM

At issue here is whether a Texas court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over Hyundam Industrial Company, Ltd., a South Korean
company that manufactures automobile parts. As we reaffirm today in
BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, “a defendant [must] specifically
target Texas” to be subject to personal jurisdiction; “it is not enough that
a defendant may foresee some of its products’ eventually arriving here.”
___ S.W.3d ___, 2025 WL ___ (Tex. June 20, 2025). Because there is no
evidence Hyundam targeted Texas, we reverse the judgment of the court
of appeals and render judgment dismissing the case against Hyundam.
I
Johari Powell suffered serious injuries when her 2009 Hyundai
Elantra stalled in the center lane of traffic and was rear-ended. Powell
alleges that the car stalled because its fuel pump failed. Paul Swacina,
on behalf of Powell and her minor children, sued multiple defendants in
Texas state court for various causes of action related to the car collision.
This appeal concerns only defendant Hyundam, the manufacturer of the
Elantra’s fuel pump.
Hyundam filed a special appearance under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 120a, requesting that the trial court dismiss the case against
it for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support, it attached an affidavit
by Jinwook Chang, Managing Director of the Technical R&D Center at
Hyundam, explaining that Hyundam designed and manufactured the
fuel pump in South Korea. Hyundam designed the fuel pump under
Hyundai Motor Company’s specifications and subject to its approval.
Hyundam sold ninety-nine percent of its fuel pumps to Donghee
Industries, Co., a South Korean company. Donghee then incorporated
the fuel pumps into a fuel system in South Korea and sold the assembled
fuel systems to Hyundai, also a South Korean company, which installed
the fuel systems into the Elantra in South Korea. Chang stated that
once Hyundam sold the fuel pumps to Donghee, it had no role in
producing the Elantra. Hyundam sold the remaining one percent of fuel
pumps to Hyundai Mobis Co. Ltd., a South Korean company. Mobis
distributes service parts to Hyundai automobile dealers globally,

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including in Texas, but Hyundam has no control over where Mobis sells
its products.
Chang added that Hyundam:
• has never done or sought to do business in Texas;
• has no place of business, employees, or agents in Texas;
• does not advertise, market, export, or sell products in Texas;
and
• has no control over where the Elantras containing the fuel
pumps are sold or shipped.
Swacina responded to Hyundam’s special appearance and
presented evidence purporting to show that Hyundam was subject to
personal jurisdiction in Texas: (1) Hyundam designed the fuel pump for
the North American region and knew the fuel pumps were sold in Texas;
(2) a replacement Hyundam fuel pump was purchased at a Hyundai
dealership in Texas; (3) Hyundam maintains a website in English that
is accessible in Texas and that says Hyundam has supplied Hyundai
with fuel pumps since 1994; and (4) Hyundai sold over 97,000 Elantras
in the United States in 2009.
Swacina also objected to Chang’s affidavit and moved to strike it
because, among other things, it was not based on Chang’s personal
knowledge. The trial court overruled Swacina’s objections and denied
the motion to strike. The court held a hearing on Hyundam’s special
appearance and ultimately denied it. Hyundam filed this interlocutory
appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(7).
The court of appeals affirmed. It held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in overruling Swacina’s objection to the affidavit.
692 S.W.3d 734, 745 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2023). The

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court further held that Hyundam purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of doing business in Texas by designing its fuel pumps for the
North American region. Id. at 749. It was “of no consequence” that the
North American region includes markets other than Texas because
“Hyundam need not ‘single Texas out in some unique way to satisfy
constitutional dictates.’” Id. (quoting State v. Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 420 (Tex. 2023)).
This petition followed.
II
A
We first consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
overruling Swacina’s objection to Chang’s affidavit and denying his
motion to strike the affidavit. See Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v.
Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 727 (Tex. 2016) (stating that appellate
courts review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion). 1
It did not.
A trial court must “determine the special appearance on the basis
of the pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the parties, such
affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties, the results of
discovery processes, and any oral testimony.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(3).

1 Swacina raised his personal-knowledge argument in his merits brief

in this Court and not by cross-petition for review. Swacina’s argument is not
forfeited by his failure to file a cross-petition because he argues an alternative
ground to affirm the court of appeals’ judgment and does not seek to alter the
judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53.1 (“A party who seeks to alter the court of
appeals’ judgment must file a petition for review.”); Dall./Fort Worth Int’l
Airport Bd. v. Vizant Techs., LLC, 576 S.W.3d 362, 366 n.9 (Tex. 2019) (holding
that Rule 53.1 does not require a cross-petition when a party raises an
argument “as an alternative basis to support [the] judgment”).

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Any affidavit attached to a special appearance “shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth specific facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify.” Id. To satisfy the personal-knowledge requirement, the
“affiant must swear that the facts presented in the affidavit reflect his
personal knowledge.” In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d
218, 224 (Tex. 2004). “An affiant’s belief about the facts is legally
insufficient.” Kerlin v. Arias, 274 S.W.3d 666, 668 (Tex. 2008).
Chang begins his affidavit by detailing the various roles he held
during the seventeen years he worked at Hyundam and the knowledge
he gained in each role. As Managing Director of the Technical R&D
Center, Chang oversaw “product development for new vehicle models.”
Chang “routinely attend[ed]” business meetings in which he “obtained
personal knowledge” about the fuel pump’s “purchasers, product
distribution chains, and quantities of the product being sold” and
information about Hyundam’s “revenues, sales[,] and marketing
practices.” Throughout the affidavit, Chang asserted that the “facts are
within [his] personal knowledge as a result of [his] experience” at
Hyundam.
An affiant’s job responsibilities can give him personal knowledge
of a company’s operations and can establish how he learned of the facts
asserted. See Valenzuela v. State & Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 317 S.W.3d
550, 553-54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Merely
stating that the facts are within the affiant’s personal knowledge would
be conclusory and insufficient to satisfy the personal-knowledge
requirement. See Ryland Grp. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996).

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But the affidavit here went further. Chang laid a foundation for his
personal knowledge by detailing his extensive experience at Hyundam,
the knowledge he obtained in each role, and the documents he reviewed
to prepare his affidavit. Most relevant here, Chang obtained contracts
for new vehicle models, learned the distribution chain of Hyundam’s fuel
pumps, and was privy to information on its sales and marketing
practices.
Because the affidavit was sufficiently based on Chang’s personal
knowledge, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
Swacina’s objection and denying his motion to strike the affidavit.
B
We next consider whether Hyundam purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of doing business in Texas such that it is subject to specific
personal jurisdiction here. We hold that there is no evidence Hyundam
targeted Texas, so it did not purposefully avail itself of the Texas
market.
A Texas court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction when
the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum [s]tate” and “the plaintiff’s claims ‘arise out
of or relate to’ those forum contacts.” Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 412-13
(alteration in original) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021)). When considering whether the
defendant purposefully availed itself of Texas, we consider “only the
defendant’s contacts with the forum . . . , not the unilateral activity of
another party or a third person.” Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg,
221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007). The defendant’s contacts must be

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“purposeful,” not “random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” Id. Further, the
defendant “must seek some benefit, advantage[,] or profit by ‘availing’
itself of [Texas’s] jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Michiana Easy Livin’
Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005)).
To engage in purposeful availment, our precedent requires that
the defendant undertake “some ‘additional conduct’—beyond merely
placing the product in the stream of commerce—that indicates ‘an intent
or purpose to serve the market in the forum [s]tate.’” Spir Star AG v.
Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
As we emphasize today in BRP-Rotax, “a key point is that mere
awareness, or ‘foreseeability,’ of a product’s sale or distribution in Texas
‘alone’ cannot ‘create minimum contacts’ sufficient to ‘support personal
jurisdiction.’” ___ S.W.3d at ___ (quoting CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d
591, 595-96 (Tex. 1996)); see also TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 46
(Tex. 2016). The defendant must target Texas; it is not enough that the
“defendant merely foresees [its] product ending up there.” Luciano v.
SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2021) (emphasis
added).
This dispute centers on Chang’s deposition testimony that
Hyundam “developed and delivered [its] products to satisfy specification
for North America.” Therefore, “Hyundam knew that Hyundai was
selling vehicles with fuel modules built by Hyundam and they were
being sold in North America,” which, Chang admitted, includes Texas.
Swacina argues that designing the fuel pump for North American

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specifications constitutes additional conduct targeting Texas. We
disagree.
Designing a product for a region that includes Texas makes it
foreseeable that the product will end up in Texas. But the fact that
Hyundam designed the fuel pump for North America and knew that it
was sold in Texas does not, by itself, constitute additional conduct
targeting Texas. It is the defendant’s purposeful contacts with
Texas—not a larger region in which Texas sits—that are relevant to our
personal-jurisdiction inquiry. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
564 U.S. 873, 885-86 (2011) (plurality opinion). Hyundam did not design
the fuel pump for Texas but rather, for the expansive North American
region which contains the United States’ fifty states and twenty-two
other countries. Hyundam had no control over where vehicles
containing its fuel pumps were sold. Further, Hyundam has never
sought to do business in Texas; maintains no offices, employees, or
agents in Texas; and does not advertise, market, or sell its products in
Texas.
This case is like BRP-Rotax, in which we rejected the argument
that a defendant’s desire to serve a large region including Texas was
evidence of the defendant’s purposeful availment of Texas. ___ S.W.3d
at ___. There, a distribution agreement between the defendant and a
third party required the third party to advertise and sell the defendant’s
product in a territory that spanned two large continents and included
Texas. Id. Here too, Hyundam’s designing the fuel pump for the entire
North American region “expresses no view, much less any command,
about whether any business at all will be transacted in Texas.” Id.; see

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also Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 886 (plurality opinion) (holding that a foreign
manufacturer had not purposefully availed itself of New Jersey despite
its intent to serve the entire United States market). Hyundam’s
manufacturing the fuel pump for North American specifications makes
it foreseeable that some of its products would end up in Texas. But the
mere foreseeability or awareness that a product may be sold in Texas,
standing alone, is insufficient to subject a defendant to personal
jurisdiction in Texas. CSR, 925 S.W.2d at 595-96.
This case is unlike Volkswagen, in which the defendants
purposefully availed themselves of every market in which their vehicles
were present, including Texas, by initiating recall and service
campaigns. 669 S.W.3d at 420, 424. “[B]ecause ‘personal jurisdiction
requires a forum-by-forum’ analysis, we look[ed] only to the
[defendants’] behavior directed toward Texas, not their behavior
directed elsewhere.” Id. at 420 (quoting Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 884
(plurality opinion)). As we explained, the fact that the defendants
similarly targeted other forums did not negate their purposeful
availment of Texas:
The defendant need not single Texas out in some unique
way to satisfy constitutional dictates. To hold that a
nonresident who has directed activity to every state is not
amenable to jurisdiction in any state would unduly
constrain the authority of state courts to hold nonresidents
accountable for their in-state conduct and would convert
the specific-personal-jurisdiction analysis into a wholly
subjective inquiry into the defendants’ state of mind.
Id. The defendants’ targeting of every forum in which their products
were located (including Texas) could not mean that they targeted no
forum. Only after concluding that the defendants targeted Texas was it

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necessary for the Court to explain that they “need[ed] not” target Texas
“in some unique way” from the other forums they targeted to be subject
to personal jurisdiction in Texas. Id.
The court of appeals below misapplied Volkswagen by stating that
“Hyundam need not ‘single Texas out in some unique way to satisfy
constitutional dictates.’” 692 S.W.3d at 749 (quoting Volkswagen, 669
S.W.3d at 420). The court of appeals took Volkswagen to mean that a
defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas if the
defendant merely targets a general region that includes Texas. Such a
reading flies in the face of our explanation that “the critical inquiry is
whether a nonresident defendant has established sufficient contacts
with Texas—not whether those contacts are materially different from its
contacts with other states.” Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 421 (emphasis
added). Unlike in Volkswagen, there is no evidence that Hyundam
targeted Texas, so our inquiry ends there. See Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v.
OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2013) (stating that courts look
only to the defendant’s contacts with Texas).
To be sure, we are not suggesting that a foreign manufacturer
must design its products specifically for Texas to purposefully avail itself
of the Texas market. But a foreign manufacturer must engage in some
conduct targeting Texas. Hyundam’s designing the fuel pump for a
general region with no specific targeting of Texas does not clear that bar.
Nor do Swacina’s three other pieces of evidence show that
Hyundam targeted Texas. First, Swacina presented evidence that one
of Hyundam’s fuel pumps was purchased in Texas. Chang explained in
his affidavit that Hyundam sold less than one percent of its fuel pumps

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to Mobis, a South Korean company that distributes service parts to
Hyundai dealerships. Hyundam had no control over where Mobis
distributed the fuel pumps. The replacement fuel pump was purchased
from Hub Hyundai, a franchised Hyundai dealership—not from
Hyundam. Swacina does not explain how Hub Hyundai obtained the
fuel pump—be it from Mobis, Hyundai, or Hyundam. Nor is there any
evidence that Hyundam had a distribution agreement with any
company in the United States, let alone in Texas. See Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 112 (plurality opinion) (stating that “[a]dditional conduct” targeting
the forum may include “marketing the product through a distributor
who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum [s]tate”). The
mere fact that a fuel pump was purchased in Texas is insufficient to
show that Hyundam acted through an agent or intermediary to
intentionally target Texas.
Second, evidence that Hyundam maintains a website in English,
without more, fails to show that Hyundam targeted Texas. “If any
website’s mere use of English illustrates an attempt to target Texas
specifically—as opposed to the other jurisdictions within our nation and
across the world that primarily speak English—then the work of the
Texas courts should be expected to grow by massive proportions.”
BRP-Rotax, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
Third, evidence of Hyundai’s Elantra sales is legally insufficient
to show that Hyundam targeted Texas. We do not consider the
unilateral activity of Hyundai, a third party, in assessing Hyundam’s
contacts with Texas. See Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 151. In all, the
evidence shows no more than that the “stream [of commerce] eventually

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swept [Hyundam’s] product into” Texas despite Hyundam doing
“nothing else to purposefully avail itself of the [Texas] market.” See
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 110 (plurality opinion).
III
As in BRP-Rotax, our decision today “break[s] no new
jurisprudential ground.” ___ S.W.3d at ___. Hyundam’s awareness that
its product may end up in Texas is not, standing alone, sufficient to
subject it to personal jurisdiction in our courts. Without hearing oral
argument, see TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, we grant Hyundam’s petition for
review, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and render
judgment dismissing the case against Hyundam.

OPINION DELIVERED: June 20, 2025

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