Reme, L.L.C., a Texas Limited Liability Company v. the State of Texas

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 23-0707
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REME, L.L.C., a Texas Limited Liability Company,
Petitioner,

v.

The State of Texas,
Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas
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PER CURIAM

The deadline to object to a commissioners’ award in a
condemnation case runs from the filing of the commissioners’ findings
“with the court.” See TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.018(a). In this case, the
State filed the commissioners’ award with the court clerk, and the trial
court judge acknowledged receipt of it three days later. The trial court
ruled that the statutory period to object to the award began to run upon
the State’s filing of the award with the court clerk, and it disallowed the
State’s tardy objection to it. The court of appeals reversed, concluding
that filing “with the court” is complete only upon the judge’s receipt of
the award. We hold that filing “with the court” includes the court clerk;
thus, the statutory period for raising an objection to the commissioners’
award commenced on that date. The trial court correctly ruled that the
State’s objection was untimely. Accordingly, we reverse the court of
appeals’ judgment.

I
In 2020, the State began condemnation proceedings to acquire
about one-tenth of an acre in Montgomery County from REME, L.L.C.
The trial court appointed disinterested commissioners. After a hearing,
the commissioners assessed condemnation damages at $1.1 million.
On Friday, April 16, 2021, the State electronically filed the
commissioners’ findings as a “proposed” award with the trial court clerk.
The clerk acknowledged that the award was “Received and E-Filed for
Record” on that date. The filing included blanks for the judge to award
the commissioners’ fees and to acknowledge receipt. The notification of
service reflected that the State filed the award on April 16.
On Monday, April 19, the judge awarded fees in the allotted space
to do so and signed the award, leaving blank an acknowledgment that
“The foregoing decision and Award was filed with me this the _____ day
of _________, 2021.” In the award, the court instructed the clerk to notify
the parties of the filing date by certified mail. See id. § 21.049 (requiring
the clerk to send notice of the commissioners’ award to the parties by
certified mail). The clerk notified the State of the commissioners’
findings, noting that the judge had signed the award on April 19. In the
notice, the clerk attached a copy of the award, with its April 16 file stamp
and its April 19 judicial signature.

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On May 14, the State electronically filed a written objection to the
commissioners’ findings—within the statutory period to object if
calculated from the date of judicial signature but outside the period if
calculated from the date the State filed the award with the trial court
clerk. 1 REME moved for the court to render final judgment, arguing
that the State’s objection was untimely.
The trial court adopted the commissioners’ award and rendered
judgment. It ruled the State’s objection untimely, stating: “It appears
to the Court, and it is so found, that no objections to the Award or
decision were filed within the time provided by law and that said Award
has been filed with the Clerk of this Court.”
The State appealed, contending that its objection was timely
because filing “with the court” requires judicial receipt to be complete,
and the trial court judge did not act on the award until three days after
the State filed it with the court clerk. The court of appeals agreed and
reversed, holding that the Property Code requirement that a filing be
made “with the court” is not complete until receipt by the judge. ___
S.W.3d ___, 2023 WL 4781647, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 27,
2023). The concurring justice would have concluded that the State’s

1 The Property Code requires objections to be filed by the “Monday
following the 20th day” after the filing of the commissioners’ award. TEX.
PROP. CODE § 21.018(a). If the award was filed Friday, April 16, the twentieth
day after would have been Thursday, May 7, and the objection would have been
due on Monday, May 10. If the award was filed Monday, April 19, twenty days
afterward would have been a Sunday. The State argues—and REME does not
dispute—that under Government Code Section 311.014(b), Monday, May 10 is
deemed the twentieth day, making the “Monday following the 20th day”
Monday, May 17. As we decide the award was filed on Friday, we express no
opinion regarding the parties’ interpretation of the Government Code.

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objection was timely by holding that a “proposed award” is ineffective to
begin the objection period. Id. at *8.

II
Texas Property Code Chapter 21 governs the State’s exercise of
its eminent domain power through condemnation. TEX. PROP. CODE
§ 21.011. Under the statutory framework, an authorized entity files a
condemnation petition in the proper court and mails a copy of the
petition to the landowner. Id. § 21.012(a), (c). The trial court then
appoints disinterested commissioners who “assess the damages” owed
to the landowner to compensate for the taking. Id. § 21.014(a). The
award is then filed with the court, along with a request that the court
award costs of the proceeding. Id. § 21.048.
A party may object to the commissioners’ award “by filing a
written statement . . . on or before the first Monday following the 20th
day after the day the commissioners file their findings with the court.”
Id. § 21.018(a). A timely filed objection converts the administrative
proceeding into a judicial one, which proceeds thereafter “in the same
manner as other civil causes.” Id. § 21.018(b). The question before us is
whether the phrase “file their findings with the court” includes filing
with the trial court clerk. We conclude it does.
We review questions of statutory construction de novo. MCI Sales
& Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 500 (Tex. 2010). “When
interpreting statutes, we look to the plain meaning of the enacted text”
and apply that plain meaning “unless a different meaning is apparent
from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or nonsensical
results.” KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 183

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(Tex. 2019). We examine the technical or particular meaning the words
have acquired and consider specific statutory language in context,
“looking to the statute as a whole.” Id.
Chapter 21 provides no specific filing mechanism. The receipt of
filings, however, is commonly understood to be a task delegated to the
court clerk. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and our Court’s
precedent reflect this commonly understood meaning. 2 Rule 74, entitled
“Filing with the Court Defined,” instructs that filings are made to the
court clerk in the ordinary case:
The filing of pleadings, other papers and exhibits as
required by these rules shall be made by filing them with
the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the
papers to be filed with him, in which event he shall note
thereon the filing date and time and forthwith transmit
them to the office of the clerk.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 74. Rule 21 similarly instructs that filings must typically
be made in writing to the court clerk. Id. R. 21 (“Every pleading, plea,
motion, or application to the court for an order, whether in the form of a
motion, plea, or other form of request, unless presented during a hearing
or trial, must be filed with the clerk of the court in writing . . . .”). 3

2 The parties agree that the Rules are generally inapplicable to the
administrative phase of condemnation proceedings. See Rayburn v. State, 356
S.W.2d 774, 774 (Tex. 1962) (“[T]he Rules of Civil Procedure do not operate to
extend the time provided by statute within which an appeal may be taken to
the courts in a proceeding originally administrative in nature.”). They provide
persuasive authority, however, as to the commonly understood meaning of
filing “with the court.”
3 Rule 21(f)(5) provides that an “electronically filed document is deemed

filed when transmitted to the filing party’s electronic filing service provider.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(f)(5).

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This Court’s precedent interpreting the rules of civil procedure
likewise holds that a document is “filed” when put in the custody or
control of the clerk. See Jamar v. Patterson, 868 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex.
1993) (“[A] document is ‘filed’ when it is tendered to the clerk, or
otherwise put under the custody or control of the clerk.”); Biffle v.
Morton Rubber Indus., Inc., 785 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex. 1990) (“An
instrument is deemed in law filed at the time it is delivered to the clerk,
regardless of whether the instrument is filemarked.”); Standard Fire
Ins. Co. v. LaCoke, 585 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex. 1979) (“[A]n instrument is
deemed filed when it is placed in the custody or control of the clerk.”).
Litigants in Texas thus generally understand that filing “with the court”
includes filing with the court clerk. Nothing in Section 21.018(a)
expresses an intent to depart from this commonly understood meaning.
The State observes that Section 21.018(a) was part of a
nonsubstantive recodification of the law and thus urges that we carry
forward the predecessor statute’s meaning. Section 21.018(a)’s
predecessor statute, recodified in 1983 with the enactment of the Texas
Property Code, was intended to reorganize state law without
substantive change. See Act of May 26, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 576,
§ 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3475, 3475 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE
§ 1.001(a)). The predecessor version reads:
If either party be dissatisfied with the decision, such party
may, on or before the first Monday following the 20th day
after the same has been filed with the county judge, file his
objection thereto in writing, setting forth the grounds of his
objection, and thereupon the adverse party shall be cited
and the cause shall be tried and determined as in other civil
causes in the county court.

6
Act of May 20, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 357, § 1, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws
766, 766-67.
A truly nonsubstantive recodification should leave the previous
interpretation intact, but “court” has a different meaning than “county
judge”—the former includes the court clerk. By choosing to use “court”
instead of “county judge,” the Legislature enacted a direct, substantive
change. Thus, we interpret the language of the statute as written. See
Dealers Elec. Supply Co. v. Scroggins Constr. Co., 292 S.W.3d 650, 658
(Tex. 2009) (“[C]ourts may not look back to the former text of a statute
that has been nonsubstantively re-codified if the current text is direct
and unambiguous.”). 4
Finally, the State notes that Section 21.049 requires “[t]he judge
of a court hearing a proceeding under this chapter [to] inform the clerk
of the court as to a decision by the special commissioners on the day the
decision is filed or on the next working day after the day the decision is
filed.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.049. The State argues that it is the judge’s
duty to inform the clerk of the filing, “not the other way around.” Such
would be the case had the commissioners handed their award to the
judge; the judge would then be charged with ensuring the award’s filing
with the court clerk. Nothing in Section 21.049, however, precludes the

4 We similarly reject the analysis in the court of appeals’ concurring

opinion. Chapter 21 tasks disinterested commissioners—not the judge—with
assessing damages in condemnation proceedings as an initial matter. TEX.
PROP. CODE §§ 21.014(a), .048. Once the commissioners’ award is filed, the
judge “shall adopt” them as its judgment absent a timely objection. Id.
§ 21.061. The State’s labeling of the commissioners’ award as “proposed”
reflects the status of the award during the objection period, not its effectiveness
to begin it.

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State from exercising its option to file the award directly with the clerk
in the first instance. Having done so, the time for objection to it runs
from the date of the State’s filing.
The State followed proper procedure in filing the commissioners’
award with the trial court clerk. The clerk’s stamp confirmed the date
of filing. The State was simply late in filing its objection.

* * *
We hold that “the day the commissioners file their findings with
the court” in Section 21.018(a) includes filing with the trial court clerk.
Id. § 21.018(a). Assuming proper notice, the deadline to object to the
award amount is calculated from that day. See id. Accordingly, without
hearing oral argument, see TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, we grant the petition for
review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and reinstate the
judgment of the trial court.

OPINION DELIVERED: February 21, 2025

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