Walgreens v. Pamela McKenzie

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 23-0955
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Walgreens,
Petitioner,

v.

Pamela McKenzie,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued February 20, 2025

JUSTICE BUSBY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Texas Citizens Participation Act permits a party to seek early
dismissal of a legal action that is based on or in response to that party’s
exercise of the right of free speech. In this case, the plaintiff sued a
corporate employer after its employee erroneously accused the plaintiff
of shoplifting. Had the employee been sued for damages resulting from
that accusation, the TCPA would have applied, authorizing the
employee to file a motion to dismiss. We are asked whether the
employer may also take advantage of the TCPA’s protections with
respect to the plaintiff’s claim that it negligently hired, trained, and
supervised its employee. The court of appeals held that it could not, and
that the trial court thus properly denied the employer’s motion to
dismiss the negligent-hiring claim. We disagree. We hold that the
TCPA applies and that the plaintiff failed to meet her evidentiary
burden to avoid dismissal. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’
judgment in part and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Pamela McKenzie was shopping in a Houston Walgreens in 2019
when she was detained in the store on suspicion of shoplifting. The
Walgreens employee who called the police suspected McKenzie was the
same person who had stolen from the store earlier that day and had
returned. 1 After reviewing surveillance video and determining that
McKenzie was not the thief, the police released her. McKenzie claims
that the other Walgreens employees in the store that day had agreed
she was not the thief, but the employee had called the police anyway.
McKenzie sued Walgreens for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligence, gross negligence, respondeat superior liability for
employee negligence, 2 and negligent hiring, training, and supervision

1 Walgreens contends that it has been unable to identify the employee

in question.
2 “Respondeat superior” is not an independent cause of action; rather, it

is a basis on which a party may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of
an agent or employee acting within the scope of his or her agency or
employment. Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 130-31
(Tex. 2018). As the court of appeals correctly explained, this liability theory

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(NHTS). Walgreens moved to dismiss under the TCPA, arguing that
McKenzie’s claims are based on the employee’s alleged false report to
the police, which is “a communication made in connection with a matter
of public concern” and therefore protected under the Act. TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 27.001(3). The trial court denied the motion.
A divided court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
676 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023). The panel
held that the trial court erred by not dismissing McKenzie’s claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and gross
negligence, and vicarious liability for employee negligence because those
claims were “based on or in response to the exercise of the right of free
speech” and McKenzie failed to establish a prima facie case for the
elements of each claim. Id. at 176, 179-181. 3 That left only the NHTS
claim, which a majority held is not subject to dismissal under the TCPA
because it is not “entirely based on or in response to [Walgreens’]
employee’s exercise of his First Amendment rights in calling the police.”
Id. at 176-77 (emphasis added). Instead, the claim is based on both that
exercise and Walgreens’ conduct in hiring, training, and supervising the
employee, which occurred before the incident. 4 Id. The majority

fails if the underlying claims fail. 676 S.W.3d 170, 180-81 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2023).
3 McKenzie has not sought our review of that portion of the court of

appeals’ judgment.
4 The court of appeals also faulted Walgreens for not specifically
identifying the NHTS claim in its motion as one of the claims for which it
sought dismissal. Id. at 177 n.2. Walgreens sought dismissal of the entire
“action,” “all of [McKenzie]’s allegations,” and “all of [McKenzie]’s claims,” but
its motion stated that McKenzie asserted only two causes of action: intentional

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remanded the case to the trial court so that McKenzie could pursue her
NHTS claim. Id. at 181.
The dissenting justice opined that the NHTS claim, like the
claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, is
not viable in the absence of underlying tortious activity by the employee.
See id. at 181-82 (Wilson, J., dissenting). And because those other
claims failed, so too must the NHTS claim. Id. at 183.
Walgreens petitioned this Court for review, which we granted.

ANALYSIS

The principal issue presented is whether the TCPA applies to
McKenzie’s NHTS claim, thereby authorizing Walgreens to file a motion
to dismiss that claim. We hold that the TCPA does apply, and we further
conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion.

infliction of emotional distress and negligence. McKenzie’s petition actually
listed three causes of action, the third being what she labeled “Vicarious
Liability/Respondeat Superior.” It was under this count that McKenzie alleged
that Walgreens negligently hired, trained, and supervised its employee.
But it seems that neither of the parties believed—at least not then—
that McKenzie was asserting an independent NHTS cause of action. In her
response to Walgreens’ motion to dismiss, McKenzie asserted that she had
established a prima facie case “for each cause of action” in her petition. And
she argued that she established the elements of her claims of negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress and her claim that Walgreens was
vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee. But she did not argue that
she was asserting an independent claim for NHTS, nor did she attempt to
establish the elements of such a claim.
Nevertheless, in its reply to that response, Walgreens specifically
attacked any NHTS claim that McKenzie may have raised, arguing that she
failed to establish a prima facie case. And it argued similarly in a
supplemental brief filed in support of its motion to dismiss after McKenzie
deposed Walgreens’ corporate representative.

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I. The TCPA framework

The TCPA’s statutorily expressed purpose is “to encourage and
safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely,
associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the
maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the
rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002. The statute serves this dual
purpose “by authorizing a motion to dismiss early in the covered
proceedings, subject to expedited interlocutory review.” McLane
Champions, LLC v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907,
914 (Tex. 2023) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.003, 27.008).
A party moving for dismissal under the TCPA must demonstrate
that the TCPA applies to the “legal action” against it—that is, that the
action “is based on or is in response to a party’s exercise of the right of
free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE §§ 27.003, 27.005(b). As relevant here, the TCPA defines
“legal action” to include “a cause of action,” and it defines “exercise of
the right of free speech” as “a communication made in connection with a
matter of public concern.” Id. § 27.001(3), (6). If the TCPA applies to a
cause of action, the party bringing it may avoid dismissal by establishing
with “clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential
element of [her] claim.” Id. § 27.005(c).

II. The TCPA applies to McKenzie’s NHTS claim.

We begin by evaluating whether the TCPA applies to McKenzie’s
NHTS cause of action. Although we have not ruled definitively on the
existence, elements, or scope of an NHTS claim, we have recognized that

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any such claim would require proof of the employer’s negligence in
hiring, training, and supervising the employee as well as the employee’s
subsequent negligent act or omission, both of which must proximately
cause the injury. See Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Cuevas, 593 S.W.3d
307, 311 (Tex. 2019); see also Wansey v. Hole, 379 S.W.3d 246, 247 (Tex.
2012) (noting cases holding that a negligent-hiring claim would
“require[] that the plaintiff suffer some damages from the foreseeable
misconduct of an employee hired pursuant to the defendant’s negligent
practices”). Walgreens thus asserts that, like the other claims McKenzie
asserted, the NHTS claim is based on or in response to Walgreens’
exercise of the right of free speech because the requisite negligent act of
its employee involved the employee’s communications regarding
McKenzie’s purported shoplifting.
The court of appeals, however, held that McKenzie’s NHTS claim
does not fall within the purview of the TCPA because Walgreens’ alleged
negligence in hiring, training, and supervising the employee—the other
recognized element of an NHTS claim—amounts to “conduct, not
communications.” 676 S.W.3d at 176. The court concluded that a
covered claim must be “entirely” based on or in response to the exercise
of free speech rights, so an NHTS claim falls outside the boundaries of
the TCPA. Id. (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Dorsey, 651 S.W.3d 692,
695-96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (“When a legal
action is in response to both expression protected by the TCPA and other
unprotected activity, the legal action is subject to dismissal only to the
extent that it is in response to the protected conduct, as opposed to being
subject to dismissal in its entirety.”)).

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In analyzing the TCPA’s applicability, we follow settled principles
of statutory interpretation. We construe statutes according to their
plain language, consider them as a whole, and “presume that the
Legislature chooses a statute’s language with care, including each word
chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.”
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.
2011). Further, we give undefined terms in a statute their ordinary
meaning unless “a different or more precise definition is apparent from
the term’s use in the context of the statute.” Id.
In 2019, the Legislature amended the provision of the TCPA at
issue here. Before that amendment, the statute authorized dismissal of
a legal action that was “based on, relate[d] to, or [was] in response to”
the exercise of the right of free speech. See Citizens Participation Act,
82d Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961, 962 (amended
2019) (emphasis added). The current version narrows the required
nexus between the action and the protected activity by deleting the
broadest connective language—“relates to”—and authorizing a
dismissal motion only when the action is “based on or is in response to”
the activity. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a); see Entergy Gulf
States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009) (“[W]e presume
that [statutory] deletions are intentional and that lawmakers enact
statutes with complete knowledge of existing law.”).
Our Court has not had occasion to elaborate on the required
connection between the cause of action asserted and the movant’s
exercise of a protected right since the amendment took effect. The TCPA
does not define the connective terms, and courts of appeals have

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variously described the “based on” portion of the standard as requiring
that the exercise of a protected right be the “gravamen” of the claim, e.g.,
Newstream Roanoke 6.125, LLC v. Shore, No. 02-22-00506-CV, 2023 WL
5615871, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.), that the
claim be “factually predicated on” the exercise, e.g., Apache Corp. v.
Apollo Expl., LLC, No. 11-21-00295-CV, 2023 WL 3511262, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland May 18, 2023, no pet.), or that the exercise be a “main
ingredient” or “fundamental part” of the claim, e.g., Ernst & Young, LLP
v. Ryan, LLC, No. 01-21-00603-CV, 2023 WL 4239350, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2023, pet. denied). The latter description
is premised on dictionary definitions, which are useful in discerning a
statutorily undefined term’s ordinary meaning. Epps v. Fowler, 351
S.W.3d 862, 866 (Tex. 2011); see Base, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2009) (“a main ingredient”; “the fundamental part
of something”). And the “in response to” component of the provision
“denotes some sort of answer or other act in return.” Ernst & Young,
2023 WL 4239350, at *8; see Response, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2009) (“something constituting a reply or a
reaction”).
We interpreted somewhat similar statutory-nexus language in
Endeavor Energy, which concerned the applicability of Chapter 95 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code to a negligent-hiring claim. 593
S.W.3d at 309. In pertinent part, Chapter 95 applies to a “claim for
damages caused by negligence” that “arises from the . . . use of an
improvement to real property.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 95.001,
95.002. We explained that a claim “arises from” the use of an

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improvement if it “depends, in part, on proof that [the] contemporaneous
use of an improvement caused the injury.” Endeavor Energy, 593
S.W.3d at 311-12.
Although these phrases drawn from dictionary definitions—
“factually predicated on,” “a main ingredient of,” “a fundamental part
of,” “in answer or reaction to”—do not replace the statutory language,
they are helpful in understanding and applying it. And we have no
hesitation in concluding that the court of appeals here imposed a stricter
nexus than the statute’s language authorizes. In short, by inserting the
word “entirely,” the court of appeals changed the meaning of the
language the Legislature chose. In essence, the court of appeals
construed the TCPA to apply when protected activity is the only
ingredient or only part of the legal action, the legal action is solely
dependent on proof of protected activity, or the legal action is instituted
solely in reaction to protected activity. Nothing in the statutory
language itself—“is based on or is in response to”—supports that
limitation.
Turning to the legal action at issue, as discussed, the plaintiff
cannot prevail on an NHTS claim without proving both (1) the
employer’s negligence in hiring, training, or supervising the employee
and (2) the employee’s subsequent tortious act or omission. Id. at 311.
When either of the alleged instances of negligence or other tortious
conduct is based on or in response to the exercise of a protected right,
the TCPA applies.
McKenzie identifies two acts by the Walgreens employee that she
alleges were tortious: (1) he accused McKenzie of stealing in front of

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other patrons; and (2) he “wrongfully deprived her of her . . . freedom by
falsely accusing her of theft” to the police and detaining her until they
arrived. 5 These are serious allegations. Wrongfully accusing someone
of a crime, especially in public, subjects the innocent person to
humiliation, the threat of arrest and detention, and possibly even more
dire consequences. Anger, shame, and a desire to see justice done are
the kinds of responses that we would expect to follow from any citizen’s
detention based on a false accusation.
Nevertheless, these allegedly tortious acts undoubtedly consisted
of “communication[s] made in connection with a matter of public
concern”—that is, the “[e]xercise of the right of free speech” as the TCPA
defines that term. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(3); Brady v.
Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. 2017) (identifying “commission of
crime” as a matter of public concern). McKenzie’s NHTS claim is thus

5 The court of appeals construed McKenzie’s petition as alleging these

acts were negligent. It then held that neither act could be recast as negligent
rather than intentionally tortious, 676 S.W.3d at 179, and McKenzie has not
appealed that holding. McKenzie argues that she sufficiently pleaded these
acts, if not as independent claims, then as elements of or facts supporting an
NHTS cause of action. See Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293, 305-06 (Tex. 2018)
(“Pleadings must give fair notice of the nature and basic issues so the opposing
party can prepare a defense. When, as here, no special exception is made, we
liberally construe the pleadings in the pleader’s favor.” (footnote omitted)).
Walgreens concedes that it did not file special exceptions to McKenzie’s
petition to seek clarification of her claims.
We have not addressed whether an employee’s intentionally tortious
acts can support an NHTS claim. Cf. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313
S.W.3d 796, 800-01, 807 (Tex. 2010) (noting plaintiff’s negligent-supervision-
and-retention claim was predicated on assault by the employee but holding
that Chapter 21 of the Labor Code supplanted any such claim). And we need
not decide that issue here. We merely presume for purposes of our analysis
that an intentional tort by the employee may sustain an NHTS claim.

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“based on” that exercise. Cf. Endeavor Energy, 593 S.W.3d at 311
(“When one of the negligent acts involves the contemporaneous use of an
improvement to real property, the claim arises from that act, regardless
of when the other negligent act occurred or whether it involved the use
of an improvement.” (emphasis added)). McKenzie’s claims were also
filed in reaction to the communications, so the NHTS claim is
additionally “in response to” Walgreens’ 6 exercise of the right of free
speech and is thus subject to a dismissal motion under the TCPA. This
conclusion is simply a consequence of the statute’s sweep; it in no way

6 It is true that the employee, whom McKenzie did not sue, was engaging

in the complained-of communications. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 27.003(a) (authorizing a party to file a motion to dismiss a legal action that
“is based on or is in response to a party’s exercise of” a protected right
(emphasis added)). But McKenzie alleges, and Walgreens now concedes, that
the employee was acting as Walgreens’ agent, and McKenzie attributes the
agent’s accusations directly to Walgreens. See In re Merrill Lynch Tr. Co. FSB,
235 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex. 2007) (“Corporations can act only through human
agents, and many business-related torts can be brought against either a
corporation or its employees.”). The TCPA’s stated purpose “is to encourage
and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely,
associate freely, and otherwise participate in government,” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 27.002 (emphasis added), but nowhere does the Act indicate its
intent to limit its applicability solely to natural persons. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 311.005(2) (“‘Person’ includes corporation, organization, government or
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership,
association, and any other legal entity.”); In re Transcon. Realty Invs., Inc., 271
S.W.3d 270, 272 (Tex. 2008) (“In construing statutes, the word ‘person’ includes
corporations and other legal entities unless the context indicates otherwise.”
(citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.005(2))). The Act intentionally refers to “a
party’s exercise of the right of free speech.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 27.003 (emphasis added), 27.005(b); see Kappus v. Kappus, 284 S.W.3d 831,
835 (Tex. 2009) (“We presume the Legislature chose its words carefully and
intentionally.”). Thus, we presume that “a party’s exercise of” a protected right
includes an exercise of that right by a corporate party’s agents on its behalf.

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suggests that the Court regards McKenzie’s allegations as specious or
her experience as insignificant.

III. McKenzie failed to establish a prima facie case of
NHTS.

Because the TCPA applies to McKenzie’s NHTS claim, the burden
shifts to her to “establish[] by clear and specific evidence a prima facie
case for each essential element of [her] claim.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 27.005(c). The court of appeals did not reach this issue given its
decision at the first step that the TCPA does not apply, but we will
address it in the first instance in the interest of judicial economy.
The lack of evidence regarding Walgreens’ hiring, training, and
supervision of the offending employee is dispositive of the NHTS claim.
See Endeavor Energy, 593 S.W.3d at 311 (explaining that both the
employer’s negligence in hiring (or training) the employee and the
employee’s subsequent negligent act or omission must proximately
cause the harm). False accusations of theft are serious matters, and
employers would be well advised to train their employees to handle such
issues with care. But as Walgreens correctly pointed out in the court of
appeals, McKenzie has identified no evidence of (1) the employee’s
hiring, training, supervision, or retention; (2) the applicable standard of
care for any of those matters; (3) how the employee’s hiring, training,
supervision, or retention fell below that standard; or (4) how any such
breach proximately caused the events of which she complains. For any

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or all of these reasons, McKenzie has not established a prima facie case
of NHTS, and the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss that claim. 7

IV. McKenzie’s cross-issues do not entitle her to relief.

In her briefing in this Court, McKenzie makes several additional
arguments that she refers to as “cross-issues.” First, she argues that
the court of appeals rejected her claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) because of “the absence of physical injury” and
that this was error because certain claims—including defamation—
allow recovery for mental anguish. See, e.g., Bentley v. Bunton, 94
S.W.3d 561, 604 (Tex. 2002) (noting that defamation per se allows for
recovery of mental-anguish damages). So too, she asserts, should she be
permitted to proceed with her IIED claim here despite the lack of bodily
injury.
We reject this argument for two reasons. First, McKenzie did not
file a petition for review in this Court, so we are unable to grant her

7 Walgreens also argues that the court of appeals erred in considering

unpleaded causes of action—defamation and false imprisonment—as potential
“underlying tort[s]” by the employee that could support an NHTS claim.
Although an employee’s tortious conduct is an element of any NHTS claim,
Endeavor Energy, 593 S.W.3d at 311, we note that nothing in our precedent
supports the notion that such a claim will fail merely because the plaintiff did
not also bring a separate tort claim based on that conduct.
Walgreens also criticizes the court of appeals for addressing and
rejecting an argument it made in the trial court but not in its briefing in the
court of appeals: that no clear and specific evidence supported the NHTS claim
because there was no evidence the employee was acting outside the scope of
his employment. We decline to fault the court of appeals for its effort to be
thorough, and in any event, we need not address whether the court reached
the correct conclusion on that issue because it has no bearing on our
disposition.

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relief regardless of whether her arguments have merit. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 53.1 (“A party who seeks to alter the court of appeals’ judgment must
file a petition for review.”). Second, we note that the court of appeals
dismissed McKenzie’s IIED claim not for lack of bodily injury but
because it concluded none of Walgreens’ actions constituted extreme and
outrageous conduct as necessary to support an IIED claim. See 676
S.W.3d at 178-79; see also Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex.
2017) (identifying extreme and outrageous conduct as an element of
IIED).
McKenzie next argues that Walgreens’ petition for review is
premature, as motions for rehearing and reconsideration en banc
remain pending in the court of appeals. But both motions were denied
by the court of appeals on October 12, 2023, well before Walgreens filed
its petition for review in this Court on December 12, 2023. Walgreens’
petition for review was timely filed.
Finally, McKenzie raises for the first time in this Court two
exceptions to the TCPA: the commercial-speech exception and the bodily
injury exception. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(a)(2), (3)
(“This chapter does not apply to . . . a legal action brought against a
person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or
services, if the statement or conduct arises out of the sale or lease of
goods, services, . . . or a commercial transaction in which the intended
audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer; [or to] a legal action
seeking recovery for bodily injury . . . .”). We conclude neither exception
provides an alternative basis to affirm the court of appeals’ judgment
declining to apply the TCPA to the NHTS claim.

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For a party to benefit from an exception, it generally must raise
that exception in the trial court. See, e.g., Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accts.
v. Att’y Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. 2010) (“[A]n agency
generally waives any exemption [to a FOIA request] it fails to raise at
the initial proceedings . . . .”); Paragon Sales Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 774
S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1989) (“Any exemptions, exceptions, or exclusions
[to an insurance policy] that would limit or deny the plaintiff’s recovery
must be pled as affirmative defenses by the defendant insurer.”).
McKenzie did not raise either exception until her briefing in this Court
and has thus waived reliance on them.
Moreover, even if McKenzie had preserved her challenge, she has
not demonstrated that the exceptions apply here. In particular, she has
not pointed to evidence that the Walgreens employee’s allegedly tortious
statements and conduct “arose out of a commercial transaction involving
the kind of goods or services [Walgreens] provides,” as required to invoke
the commercial-speech exemption. Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd.,
546 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. 2018). Nor has McKenzie established that
the kinds of bodily injury she describes—such as “elevated blood
pressure[,] excessive yawning and fatigue related to sleeplessness”—are
covered by the bodily injury exception. See, e.g., City of Tyler v. Likes,
962 S.W.2d 489, 495-96 (Tex. 1997) (“[M]inor physical symptoms . . .
such as difficulty sleeping[] are not serious bodily injuries that can form
the basis for recovering mental anguish damages.”).

CONCLUSION

The TCPA applies to any claim for negligent hiring, training, or
supervision when at least one of the underlying tortious acts is based on

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or in response to the defendant’s exercise of the right of free speech.
Because the TCPA applies in this case, and because McKenzie has failed
to establish a prima facie case of negligent hiring, training, or
supervision, her claim must be dismissed. We therefore reverse the
portion of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court’s
denial of Walgreens’ motion to dismiss the NHTS claim and render
judgment dismissing that claim. The remainder of the court of appeals’
judgment is undisturbed. We remand the case to the trial court for
dismissal of McKenzie’s other claims against Walgreens pursuant to the
court of appeals’ judgment and for any other necessary proceedings.

J. Brett Busby
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 16, 2025

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