3M Properties, Inc., and Petro Mart, LLC v. State of Texas — Memorandum Opinion by Justice Miskel

Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 21, 2026
SIn The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-25-00219-CV
3M PROPERTIES, INC., AND PETRO MART, LLC, Appellants
V.
STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-20-00396-E
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Miskel, Kennedy, and Lee
Opinion by Justice Miskel
This is an appeal from a condemnation judgment arising from the State’s
acquisition of property owned by appellants, 3M Properties, Inc. and Petro Mart,
LLC (collectively, “3M”), for a highway-expansion project. Before trial, 3M moved
for a continuance based on the illness of its counsel. The trial court denied the
motion, and the case proceeded to trial.
On appeal, 3M raises a single issue. It contends the trial court abused its
discretion in denying its motion for continuance because counsel’s medical
condition prevented adequate trial preparation and necessitated the substitution of

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counsel. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the
motion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
3M owned a parcel of land on State Highway I.H. 35E in Dallas County with
a convenience store and gas station operated by 3M’s owner, Sam Bayati. In 2020,
the State initiated condemnation proceedings to acquire 3M’s parcel for a highway
expansion project. Special commissioners awarded 3M $1.7 million. Both sides
objected to the award, and the case proceeded to trial as an ordinary civil action. See
TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.018(b).
The case was initially set for trial in January 2022. Between December 2021
and May 2024, the trial court granted a total of six continuances, including three at
the request of 3M. 3M’s original trial counsel withdrew in November 2023, and
attorney Timonthy Vinson appeared the following month. In December 2023,
Vinson obtained a continuance of the February 2024 trial setting. In March 2024,
3M obtained another continuance after representing that its appraiser had been
unable to complete an appraisal because of health issues and that a new appraiser
was needed. In May 2024, 3M obtained a third continuance based on health issues
affecting both counsel’s staff and 3M’s expert. The trial court reset the case for trial
on October 22, 2024.
On August 26, 2024, the State appeared for a hearing regarding a proposed
scheduling order. Earlier that day, 3M filed the continuance motion at issue in this

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appeal. The motion stated that Vinson “ha[d] been suffering with Vertigo and related
health issues for the last few months and need[ed] to retain other counsel to assist in
preparing for trial.” The motion also represented that a new firm, Cohen and
Zwemer, had been retained to become lead counsel, and that a newly retained
damages expert needed at least two weeks to complete an expert report. Vinson did
not appear at the August 26 hearing. The trial court signed the State’s proposed
scheduling order, which left the October 22 trial setting in place and reflected
deadlines that had already expired for expert designations, property-value witnesses,
and discovery.
During the weeks that followed, the State moved to exclude Bayati’s valuation
testimony and also moved to exclude 3M’s appraisal experts as untimely designated.
On October 4, Vinson filed a motion to withdraw. The motion stated only that good
cause existed because 3M consented to the withdrawal.
At the October 18 pretrial conference, the trial court announced that it would
exclude Bayati’s valuation opinions and the testimony of 3M’s two appraisal
experts. The court also denied 3M’s August continuance motion. Vinson informed
the trial court that his withdrawal request was contingent on a continuance and that
he would continue representing 3M if the case proceeded to trial. Following the
hearing, the trial court signed written orders denying the continuance and withdrawal
motions.

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The case proceeded to trial on October 22, 2024. Before trial began, the trial
court accommodated Vinson’s difficulties related to his vertigo and told him that he
could remain seated as much as necessary during the proceedings. Vinson thereafter
appeared as 3M’s sole trial counsel and represented 3M throughout the trial. After
the trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict, 3M filed a motion for new
trial, which the trial court denied. 3M then perfected this appeal. The sole issue
before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 3M’s August 26,
2024 motion for continuance.1
II. Standard of Review
This Court will not disturb a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance
unless the trial court has committed a clear abuse of discretion. See Joe v. Two Thirty
Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004); DFW Advisors Ltd. Co. v.
Ervin, No. 05–14–00883–CV, 2016 WL 1251224, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb.
11, 2016, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Joe,
145 S.W.3d at 161; Ervin, 2016 WL 1251224, at *5. In reviewing a continuance
ruling, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court but determine
only whether the ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable. Yowell v. Piper Aircraft
1 We do not consider 3M’s subsequent October 21, 2024 motion for continuance. That motion was not
before the court when it made the October 18 ruling challenged on appeal. See In re K.P.P., No. 05-23-
00847-CV, 2023 WL 7532754, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 14, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Nor does
the record reflect a ruling on the motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). In any event, 3M’s appeal challenges
only the denial of its August motion.

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Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 635 (Tex. 1986). The party complaining of an abuse of
discretion bears the burden to present a record showing the abuse. Cannon v. Wilson,
No. 05-23-01185-CV, 2025 WL 1372864, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 12, 2025,
no pet.) (mem. op.). Whether a continuance should have been granted is judged
based on the facts before the trial court when the motion was presented. In re K.P.P.,
No. 05-23-00847-CV, 2023 WL 7532754, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 14, 2023,
pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161.
III. Applicable Law
A continuance may be granted only for sufficient cause supported by affidavit,
by consent of the parties, or by operation of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 251; In re K.P.P.,
2023 WL 7532754, at *3. Except as otherwise provided by the rules, the absence of
counsel is not good cause for a continuance unless the trial court, in its discretion,
allows a continuance upon cause shown or upon matters within the judge’s
knowledge or information stated on the record. TEX. R. CIV. P. 253. When a
continuance is sought because counsel has withdrawn or cannot continue the
representation, the movant must show that the resulting inability to proceed is not
due to the movant’s own fault or negligence. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624,
626 (Tex. 1986).
In determining whether good cause exists for a continuance, courts may
consider the entire procedural history of the case. Wilborn v. Life Ambulance
Services, Inc., 163 S.W.3d 271, 275 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied); Waste

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Water, Inc. v. Alpha Finishing & Developing Corp., 874 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). Some courts have stated that, when a
verified first motion for continuance substantially complies with the rules and is not
controverted, the facts asserted in the motion must generally be accepted as true.
See, e.g., Verkin v. Sw. Ctr. One, Ltd., 784 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Garza v. Serrato, 699 S.W.2d 275, 280–81 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Even so, this Court has recognized that the
existence of uncontroverted facts does not deprive the trial court of discretion to
deny a subsequent continuance. Ervin, 2016 WL 1251224, at *5.
IV. Analysis
3M contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying its August 26,
2024 motion for continuance. According to 3M, Vinson’s medical condition
prevented it from timely preparing its valuation case, obtaining expert testimony,
and defending the basis for Bayati’s valuation opinions. 3M argues that the trial court
was required to accept as true the uncontroverted factual assertions in the verified
motion and that the denial of the motion effectively deprived it of the ability to
present its valuation evidence. It therefore seeks a new trial.
A. The Trial Court’s Oral Comments Do Not Demonstrate Reversible Error
At the October 18 pretrial conference, the trial judge stated that she would
deny 3M’s August motion for continuance because “[t]he rules require that you
provide a good reason for a motion for continuance to be granted, and there was no

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reason except a statement there is good reason with no further explanation in the
motion.” 3M argues this statement mischaracterized the August motion, which
asserted several grounds for a continuance.
Even if the trial court inaccurately described the motion during the hearing,
the October 18 written order states no basis for the ruling. We review the ruling
reflected in the written order, which controls over any contrary oral pronouncements
from the bench. See Miles-Edmond v. Skillman Prop. Inv. Dall. LLC, No. 05-23-
00789-CV, 2025 WL 593499, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 24, 2025, no pet.)
(mem. op.); Kaur–Gardner v. Keane Landscaping, Inc., No. 05-17-00230-CV, 2018
WL 2191925, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Moreover, a trial court does not abuse its discretion if it reaches the correct result,
even for an incorrect reason. Weiss v. JPMorgan Chase, Bank, N.A., No. 05-06-
00940-CV, 2007 WL 2069627, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 20, 2007, pet. denied)
(mem. op.); Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 141–42 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1992, no writ). Accordingly, even if the trial court misstated the contents of 3M’s
motion, we must uphold the ruling if the record demonstrates that the denial of the
continuance fell within the trial court’s discretion.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the August
Motion
We next consider whether, based on the facts before the trial court at the time
the August motion was presented, the court abused its discretion in denying the
motion. See In re K.P.P., 2023 WL 7532754, at *3. We conclude it did not.

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3M’s motion established an illness, but not why the illness required a
continuance.
The August motion, which Vinson verified, stated that he “[h]ad been
suffering with Vertigo and related health issues for the last few months.” Even
accepting that assertion as true, the motion nonetheless provided little information
from which the trial court could determine whether those health issues constituted
sufficient cause for a seventh continuance. The motion established that counsel had
health issues. It did not explain how those health issues affected specific litigation
responsibilities or made a continuance necessary. The motion did not describe the
nature or severity of Vinson’s symptoms, explain what litigation or trial-preparation
tasks his condition prevented him from performing, or explain why the condition
required a continuance rather than some other accommodation. Although the motion
asserted that Vinson had been suffering from vertigo for several months, it did not
explain when the condition began interfering with his representation of 3M, what
work remained uncompleted because of the illness, or why co-counsel could not
have been associated sooner.
Nor did the motion explain how Vinson’s illness related to the other grounds
advanced for a continuance. Although the motion stated that 3M “had been delayed
in finding an expert witness,” it did not state that Vinson’s illness caused that delay.
Likewise, although the motion stated that Vinson needed to retain other counsel to
assist in preparing for trial, it also represented that, if a continuance were granted,
Cohen and Zwemer would become lead counsel in the case. The motion did not

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reconcile that apparent inconsistency or otherwise explain what role substitute
counsel would serve.
The motion to withdraw, filed on October 4, likewise provided little additional
support for a continuance. The motion stated only that “[g]ood cause exist[ed] for
withdrawal of Movant as counsel because Defendant[‘]s agent consents to the
withdrawal.” It did not identify Vinson’s illness as a basis for withdrawal, mention
Cohen and Zwemer, or otherwise indicate that substitute counsel had been retained.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 10 (requiring specific information if another attorney will be
substituted).
Nor did the information presented at the October 18 pretrial hearing cure these
deficiencies. In arguing the continuance, Vinson said, “[t]here is another law firm
that[‘]s much more experienced in this matter that is willing to step in[.]” He did not
explain why substitute counsel had not appeared earlier, how his illness prevented
him from proceeding to trial, or why a continuance was necessary at that stage of the
proceedings.
The trial court could consider the entire history of the case.
The trial court was also not required to evaluate the August motion in
isolation. When the motion was presented at the October 18 pretrial conference, the
court could consider the history of the case. Ervin, 2016 WL 1251224, at *5;
Wilborn, 163 S.W.3d at 275; Waste Water, 874 S.W.2d at 942. By that point, the
case had been pending for nearly five years, and the trial court had already granted

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six continuances, including the three most recent continuances requested by 3M. 3M
had already obtained continuances to locate an expert witness, because of health
issues affecting 3M’s expert, and because of health issues affecting counsel’s staff.
Although 3M contends these prior continuances are not themselves a basis for
denying its August motion for continuance, the trial court was entitled to consider
the entire procedural history of the case, including the length of time the case had
been filed and the number of prior continuances. Ervin, 2016 WL 1251224, at *5;
Wilborn, 163 S.W.3d at 275; Waste Water, 874 S.W.2d at 942; cf. Burke v. Scott,
410 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (concluding
that prior continuances did not justify denial of a continuance under the particular
facts presented).
The trial court could also consider that 3M waited more than seven weeks
after filing the motion before asking the trial court to rule on it. The State noted that
Vinson did not raise the motion until October 14, when he asked that it be addressed
at the October 18 pretrial conference.
3M relies on Smith-Weik, in which lead counsel suffered a sudden illness
shortly before trial and replacement counsel was required to proceed with inadequate
preparation. See Smith-Weik Mach. Corp. v. Murdock Mach. & Eng’g Co., 423 F.2d
842, 843 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1970). Whatever persuasive value Smith-Weik may have,
the circumstances here are materially different. See Vrinios v. Mary Kay, Inc., No.
05-23-00001-CV, 2024 WL 3912364, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 23, 2024, pet.

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denied) (mem. op.) (opinions from federal courts are not binding authority). Vinson
represented that he had been experiencing vertigo for months before trial and did not
explain why substitute counsel could not have been associated earlier. Our
conclusion is consistent with a case cited by the State, in which this Court affirmed
the denial of a continuance sought on account of counsel’s health problems. There,
as here, the trial court could reasonably conclude that counsel’s condition had been
known for months and that there had been sufficient time to obtain assistance before
trial. See PS Royal Servs. Grp. LP v. Fisher, No. 05-17-01139-CV, 2019 WL
3543575, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 5, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Considering the limited information provided regarding the claimed illness,
the absence of any explanation linking that illness to specific unfinished trial-
preparation tasks, the lack of a showing that substitute counsel could not have been
associated earlier, and the lengthy procedural history of the case, we cannot conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that 3M failed to demonstrate
sufficient cause for a seventh continuance.
V. Conclusion
We overrule appellant’s sole issue, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Emily Miskel/
EMILY MISKEL
JUSTICE