Solomon & Silver Limited

Mailed: October 21, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Solomon & Silver Limited
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Serial No. 79405252
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Lauren Caverly Pratt and Daniel C. Neustadt of Holland & Knight LLP,
for Solomon & Silver Limited.
Andrew Crowder-Schaefer, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 104,
Zachary Cromer, Managing Attorney.
————
Before Thurmon, Lavache, and Brock,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lavache, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant Solomon & Silver Limited seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the standard-character mark THE JONES for the following services:
Consulting services about education; providing of training in the field of
hotel, bar and restaurant management; entertainment information;
sporting and cultural activities, namely, entertainment and educational
services namely, organizing community sporting and cultural events;
providing on-line electronic publications in the nature of magazines, not
downloadable, in the fields of hotels, style, fashion, health, luxury,
interior design and real estate; publication of books; publication of
electronic books and journals on-line; publication of texts, other than
publicity texts; education services, namely one-on-one business
mentoring services; educational services, namely, provision of training
and education classes in relation to cookery, alcoholic beverages, and
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Serial No. 79405252
2
hotel, bar and restaurant management services; educational services,
namely, providing classes relating to the provision of restaurant
services; training relating to the hotel industry; training relating to the
restaurant industry; educational services, namely, providing classes
relating to the provision of hotel services; arranging of educational
events in the field of fashion, health, interior design, music and film;
arranging of lectures in the field of interior design; organisation of
recreational social entertainment events; event management services
being organising of cultural events; live musical performances by a
musical group; art exhibitions; entertainment services provided by
hotels, namely, hosting of talks and panel discussions, live
entertainment quizzes in the nature of games featuring trivia, live
musical performances, live comedy shows, cinema theater screenings,
dinner theaters, social entertainment events and courses of instruction
in the nature of cookery lessons; cinema services, namely, cinema
theaters; provision of entertainment facilities in hotels, namely, movie
theatres, ballrooms in the nature of dance halls, event spaces in the
nature of indoor recreational facilities for group recreational events,
podcasting recording studios, and lecture halls in the nature of facilities
for movies, shows, plays, music, and educational training; fitness club
services, namely, providing fitness and exercise facilities; sports and
fitness services, namely, providing fitness and exercise facilities; health
and fitness training, namely, physical fitness training services; casino
services; nightclub services; party planning services; providing fitness
and exercise facilities; provision of gymnasium facilities; gymnasium
services; gymnasium club services; providing online education and
training services, namely exercise classes in the field of yoga, Pilates
and gym workouts, delivered by virtual means; entertainment services,
namely, providing podcasts in the field of fitness, panel discussions in
the field of fitness, and courses of instruction in the nature of cookery
lessons delivered by virtual means; health and fitness training services,
namely, providing online physical fitness training services delivered by
virtual means; organising of cultural and recreational events, namely
online social entertainment events delivered by virtual means;
information, consultancy and advisory services in relation to all of the
aforesaid; none of the foregoing related to smoking or vaping cessation,
in International Class 41;1
1 Application Serial No. 79405252 is a request for extension of protection under Trademark
Act Section 66(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1141f(a), based on International Registration No. 1812070 and
has a filing date of October 24, 2023. In this opinion, we refer to the request for extension of
protection as “the application.”

Serial No. 79405252
3
Restaurant services for providing food and drink; providing temporary
accommodation; hotel accommodation services; hospitality services in
the nature of provision of temporary accommodation; hospitality
services in the nature of provision of food and drink; booking of hotel
rooms and arranging hotel accommodation services; resort hotel
accommodation services; provision of hotel accommodation; reservation
services, namely, making reservations and bookings for others for
accommodation and meals at hotels; providing temporary
accommodation for functions; catering services; providing temporary
accommodation for meetings; restaurant services provided by hotels;
restaurant services; bar services; restaurant services incorporating
licenced bar facilities; providing online booking of hotel rooms and
arranging hotel accommodation services delivered by virtual means;
providing online reservation services, namely, making reservations and
bookings for others for accommodation and meals at hotels delivered by
virtual means; day nursery services and crèche facilities services;
information, consultancy and advisory services in relation to all of the
aforesaid, in International Class 43; and
Hygienic and beauty care for human beings and animals; flower
arranging; wreath making; health spa services, namely, health and
wellness of the body and spirit offered at a health club facility; spa
services namely cosmetic body care services; health spa services for
health and wellness of the body and spirit; beauty care services provided
by a health spa; cosmetic body care services provided by a health spa;
hairdressing services; pedicure and manicure services; depilatory
services; massage services; health-care services; beauty care services;
health spa services provided by virtual means, namely, online cosmetic
skincare consultation services; beauty care services provided by virtual
means, namely, online cosmetic skincare consultation services; health
care services provided by virtual means, namely, online medical
consultations rendered in virtual environments; health and nutritional
advisory and consultancy services, namely, dietary and nutritional
guidance; information, consultancy and advisory services in relation to
all of the aforesaid; none of the foregoing related to smoking or vaping
cessation, in International Class 44.
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s proposed
mark as to all three classes of services under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(e)(4), on the ground that it is primarily merely a surname. After the
Examining Attorney issued a final refusal of registration, Applicant filed a request

Serial No. 79405252
4
for reconsideration, followed immediately by an appeal. The Examining Attorney
denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal resumed, and both Applicant and
the Examining Attorney filed a brief.2 As explained below, we affirm the refusal
under Section 2(e)(4) on the ground that THE JONES is primarily merely a surname.
I. Evidentiary Objection
Before turning to our analysis, we address the Examining Attorney’s objection to
evidence that Applicant introduced with its brief, consisting of an excerpt from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s website and a related downloaded file of “Frequently Occurring
Surnames from the 2010 Census.”3 The Examining Attorney asserts that this
evidence is untimely and therefore requests that we disregard it.4
The Examining Attorney is correct that, as a general matter, the record should be
complete prior to the filing of the appeal. Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.142(d); In re HSB Solomon Assocs., No. 77136242, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 79, at *9;
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 1207.01
(2026). However, Applicant’s brief includes a request that the Board take judicial
2 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 6 TTABVUE; Examining Attorney’s Brief, 8 TTABVUE.
The TTABVUE and Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) citations in this
opinion refer respectively to entries in the Board’s electronic docket and the downloadable
PDF version of the electronic application file. For TTABVUE citations, the number preceding
the TTABVUE designation is the docket entry number and any numbers following indicate
the relevant page numbers within the docket entry.
3 Examining Attorney’s Brief, 8 TTABVUE 4-5 (objecting to evidence attached to Applicant’s
Appeal Brief at 6 TTABVUE 14-34).
4 See id.

Serial No. 79405252
5
notice of the evidence at issue, which Applicant submitted to show that the names
referenced in previously submitted evidence are surnames.5
The Board may take judicial notice of information that is either generally known
or that otherwise “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201; see also TBMP
§ 704.12(a). Such information includes census data. See, e.g., In re tapio GmbH, No.
87941532, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 483, at *42 n.46 (taking judicial notice of 2010 U.S.
Census records for the top 1,000 surnames); In re S. Malhotra & Co., No. 79194076,
2018 TTAB LEXIS 344, at *6 n.5 (taking judicial notice of U.S. Census data to find
that Greek is a common, modern language); In re Highlights for Children, Inc., No.
85838981, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 104, at *8 n.7 (taking judicial notice of U.S. Census
Report); see also TBMP § 1208.04. Because the Census evidence attached to
Applicant’s brief is the type of evidence that we may, and regularly do, take judicial
notice of, we grant Applicant’s request and overrule the Examining Attorney’s
objection. Accordingly, we have considered the evidence.
II. Section 2(e)(4) - Primarily Merely a Surname
We now turn to the Examining Attorney’s refusal to register the proposed mark
THE JONES based on Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4). The Examining Attorney’s
position is that the proposed mark consists of a nondistinctive term, THE, and the
surname JONES, and, when the proposed mark is viewed as a whole, the purchasing
5 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 6 TTABVUE 10-11.

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6
public will perceive it as primarily merely a surname.6 Applicant, on the other hand,
contends that the primary significance of the proposed mark, as a whole, is as an
indicator of source for the identified services and not merely as a surname.7
A. Applicable Law
Section 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act bars registration of a mark on the Principal
Register that is “primarily merely a surname” without a showing of acquired
distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).8 A term is primarily
merely a surname if, when viewed in relation to the goods or services for which
registration is sought, its primary significance to the purchasing public is that of a
surname. Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
In re Beds & Bars Ltd., No. 85597669, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 141, at *5. There is no rule
as to the kind or amount of evidence necessary to make out a prima facie showing
that the mark would be perceived as primarily merely a surname. Instead, each case
must be resolved based on the facts in evidence. In re Etablissements Darty et Fils,
759 F.2d 15, 17 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Beds & Bars Ltd., 2017 TTAB LEXIS 141,
at *7.
The factors to consider in determining whether a mark is primarily merely a
surname may include:
(1) the degree of the surname’s “rareness”;
(2) whether anyone connected with applicant has the mark as a surname;
6 See Examining Attorney’s Brief, 8 TTABVUE 11.
7 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 6 TTABVUE 12.
8 Applicant does not claim that the proposed mark has acquired distinctiveness.

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(3) whether the mark has any recognized meaning other than as a
surname;
(4) whether the mark has the “look and feel” of a surname; and
(5) whether the mark is presented in a stylized form distinctive enough to
create a separate non-surname impression.
In re Benthin Management GmbH, No. 74340080, 1995 TTAB LEXIS 10, at *2-7.
These Benthin factors “are not exclusive, nor are they presented in order of
importance.” In re Six Continents Ltd., No. 88430142, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 35, at *6.
“[A]ny of the [factors]—singly or in combination—as well as any other relevant
circumstances, may shape the analysis in a particular case.” Id.
B. Analysis
1. Surname’s Connection to Applicant & Distinctiveness of
Stylization
In this case, the second and fifth Benthin factors have no impact on our analysis.
Under the second factor, evidence that the applicant or someone connected with the
applicant has the proposed mark (or a portion of it) as a surname may weigh in favor
of a conclusion that the proposed mark would be perceived primarily merely as a
surname. See, e.g., In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, No. 86262060, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 472,
at *10 (“We find the evidence pertaining to the connection of Applicant’s name to the
goods persuasive of consumer perception of ALDECOA as a surname.”). “In contrast,
[the fact] that a proposed mark is not the applicant’s surname, or the surname of an
officer or employee, does not tend to establish one way or the other whether the
proposed mark would be perceived as a surname.” In re Gregory, No. 76277664, 2004
TTAB LEXIS 277, at *11. Here, the record contains no evidence indicating that

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8
anyone connected with Applicant has “Jones” as a surname, and Applicant has
confirmed that the “term JONES does not refer to or identify anyone connected to the
applicant.”9 See, e.g., In re Thermo LabSystems, Inc., No. 78204502, 2007 TTAB
LEXIS 92, at *5-6 (“The absence of anyone associated with applicant who has the
surname ‘Watson’ is therefore a factor which is neutral.”).
As to the fifth factor, Applicant seeks registration of the proposed mark in
standard characters, “without claim to any particular font style, size, or color.”
Trademark Rule 2.52(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(a). Thus, the proposed mark features no
stylization, let alone a stylization that would create a separate non-surname
impression. See, e.g., In re Yeley, No. 78489186, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 87, at *2 (“Because
[the proposed mark] is in standard character form, we need not consider the fifth
Benthin factor here, that is, whether the manner in which the mark is displayed
might negate any surname significance.”).
2. Rareness
Under the first Benthin factor, we consider any evidence establishing how rare, or
common, the surname JONES is. Such evidence informs our determination of
“whether the purchasing public for Applicant’s services is more likely to perceive
Applicant’s proposed mark as a surname rather than as anything else.” Tapio, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 483, at *17 (quoting Beds & Bars, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 141, at *15).
The Examining Attorney has made of record excerpts from Ancestry.com and
Wikipedia stating that JONES is the fifth most common surname in the United
9 April 22, 2025 Response to Nonfinal Office Action at TSDR 63.

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9
States.10 This ranking is confirmed by the excerpt from Census.gov attached to
Applicant’s brief.11 In addition, a LexisNexis-generated report provided by the
Examining Attorney indicates that JONES appears more than 3.5 million times as a
surname in a “weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers . . .
from various data providers.”12 This evidence establishes that JONES is an extremely
common surname in the U.S. and Applicant’s brief does not contend otherwise.
3. Look and Feel
Evidence that a term has the structure and pronunciation, or, in plainer terms,
the “look and feel,” of a surname may support a finding that the primary significance
of the term is that of a surname. Tapio, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 483, at *39 (citing In re
Giger, No. 76545470, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 61, at *12). To support the argument that
JONES has the look and feel of a surname, the Examining Attorney points to an
10 June 3, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 52-53 (Wikipedia), 61 (Ancestry.com). According
to Wikipedia, the “Jones” “surname is one of the most common in the United States, and is
consistently ranked in the top ten.” Id. at 58. “The Board gives guarded consideration to
evidence taken from Wikipedia, bearing in mind the limitations inherent in this reference
work, so long as the non-offering party has an opportunity to rebut the evidence by
submitting other evidence that may call its accuracy into question.” In re Lizzo LLC, No.
91240180, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 22, at *16 n.24. Here, because the Wikipedia excerpt was
included in a final office action, to which Applicant could, and did, respond, Applicant had an
opportunity to rebut the evidence.
While the evidence from Wikipedia and Ancestry.com has a hearsay element to it, the
hearsay rule does not apply in ex parte proceedings such as this. See, e.g., In re Epstein, 32
F.3d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that the hearsay rule does not apply in ex parte
proceedings before the USPTO); In re Hudson News Co., No. 74441602, 1996 TTAB LEXIS
16, at *16 n.10, aff’d without op., 114 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Although there is a hearsay
element to this evidence, there is no bias in the evidence which was not prepared for purposes
of this case.”). Moreover, we find this evidence trustworthy on the issues before us.
11 See Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 6 TTABVUE 14 (showing JONES as the fifth entry in a list
of the top ten most frequently occurring surnames in the 2010 Census).
12 Examining Attorney’s Brief, 8 TTABVUE 6 (describing evidence attached to the October
11, 2024 Nonfinal Office Action at TSDR 10-60).

Serial No. 79405252
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excerpt from the website Forebears.io,13 which states that “Jones is a patronymic
surname, meaning the son of John, or Johan or Jone.”14 And the Census data provided
by Applicant indicates that other common surnames, such as “Williams,” “Adams,”
and “Rogers,” appear to have a similar patronymic derivation.15 Further, there is no
evidence to suggest that JONES would be perceived as anything other than a
surname. See Gregory, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 277, at *14 (concluding that ROGAN “has
the look and sound of a surname,” noting that “[i]t would not be perceived as an
initialism or acronym . . . and does not have the appearance of having been coined by
combining a root element that has a readily understood meaning in its own right with
either a prefix or a suffix”). Nor does Applicant contest that JONES, alone, has the
look and feel of a surname. Instead, as discussed below, Applicant claims that the
proposed mark as a whole would be perceived as something other than a surname.16
4. Any Recognized Non-Surname Meaning
When, as in this case, a proposed mark is composed of a surname plus
additional matter, the Board must determine whether the proposed mark, as a whole,
would be perceived by the purchasing public as primarily merely a surname. See
Earnhardt, 864 F.3d at 1377 (“[T]o evaluate whether the commercial impression of a
mark that combines a surname with a second term is still primarily merely the
surname, the PTO must determine whether the primary significance of the mark as
13 Id.
14 June 3, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 10.
15 See Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 6 TTABVUE 17-35 (U.S. Census Bureau data).
16 See id. at 11-12.

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a whole in connection with the recited goods and services is that of the surname.”)
(citing In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
A key consideration in this determination is the relative distinctiveness of any
additional terms in the mark. Earnhardt, 864 F.3d at 1377-78 (citing Hutchinson
Tech., 852 F.2d at 554-55). Nondistinctive terms are less likely to detract from, or
otherwise change, the primary surname significance of the mark. See, e.g., Six
Continents, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 35, at *32-33 (finding ATWELL SUITES primarily
merely a surname); In re Weiss Watch Co., No. 86782562, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 183, at
*23-24 (“[W]hen used in connection with watches, the additional words WATCH
COMPANY are incapable of source-identifying function and, viewing the mark as a
whole in the context of the identified goods, do not alter the primary significance of
the proposed mark WEISS WATCH COMPANY as primarily merely a surname.”);
Azeka Bldg. Corp. v. Azeka, No. 91218679, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 123, at *17 (“[T]he
addition of RIBS in the mark does not detract from the primary significance of the
surname AZEKA.”).
Here, the Examining Attorney argues that “the addition of the article THE does
not alter the primary significance of the [proposed] mark as a whole from that of a
surname,” noting that the Board “has often found that the definite article ‘THE’ is
used to denote a particular object, and as such, generally has no trademark
significance.”17 See, e.g., In re Thor Tech, Inc., No. 78634024, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 253,
at *3 (finding that “THE” “does not have any trademark significance” and when used
17 Examining Attorney’s Brief, 8 TTABVUE 8.

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in the mark THE WAVE, it “simply emphasizes the word ‘Wave’”); In re The Place,
Inc., No. 76436826, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 451, at *3 (finding that the definite article
“THE” “add[s] no source-indicating significance to the mark as a whole”).
Applicant acknowledges that “the article THE often carries little to no weight in
altering the meaning of a mark,”18 but argues that, “[g]iven the overwhelming
frequency with which consumers are accustomed to encountering marks comprised
of THE and a surname, for hotel and hotel-related services, the public is most likely
to perceive [THE JONES] as a source indicator for such services.”19 In support,
Applicant points to what it calls “numerous registrations for, and widespread third-
party use of, marks constructed in the form THE + [surname] in connection with the
pertinent [hotel and hotel-related] services.”20
However, Applicant’s evidence does not persuade us that the purchasing public
will view THE JONES as anything other than a surname. The record does not contain
the file records for any of the submitted third-party registrations and thus we do not
know the examining attorneys’ reasons for approving the relevant marks for
registration. Regardless, we are not bound by the prior decisions of examining
attorneys involving different marks and different records. See In re Nett Designs Inc.,
236 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Everson, No. 97104306, 2026 TTAB LEXIS
75, at *22.
18 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 6 TTABVUE 12.
19 Id. at 11-12.
20 Id. at 11 (bracketed “surname” in original; bracketed “hotel and hotel-related” added).

Serial No. 79405252
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Some of the names reflected in both the third-party registrations and the
examples of use do appear to have primary significance as surnames. These include
“Moore,” “Crawford,” “Pittman,” “Barnes,” “Williams,” and “Duniway.” But many of
the others, including “Alexander,” “James,” “Tony,” “Thomas,” “Stanley,” and “Drake”
could also be perceived as first names. Still other examples feature words that have
other non-name significance, such as “Butler,” “Cooper,” and “Brown.” We therefore
disagree with Applicant’s characterization of the evidence as showing “numerous
registrations for, and widespread third-party use of, marks constructed in the form
THE + [surname] in connection with the pertinent [hotel and hotel-related]
services.”21
In any event, we can only guess as to how any of these examples are actually
perceived by the purchasing public, because we have no actual evidence on that point.
Instead, Applicant asks us to presume that, because there are hotels that use the
“THE + [surname]” naming convention, the purchasing public would view any
proposed mark with a similar construction that is used in connection with hotel
services as something other than just a surname. To bolster its position, Applicant
draws our attention to a prior non-precedential Board decision, In re IMH Columbia,
LLC, No. 88094045, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 485.22 In that case, the Board reversed a
Section 2(e)(4) refusal of the mark THE MERRIWEATHER for hotel services,
concluding that the “record does not support a finding that consumers are likely to
21 Id.
22 A copy of the decision was included in Applicant’s April 22, 2025 Response to Nonfinal
Office Action at TSDR 16-30.

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view and understand the mark THE MERRIWEATHER, when considered in its
entirety, in connection with hotel services to be primarily merely a surname.” Id. at
*19. Applicant notes that in the prior case, “[t]he Board found the applicant’s evidence
of other hotel names prefaced by the word ‘the’ to be probative . . . as it showed
consumers often encounter the names of hotels or buildings beginning with the word
‘the.’”23 According to Applicant, the circumstances in IMH Columbia are “virtually
identical” to those here, and thus we should act consistently and reverse the refusal
to register Applicant’s proposed mark.
We disagree. As an initial matter, while non-precedential decisions may be cited
and considered for whatever persuasive value they might have, they are not binding
on the Board, nor are they a substitute for evidence needed to overcome a refusal. In
re UST Global (Sing.) Pte. Ltd., No. 87657822, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 19, at *21 n.23.
And non-precedential decisions decided on different records are unlikely to carry
much persuasive value. See, e.g., Tapio, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 483, at *32 n.34 (finding
two non-precedential surname decisions unpersuasive because they were based on
different records); In re Gen. Mills IP Holdings II, LLC, No. 86757390, 2017 TTAB
LEXIS 262, at *40 (noting that comparisons to other cases “are rarely helpful, because
the critical facts of different cases almost always differ substantially”).
We find the facts of this case differ from those in IMH Columbia. While the Board
in the latter case deemed evidence showing that hotel names can be prefaced by “the”
23 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 6 TTABVUE 9. (referencing the Board’s statement in IMH
Columbia, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *19).

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15
to be probative, the decision explicitly states that the Board’s determination was also
“based on ‘Merriweather’ being a relatively uncommon surname, having several
possible non-surname meanings, including a very similar, known historical first
name.” IMH Columbia, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *19. Here, JONES is an extremely
common surname and the record contains no evidence that it has any non-surname
meanings. Thus, we agree with the Examining Attorney that Applicant’s evidence of
hotel names prefaced by “the” does not compel us to reach the same conclusion here
as in IMH Columbia.
Even if we were convinced that the purchasing public would view the primary
significance of THE JONES as something other than a surname when used in
connection with hotel services, Applicant seeks registration of more than just hotel
services. Indeed, the application identifies other services in International Class 43,
as well as various services in International Classes 41 and 44.24 And, as the
Examining Attorney points out, there is no evidence of record to support a finding
that the addition of “THE” lends the proposed mark non-surname significance when
used in connection with any of the identified non-hotel services in Classes 41, 43,
and 44.
Lastly, Applicant argues that “[t]o the extent there is any lingering doubt as to
whether the primary significance of the Mark is merely a surname, the Board should
24 This is another way that the facts in the present case differ from those in IMH Columbia,
where the application identified only “hotel services.” 2020 TTAB LEXIS 485, at *1.

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16
resolve all such doubt in favor of Applicant, and accordingly, reverse the refusal.”25
Here, we have no doubt as to our conclusion.
III. Conclusion
The evidence of record shows that JONES is one of the most common surnames
in the U.S. and would likely be recognized as such by the purchasing public. Further,
the record contains no evidence establishing that JONES, by itself, would be
perceived as having any other significance. And the addition of THE to the proposed
mark does not detract from, or otherwise change, the surname significance of JONES.
Accordingly, on this record, we conclude that the primary significance of THE JONES
is merely that of a surname and therefore registration of the proposed mark must be
refused under Section 2(e)(4).
Decision: We affirm the refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Trademark
Act Section 2(e)(4) as to all three classes of services because the proposed mark THE
JONES is primarily merely a surname.
25 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 6 TTABVUE 12.