Subsup Pte. Ltd.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: October 19, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Subsup Pte. Ltd.
_____
Serial No. 98680779
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Alex D. Patel and Andrew T. Rissler of Patel IP, P.C. for Subsup Pte. Ltd.
Mitchell Knief, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 103,
Stacy Wahlberg, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Larkin, Casagrande, and O’Connor,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Subsup Pte. Ltd. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
standard-character mark TALKIE for the following goods in International Class 9:
Downloadable computer chatbot software for simulating
conversations in the field of entertainment, education,
creative writing, role-playing, and personal
companionship; Downloadable software in the nature of a
mobile application for allowing users to interact and have
conversations with artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots;
Downloadable computer operating programs using
artificial intelligence in the field of entertainment,
education, creative writing, role-playing, and personal
companionship; Downloadable software for creating
avatars, building virtual objects, and interacting with

Serial Nos. 98680779
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users and objects in virtual worlds in the field of
entertainment, education, creative writing, role playing,
and personal companionship; Downloadable software in
the nature of a mobile application for allowing users to chat
with artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot; Downloadable
computer software platforms for developing applications
using artificial intelligence in the field of entertainment,
education, creative writing, role-playing, and personal
companionship; Recorded computer programs using
artificial intelligence (AI) for facial and speech recognition;
Downloadable computer application software for mobile
phones, namely, software for allowing users to chat with
artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots; Downloadable virtual
reality game software using artificial intelligence;
Smartphone game software, downloadable, using artificial
intelligence in the field of entertainment, education,
creative writing, role-playing, and personal
companionship.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that it
so resembles the several marks registered on the Principal Register that are shown
and discussed below as to be likely to cause confusion when Applicant’s mark is used
in connection with the goods identified in its application.
Three of the marks, TALKIE and TALK TO TALKIE in standard characters, and
the composite mark shown below
1 Application Serial No. 98680779 was filed on August 2, 2024 under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce. As discussed below, the identification of goods was amended to
its final version on remand during this appeal.
Applicant has filed two other applications to register TALKIE in standard characters for
various services in Classes 38 and 45 that are the subject of appeals that will be decided
separately.

Serial Nos. 98680779
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are commonly owned, and are registered for “internet protocol television (IPTV)
transmission services; voice over internet protocol (VOIP) services;
telecommunications services, namely, providing fiberoptic network services; video-
on-demand transmission services; electronic transmission and streaming of digital
media content for others via global and local computer networks” in International
Class 38.2
The other two cited marks have different owners. The composite mark shown
below
is registered on the Principal Register for numerous goods in International Class 9,
including “Downloadable computer chatbot and bot software for simulating
conversation,” and services in International Classes 35 and 42.3 The standard-
character mark TALKIESPACE is registered on the Principal Register for
“Downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application for sending and
receiving messages; none of the foregoing for purposes of therapy, for accepting and
processing user fees, or for use in initiating online communications sessions for
2 Registration No. 6178468 of TALKIE issued on October 20, 2020 and has been maintained,
and Registration No. 7682216 of TALK TO TALKIE issued on February 4, 2025. Registration
No. 6089182 of the composite mark issued on June 30, 2026.
3 Registration No. 7265449 issued on January 9, 2024.

Serial Nos. 98680779
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purposes of therapy interactions among groups and with therapists” in International
Class 9.4
Applicant appealed when the Examining Attorney made the refusal final.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney have filed briefs.5 We affirm the refusal to
register.
I. Prosecution and Procedural History, and Record on Appeal6
Applicant originally sought registration of its mark for the following Class 9 goods:
Downloadable computer chatbot software for simulating
conversations; Downloadable software in the nature of a
mobile application for users to interact and have
conversations with artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots;
Downloadable computer operating programs;
Downloadable software for creating avatars, building
virtual objects, and interacting with users and objects in
virtual worlds; Downloadable software in the nature of a
mobile application, namely, software being artificial
intelligence (AI) chatbots; Downloadable computer
software platforms for application development; Recorded
computer programs using artificial intelligence (AI) for
facial and speech recognition; Downloadable computer
application software for mobile phones, namely, software
being artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots; Downloadable
virtual reality game software; Smartphone game software,
downloadable.7
4 Registration No. 7014161 issued on March 28, 2023.
5 Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the case docket refer to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number preceding TTABVUE
corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers following TTABVUE refer to the
page(s) of the docket entry where the cited materials appear. Applicant’s brief appears at 4
TTABVUE and the Examining Attorney’s brief appears at 10 TTABVUE.
6 Citations in this opinion to the application record are to pages in the downloadable .pdf
version of the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) database of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).
7 August 2, 2024 Application at 1-2.

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The Examining Attorney issued an Office Action refusing registration under
Section 2(d) based on the five registrations discussed above,8 and requiring an
amendment to Applicant’s identification of goods.9 The Examining Attorney made of
record USPTO electronic records regarding the five cited registrations,10 and third-
party webpages regarding the involved goods and services.11 Applicant responded by
arguing against the refusal to register and purporting to amend its identification of
goods.12
The Examining Attorney then issued an Office Action making final the refusal to
register and the requirement of an amendment to Applicant’s identification of
goods.13 The Examining Attorney made of record additional third-party webpages
regarding the involved goods and services.14
After Applicant appealed and filed its appeal brief, Applicant requested remand
“for the limited purpose of entering a narrowing amendment to the identification of
goods in International Class 9.” 6 TTABVUE 2. The amended goods, which are set
forth at the outset of this opinion, involved what Applicant described as “clarification
of the ‘field of use’ for certain Class 9 software items.” Id.
8 February 21, 2025 Office Action at 2-10.
9 Id. at 9-10.
10 Id. at 12-22.
11 Id. at 23-60.
12 August 11, 2025 Response to Office Action at 1-12.
13 September 3, 2025 Final Office Action at 3-13.
14 Id. at 14-120.

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The Board granted Applicant’s request, 8 TTABVUE 1, and the Examining
Attorney accepted Applicant’s amendment in a Subsequent Final Office Action.15 The
Examining Attorney maintained the final refusal under Section 2(d),16 and the appeal
was resumed. 9 TTABVUE 1. Following the filing of the Examining Attorney’s brief,
the appeal is now ready for decision.
II. Analysis of Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or
services of the applicant, to cause confusion [or] mistake, or to deceive.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Our determination
of the likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is based on an
analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1379. We consider each
DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg.
Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
“Two key factors in every Section 2(d) case are the first two factors regarding the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods or services, because the
fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.” DC Comics
15 May 27, 2026 Subsequent Final Office Action at 2.
16 Id.

Serial Nos. 98680779
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v. Cellular Nerd LLC, No. 91246950, 2022 WL 17832492, at *10 (TTAB 2022)
(internal quotations and quotation marks omitted).
Applicant addresses these two key DuPont factors, 4 TTABVUE 4-5, 6-9, as well
as the third DuPont factor, the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-
continue trade channels,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 4 TTABVUE 10-11, and the
fourth DuPont factor, the “conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are
made, i. e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361,
4 TTABVUE 11. Applicant also argues that the TALKIE/TALK formative that is
common to the involved marks is conceptually weak in the context of communications
and AI-chat software and is entitled to a narrower scope of protection, id. at 5-6,
which alludes to the sixth DuPont factor, the “number and nature of similar marks
in use on similar goods.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
We will focus our analysis under Section 2(d) on the composite mark shown in
cited Registration No. 7265449 (the “’449 Registration”),17 and reproduced again
below
which we find to be the most pertinent of the cited registrations because it covers
goods in Class 9. See, e.g., Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 WL 22358, at *2
17 The owner of the cited ’449 Registration describes the mark as follows: “The mark consists
of a design of two overlapping speech bubbles each containing two dots to the left of the
stylized wording ‘TALKIE.AI’.”

Serial Nos. 98680779
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(TTAB 2010). If we find a likelihood of confusion with respect to this mark and the
involved identified Class 9 goods, we need not consider the other cited marks.
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods, Channels of Trade, and
Classes of Consumers
We begin with the second and third DuPont factors. The second factor “considers
‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an
application or registration . . . .” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). “This factor considers whether ‘the consuming public may perceive [the
goods or services] as related enough to cause confusion about the source or origin of
the goods or services.’” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir.
2002)). “In analyzing the [goods], the Board considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity
and nature of the [goods] as described in an application or registration.’” In re OSF
Healthcare Sys., No. 88706809, 2023 WL 6140427, at *4 (TTAB 2023) (quoting In re
Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 WL 2285576, at *10 (TTAB 2021)).
The relatedness of goods or services may be established based on (1) the language
of the involved identifications of goods or services, which may show, on the face of the
identifications, that the goods or services are literally or legally identical, or are
otherwise intrinsically related, and (2) evidence of third-party uses or registrations,
which may show that the identified goods or services are commonly offered by the
same entity under the same mark. See, e.g., id. at *4. As discussed below, the
language of the identifications is sufficient here to establish relatedness.

Serial Nos. 98680779
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The “Examining Attorney need not prove, and we need not find, similarity as to
each [good] listed in the description of [goods]” in Class 9 in the application. Id. at *5
(citation omitted). “It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness
is established for any item encompassed in the identification of goods in a particular
class in an application.” In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025 WL
2953731, at *3 (TTAB 2025) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp.,
Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981)). “[R]egistration must be refused in a
particular class if Applicant’s mark for any of its identified goods . . . in [Class 9] is
likely to cause confusion with the Registrant’s mark for any of its identified [Class 9]
goods . . . .” In re Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964, 2020 WL 2094122, at *3 (TTAB
2020).
The goods ultimately identified in the application following Applicant’s
amendment on remand include “Downloadable computer chatbot software for
simulating conversations in the field of entertainment, education, creative writing,
role-playing, and personal companionship.” The goods identified in the ’449
Registration include “Downloadable computer chatbot and bot software for
simulating conversation.”
In comparing the goods, “we must construe the [goods] identified in the cited [’449]
[R]egistration as broadly as reasonably possible ‘to include all [goods] of the nature
and type described therein,’” OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *5 (quoting In re
Solid State Design Inc., No. 87269041, 2018 WL 287909, at *6 (TTAB 2018) (internal
quotation omitted)), and “we must resolve any ambiguities regarding their coverage

Serial Nos. 98680779
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in favor of the cited registrant ‘given the presumptions afforded the [’449]
[R]egistration under Section 7(b)’ of the Trademark Act.” Id. (quoting In re C.H.
Hanson Co., No. 77983232, 2015 WL 6121759, at *5 (TTAB 2015) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
1057(b)). We must give “‘full sweep’ to an identification of goods or services regardless
of [the] registrant’s actual business,” Advance Mag. Publishers, Inc. v. Fashion Elecs.,
Inc., No. 91247034, 2023 WL 4261426, at *15 (TTAB 2023) (quoting Paula Payne
Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 473 F.2d 901, 902 (CCPA 1973)), and “we may
consider . . . restrictions [regarding the actual goods] only if they are included in the
identification of goods . . . .” In re FCA US, LLC, No. 85650654, 2018 WL 1756431, at
*4 n.18 (TTAB 2018), aff’d mem., 778 F. App’x 962 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Applicant’s argument regarding the goods identified in the ’449 Registration is as
follows:
The Examining Attorney contends that Reg. No. 7265449
(TALKIE.AI) includes wording broad enough to encompass
“downloadable computer chatbot and bot software for
simulating conversation,” and therefore Applicant’s
relevant goods are legally identical or overlapping with the
registrant’s goods for Section 2(d) purposes. . . . Applicant
respectfully submits that the Office’s analysis overextends
that overlap and treats it as dispositive without the record
support required for a likelihood-of-confusion finding. As a
mark, TALKIE.AI reinforces a technical, automated tool
associated with artificial intelligence, which differs in
commercial impression from TALKIE alone. In addition,
Applicant’s identification is expressly limited to non-
medical or healthcare purposes. The cited TALKIE.AI
identification, read as a whole, is lengthy and heavily
oriented toward specialized AI and communications-
processing functionalities, including extensive interaction
and healthcare-focused features alongside other technical
components. The Board compares identifications as
written, but the likelihood-of-confusion inquiry still turns

Serial Nos. 98680779
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on whether consumers would be likely to assume a single
source when encountering Applicant’s non-medical, AI
chatbot software and related software offerings under
TALKIE versus the registrant’s broad, specialized, and
differently framed suite of goods under TALKIE.AI.
Moreover, the Examining Attorney’s “legal identity”
position, even if accepted as to a subset of chatbot-related
items, does not establish that Applicant’s entire Class 009
identification is commercially interchangeable with the
cited registration’s full scope, nor does it eliminate the need
to weigh the remaining relevant du Pont factors on the
record presented, including differences in overall
commercial impression created by the cited mark’s
additional matter and presentation and the absence of
record evidence demonstrating that purchasers would
expect Applicant’s non-medical offerings and the
registrant’s identified suite of goods to emanate from the
same source.
4 TTABVUE 9-10 (record citation omitted).
The Examining Attorney responds as follows:
In this case, registrant TALKIE.AI (7265449) uses broad
wording to describe “Downloadable computer chatbot and
bot software for simulating conversation” which
presumably encompasses all goods of the type described,
including applicant’s more specific “Downloadable
computer chatbot software for simulating conversations in
the field of entertainment, education, creative writing,
role-playing, and personal companionship; Downloadable
software in the nature of a mobile application for allowing
users to interact and have conversations with artificial
intelligence (AI) chatbots; Downloadable software in the
nature of a mobile application for allowing users to chat
with artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot; Downloadable
computer application software for mobile phones, namely,
software for allowing users to chat with artificial
intelligence (AI) chatbots”. . . . Thus, applicant’s and
registrant’s goods are legally identical.
10 TTABVUE 17 (emphasis supplied by the Examining Attorney; citations omitted).

Serial Nos. 98680779
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We agree with the Examining Attorney. As discussed above, we must construe
each of the multiple distinct goods in the Class 9 identification in the ’449
Registration, which are separated by semicolons,18 as broadly as reasonably possible,
and it is not necessary for the Examining Attorney to show that each Class 9 good
identified in the application is related to each Class 9 good identified in the ’449
Registration. The goods broadly identified in the ’449 Registration as “Downloadable
computer chatbot and bot software for simulating conversation” are not limited on
the face of the identification to any particular field of use, and thus must be deemed
to encompass “all [goods] of the nature and type described therein,” OSF Healthcare,
2023 WL 6140427, at *5, including the narrower “Downloadable computer chatbot
software for simulating conversations in the field of entertainment, education,
creative writing, role-playing, and personal companionship” identified in the
application following amendment from Applicant’s original identification of
“Downloadable computer chatbot software for simulating conversations.” See Int’l
Paper Co. v. Valley Paper Co., 468 F.2d 937, 938 (CCPA 1972) (where the “registration
description is broad enough to cover the goods [of the applicant], . . . the legal effect
of this fact is that the goods and channels of trade are to be considered the same for
the purposes of this opposition”). These goods are legally identical, and the second
DuPont factor strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely. OSF
Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *9.
18 “Under standard examination practice, a semicolon is used to separate distinct categories
of goods or services.” Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050, 2023 WL 417620, at *7 n.35
(TTAB 2023) (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted).

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The third DuPont factor “considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.’” Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1308 (quoting
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Because the [goods] described in the application and the
[’449] [R]egistration are legally identical in part, we must presume that the channels
of trade and classes of purchasers are the same as to those . . . identical [goods].” OSF
Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *9 (quoting Monster Energy, 2023 WL 417620, at
*8 (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). We are entitled to
“rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion.” Viterra, 671
F.3d at 1362;19 accord Int’l Paper Co., 468 F.2d at 938. Thus, the overlap in trade
channels and classes of consumers also strongly supports a conclusion that confusion
is likely. OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *9.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, “we consider the ‘similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.’” Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, 2025 WL 2953731, at *4
(quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be
sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” Sage Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sageforth
Psych. Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (TTAB 2024) (quoting In
re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, at *5 (TTAB
19 Applicant argues that “trade-channel presumptions cannot convert broad industry
adjacency into a likelihood of confusion,” 4 TTABVUE 11, but here we have legal identity of
the goods in part, not mere relatedness or “broad industry adjacency,” and we may rely on
the presumption discussed in Viterra.

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2018) (citation omitted), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); accord Krim-
Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if
the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”)
(citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (quoting Coach
Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning, LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “The
focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally ‘retains a general
rather than a specific impression of marks.’” Id. (quoting In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No.
85916778, 2018 WL 3993582, at *4 (TTAB 2018) (citations omitted)). The “average
purchaser” here is a consumer of “Downloadable computer chatbot software for
simulating conversations in the field of entertainment, education, creative writing,
role-playing, and personal companionship,” which, by definition, includes ordinary
members of the general public seeking conversations with a chatbot for various
purposes, including “personal companionship.”
“[S]imilarity is not a binary factor, but is a matter of degree.” St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d at 752 (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2003)). Where, as here, the involved goods are legally identical in part, a lesser degree
of similarity between the marks is required for confusion to be likely. Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“When marks

Serial Nos. 98680779
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would appear on virtually identical goods or services, the degree of similarity
necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.”).
The marks here are TALKIE in standard characters, and the composite mark
shown in the ’449 Registration and reproduced again below for ease of reference in
following our analysis:
Applicant candidly acknowledges that the “similarity of the marks weighs against
Applicant,” but argues that “that factor is not dispositive.” 4 TTABVUE 4. According
to Applicant, the cited “TALKIE.AI [mark] create[s] [a] distinct commercial
impression[ ] beyond the shared TALKIE element,” id. at 5, because “TALKIE.AI
signals a technical, automated tool associated with artificial intelligence.” Id.
Applicant also notes that the cited mark is a “stylized composite mark[ ] with design
elements,” id. at 12, and “additional literal matter [.AI].” Id.
The Examining Attorney responds that “the applied for and registered marks all
contain the identical TALKIE, and create a confusingly similar commercial
impression, and thus, are confusingly similar in appearance.” 10 TTABVUE 12-13.
The Examining Attorney argues that “[a]lthough applicant’s mark does not contain
the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective
purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark,” id. at 13, and that Applicant’s

Serial Nos. 98680779
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standard-character mark can be rendered in the same manner of display as the literal
elements of the mark shown in the ’449 Registration. Id. at 14.
Marks must be considered in their entireties, but “in articulating reasons for
reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
their entireties.” Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305 (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp.,
753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
The cited mark consists of what the registrant describes as “two overlapping
speech bubbles each containing two dots,” and the verbal element TALKIE.AI in a
stylized font. “When a mark comprises both words and a design, the words are
normally accorded greater weight because they are more likely to be impressed upon
a purchaser’s memory and would typically be used by purchasers to request the goods
or services.” Iron Balls Int’l Ltd. v. Bull Creek Brewing, LLC, No. 92079099, 2024 WL
2844425, at *12 (TTAB 2024) (citing Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362). This general principle
applies here, where the design element cannot be verbalized. We find that the literal
element TALKIE.AI is the dominant portion of the cited mark, and in the required
comparison of the marks in their entireties, we will give greater weight to TALKIE.AI
than to the design element.
With respect to appearance, because Applicant’s TALKIE mark is a standard-
character mark, “we must consider that the literal elements of the mark (the words
and the letters) may be presented in any font style, size or color, including the same

Serial Nos. 98680779
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font, size and color as the literal portions of [the cited] mark.” In re Aquitaine Wine
USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 WL 1620989, at *5 (TTAB 2018); accord Cai v.
Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “This is because the rights
associated with a standard character mark reside in the wording per se and not in
any particular font style, size, or color.” Aquitaine Wine, 2018 WL 1620989, at *5
(citing Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
Accordingly, we must assume that Applicant’s mark could be depicted in the same
font style and size as the word TALKIE in the mark shown in the ’449 Registration.
In this assumed depiction, Applicant’s mark is very similar in appearance to the
cited mark from the standpoint of a consumer with a general rather than specific
mind’s eye recollection of the cited mark who separately sees Applicant’s mark for
legally identical goods.
With respect to sound, the cited mark is likely to be verbalized as “Talkie dot AI.”
The marks are also similar in sound because the TALKIE element of each mark will
sound identical. The marks as a whole sound partially different because of the “.AI”
in the cited mark, “but the shared [‘talkie’] element will have the same impact when
spoken or heard as it does when seen.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *6.
Finally, the marks are quite similar in connotation and commercial impression,
because “talkie” connotes figurative “talking” between humans and chatbots in both
marks when they are used in connection with legally identical chatbot software. As
noted below, Applicant states that TALKIE suggests “‘talking’ or ‘chatting,’ a
commonplace concept in software used for conversation, messaging, and chatbot

Serial Nos. 98680779
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interaction,” 4 TTABVUE 6, the design element of the cited mark, which the
registrant aptly describes as “two overlapping speech bubbles each containing two
dots,” reinforces the idea of “talking” or “chatting,” and the .AI suffix in the cited mark
identifies one party to the conversation.20
The first DuPont factor strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely.
Naterra, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
C. The Fourth DuPont Factor
We also consider the “conditions under which . . . sales are made, i. e. ‘impulse’ vs.
careful, sophisticated purchasing,” under the fourth DuPont factor. DuPont, 476 F.2d
at 1361.
Applicant argues that “purchasers typically select downloadable software and
communications-related services with attention to functionality, platform
compatibility, privacy and security considerations, and (for telecom or VoIP-type
services) service reliability and pricing commitments.” 4 TTABVUE 11. As noted
above, the purchasers of the goods identified in the application as “Downloadable
computer chatbot software for simulating conversations in the field of entertainment,
education, creative writing, role-playing, and personal companionship” include
20 The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including definitions from
online dictionaries that exist in printed format or have fixed regular editions. See, e.g., In re
Nursecon, LLC, No. 88052194, 2024 WL 5265079, at *10 n.64 (TTAB 2024) (citation omitted).
We take judicial notice that a “chatbot” is defined as “a computer program designed to have
a conversation with a human being, usually over the internet” and includes an “AI chatbot.”
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (dictionary.cambridge.org, last accessed on October 16, 2026). In the
context of goods identified as “Downloadable computer chatbot software for simulating
conversations,” the .AI suffix reinforces the idea of talking to a chatbot or computer program
powered by artificial intelligence.

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ordinary consumers in the general public, as well as other potential consumers, and
our decision must be based on the “least sophisticated potential purchasers” of the
goods. Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted). There is nothing in the
record to show that the least sophisticated potential purchaser of Applicant’s
downloadable software is likely to exercise anything more than ordinary care, and
the argument of Applicant’s counsel “is no substitute for evidence.” In re Samsung
Display Co., No. 90502617, 2024 WL 3451873, at *10 (TTAB 2024) (quoting Cai, 901
F.3d at 1371 (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)). The degree of consumer care factor is neutral in our analysis of the
likelihood of confusion.
D. The Sixth DuPont Factor
Under the sixth DuPont factor, which considers the “number and nature of similar
marks in use on similar goods,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, “[t]here are two prongs of
analysis for a mark’s strength . . .: conceptual strength and commercial strength.”
Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
“Conceptual strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness . . . and distinctiveness
is often classified in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness[:] . . . (1)
generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Id. (citation,
quotation, and quotation marks omitted). “Distinctiveness is relevant to a mark’s
overall strength in the likelihood of confusion analysis.” Id. (citation omitted).
“Commercial strength, on the other hand, is the marketplace recognition value of the

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mark. [It] is a question of whether consumers in fact associate the . . . mark with a
unique source[.]” Id. (quotation and quotation marks omitted).
Applicant focuses here solely on the alleged conceptual weakness of the cited
TALKIE-formative marks, 4 TTABVUE 5-6, arguing that “‘TALKIE’ is highly
suggestive of ‘talking’ or ‘chatting,’ a commonplace concept in software used for
conversation, messaging, and chatbot interaction.” Id. at 6. Applicant concludes that
“the shared TALKIE/TALK element should be afforded a narrower scope in the
overall Section 2(d) analysis . . . .” Id.
The cited ’449 Registration issued on the Principal Register without a requirement
of a showing of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f), so “we presume that it is inherently distinctive, i.e., that it is at
worst suggestive of the goods.” Cielo e Terra, S.p.A. v. Hoteles y Viñedos del Valle de
Guadalupe S.A. de C.V., No. 91287216, 2026 WL 2624328, at *9 (TTAB 2026) (quoting
Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 WL 4925901, at *18 (TTAB 2024)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)); see also Brooklyn Brewery Corp. v. Brooklyn Brew Shop,
LLC, 17 F.4th 129, 146 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Where, as here, the mark is registered
without a Section 2(f) claim of acquired distinctiveness, the mark is presumed to be
inherently distinctive.”) (citation omitted). “Nevertheless, ‘where there is evidence
that a mark, or element of a mark, is commonly used or registered by many different
third parties for similar goods or services, that may indicate that the mark or common
element has some conceptual weakness.’” Cielo e Terra, 2026 WL 2624328, at *9

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(quoting August Storck KG v. Florend Indústria e Comércio de Chocolates LTDA, No.
91277224, 2025 WL 4107480, at *13 (TTAB 2025) (internal citations omitted)).
Here, Applicant has pointed to no TALKIE-formative registrations in the record
beyond the three cited registrations owned by the same entity and the fourth cited
registration owned by a different entity. Even if we consider the four other cited
registrations, reflecting only two additional source entities, to be “third-party
registrations” vis-à-vis the mark shown in the ’449 Registration, “two sources are not
enough to show dilution of a mark, nor [do] they show that there is a ‘crowded field’
of sources utilizing these similar terms.” In re Textnow Inc., No. 98231457, 2026 WL
1920576, at *9 (TTAB 2026) (quotation omitted) (citing Embiid, 2021 WL 2285576,
at *19 (“three third-party registrations . . . [are] a far cry from the large quantum of
evidence of third-party use and third-party registrations that was held to be
significant in both Jack Wolfskin [Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. v. New
Millenium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015)] and Juice
Generation[, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015)].”)). The sixth
DuPont factor is neutral in our analysis of the likelihood of confusion, and we will
accord the mark shown in the cited ’449 Registration “the ‘normal scope of protection
to which inherently distinctive marks are entitled.’” Cielo e Terra, 2026 WL 2624328,
at *21 (quoting Iron Balls, 2024 WL 284445, at *15).
E. Summary
The goods, channels of trade, and classes of consumers are legally identical in
part, and the marks are quite similar when considered in their entireties. The

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identity of the goods and the high degree of similarity of the marks represent key
DuPont factors. Together, these factors all strongly support a conclusion that
confusion is likely, and the degree of consumer care factor and the sixth factor are
neutral. No factors weigh against a conclusion that confusion is likely. We conclude
that a consumer with a general rather than specific recollection of the cited
TALKIE.AI and design mark for “Downloadable computer chatbot and bot software
for simulating conversation” who separately encounters Applicant’s standard-
character TALKIE mark for “Downloadable computer chatbot software for simulating
conversations in the field of entertainment, education, creative writing, role-playing,
and personal companionship” is likely to believe mistakenly that the goods have a
common source.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.