Adblock Inc. v. Crypto, Inc.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 29, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Adblock Inc.
v.
Crypto, Inc.
_____
Ad-IP GmbH & Co. KG
v.
Crypto, Inc.
_____
Eyeo GmbH
v.
Crypto, Inc.
_____
Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent),1 91290857, and 91290989
_____
Thomas M. Freiburger,
for Adblock Inc., Ad-IP GmbH & Co. KG, and Eyeo GmbH.2
Jefferson F. Scher of Carr & Ferrell LLP,
for Crypto, Inc.
_____
1 The Board consolidated these cases on May 9, 2024. 5 TTABVUE. Unless otherwise
specified, citations are to the parent proceeding, Opposition No. 91290855. Citations to the
record refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docket system.
2 Opposer Eyeo GmbH is not capitalized in the caption of Opposition No. 91290989 but is
otherwise capitalized within the body of the notice of opposition, 1 TTABVUE (in all
oppositions), answer, 6 TTABVUE, and in Opposers’ main brief. 15 TTABVUE. We will use
the uppercase version.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
- 2 -
Before English, Stanley, and Brock,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Brock, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Ad-IP GmbH & Co. KG, Eyeo GmbH and Adblock Inc. (collectively, “Opposers”)
oppose registration on the Principal Register by Applicant Crypto, Inc. of the
standard character mark ADBLOCK PRO (with a claim of acquired distinctiveness
in whole) for “downloadable computer software for enhancing web browser privacy
and security; downloadable computer software for removing, blocking, and
deactivating annoying and unwanted content in web pages” in International Class 9.3
Opposers pleaded two grounds of opposition, but pursued only one ground at trial:
likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d),4
based on Ad-IP GmbH & Co. KG’s claimed ownership of three registrations5 for two
marks on the Principal Register (collectively, the “Pleaded Registrations”), the oldest
with a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f), as follows:
3 Application Serial No. 97017845 was filed on September 8, 2021, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), alleging October 31, 2015 as the date of first use
anywhere and in commerce.
Citations are to the downloadable .pdf versions of documents in the Trademark Status &
Document Retrieval (TSDR) database.
4 Opposers also pleaded “Fraud in the Declaration and Specimen,” 1 TTABVUE 10 in each
proceeding, but did not present arguments or evidence on the merits in the main brief. See
15 TTABVUE. The fraud ground is waived. See, e.g., Swatch AG v. M.Z. Berger & Co., No.
91187092, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 515, at *2 n.3 (opposer’s pleaded claims not argued in its brief
deemed waived), aff’d, 787 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
5 1 TTABVUE 6 in each proceeding. We address the ownership shown on the registration
certificates attached to the pleadings in the entitlement discussion below.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
- 3 -
• Registration No. 4680485 for ADBLOCK PLUS (in standard characters,
Section 2(f) claimed in whole), issued February 3, 2015;
• Registration No. 6756730 for ADBLOCK PLUS (in standard
characters), issued June 14, 2022; and
• Registration No. 5283149 for
(BROWSER disclaimed),6 issued September 12, 2017.
In each answer, Applicant denied the salient allegations in each notice of
opposition.7 Each party filed a trial brief and Opposers filed a reply brief.8
I. Trial Record and Evidentiary Matters
A. Record
The record consists of the pleadings9 and the files of the opposed application,
under Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1), as well as evidence introduced by the parties as
described below.
Opposers introduced:
• testimony declaration of Thomas M. Freiburger, counsel for Opposers,
dated April 4, 2025, with exhibits A-B (“Freiburger Declaration”);10 and
6 The mark description is: The mark consists of a portion of a double bordered octagonal
shape out of which a partial globe is emerging; to its right are the words “ADBLOCK
BROWSER”. The octagonal shape casts a shadow upon the globe.
Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
7 6 TTABVUE in each proceeding.
8 Opposers’ main brief, 15 TTABVUE; Applicant’s brief, 16 TTABVUE; Opposers’ reply brief,
17 TTABVUE.
9 There is one exception. We give no consideration to the attachments to Applicant’s answers.
Trademark Rule 2.122(c), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(c).
10 7 TTABVUE 2-18.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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• notice of reliance on their Pleaded Registrations, without supporting
exhibits (that is, a mere cover sheet listing the marks and registration
numbers).11
For its part, Applicant introduced:
• testimony declaration of Jefferson F. Scher, counsel for Applicant, dated
November 10, 2025, with exhibits A-J (“Scher Declaration”);12 and
• notice of reliance on Internet materials, with exhibits 1-3.13
B. Freiburger Declaration
Applicant moved to strike the Freiburger Declaration along with its supporting
exhibits,14 and the Board issued an order deciding some of Applicant’s objections and
deferring another until final decision.15 In that Order, the Board (1) granted in part
Applicant’s motion to strike Mr. Freiburger’s testimony declaration as to Paragraph
3 and Exhibit B, (2) denied the motion in part as to the remainder of the declaration
and Exhibit A, and (3) deferred until final decision Applicant’s motion to strike the
declaration in its entirety based on lack of foundation.16
Applicant renewed its foundation objection in its brief,17 so we now consider it. In
its motion, Applicant argues that “Mr. Freiburger does not have first-hand knowledge
11 Id. at 19-20.
12 13 TTABVUE.
13 14 TTABVUE.
14 8 TTABVUE.
15 12 TTABVUE.
16 Id. at 6-7.
17 16 TTABVUE 10-11.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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of the facts stated therein. His account is at best second-hand, repeating the
statements of others.”18
As Paragraph 3 and Exhibit B were struck, only Paragraphs 1 and 2 and Exhibit
A remain. Paragraph 1 introduces the declarant, Mr. Freiburger, the attorney of
record for Opposers.19 Paragraph 2 describes a December 9, 2019 email and
attachments sent “from a party unknown to Opposers” to “Opposer Eyeo GmbH.”20
Mr. Freiburger describes the email, from Michael Sedlak, as “warning the ‘AdBlock’
team about the applicant’s use of the name ADBLOCK PRO FOR SAFARI, offering
for sale a program on the app store” and enclosing links and two screenshots of “top
charts” with apps circled.21 The email and two attachments are Exhibit A to the
declaration.
We agree with Applicant that Mr. Freiburger’s testimony does not provide
sufficient foundation for us to consider Paragraph 2 of his testimony or the Sedlak
email and attachments. Hangzhou Mengku Tech. Co. v. Shanghai Zhenglang Tech.
Co., No. 91272143, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 575, at *8. He provides no basis for
authenticating the email, as he neither sent nor received it. Nor did Mr. Freiburger
establish personal knowledge of the screenshots attached to the Sedlak email. In the
context of the Sedlak email, the screenshots appear to be from the Apple App Store,
and could have been considered self-authenticating Internet materials, under
18 8 TTABVUE 8.
19 7 TTABVUE 2.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 3.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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Trademark Rule 2.122(e)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(e)(2). Absent a full URL and access
date, however, they are not self-authenticating. Id.
In sum, we sustain Applicant’s objection as to Paragraph 2 and Exhibit A to the
Freiburger Declaration and do not consider them.22
II. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Entitlement to a statutory cause of action must be established in every inter
partes case. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
Austl. Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (Fed.
Cir. 2020) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,
125-26 (2014)). An opposer must prove its entitlement by a preponderance of the
evidence, see, e.g., Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022
TTAB LEXIS 228, at *8, by demonstrating that it has: (1) an interest falling within
the zone of interests protected by the statute, and (2) a reasonable belief in damage
proximately caused by the registration of the mark. Curtin v. United Trademark
Holdings, Inc., 137 F.4th 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Lexmark, 572 U.S. at
129-134).
One way of proving entitlement is to demonstrate ownership of an active, pleaded
registration. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir.
22 As only the introduction sentence remains in the declaration, the Freiburger Declaration
effectively is stricken.
Even if we had considered paragraph 2 of the declaration and the email and attachments at
Exhibit A, it would not change the outcome. The email and its contents are hearsay and
“without direct testimony from [the] supposedly confused individuals, there is insufficient
evidence to ascertain what they were thinking, or whether they were actually confused.”
Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 347, at *26.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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2000) (party’s ownership of pleaded registrations for arguably similar marks
establishes statutory entitlement for Section 2(d) claim). Opposers did not do so here.
Generally, an opposer may introduce its pleaded registrations in three ways:
attached to the pleading, identified and introduced through testimony, or filing under
notice of reliance. Trademark Rules 2.122(c), (d)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(c), (d)(1).
Opposers attempted the first and third methods.
Opposers attached plain copies of the registration certificates of the Pleaded
Registrations to the notices of opposition.23 As explained in Trademark Rule
2.122(d)(1),
A registration of the opposer or petitioner pleaded in an opposition …
will be received in evidence and made part of the record if the opposition
… is accompanied by an original or photocopy of the registration
prepared and issued by the Office showing both the current status of
and current title to the registration, or by a current copy of information
from the electronic database records of the Office showing the current
status and title of the registration.
37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d)(1).
The plain copies of the registration certificates attached to the notice of opposition,
issued in February 2015, September 2017 and June 2022, are not reasonably
contemporaneous with the April 2024 filing date of the notice of opposition, and
therefore, are not sufficient to make the Pleaded Registrations of record. Shenzhen
IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy Pants Prods., LLC, No. 91263919, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 383,
at *15-17 (plain copy of registration issued two months before opposition filing date
23 1 TTABVUE 13-16.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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is contemporaneous but plain copies of registrations issued five and six years prior
are not).
As noted above, “Opposers’ Notice of Reliance on Trademark Registrations”
consisted of a mere listing of the three Pleaded Registrations; current status and title
copies of the registrations or printouts from the Office’s electronic database were not
attached to the notice.24 Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(2). “A notice of reliance is
essentially a cover sheet for the materials sought to be introduced.”25 Listing the
registrations, without attaching evidence of current status and title, does not enter
them into the record.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in an odd twist, Applicant made pleaded
Registration No. 4680485 for the mark ADBLOCK PLUS of record by attaching a
TSDR printout to the Scher Declaration showing current ownership in Opposer Ad-
IP GmbH & Co. KG and that the registration is active.26 When evidence has been
properly made of record by one party, it may be used by any party for any purpose
permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Trademark Rule 2.122(a). That printout,
however, establishes title in only one of the three Opposers. We therefore address the
entitlement of Opposer Ad-IP GmbH & Co. KG separately from that of Opposers Eyeo
GmbH and Adblock Inc.
24 7 TTABVUE 19.
25 TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (“TBMP”) § 704.02 (2026).
26 13 TTABVUE 56-63.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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A. Opposer Ad-IP GmbH & Co. KG
We find that Opposer Ad-IP GmbH & Co. KG has established its entitlement to
oppose registration of Applicant’s mark, based on its ownership of Registration No.
4680485 for the ADBLOCK PLUS word mark. Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 945.
B. Opposers Eyeo GmbH and Adblock Inc.
In the notices of opposition, Opposers allege that Eyeo GmbH and Adblock Inc.
are Opposer Ad-IP GmbH & Co. KG’s global and United States licensees.27 Opposers
offered no testimony or evidence to support these alleged relationships, and as
described above, the only registration of record is owned by Opposer Ad-IP GmbH &
Co. KG.
Because a party must establish its entitlement to a statutory cause of action to
prevail before the Board, and they have not done so, the oppositions of Opposers
Adblock Inc. (Opposition No. 91290855) and Eyeo GmbH (Opposition No. 91290989)
are dismissed with prejudice with regard to all operative claims. See Int’l Dairy
Foods Ass’n v. Interprofession du Gruyere, No. 91232427, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 268, at
*32-33, aff’d, 575 F. Supp. 3d 627 (E.D. Va. 2021), aff’d, 61 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2023)
(opposition dismissed as to both pleaded claims).
III. Priority and Likelihood of Confusion
As only Opposer Ad-IP GmbH & Co. KG remains, we refer to it as Opposer. To
prevail on its Section 2(d) claim, Opposer must prove priority and likelihood of
27 1 TTABVUE 5-6.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
- 10 -
confusion by a preponderance of the evidence. Sage Therapeutics, Inc. v. SageForth
Psychological Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 139, at *10-11 (citation
omitted).
Because Opposer’s Registration No. 4680485 for the ADBLOCK PLUS word mark
(“Opposer’s ’485 Registration”) is of record and there are no pending counterclaims to
cancel it, priority is not at issue with respect to the mark and goods and services
covered by the registration, namely:
Computer programs for allowing users to filter or prevent the display of
advertisements on the Internet; parts and fittings for computer
programs, namely, subroutines, program modules, program generators,
and help and interface programs which filter or prevent the display of
advertisements; … computer software for allowing users to filter or
prevent the display of advertisements on the Internet, in Class 9; and
Providing information in the field of online monitoring of computer
systems for security purposes, via computer networks, wireless network
and the Internet; security services for the protection of property and
individuals, namely, security threat analysis for protecting personal
property and for personal protection purposes, in Class 45.
See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1402 (CCPA 1974).
Our determination of Opposer’s claim of likelihood of confusion is based on an
analysis of all the facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set forth in In re
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). In
considering the evidence of record on these factors, we keep in mind that “[t]he
fundamental inquiry mandated by §2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.” Federated
Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976). We discuss
these and other relevant factors below. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376,

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
- 11 -
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Board considers each DuPont factor for which there is evidence
and argument).
A. The similarity or dissimilarity of the goods and services, trade
channels, and conditions of sale
Under the second, third, and fourth DuPont factors, we consider the “similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration,” the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels,” and “the conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e.
‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; In re
Detroit Ath. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands,
LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 464, at *20. We base our consideration under
these factors on the goods as identified in the Application and the Class 9 goods in
Opposer’s ’485 Registration. Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d
937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that the question of registrability
of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set
forth in the application regardless of what the record may reveal as to the particular
nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels of trade or the class of
purchasers to which sales of the goods are directed.”).
Opposer’s ’485 Registration and the application both identify computer software
for blocking material that would otherwise be displayed; in the case of Opposer’s ’485
Registration, the software “filter[s] or prevent[s] the display of advertisements,” and
in the application, the software is for “for removing, blocking, and deactivating
annoying and unwanted content in web pages.” Internet advertisements are a sub-

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
- 12 -
category of the broader field of “annoying and unwanted content in web pages”;
therefore, the parties’ identified goods in Class 9 are identical or legally identical in
part.
Because the goods are identical or legally identical in part and neither
identification contains any limitations, we must presume that they flow through the
same trade channels to the same classes of consumers. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d
1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is well established that, absent restrictions in the
application and registration, [identical] goods and services are presumed to travel in
the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), cited in Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
As to the fourth DuPont factor, in which we consider “‘impulse’ vs. careful,
sophisticated purchasing,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, Opposer argues “the care level
of the ordinary consumers is low. The products are relatively inexpensive and often
subject to impulse purchases, particularly since the product/service can be
cancelled.”28 Applicant disagrees, arguing that its $9.99 annual fee is offered with a
trial period, encouraging consumers to “shop around.”29 Applicant further argues that
“Opposer[] characterize[s] the charges for premium features as ‘relatively
inexpensive,’ but they provide no evidence to assess the average consumer’s
28 15 TTABVUE 10.
29 16 TTABVUE 17.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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impression of these costs in the context of the relevant marketplace.”30 Conversely,
Applicant also provided no evidence of context. Based on the record, we find the
parties’ goods low-priced.31 “When products are relatively low-priced and subject to
impulse buying, the risk of likelihood of confusion is increased because purchasers of
such products are held to a lesser standard of purchasing care.” Recot Inc. v. M.C.
Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
The second, third, and fourth DuPont factors weigh heavily in favor of likelihood
of confusion.
B. The strength or weakness of Opposer’s mark
Because it affects the scope of protection to which Opposer’s mark is entitled, we
next consider the strength or weakness of Opposer’s registered ADBLOCK PLUS
mark. “Two of the DuPont factors (the fifth and sixth) consider strength.” Spireon,
Inc. v. Flex LTD, 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The “fifth DuPont factor
enables Opposer to prove that its pleaded marks are entitled to an expanded scope of
protection by adducing evidence of ‘[t]he fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising,
length of use)’,” while “the sixth DuPont factor allows Applicant to contract that scope
of protection by adducing evidence of ‘[t]he number and nature of similar marks in
use on similar goods.’” Made in Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *23-24 (quoting
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
30 Id.
31 Because the parties’ goods are legally identical and Opposer argues that the goods are
identical, 15 TTABVUE 9, we presume that Opposer’s goods may also be sold for the same
relatively low price as Applicant’s goods.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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Opposer did not introduce any evidence of commercial strength under the fifth
DuPont factor so we find this factor neutral.
“There are two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength under the sixth factor:
conceptual strength and commercial strength. Conceptual strength is a measure of a
mark’s distinctiveness” along the spectrum of distinctiveness from generic terms to
fanciful marks, Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (citations omitted), while commercial
strength “‘is the marketplace recognition value of the mark.’” Id. at 1363 (quoting 2
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:80).
In determining the strength of a mark, we consider both its inherent strength,
based on the nature of the mark itself, and commercial strength. Spireon, 71 F.4th at
1362 (citing In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A
mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual strength … and its marketplace
strength ….”)); Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., No. 91157248, 2011 TTAB
LEXIS 367, at *25 (the strength of a mark is determined by assessing its inherent
strength and its commercial strength). “[T]he strength of a mark is not a binary
factor” and “varies along a spectrum from very strong to very weak.” Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal
citations omitted). “The weaker an opposer’s mark, the closer an applicant’s mark can
come without causing a likelihood of confusion and thereby invading what amounts
to its comparatively narrower range of protection.” Id. at 1338-39 (internal citations
omitted).

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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Conceptual or inherent strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness.
Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1352-1354. Opposer notes that the ’485 Registration is
incontestable,32 while Applicant points out that the registration issued with a claim
of acquired distinctiveness in whole.33
As for Opposer’s assertion, the mark’s “incontestable status does not render it
commercially strong.” Iron Balls Int’l Ltd. v. Bull Creek Brewing, LLC, No. 92079099,
2024 TTAB LEXIS 205, at *38 (citation omitted); Safer, Inc. v. OMS Invs., Inc., No.
91176445, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 51, at *12-13 (“[T]he fact that [O]pposer’s federally-
registered trademark has achieved incontestable status means that it is conclusively
considered to be valid, but it does not dictate that the mark is ‘strong’ for purposes of
determining likelihood of confusion.”) (citing MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 11:82 and 32:155).
As for the fact that Opposer’s ’485 Registration issued with a claim under Section
2(f) of the Trademark Act, the registration still carries a presumption of acquired
distinctiveness. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., No.
91118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 330, at *62 (“A mark that is registered on the Principal
Register is entitled to all Section 7(b) presumptions including the presumption that
the mark is distinctive ….”). But that presumption “does not extend to individual
components of the registered mark ...” In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 873 (Fed. Cir.
1985), citing In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The
32 15 TTABVUE 10.
33 16 TTABVUE 6.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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registration affords prima facie rights in the mark as a whole, not in any
component.”) (emphasis in original changed to boldface).
Opposer’s ADBLOCK PLUS mark is registered in connection with, inter alia,
“computer software for allowing users to filter or prevent the display of
advertisements on the Internet,” that is, software that filters or blocks the displays
of advertisements or ads.34 Indeed, in the first sentence of Opposer’s “Statement of
the Case,” it states: “The Opposers’ registrations include U.S. Registration No.
4,680,485 for ADBLOCK PLUS, covering, in effect, computer software effective to
block unwanted advertisements that appear on the internet or in web browsers.”35
So, while Opposer’s ’485 Registration is entitled to a presumption of distinctiveness,
that presumption does not dictate a finding that the mark is conceptually strong. See,
e.g., Sure-Fit Prods. Co. v. Saltzson Drapery Co., 254 F.2d 158, 159-60 (CCPA 1958)
(“‘Rite-Fit’ is an obvious misspelling of ‘Right-Fit’ and is clearly descriptive of a
function of the goods with which the words are used. And though appellant has
obtained a registration for this mark on the principal register as a secondary meaning
mark, there is nothing in the record to indicate that this mark is not still in the
category of a weak mark.”).36 We find that the term ADBLOCK in Opposer’s ’485
34 An article on Opposer’s own website, titled “Is Adblock Plus the same thing as Adblock”
states in the first lines: “In short — no. Both are ad blockers, but they are separate
products.” 14 TTABVUE 15 (emphasis added).
35 15 TTABVUE 7 (emphasis added).
36 Additionally, Opposer concedes some conceptual weakness in the term PLUS in its mark,
stating, “[c]oncerning the two ADBLOCK PLUS marks, as compared to Applicant’s mark, the
suffixes ‘PLUS’ and ‘PRO’ are both laudatory terms meaning ‘enhanced’, ‘improved’ or
‘advanced’, or implying ‘a higher level’; or something superior.” 15 TTABVUE 8.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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Registration is very conceptually weak. The number of third parties using ADBLOCK
for the same or highly similar goods underscores the considerable conceptual
weakness of this term.
Opposer also concedes that the term PLUS in its ADBLOCK PLUS mark is
laudatory.37 We agree. See, e.g., In re The Place, Inc., No. 76436826, 2005 TTAB
LEXIS 451, at *5 (“the courts of appeal and this Board have held that other marks
which arguably denote ‘high quality,’ ‘excellence’ and ‘superior quality’ are laudatory
and thus merely descriptive.”). As a merely descriptive term, the PLUS component in
Opposer’s ’485 Registration is conceptually very weak.
Because both terms in Opposer’s ADBLOCK PLUS mark are conceptually very
weak and the combination of the terms does not change the meaning of those words,
we find that Opposer’s mark, in its entirety, is very conceptually weak.
We now address Applicant’s evidence of third-party use, which serves two related
purposes here. One purpose of introducing evidence of third-party marketplace use is
“to show that customers have become so conditioned by a plethora of such similar
marks that customers ‘have been educated to distinguish between different [such]
marks on the bases of minute distinctions.’” Omaha Steaks Int’l v. Greater Omaha
Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v.
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2005)); accord Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New
37 15 TTABVUE 8 (“as compared to Applicant’s mark, the suffixes ‘PLUS’ and ‘PRO’ are both
laudatory terms”).

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Juice Generation,
794 F.3d at 1338-39. Another purpose of third-party use is to demonstrate conceptual
weakness of a mark or term. Where “there is evidence that a mark, or element of a
mark, is commonly used or registered by many different third parties for similar
goods or services, that may indicate that the mark or common element has some
conceptual weakness.” August Storck KG v. Florend Indústria e Comércio de
Chocolates LTDA, No. 91277224, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 502, at *35. “Extensive evidence
of third-party use and registrations is ‘powerful on its face,’ even where the specific
extent and impact of the usage has not been established.” Jack Wolfskin, 797 F.3d at
1373-74 (quoting Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339). Accord Spireon, 71 F.4th at
1364.
“The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods … is a measure
of the extent to which other marks weaken the assessed mark.” Spireon, 71 F.4th at
1362; see Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1373 (“Evidence of third-party use of similar marks
on similar goods [or services] is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and
entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.”); see also Jack Wolfskin, 797 F.3d 1363;
Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1373-1374 (internal citations omitted). The record
contains the following third-party uses of “adblock” and “adblocker” for similar
software products:
• AdBlock, published by Future Mind Sp. z o.o.;38
• Adblock Green, published by Sha Li;39
38 December 18, 2022 Response to office action, 42.
39 Id. at 43.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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• Adblock for YouTube, published by AdRemover;40
• Adblock for YouTube, published by Adblock Systems;41
• AdBlocker Ultimate, published by AdAvoid Ltd;42 and
• Total AdBlock, published by Protected.net Group Limited.43
In his testimony declaration, counsel for Applicant, Mr. Scher, describes taking a
screenshot of “a page from the website of mobile app analytics company Sensor
Tower.”44 The analytics page for Applicant’s ADBLOCK PRO FOR SAFARI app
includes a list of “related apps” including:45
• Norton Ad Blocker;
• 1Blocker – Ad Blocker;
• Ad Blocker;
• Naka AdBlocker VPN; and
• Ad Block One: Tube Ad Blocker.
Attached to a notice of reliance, Applicant also included the results of a search of
the term “adblock” from the Google.com Chrome webstore.46. The printouts show that
a search for the term “adblock” produces third-party software extensions for the
Google Chrome browser that use the terms “adblock” or “adblocker”:47
• YouTube Adblock by Friendly;
40 Id. at 44-52.
41 Id. at 53-58.
42 Id. at 59-70.
43 Id. at 71-72.
44 13 TTABVUE 3.
45 Id. at 48-49.
46 14 TTABVUE, Exhibit 1. Some of the extensions may be duplicates of those attached to the
December 18, 2022 Response to office action. We do not include them as examples unless they
are clearly different. The attachment displays the full URL and access date; absent testimony
from a competent witness, we consider the printout for what it shows on its face, not for the
truth of the matters stated within. Trademark Rule 2.122; cf. WeaponX Performance Prods.
Ltd. v. Weapon X Motorsports, Inc., No. 91221553, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 72, at *11.
47 Id. at 6-13.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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• Pie Adblock;
• Stands Fast Adblocker;
• Unlimited AdBlock for YouTube;
• All Block Adblock for YouTube and Chrome;
• AdGuard AdBlocker;
• Ghostery Tracker & Ad Blocker;
• Adaware AdBlock;
• Spark AdBlock for YouTube;
• FadBlock Origin: Friendly YouTube Adblock;
• AdBlock Ad Blocker Pro Free by Blox;
• YouTube Anti-Adblock Bypass;
• AdBlock Pause;
• AdLock: Free Adblocker & Privacy Protection;
• JadSkip: Adblock for Youtube and Youtube Music;
• Adblock from Capital One Shopping;
• Webmail Ad Blocker;
• Breeze Ads: Friendly Adblock for YouTube;
• UltraBlock – Adblock & Privacy Protection;
• Video AdBlocker for YouTube;
• No Ads Adblocker That Works;
• YouTube AdBlock – Coffee Break for YouTube;
• Advanced Adblocker;
• Trend Micro Ad Blocker;
• AdBlock – Block Ads Plus;
• Hulu Ad Skipper | Ad Blocker;
• Adblock for Browser;
• Easy Ad Blocker;
• Twitch Adblock;
• Better Twitch Adblock;
• Purple Ads Blocker;
• Reddit Promoted Ad Blocker;
• Ad Remover – Ad Blocker for Chrome; and
• Urban Ad blocker.
Characterizing it as an admission,48 Applicant also attached an article from
Opposer’s website, adblockplus.com, that states:
You probably also have seen other ad blockers with similar names:
Total Adblock, Ad Remover, AdLock, AdGone, AdTranquility...the list
goes on and on! It is important to note, we aren’t affiliated with any of
48 16 TTABVUE 14.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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these. … Since product names cannot be trademarked, we cannot
prevent other ad blockers from using a similar name or logo.49
Opposer acknowledges that the statement “is based on a notion contrary to law,
and the undersigned states that he has been informed by in-house counsel of
Opposers that in-house counsel knows it is erroneous and was unaware of the
statement and who was responsible for including it on the help page.”50
Opposer argues that every third-party use “appears to have been adopted after
Opposers’ use and/or registration and has little relevance on the issue of likelihood of
confusion. Reliance on third party uses attempts to show a trademark is weak or
merely descriptive. This is ineffective, in view of Opposers’ three registrations,
particularly regarding Opposers’ incontestable rights in ADBLOCK PLUS.”51
Opposer’s reliance on Park ’n Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189 (1985) is
misplaced. While Applicant cannot attack Opposer’s ’485 Registration for the
ADBLOCK PLUS mark on the ground that the registration is invalid based on its
pleadings here,52 id., or the mark as a whole is merely descriptive, DuPont directs us
to consider a registered mark’s strength or weakness and third-party use evidence is
particularly relevant to this inquiry. Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1338-39; Jack
Wolfskin, 797 F.3d at 1373-74.
49 14 TTABVUE 16.
50 17 TTABVUE 10.
51 15 TTABVUE 8.
52 Contrary to Opposer’s assertions, an incontestable registration may still be challenged at
any time on any ground specified in Trademark Act §§ 14(3), 14(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), (5).

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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In light of the significant evidence of third-party use of the terms “adblock” and
“adblocker” for software used to block ads, we find that the ADBLOCK term of
Opposer’s ’485 Registration has considerable conceptual and commercial weakness.
See Jack Wolfskin, 797 F.3d at 1373; see also Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1338-
1339.
In conclusion, we find that the ADBLOCK portion of Opposer’s mark is diluted by
third-party use such that it will not act as a bar to the registration of every mark that
includes the word ADBLOCK. “[I]t will only bar the registration of marks as to which
the resemblance to [ADBLOCK PLUS] is striking enough to cause one seeing it to
assume that there is some connection, association or sponsorship between the two.”
Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta Int’l Inc. v. Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co., No. 91171509, 2009
TTAB LEXIS 718, at *25-26, aff’d, 415 Fed. Appx. 222 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation omitted). The sixth DuPont factor thus weighs heavily against likely
confusion.
C. The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as
to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the “similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; see also Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion
Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “Similarity in any one of these
elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St.
John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (citing In re Davia, No.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
We do not predicate our analysis on a dissection of the involved marks; we consider
the marks in their entireties. Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1321; Franklin Mint Corp. v.
Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark
should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a
whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”). The issue is not whether the marks
can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether
the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression
such that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks
is likely to result. Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2012). The marks must be considered in their entireties, but “in articulating
reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper
in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular
feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the
marks in their entireties.” Detroit Ath. Co., 903 F.3d at 1305 (quoting In re Nat’l Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The focus is on the recollection of an
ordinary consumer, who normally retains a general rather than specific impression
of trademarks. Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007
(CCPA 1971); L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, No. 91184456, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 77, at *16;
Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., No. 91055167, 1975 TTAB LEXIS 236, at *6.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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Opposer’s mark is ADBLOCK PLUS and Applicant’s mark is ADBLOCK PRO;
both marks are in standard characters. The marks share the leading first term,
ADBLOCK; we have found this term is conceptually and commercially very weak.
Opposer argues that both “marks share the identical dominant term
ADBLOCK,”53 and the marks cannot be distinguished given the similarity of the
laudatory terms that follow in both marks – PLUS and PRO – and both begin with
the letter P.54 Applicant disagrees that ADBLOCK is dominant in the marks.55 It
argues that it has shown ADBLOCK in Opposer’s mark is weak,56 and that the terms
PLUS and PRO in the marks create different commercial impressions due to their
different appearance, sound, and meaning.57
Opposer is correct that both terms begin with P and are laudatory in nature. But
we also agree with Applicant that the terms are visually and phonetically different,
and PRO in a computer program suggests competence, while PLUS implies added
features.58 There even appear to be other ADBLOCK + P term marks out there, such
as AdBlock Pause and even AdBlock – Block Ads Plus.
Taking into account the conceptual and commercial weakness of the only shared
component with Applicant’s mark (i.e., ADBLOCK), and in view of the differences in
53 15 TTABVUE 8.
54 Id.
55 16 TTABVUE 11.
56 Id. (“All parties to this case faced descriptiveness refusals or disclaimer requirements
addressed to the term ADBLOCK, which simply removes the space from the descriptive
phrase ‘ad block.’”)
57 Id. at 15.
58 Id.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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the marks’ overall connotations and commercial impressions, appearance and sound,
we find that, in this crowded market, the marks as a whole are dissimilar.
The first DuPont factor weighs against a finding of likely confusion.
D. Actual confusion
In addition to the DuPont factors discussed above, the parties briefly discuss the
seventh and eighth DuPont factors.59 We address them briefly as well.
The seventh and eighth DuPont factors relate, respectively, to the nature and
extent of any actual confusion and the extent of the opportunity for actual confusion.
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. These “factors are interrelated; the absence of evidence of
actual confusion, under the seventh DuPont factor, by itself is entitled to little weight
in our likelihood of confusion analysis unless there also is evidence, under the eighth
DuPont factor, that there has been a significant opportunity for actual confusion to
have occurred.” Keystone Consol. Indus. v. Franklin Inv. Corp., No. 92066927, 2024
TTAB LEXIS 290, at *75-76 (citation omitted).
Applicant argues that “after ten years of coexistence in the marketplace, the lack
of evidence of any instances of confusion is strong evidence that consumers are able
to distinguish among the numerous ADBLOCK products available by the differences
in their names.”60 In support of this assertion, Applicant appears to be relying on the
allegation in the involved application that it has used its mark since October 31, 2015.
59 Opposer also includes the tenth factor, “Market interface: The Applicant and Opposers are
in direct competition in similar markets.” 15 TTABVUE 11. This argument was properly
considered under factors two and three.
60 16 TTABVUE 17.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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“The allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use
is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant; a date of use of a mark must
be established by competent evidence.” Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(2); 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.122(b)(2). Applicant has not established its alleged date of use by competent
evidence.
Therefore, we treat the seventh and eighth DuPont factors as neutral.61 See In re
Davey Prods. Pty, No. 77029776, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *22-25.
E. Balancing the DuPont factors
The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there has been evidence and argument; “explain the results of that
weighing;” and “the weight [we] assigned to the relevant factors.” In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
The second, third, and fourth DuPont factors weigh heavily in favor of likely
confusion. The parties’ Class 9 goods are identical or legally identical in part, and
because neither identification contains limitations, we presume the identical goods
travel through the same trade channels to the same classes of purchasers, who
exercise a lesser degree of purchasing care.
The sixth DuPont factor weighs heavily against likely confusion. The extensive
third-party use of “adblock” and “adblocker” for ad-blocking software establishes that
61 See n.22 supra and our discussion of the excluded Freiburger Declaration and its purported
evidence of actual confusion.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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the ADBLOCK element of Opposer’s mark is conceptually and commercially weak,
and this factor weighs heavily against a finding of likely confusion.
The first factor also weighs against a likelihood of confusion. Taking into account
the considerable weakness of the shared term ADBLOCK, the marks ADBLOCK
PLUS and ADBLOCK PRO differ in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial
impression.
The fifth, seventh, and eighth DuPont factors are neutral.
On balance, we find that the first and sixth DuPont factors outweigh the second,
third, and fourth. Because of the considerable weakness of the shared term
ADBLOCK, we find the differences between the marks in their entireties, resulting
from the second words—PLUS and PRO—are sufficient to distinguish the marks
notwithstanding the identity of the goods, trade channels, and consumers and the
lack of purchaser care. Cf. Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. v. Georgallis Holdings, LLC, 826
F.3d 1376, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“a single DuPont factor may be dispositive in a
likelihood of confusion analysis, especially when that single factor is the dissimilarity
of the marks”); Odom’s Tenn. Pride Sausage, Inc. v. FF Acquisition, LLC, 600 F.3d
1343, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[E]ven if all other relevant DuPont factors were
considered in [opposer’s] favor, as the board stated, the dissimilarity of the marks
was a sufficient basis to conclude that no confusion was likely.”). We therefore find
that Opposer has not proved likelihood of confusion by a preponderance of the
evidence.

Opposition Nos. 91290855 (parent), 91290857, and 91290989
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Decision:
Opposition No. 91290855 (parent) is dismissed (opposer Adblock Inc.) for lack of
entitlement.
Opposition No. 91290989 is dismissed (opposer Eyeo GmbH) for lack of
entitlement.
Opposition No. 91290857 is dismissed because Opposer failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the parties’ marks are likely to be confused.62
62 As explained in n.4 above, Opposer waived its fraud claim.