Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Kent Pimentel

kds Mailed: September 24, 2026
Opposition No. 91291723
Citizens of Humanity, LLC
v.
Kent Pimentel
Before Larkin, Cohen, and Elgin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
By the Board:
This proceeding comes before the Board for consideration of Opposer’s motion,
filed February 9, 2026, for partial summary judgment on its claim of Applicant’s lack
of bona fide intent to use. 25 TTABVUE.1 Opposer’s motion is fully briefed.2
I. Background
Applicant seeks registration on the Principal Register of the standard-character
mark HUMANITYHOPELEGACY for use in connection with “tee shirts” in
1 Citations to the record are to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number
preceding “TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number; the number(s) following
“TTABVUE” refer(s) to the page number(s) of that particular docket entry, if applicable.
2 Opposer’s reply in support of the instant motion contains an embedded request for
sanctions. See 29 TTABVUE 7. Opposer’s request for sanctions is addressed infra at note 9.
We have carefully considered the parties’ briefs and evidence, address the record only to the
extent necessary to set forth our analysis and findings, and do not repeat or address all of the
parties’ arguments. See Guess? IP Holder LP v. Knowluxe LLC, No. 92060707, 2015 WL
9702438, at *1 (TTAB 2015).
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
THIS ORDER IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB

Opposition No. 91291723
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International Class 25.3 In its first amended notice of opposition, Opposer alleges,
inter alia, prior use and registration of various HUMANITY-formative marks for
shirts and other goods and services. See 21 TTABVUE 2-4, ¶¶ 1-8.
As grounds for opposition, Opposer pleads the following claims: (1) likelihood of
confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d); (2) likelihood of
dilution by blurring under Section 43(c) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c);
and (3) Applicant’s lack of a bona fide intent to use the subject mark in commerce as
of the filing date of the application under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b). See id. at 6-8, ¶¶ 15-25.
In his answer, Applicant denies the salient allegations of the amended notice of
opposition and, in a section captioned “G[rounds] [of] D[efense],” pleads permissible
amplifications of his denials of Opposer’s claims.4 See 22 TTABVUE.
On February 9, 2026, Opposer filed the instant motion for partial summary
judgment on its claim of Applicant’s lack of bona fide intent to use.5 See 25 TTABVUE.
3 Application Serial No. 98097272; filed July 22, 2023, based on an allegation of a bona fide
intent to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b).
4 See TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 311.02(d)
(2026) (“An answer may include affirmative assertions that, although they may not rise to
the level of an affirmative defense, nevertheless state the reasons for, and thus amplify, the
defendant’s denial of one or more of the allegations in the complaint. These amplifications of
denials . . . are permitted by the Board because they serve to give the plaintiff fuller notice of
the position which the defendant plans to take in defense of its right to registration.”).
5 On February 10, 2026, the Board suspended proceedings pending disposition of Opposer’s
motion for partial summary judgment, conditioned upon Opposer’s submission of a statement
indicating that it had made its initial disclosures pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.127(e)(1),
37 C.F.R. § 2.127(e)(1). 26 TTABVUE. On February 11, 2026, Opposer filed a submission
confirming prior service of its initial disclosures. 27 TTABVUE. Accordingly, the Board now
takes up Opposer’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Opposition No. 91291723
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II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is an appropriate method of disposing of cases in which there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, thus allowing the case to be resolved as
a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment
has the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute of material
fact remaining for trial and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1987). All evidence must
be viewed in a light favorable to the non-movant, and all justifiable inferences are to
be drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Lloyd’s Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d
766, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Opryland USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d
847, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Board may
not resolve disputes of material fact; it may only ascertain whether such disputes
exist. Lloyd’s Food Prods., Inc., 987 F.2d at 767; Opryland USA Inc., 970 F.2d at 849;
Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 202 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
A factual dispute is genuine if, on the evidence of record, a reasonable fact finder
could resolve the matter in favor of the non-movant. Opryland USA Inc., 970 F.2d at
850; Olde Tyme Foods, Inc., 961 F.2d at 202. The evidence submitted by the non-
movant, in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Opryland USA Inc., 970 F.2d at
850.
Where the party moving for summary judgment on a claim bears the burden of
proof at trial on that claim, the moving party “must lay out the elements of its claim,

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citing the facts it believes satisfies [sic] those elements, and demonstrating why the
record is so one-sided as to rule out the prospect of the nonmovant prevailing.” 10A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. AND PROC. CIV. § 2727.1 (4th ed. 2026). If
the movant successfully discharges its initial burden of production, then the burden
shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of disputes of material fact that
must be resolved at trial. The non-movant may not rest on mere denials or conclusory
assertions, but rather must proffer countering evidence, by affidavit or by means
otherwise provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, showing that there is a genuine factual
dispute for trial. Enbridge, Inc. v. Excelerate Energy L.P., No. 91170364, 2009 WL
3541047, at *3 (TTAB 2009).
III. The Parties’ Arguments and Evidence
A. Opposer’s Arguments and Evidence
In support of its motion for partial summary judgment, Opposer submits the
declaration of its general counsel, Gary Freedman, with accompanying Exhibits 1-4
(25 TTABVUE 12-111), and the declaration of its outside counsel, Leigh Ann
Lindquist, with accompanying Exhibits 5-6 (id. at 112-59). The exhibits are as follows:
(1) Documents from the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s
(USPTO) Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database
displaying the file records for Opposer’s pleaded registrations (Exhibit
1) (id. at 15-65);6
6 We note that Opposer previously submitted status and title copies of its pleaded
registrations as exhibits to its amended notice of opposition. See 21 TTABVUE 17-63. The
submission of duplicative evidence is unnecessary and a burden on the Board. See ITC Entm’t
Grp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., No. 92023557, 1998 WL 132925, at *1 (TTAB 1998) (filing of
unnecessary papers strongly discouraged). Instead, the parties are encouraged to cite to the
TTABVUE docket entry and TTABVUE page number, e.g., 1 TTABVUE 2, whenever possible.
See TBMP §§ 106.03, 110.03(c).

Opposition No. 91291723
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(2) Printouts from Opposer’s website (Exhibit 2) (id. at 66-76);
(3) Printouts from third-party websites displaying certain of Opposer’s
pleaded marks (Exhibit 3) (id. at 77-105);
(4) Printouts from Opposer’s social media pages (Exhibit 4) (id. at 106-11);
(5) Opposer’s first set of interrogatories and first set of requests for
production of documents (“RFPD”) to Applicant (collectively, “Opposer’s
Discovery Requests”) (Exhibit 5) (id. at 114-25); and
(6) Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s first set of interrogatories and first
set of RFPD (collectively, “Applicant’s Responses to Opposer’s
Discovery Requests”) (Exhibit 6) (id. at 126-59).
Opposer argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on its claim of lack of
bona fide intent to use because “there is no documentary evidence of any plans to use
the HUMANITYHOPELEGACY mark on or in connection with the goods listed in the
[subject] [a]pplication.” Id. at 8. In support of this assertion, Opposer points to the
following discovery requests and responses attached to its brief:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify all documents which are relevant
to Applicant’s selection, adoption and application for registration of
Applicant’s Mark.
RESPONSE: . . . Subject to . . . and without waiving [his] objections,
Applicant responds as follows:
HumanityHopeLegacy is a grassroots non-profit organization
established to benefit the public good. HumanityHopeLegacy is an
organization that is unbiased, non-political and non-religious with the
primary purpose to take part in preserving humanity today for
tomorrow through awareness, education and actions now. I
trademarked the organization name HumanityHopeLegacy by
combining the words Humanity to represent our species, the Hope that
we have in preserving our species for the future and the Legacy that we
will leave by doing the right things at the right time, now.
Relevant documents: Application for trademark registration; Mission
Statement.

Opposition No. 91291723
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Id. at 132-33.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe all facts and identify all
documents in support of Applicant’s claim that, at the time of filing
Application Serial No. 98097272, it had a bona fide intent to use
Applicant’s Mark in connection with the goods listed in Application
Serial No. 98097272.
RESPONSE: . . . Subject to . . . and without waiving [his] objections,
Applicant responds as follows:
Please refer to my responses to Interrogatory No. 1 that describes [sic]
how I arrived at the trademark and the mission of the organization.
Id. at 134-35.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: All documents and things
that evidence Applicant’s bona fide intent to use Applicant’s mark on
the identified goods in Application Serial No. 98097272 as of July 22,
2023.
RESPONSE: Such documents will be produced and are already in
Opposer’s possession. Applicant states the trademark application is the
evidence of Applicant’s bona fide intent to use.
Id. at 145-46.
Opposer asserts that “Applicant provided no marketing plans, no business plans,
no licensing plans, no website, no correspondence with potential licensees or sellers,
no promotional materials, or any plans to develop actual use of its [sic] mark for tee-
shirts,” and that summary judgment is appropriate because “Applicant simply has no
evidence to support its [sic] bona fide intent to use its [sic] mark in U.S. commerce.”
Id. at 8-9.
B. Applicant’s Arguments and Evidence
In response, Applicant submits his own declaration (28 TTABVUE 9-10), wherein
he attests, inter alia, that:

Opposition No. 91291723
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(1) At the time he filed the subject application, he “had a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce on tee-shirts in the United States” (id. at
9, ¶ 2);
(2) “At the time of filing the trademark application and in furtherance of
[his] intent to use the mark on tee-shirts, [he] created and began using
a business card bearing the mark HUMANITYHOPELEGACY” and has
“continuously used this card since shortly after filing” (id. at 10, ¶ 4);
(3) He “intended—and still intend[s]—to use tee-shirts bearing the mark as
a fundraising/awareness tool for [his non-profit] organization (e.g.,
distributed at events, sold directly/online, or used to solicit support)” (id.
at 10, ¶ 5);
(4) “The [business] card was part of that plan: to network, work out
logistics, promote the organization, and advance merchandise efforts,
including tee-shirts” (id.); and
(5) His “intent at [the time of] filing was firm and not speculative. Tee-shirts
are a simple, low-cost item easily produced on-demand to support the
mission and raise awareness [of his non-profit]. The business card
reflects objective steps toward that use” (id. at 10, ¶ 6).
By his declaration, Applicant introduces the following image of the business card
bearing the subject mark:

Opposition No. 91291723
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See id. at 12.
Applicant asserts that Opposer’s motion should be denied because “genuine
disputes of material fact exist as to [his] bona fide intent to use the mark in Class 25
for tee-shirts.” Id. at 2. In particular, Applicant argues that the business card “is
objective evidence of [his] firm, good-faith intent at [the time of] filing to use the mark
in connection with tee-shirts . . . as a fundraising/awareness tool for the non-profit
mission.” Id. at 5. Applicant also asserts that, although he objected to Opposer’s
Discovery Requests on the basis that they were “compound, overbroad, unduly
burdensome, and improperly shifted Opposer’s burden in an [intent to use] context,”
Opposer never followed up on Applicant’s offer to meet and confer and did not move
to compel supplemental responses. See id. at 6. Applicant contends that the Board
should not grant Opposer’s motion “on a record [that he] was willing to supplement
or clarify.” Id.

Opposition No. 91291723
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C. Opposer’s Arguments in Reply
In reply, Opposer argues, inter alia, that: (1) “[it] has demonstrated, by submission
of evidence, that Applicant did not have a bona fide intent to use the mark for tee
shirts at the time its [sic] application was filed” and “Applicant has presented no
viable countervailing evidence” (29 TTABVUE 2); (2) Applicant’s declaration contains
“what can only be described as aspirational language” (id. at 5); (3) neither
Applicant’s business card nor the filing of his trademark application establishes
Applicant’s bona fide intent to use (id. at 7); and (4) “Opposer cannot be compelled to
meet and confer by Applicant regarding Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s discovery
requests” (id. at 4) (emphasis omitted).7
IV. Analysis and Determination
A. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Entitlement to a statutory cause of action must be established in every inter
partes proceeding. Austl. Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d
1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014)). To establish entitlement to a statutory cause of
action on summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact that it has (i) an interest falling within the zone of interests
protected by the statute, and (ii) a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused
by the registration of the mark. See Meenaxi Enter., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 38 F.4th
7 As noted previously (see supra note 2), Opposer’s embedded request for sanctions (see 29
TTABVUE 7) is addressed infra at note 9.

Opposition No. 91291723
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1067, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 572 U.S. at 129); Corcamore,
LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1303-05 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Empresa Cubana Del
Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Applicant does not contest Opposer’s entitlement to a statutory cause of action to
pursue its opposition. In any event, we find that Opposer has made the requisite
showing on summary judgment as to its entitlement by submitting, with its amended
notice of opposition, copies of its pleaded registrations obtained from the USPTO’s
TSDR database, showing their current title and status (21 TTABVUE 17-63), see
Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d)(1), and asserting “[a] claim of
likelihood of confusion that ‘is not wholly without merit’[.]” DeVivo v. Ortiz, No.
91242863, 2020 WL 1227592, at *2 (TTAB 2020); see also Cunningham v. Laser Golf
Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Once a plaintiff demonstrates its
entitlement to a statutory cause of action on one ground, it has the right to assert any
other legally sufficient ground in this proceeding. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v.
Interprofession du Gruyère, No. 91232427, 2020 WL 4559436, at *10 (TTAB 2020),
aff’d, 575 F. Supp. 3d 627 (E.D. Va. 2021), aff’d, 61 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2023).
Accordingly, we find that Opposer has demonstrated the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact as to its entitlement to a statutory cause of action.
B. Lack of Bona Fide Intent to Use
Trademark Act Section 1(b)(1) provides:
A person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing
the good faith of such person, to use a trademark in commerce may
request registration of its trademark . . . .

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15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1).
Whether an applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce is an
objective determination based on the totality of the circumstances. See M.Z. Berger
& Co., Inc. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Swiss Grill Ltd. v.
Wolf Steel Ltd., No. 91206859, 2015 WL 5675642, at *7 (TTAB 2015). The evidentiary
bar for showing bona fide intent to use is not high, but more is required than “a mere
subjective belief.” M.Z. Berger & Co., Inc., 787 F.3d at 1375. The objective evidence
must indicate an intention to use the mark that is “firm” and “demonstrable.” Id. at
1376; Swiss Grill Ltd., 2015 WL 5675642, at *7; see also Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club
LP v. Sherman, No. 91172268, 2008 WL 4149008, at *6 (TTAB 2008).
One way an opposer can establish a prima facie case of no bona fide intent on
summary judgment is by proving the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact
that applicant has no documentary evidence to support its claimed bona fide intent
to use the mark in commerce as of the application filing date. Cf. Saul Zaentz Co. v.
Bumb, No. 91156452, 2010 WL 2783892, at *4-5 (TTAB 2010) (an opposer has the
initial burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that applicant
lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark on the identified goods). If the opposer meets
this burden, the burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with evidence that
either explains or outweighs the lack of documentary evidence, such that a genuine
dispute of material fact is raised. Id. Where there is no evidence of an applicant’s
bona fide intent to use the mark at issue on the claimed goods or services as of the
filing date of the application, entry of summary judgment on a claim that the

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applicant had no bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce when it filed the
involved application may be warranted. See Honda Motor Co. v. Winkelmann, No.
91170552, 2009 WL 962810, at *4 (TTAB 2009).
Opposer’s motion relies largely on Applicant’s Responses to Opposer’s Discovery
Requests, including Applicant’s response to RFPD No. 5, which seeks “[a]ll documents
and things that evidence Applicant’s bona fide intent to use” the subject mark on the
identified goods as of the filing date of the involved application. 25 TTABVUE 145.
As noted supra, Applicant responds to this request as follows: “Such documents will
be produced and are already in Opposer’s possession. Applicant states the trademark
application is the evidence of Applicant’s bona fide intent to use.” Id. at 146.
It is well-settled that the filing of a trademark application alone does not
constitute evidence of bona fide intent. See Rsch. In Motion Ltd. v. NBOR Corp., No.
91179284, 2009 WL 4694941, at *5 (TTAB 2009) (“If the filing and prosecution of a
trademark application constituted a bona fide intent to use a mark, then in effect,
lack of a bona fide intent to use would never be a ground for opposition or cancellation,
since an inter partes proceeding can only be brought if the defendant has filed an
application.”). Applicant’s response identifies no other documents or things that
support his claimed bona fide intent to use the subject mark as of the filing date of
the application. See 25 TTABVUE 146. Accordingly, we find that Opposer has made
a prima facie showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Applicant
has no documentary evidence to support his claimed bona fide intent. Accordingly,
the burden shifts to Applicant to rebut the prima facie case by producing evidence

Opposition No. 91291723
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that either explains or outweighs the lack of documentary evidence and raises a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding his intent.
The only evidence Applicant submits in response to the instant motion consists of
Applicant’s declaration, together with the image of a business card shown above that
displays the applied-for mark. 28 TTABVUE 9-12. Although Applicant attests that
he “had a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce on tee-shirts in the United
States” (id. at 9, ¶ 2) and created the business card “in furtherance of [his] intent”
(id. at 10, ¶ 4), the business card refers to HUMANITYHOPELEGACY only in
connection with “a grassroots nonprofit organization” and makes no reference to the
applied-for goods (see id. at 12). Cf. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A. v. Candido
Vinuales Taboada, No. 91232597, 2020 WL 4530518, at *17 (TTAB 2020) (finding
applicant’s business plan “lacking in sufficient detail to demonstrate a bona fide
intent to introduce into the market the products identified in the opposed . . .
application”); Honda Motor Co., 2009 WL 962810, at *4 (“Any intention to use the
mark [as evidenced by the website printouts] may go to promotional services for
dealerships, but not to [the goods listed in the application, i.e.,] ‘vehicles for
transportation.’”).
Moreover, Applicant’s subjective intent or hope to introduce a product in the
future is insufficient to show bona fide intent. See A&H Sportswear Co. v. Yedor, No.
91235843, 2019 WL 1453071, at *4-7 (TTAB 2019) (statement of intent to use mark,
unsupported by evidence of any activities undertaken to actually commence such use,
insufficient to stave off summary judgment); Lincoln Nat’l. Corp. v. Anderson, No.

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91192939, 2014 WL 879506, at *7 (TTAB 2014) (an applicant’s “idealistic hopes”
regarding a mark do not suffice to show bona fide intent to use); L’Oreal S.A. v.
Marcon, No. 91184456, 2012 WL 1267956, at *12 (TTAB 2012) (finding, inter alia,
that applicant’s “failure to take any concrete actions or to develop any concrete plans
for using the mark . . . demonstrates that applicant objectively lacks the requisite
bona fide intent to use the . . . mark in commerce”).
Even assuming, as Applicant argues, that “[t]ee-shirts are a simple, low-cost item
easily produced on demand,” 28 TTABVUE 10, ¶ 6, there is nothing in the record to
explain how Applicant has the capacity, either on its own or through a third party, to
produce the identified goods. See Swatch AG (Swatch SA) (Swatch Ltd.) v. M.Z.
Berger & Co., Inc., No. 91187092, 2013 WL 5655834, at *15 (TTAB 2013) (“The Board
has repeatedly found a lack of bona fide intent to use a mark by individuals who lack
the demonstrated capacity to produce the goods identified in the application.”)
(emphasis added), aff’d, 787 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Applicant has had several opportunities, both in responding to Opposer’s
Discovery Requests and in responding to the instant motion, to come forward with
evidence to show any concrete steps taken or plans made to actually use his mark in
connection with tee-shirts, such as manufacturing, licensing or marketing efforts, a
functioning website, correspondence with potential licensees or printers, marketing
plans, business plans, or the creation of labels or promotional materials related to the
subject goods. See A&H Sportswear, 2019 WL 1453071, at *5 (citing SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Omnisource DDS LLC, No. 91178539, 2010 WL 5099661, at *5

Opposition No. 91291723
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(TTAB 2010)). Applicant has failed to do so. Indeed, Applicant responded to several
of Opposer’s Discovery Requests by stating that, subject to his asserted objections, he
has no documents in his possession that: (1) evidence his use of the subject mark
(RFPD No. 2, 25 TTABVUE 143-44); (2) relate to actual or planned channels of trade
used to promote, offer and sell his goods under the subject mark (RFPD No. 3, id. at
144-45); (3) relate to his actual or planned classes of customers to whom the identified
goods are or will be offered (RFPD No. 4, id. at 145); (4) relate to his advertising and
promotion of his goods under the subject mark “unless Opposer considers a business
card responsive” (RFPD No. 6, id. at 146); or (5) evidence total sales of goods offered
under the subject mark (RFPD No. 7, id.).8
The lack of any probative documentation from the time of filing the subject
application in July 2023 through Applicant’s opposition to the instant motion in
March 2026 is probative of Applicant’s lack of a bona fide intent to use the applied-
for mark at the time he filed the subject application, and Applicant has not come
forward with any evidence to adequately explain or outweigh his lack of documentary
evidence.
8 Applicant’s argument that the lack of documentary evidence is somehow excusable because
Opposer “never followed up, never moved to compel, and raised no issue” with Applicant’s
discovery responses (28 TTABVUE 6) is not well taken. Applicant contends that the Board
should not grant a motion “on a record [that] Applicant was willing to supplement or clarify”
(id.); however, Applicant is reminded that he has an ongoing duty to supplement or correct
his discovery responses in a timely manner, regardless of whether Opposer chooses to “follow
up” concerning any of his responses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). Notably, when provided with
another opportunity to present evidence supporting his claimed bona fide intent in response
to the instant motion, Applicant was unable to do so.

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16
Having considered the arguments and evidence on summary judgment, and
having drawn all justifiable inferences in favor of Applicant as the non-movant, we
find that Opposer has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as
to Applicant’s lack of bona fide intent to use the subject mark for the applied-for goods
as of the filing date of the application, and that Applicant has not rebutted this prima
facie case with any sufficient evidence to explain the lack of documentary evidence or
otherwise establish the requisite intent.
Accordingly, Opposer’s motion for partial summary judgment on its claim of lack
of bona fide intent to use is granted, the opposition is sustained on that ground, and
registration of the subject mark is refused.9
9 In view of our disposition of this proceeding, Opposer’s request for sanctions, embedded in
its reply in support of the instant motion, is moot. Nonetheless, bearing in mind Opposer’s
assertion that Applicant’s response brief is “replete with legal errors” (29 TTABVUE 2), we
find it prudent to note that the citation of fabricated or nonexistent legal support, or the
inclusion of any invented quotations from existing law, whether the result of the use of
artificial intelligence or what Applicant calls “scrivener’s errors” (30 TTABVUE 3),
undermines the integrity of Board proceedings and may open a party in a pending proceeding
to sanctions under the Board’s inherent authority, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and/or Trademark Rule
11.18, 37 C.F.R. § 11.18.