Carolyn M Droll

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: September 22, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Carolyn M. Droll
_____
Serial No. 99060504
_____
Carolyn M. Droll, pro se.
James Prizant, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 128,
Travis Wheatley, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Heasley, Thurmon, and Allard,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Allard, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Carolyn M. Droll (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark BAKIE BAR (in standard characters, BAR disclaimed) for “Bar Cookies,” in
International Class 30.1
1 Application Serial No. 99060504 was filed on February 27, 2025, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention
to use the mark in commerce. Applicant subsequently filed an Amendment to Allege use,
alleging first use on May 3, 2025 and first use in commerce on May 17, 2025.

Serial No. 99060504
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Registration has been refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used on the goods identified
above, so resembles the following marks, both owned by the same registrant
(“Registrant”), that it is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive:
• BAKEY (in standard characters) for “Bakery products, bakery goods and
dessert items, namely, cakes, pies, cookies, muffins, pastries, desserts,
crackers, biscuits, sweets, cupcakes, brownies, puddings, ice cream cakes, fruit
cakes, ice cream, refrigerated prepackaged sandwiches, sandwich wraps,
sandwich paninis, combination meals consisting primarily of pasta or rice-
based entrees and soup or salad for consumption on or off the premises,” in
International Class 30;2 and
• for “Bakery products, bakery goods and dessert items,
namely, cakes, pies, cookies, muffins, pastries, desserts, crackers, biscuits,
sweets, cupcakes, brownies, puddings, ice cream cakes, fruit cakes, ice cream,
refrigerated prepackaged sandwiches, sandwich wraps, sandwich paninis,
combination meals consisting primarily of pasta or rice-based entrees and soup
or salad for consumption on or off the premises; chocolate-based spreads,” in
International Class 30.3
After the refusal was made final, Applicant requested reconsideration.4 After the
Examining Attorney denied the request for reconsideration,5 Applicant requested
2 Registration No. 6782826, issued on July 5, 2022. The registration also identifies goods and
services in International Classes 29 and 35, respectively, that do not form a basis of the
refusal.
3 Registration No. 7097861, issued on July 4, 2023. The mark is described as “consist[ing] of
the word ‘BAKEY’ in all capital red lettering under a red rectangular shaped stripe with
jagged edges on the left and right side of the red rectangular shaped stripe.” The color red is
claimed as a feature of the mark. The registration also identifies goods and services in
International Classes 29 and 35, respectively, that do not form a part of the basis of the
refusal.
4 November 15, 2025 Request for Reconsideration after Final.
Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system and identify the documents by title, date, and page.
5 December 16, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration after Final.

Serial No. 99060504
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reconsideration again6 and filed a notice of appeal.7 The appeal was suspended and
the application was remanded to the Examining Attorney.8 After the second request
for reconsideration was denied,9 the appeal resumed.10 Applicant and the Examining
Attorney filed briefs.11 We affirm the refusal.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office … as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ….” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). We assess the likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) based on the
factors set forth in In re E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA
1973) (“DuPont”). When analyzing these factors, the overriding concerns are not only
to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods or services, but also to protect
the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a
newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
6 January 3, 2026 Request for Reconsideration after Final.
7 1 TTABVUE.
References to the briefs and other materials in the appeal record refer to the Board’s
TTABVUE online docketing system.
8 2 TTABVUE.
9 4 TTABVUE. See also February 17, 2026 Denial of Request for Reconsideration after Final.
10 5 TTABVUE.
11 6, 10 TTABVUE.

Serial No. 99060504
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In any likelihood of confusion analysis, we consider each DuPont factor for which
there is evidence and argument. In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2019). Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the
evidence presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1206 (“[T]he various evidentiary factors
may play more or less weighty roles in any particular determination.”). “Each case
must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus.
Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key factors are the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks and the relatedness of the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866
F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d
1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544
F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to
the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”). These factors and others are addressed below.
We focus our Section 2(d) analysis on Registrant’s mark BAKEY in standard
characters (Reg. No. 6782826) (“Cited Mark” or “Cited Registration”) because we find
this mark and the recited goods most similar to Applicant’s mark and goods. Sock It
To Me, Inc. v. Fan, No. 91230554, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 201, at *20-21 (TTAB 2020)
(confining 2(d) analysis to most similar pleaded mark); In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No.
77186166, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *4-5 (TTAB 2010) (comparing applicant’s mark to

Serial No. 99060504
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most similar cited mark). If we find confusion likely between this mark and
Applicant’s mark, we need not consider the other cited mark.
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity and Nature of the Goods, Similarity or
Dissimilarity of Established and Likely-to-Continue Channels of
Trade and Classes of Purchasers
We turn first to the second DuPont factor and consider the similarity or
dissimilarity of the goods as they are identified in the involved application and Cited
Registration. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018);
Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
The Cited Registration identifies several goods but we focus on “cookies.” Here,
Registrant’s “cookies” is broad enough to encompass all types of cookies, including
Applicant’s more narrowly identified “bar cookies.” Consequently, we find the goods
to be legally identical in-part. See e.g., In re Hughes Furniture Indus., No. 85627379,
2015 TTAB LEXIS 65, at *10 (TTAB 2015) (Because Applicant’s broadly worded
identification of “furniture” necessarily encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified
“residential and commercial furniture,” the goods are legally identical.). During
examination, Applicant, for its part, wrote that “[t]he Examiner correctly notes that
the goods are legally identical, as the Registrant’s broad ‘cookies’ fully encompasses
Applicant’s ‘bar cookies’, and that channels of trade are presumed to overlap.”12
Because Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are in-part legally identical and
because the identifications have no restrictions as to channels of trade or classes of
consumers, we must presume that these goods travel through the same channels of
12 November 15, 2025 Request for Reconsideration after Final at TSDR 9.

Serial No. 99060504
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trade and are offered to the same or overlapping classes of purchasers. In re Viterra
Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Board entitled to rely on this legal
presumption in determining likelihood of confusion).
The second and third DuPont factors weigh in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
B. The Strength or Weakness of the Cited Mark
Before we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks, we first consider
the strength or weakness of the Cited Mark. The strength or weakness of the Cited
Mark affects the scope of protection to which it is entitled. When evaluating the
strength or weakness of the Cited Mark, we look at the mark’s conceptual strength
based on the nature of the term itself and, if evidence is present, its commercial
strength. See Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“There
are two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength under the sixth factor: conceptual
strength and commercial strength.”); In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346,
1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (measuring both conceptual and marketplace strength).
Conceptual strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness and may be placed
“in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness: . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive;
(3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992). “Marks that are descriptive or highly suggestive are entitled to
a narrower scope of protection, i.e., are less likely to generate confusion over source
identification, than their more fanciful counterparts.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS
Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Serial No. 99060504
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Because the Cited Mark is registered on the Principal Register without a claim of
acquired distinctiveness, we must presume that it is inherently distinctive, i.e. that
it is at least as distinctive as a suggestive term for its identified goods. Section 7(b) of
the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). See also Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea,
Inc., No. 91118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 330, at *62 (TTAB 2006) (“A mark that is
registered on the Principal Register is entitled to all Section 7(b) presumptions
including the presumption that the mark is distinctive and moreover, in the absence
of a Section 2(f) claim in the registration, that the mark is inherently distinctive for
the goods.”). “Nevertheless, ‘where there is evidence that a mark, or element of a
mark, is commonly used or registered by many different third parties for similar
goods or services, that may indicate that the mark or common element has some
conceptual weakness.’” Cielo e Terra, S.p.A. v. Hoteles y Viñedos del Valle de
Guadalupe S.A. de C.V., No. 91287216, 2026 TTAB LEXIS 240, at *18-19 (TTAB
2026) (quoting August Storck KG v. Florend Indústria e Comércio de Chocolates
LTDA, No. 91277224, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 502, at *13 (TTAB 2025)).
Applicant’s evidence consists of 14 registrations held by 10 different third-
parties.13 Third-party registrations are not evidence that the registered marks are in
use or that the public is familiar with them, nonetheless they may bear on conceptual
weakness if a term is commonly registered for similar goods or services. See
Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 917 (CCPA 1976) (Third-party
13 November 15, 2025 Request for Reconsideration after Final at TSDR 12-31.

Serial No. 99060504
- 8 -
registrations “may be given some weight to show the meaning of a mark in the same
way that dictionaries are used.”).
Applicant argues that this evidence shows that the Cited Mark BAKEY is
conceptually weak.14 “Because the shared BAKE formative is weak,” Applicant
continues, “the differences in Applicant’s mark are more than sufficient to avoid any
likelihood of confusion.”15
For ease of reference, we repeat below the chart in the Examining Attorney’s brief
summarizing the third-party marks.16
MARK Reg. No. Owner Goods/Services
BAKE SHOP
(+des)
5998274 ALDI, Inc. Cl 30: Apple fritters; Bakery
products; Bakery
products, namely, sweet
bakery goods; Cakes;
Cinnamon rolls; Cookies;
Croissants; Danish; Donuts;
Muffins; Pastries
THE BAKE SHOP 6579979 Pablo
Gonzalez
Cl 35: Retail store services
featuring paraphernalia for
smoking, electronic oral
vaporizers for smoking, and
glass pipes, with all of the
14 6 TTABVUE 8.
15 6 TTABVUE 9.
16 10 TTABVUE 7-9.
Applicant, in its November 15, 2025 Request for Reconsideration after Final made of record
screenshots of a portion of the TSDR record together with another page consisting of what
appears to be a screen shot of the specimen of record and a typed version of the identification
of goods or services. See id. at TSDR 13-31. In denying the Applicant’s request for
reconsideration, the Examining Attorney did not object to the TSDR printouts or instruct
Applicant as to how to make the registrations of record and addressed the issue on the merits,
albeit briefly. December 16, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration after Final at TSDR
2. In any event, any objection to the form of the evidence has been waived. In re City of
Houston, No. 77660948, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *5 (TTAB 2012) (“examining attorney’s
failure to advise applicant of the insufficiency of the list of registrations when it was proffered
during examination constituted a waiver of any objection to consideration of that list”).

Serial No. 99060504
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aforementioned featured goods
exclusively for use with
cannabis products solely
derived from hemp with a
delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol
THC concentration of not more
than 0.3 percent on a dry
weight basis; Retail store
services featuring lighters for
smokers and clothing
conducting
clinical drug trials
THE BAKE SHOP
(+des)
6587498 Pablo
Gonzalez
Cl 35: Retail store services
featuring paraphernalia for
smoking, electronic oral
vaporizers for smoking, and
glass pipes, with all of the
aforementioned featured goods
exclusively for use with
cannabis products solely
derived from hemp with a
delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol
THC concentration of not more
than 0.3 percent on a dry
weight basis; Retail store
services featuring lighters for
smokers and clothing
TATE’S BAKE
SHOP
SOUTHAMPTON,
NY UNIQUELY
CRISPY DEEPLY
DELICIOUS
(+des)
5085147 Tate’s
Bake
Shop, Inc.
Cl 30: Bakery goods, namely,
cookies, and gift baskets
containing cookies
NOM’S BAKE
SHOP
(+des)
6011617 Nomaste
Confection,
LLC
Cl 30: Bakery goods; Bakery
goods, namely, gift baskets
containing bakery goods;
Bakery products
Cl 35: Online retail bakery
shops
CAKE BAKE
SHOP
6083772 Cake Bake
Shop, Inc.
Cl 30: Bakery products,
namely, sweet bakery goods
Cl 43: Restaurant and café
services

Serial No. 99060504
- 10 -
CAKE BAKE
SHOP
(+des)
6083771 Cake Bake
Shop, Inc.
Cl 30: Bakery products,
namely, sweet bakery goods
Cl 43: Restaurant and café
services
VINTAGE BAKE
SHOP
5718275 Fusion
Grounds,
Inc.
Cl 30: Cookies and crackers
SWEET E’S BAKE
SHOP
8086029 Sweet E’s,
Inc.
Cl 30: Various bakery desserts
and baked goods
SWEET E’S BAKE
SHOP
8086030 Sweet E’s,
Inc.
CL 35: Store services for
bakery shops featuring various
bakery desserts and baked
goods
CUPCAKIN’ BAKE
SHOP
7924529 Cupcakin’
Bake
Shop,
Inc.
Cl 35: Retail bakery shop;
online retail bakery shop
CUPCAKIN’ BAKE
SHOP
7924528 Cupcakin’
Bake
Shop,
Inc.
CL 30: Baked goods, namely,
cupcakes, cakes, cookies, tarts
OVER THE
RAINBOW
BAKE SHOP
6000558 Lauren
Spaventa
CL 40: Bakery services,
namely, the manufacture of
bakery products to order
and/or specification of others
THE LITTLE
DAISY
BAKE SHOP
(+des)
4160947 The Little
Daisy
Bake
Shop, LLC
CL 35: Retail bakery
shops
Recall that the involved application identifies “bar cookies.” Thus, we immediately
disregard the marks THE BAKE SHOP (Reg. No. 6579979) and THE BAKE SHOP
and Design (Reg. No. 6587498), both in the name of Pablo Gonzalez, because these
registrations identify retail store services featuring cannabis paraphernalia, not
baked goods. See i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1328-29 (disregarding third-party
registrations for other types of goods where the proffering party had neither proven
nor explained that they were related to the goods in the cited registration).

Serial No. 99060504
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Even considering the remaining 12 third-party marks in the name of 9 different
third-parties, each of them combines the term BAKE with the term SHOP. None of
them contain the word BAKE alone, nor do any of them include the word BAKIE or
BAKEY, either alone or in combination with the term SHOP. These third-party
marks are less similar to the Cited Mark than Applicant’s mark. While they may
show conceptual weakness of the terms BAKE SHOP for baked goods, they do not
demonstrate that the term BAKEY is weak. See In re I-Coat Co., LLC, No. 86802467,
2018 TTAB LEXIS 171, at *16-17 (TTAB 2018) (“Only two of the three third-party
registrations recite goods identified in the cited registration, and none of the marks
are as similar to the mark in the cited registration as is Applicant’s mark.”). See also
Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distributors, Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 675 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (“Applicant introduced evidence of eight third-party registrations for tea which
contain the word ‘SPICE’, five of which are shown to be in use. None of these marks
has a ‘SPICE (place)’ format or conveys a commercial impression similar to that
projected by the SPICE ISLANDS mark, and these third-party registrations are of
significantly greater difference from SPICE VALLEY and SPICE ISLANDS than
either of these two marks from each other.”); Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No.
92068086, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 464, at *32 (TTAB 2021) (“[W]hile the registered marks
all contain the word “MIRAGE” they contain additional elements that cause many of
them to be less similar to Petitioner’s mark than Respondent’s marks are.”).
Considering the foregoing, Applicant was not successful in demonstrating that the
Cited Mark has some conceptual weakness. Because, as mentioned earlier, the mark

Serial No. 99060504
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of the Cited Registration issued on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired
distinctiveness, and, as a result, we must presume that the Cited Mark is inherently
distinctive for Registrant’s goods, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), we find that the Cited Mark is
entitled to the ordinary scope of protection to which inherently distinctive marks are
entitled.
This factor is neutral.
C. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties, considering their appearance,
sound, meaning and commercial impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. See also
Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1303. “Similarity in any one of these elements may be
sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No.
87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (TTAB 2018), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x
516 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at
*3-4 (TTAB 2014)).
“[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d
1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The proper test regarding similarity “is not a side-by-
side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar
in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong,
Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph

Serial No. 99060504
- 13 -
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally retains a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks. In re St.
Julian Wine Co., No. 87834973, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 196, at *13 (TTAB 2020); In re
Bay State Brewing Co., Inc., No. 85826258, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 46, at *9 (TTAB 2016)
(citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., No. 91079317, 1991 TTAB LEXIS 53, at
*18 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam, 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
Because the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the
marks in their entireties, our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks
into their various components. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1985). See also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA
1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal;
rather, it must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”).
Nonetheless, “there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or
less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” Nat’l Data, 753
F.2d at 1058.
Recall that Applicant seeks to register the mark BAKIE BAR (in standard
characters). We find that the term BAKIE is the dominant term of the mark for
several reasons, starting with the fact that it is the most distinctive term and appears
first in the mark. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee
En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (VEUVE as first word is a prominent

Serial No. 99060504
- 14 -
feature of the marks); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970
F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[U]pon encountering each mark, consumers must first
notice this identical lead word.”). Moreover, Applicant has disclaimed the term BAR,
an acknowledgement that it is either descriptive or generic when considered in light
of the identified goods and, as a result, has less trademark significance. See
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Regarding
descriptive terms, this court has noted that the ‘descriptive component of a mark may
be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on the likelihood of confusion.’”)
(quoting Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060).
There are modest differences in appearance between the dominant portion of
Applicant’s mark and the Cited Mark (BAKIE versus BAKEY). However, these terms
are identical in sound when pronounced.17 “Similarity in sound alone may be
sufficient for a finding of confusion.” In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., No. 78553715,
2007 TTAB LEXIS 73, at *16 (TTAB 2007) (citing Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968)). See also, Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s
Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Another factor weighing
heavily in our decision is that the dominant portion of both parties’ marks sounds the
same when spoken.”).
Because of the modest differences in appearance and the high similarity in sound,
the marks will also engender similar commercial impressions. See Ralston Purina Co.
17 Applicant itself acknowledged the phonetic similarity of these terms during examination.
November 15, 2025 Request for Reconsideration after Final at TSDR 4 (“Applicant
acknowledges the phonetic similarity of the marks’ first components.”).

Serial No. 99060504
- 15 -
v. The Quaker Oats Co., 1971 TTAB LEXIS 39, at *6-7 (TTAB 1971) (LUV and LOVE
are phonetic equivalents, such that the compared marks have substantially similar
commercial impressions related to “love”). Moreover, there is no evidence that either
“BAKEY” or “BAKIE” has any meaning to lead away from their similarity in
appearance and phonetic equivalence. Applicant argues that “BAR conveys a product-
specific meaning, while BAKEY conveys only a general association with baking.”18
We disagree. Contrary to Applicant’s arguments, BAR is insufficient to distinguish
the marks inasmuch as BAR is descriptive or generic of Applicant’s “bar cookies” and
could describe Registrant’s identified “cookies” as well.
Applicant argues that its “mark is consistently presented as a unitary phrase
identifying a specific product format, reinforcing that consumers perceive it as a
complete and distinct designation rather than as a variation of BAKEY.”19 We
disagree that Applicant’s mark is a unitary mark. A mark is considered unitary
“when it creates a commercial impression separate and apart from any unregistrable
component.” TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1213.05
(2026) and cases cited therein; see also Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l, Inc., 950 F.2d
1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[A] unitary mark must create a single and distinct
commercial impression.”). While Applicant’s mark is an alliteration and, as a result,
has a pleasing cadence when spoken, this is not enough to render it unitary.
18 6 TTABVUE 10.
19 6 TTABVUE 6.

Serial No. 99060504
- 16 -
Considering the marks as a whole, we find them to be very similar and, as a result,
the first DuPont factor weighs in favor of likelihood of confusion.
D. Summarizing the DuPont Factors
In cases such as this, where Applicant’s identified goods are identical in-part to
Registrant’s identified goods, the degree of similarity between the marks that is
required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is less than it would be if the
goods were not identical. Century 21 Real Estate, 970 F.2d at 877. In view thereof,
and because each of the DuPont factors considered above weighs in favor of a finding
of likelihood of confusion and the sixth factor is neutral, we conclude that confusion
with Registrant’s mark is likely to occur.
Decision
The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed.