Mitchell Industrial Tire Co., Inc.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: August 26, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Mitchell Industrial Tire Co., Inc.
_____
Serial No. 98814134
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Stephen J. Stark of Miller & Martin PLLC, for Mitchell Industrial Tire Co., Inc.
Karanendra S. Chhina, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 114,
Nicole Nguyen, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Goodman, Bradley, and O’Connor,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Bradley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Mitchell Industrial Tire Co., Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the standard-character mark WIDE TRACK for “tires; solid tires” in
International Class 12.1
1 Application Serial No. 98814134, filed on October 22, 2024, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming first use anywhere and first use in commerce
since at least as early as January 1, 1999.

Serial No. 98814134
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The Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(e)(1) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), on the ground that Applicant’s proposed mark
is merely descriptive of the applied-for goods. After the Examining Attorney issued a
final refusal, Applicant appealed and requested reconsideration.2 The Examining
Attorney denied the request for reconsideration,3 and the appeal resumed. The appeal
is fully briefed.4 We affirm the refusal to register.
I. Preliminary Issues
A. Evidentiary Objection
Applicant objects to what it describes as “20 new pages of [e]xhibits” attached to
the Examining Attorney’s appeal brief.5 The Examining Attorney explained that it
was providing “an additional relevant definition of TRACK taken from the prominent
Collins [D]ictionary” in response to Applicant’s criticism that the previously proffered
definition from Merriam-Webster Dictionary was “obscure.”6 The Examining
Attorney requests that the Board take judicial notice of the additional dictionary
definition.7
2 1 TTABVUE; November 13, 2025 Request for Reconsideration.
Citations in this opinion to the briefs and other materials in the appeal docket refer to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. Page references to the application file refer
to the online database of the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”)
system. All citations to documents contained in the TSDR database are to the downloaded
.pdf versions of the documents.
3 4 TTABVUE.
4 6 TTABVUE (Applicant’s brief); 8 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney’s brief); 9 TTABVUE
(Applicant’s reply brief).
5 9 TTABVUE 3.
6 8 TTABVUE 8-9.
7 Id. at 9.

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The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary evidence, including from online
dictionaries that exist in printed format or regular fixed editions. In re Cordua Rests.
LP, No. 85214191, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 94, at *6 n.4 (TTAB 2014), aff’d, 823 F.3d 594
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (approving examining attorney’s request to take judicial notice of a
dictionary definition); In re Red Bull GmbH, No. 75788830, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 136,
at *6-9 (TTAB 2006). A review of the exhibit attached to the Examining Attorney’s
brief confirms that it contains a print-out from the online version of Collins Dictionary
showing definitions for the word “track.”8 Accordingly, we take judicial notice of the
definition offered by the Examining Attorney.
B. Procedural Issues
1. Applicant Can’t Incorporate Arguments By Reference
In its appeal brief, Applicant states that “[a]ll arguments and exhibits from earlier
responses are hereby incorporated by reference.”9 However, the Board has previously
held that, “[p]arties whose briefs purport to incorporate by reference arguments made
during prosecution will be held to have failed thereby to present whatever arguments
the incorporation statement purports to cover to the Board and will be deemed to
have forfeited them.” In re Princeton Equity Grp. LLC, No. 97397212, 2025 TTAB
LEXIS 242, at *9 (TTAB 2025). Accordingly, we consider only the arguments
Applicant presented in its appeal briefs.10
8 8 TTABVUE 15-36.
9 6 TTABVUE 8.
10 With regards to Applicant’s reference to “exhibits,” all evidence filed during prosecution of
the application are of record on appeal. See Trademark Rule 2.142(b)(3), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.142(b)(3).

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2. Genericness is Not at Issue on Appeal
Applicant argues in its appeal briefs that its proposed mark is not generic.11
During examination, the non-final and final office actions contained an advisory
statement that the Examining Attorney could not recommend registration under
Section 2(f) based on acquired distinctiveness or on the Supplemental Register
because the proposed mark WIDE TRACK appears to be generic in connection with
the applied-for goods.12 This was simply an advisory; no generic refusal was made.13
The Examining Attorney confirmed in its brief that the “sole issue on appeal is
whether the applicant’s mark WIDE TRACK is merely descriptive of the goods.”14
“Advisory statements are not refusals subject to appeal” and as such “genericness is
not at issue in this appeal.” In re Nat’l Ass’n of Veterinary Technicians in Am., No.
87171093, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 259, at *4 n.11, *5 (TTAB 2019).15
11 6 TTABVUE 10-12, 17-21.
12 June 9, 2025 Office Action at 2-3; October 14, 2025 Final Office Action at 5.
13 See December 19, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at 1 (noting the “generic
advisory” and explaining that genericness was “not ripe . . . at this juncture”).
14 8 TTABVUE 3 (emphasis in original).
15 In its reply brief, in response to the Examining Attorney’s statement that the arguments
on genericness were premature, Applicant asks if it does not address genericness in its appeal
brief, “when could the Applicant make the argument during the prosecution of this
application?” 9 TTABVUE 3. Applicant asserts that “the Examining Attorney is attempting
to procedurally hide behind an ‘advisory indication’ that could NEVER be addressed by the
applicant according to the Examining Attorney’s logic.” Id.
However, the Examining Attorney followed proper examination procedure here where
Applicant never offered during prosecution to amend to the Supplemental Register, and
accordingly, the appropriate procedure is to issue a final refusal under § 2(e)(1) only, on the
ground that the proposed mark is merely descriptive. See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1209.02(a) (examining attorneys must not issue refusals
on the basis of genericness unless and until the applicant amends to the Supplemental
Register or submits a § 2(f) claim). As explained in the TMEP an applicant during prosecution

Serial No. 98814134
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3. Applicant’s Proposed Conditional Compromises
In its appeal brief, Applicant proposes two “compromise[s]”: (i) In response to the
Examining Attorney’s proffered dictionary definition of “track” referencing
“automobile tires,” Applicant states it “could be willing to amend the goods to ‘Tires
for industrial use [not automotive tires]; ‘solid tires for industrial use [not automotive
tires]’ or something similar for the clarity,”16 and (ii) “If found to be merely
descriptive, please amend the application to the Supplemental Register.”17
Applicant asserts that it “should have the opportunity to argue first for a Principal
Registration, and then, and only if the Principal Registration is refused, have an
opportunity to argue for Supplemental Registration.”18 However, under Trademark
Rule 2.142(g), “[a]n application which has been considered and decided on appeal will
not be reopened,” i.e., an applicant may not amend its application at this stage, except
in two very limited situations which are not present here.19 See TRADEMARK TRIAL
may respond to a descriptiveness refusal by (i) amending to the Supplemental Register, (ii)
“arguing the merits of the examining attorney’s refusal of registration on the Principal
Register and, in the alternative, request registration on the Supplemental Register”, or (iii)
“the applicant may seek registration on the Principal Register based on acquired
distinctiveness under § 2(f), . . . and, in the alternative, on the Supplemental Register.”
TMEP § 816.04. Applicant did not pursue any of these options in response to the non-final or
final office actions, and as such the Examining Attorney is correct that the genericness issue
never ripened.
16 6 TTABVUE 17.
17 Id. at 21.
18 9 TTABVUE 3. “Had Applicant wished to argue registrability on the Supplemental Register
in the alternative, it should have raised that issue prior to appeal, or sought a remand for
good cause prior to final decision.” In re Hikari Sales USA, Inc., No. 86439012, 2019 TTAB
LEXIS 73, at *66-67 (TTAB 2019).
19 Trademark Rule 2.142(g) only allows reopening for entry of a disclaimer or upon order of
the Director. And “it has been [the] practice of the Commissioner [now Director] to refuse to

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AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 1218 (2026) (and cases cited
therein). Additionally, Applicant’s first proposed compromise does not even consist of
a concrete proposal, but merely a conditional statement that Applicant “could” amend
its identification of goods to one proposal or “something similar.” In any case, “the
Board cannot . . . re-open the application for amendment of the identification by
applicant.” In re Faucher Indus. Inc., No. 85202870, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 313, at *7
(TTAB 2013).20 And with regards to Applicant’s second proposed compromise “our
prior precedents are clear that once the Board has rendered a final decision, a request
to amend to the Supplemental Register is not possible.” Integrated Embedded, 2016
TTAB LEXIS 470, at *24.
Bottom line, Applicant cannot make its request for an amendment conditional on
the outcome of the Board’s decision on appeal. See In re Phillips Van Heusen Corp.,
No. 75664835, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *2 n.2 (TTAB 2002) (denying “request in
applicant’s brief that, ‘even if these refusals are maintained, . . . its application be
amended to the Supplemental Register’” because “an application which has been
considered and decided on appeal will not be reopened for such purpose”) (citation
reopen, after final decision, for amendment to the Supplemental Register.” In re Integrated
Embedded, No. 86140341, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 470, at *24 (TTAB 2016) citing In re Taverniti,
SARL, No. 73397073, 1985 TTAB LEXIS 98, at *6 (TTAB 1985).
20 To the extent Applicant intended its proposed compromise to amend its goods to be a
request to remand its application, Applicant has not attempted to show any good cause and
given the late stage of its request we find good cause lacking. See In re Ox Paperboard, LLC,
No. 87847482, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 266, at *7 (TTAB 2020) (“Given the late stage of Applicant’s
‘request’ without any explanation for the reason for the delay, we find that Applicant has
failed to demonstrate good cause to suspend the appeal and remand the application to the
Examining Attorney for consideration of Applicant’s proposed amendment and further
examination.”).

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omitted); In re Adlon Brand GmbH & Co. KG, No. 85831682, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 526,
at *30 (TTAB 2016) (“Applicant cannot, in effect, make a request for remand
conditional on the outcome of the Board’s decision in the appeal, i.e., to request, in
the event that the Board affirms the refusal, that the application be remanded so that
Applicant may submit additional evidence.”).
Accordingly, we deny Applicant’s conditional “compromises” to amend its
application to modify the identification of goods and/or to seek registration on the
Supplemental Register.
II. Mere Descriptiveness Refusal
A. Applicable Law
Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), prohibits registration
on the Principal Register of “a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection with
the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive . . . of them,” unless the mark has
acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Act.21
A term is “merely descriptive” within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1) if it
“immediately conveys knowledge of a quality, feature, function, or characteristic of
the goods or services with which it is used.” In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.,
675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d 960, 963 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)). “A mark need not recite each feature of the relevant goods or services in
21 Applicant does not claim the proposed mark is registrable because it has acquired
distinctiveness. Thus, Section 2(f) is not pertinent to our decision.

Serial No. 98814134
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detail to be descriptive, it need only describe a single feature or attribute.” Id.
(cleaned up; citation omitted).
“Descriptiveness must be evaluated ‘in relation to the particular goods for which
registration is sought, the context in which it is being used, and the possible
significance that the term would have to the average purchaser of the goods because
of the manner of its use or intended use.’” Id. (quoting Bayer AG, 488 F.3d at 963-64).
Descriptiveness is not considered “in the abstract or on the basis of guesswork.” In re
Fat Boys Water Sports, LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *4 (TTAB
2016) (citing In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814 (CCPA 1978)). “The question
is not whether someone presented with only the mark could guess what the goods or
services are. Rather, the question is whether someone who knows what the goods and
services are will understand the mark to convey information about them.” DuoProSS
Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted).
“Whether a mark is merely descriptive or not is determined from the viewpoint of
the relevant purchasing public.” In re Stereotaxis, Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citation omitted). Here, we must consider the perception of the average
purchaser of tires and solid tires which include members of the general public.
Evidence of the relevant purchasers’ understanding of a term or phrase “may be
obtained from any competent source, such as purchaser testimony, consumer surveys,
listings in dictionaries, trade journals, newspapers, and other publications.” Real
Foods Pty Ltd. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 906 F.3d 965, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation

Serial No. 98814134
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omitted). “These sources may include [w]ebsites, publications and use in labels,
packages, or in advertising materials directed to the goods.’” In re N.C. Lottery, 866
F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
B. Analysis of Mere Descriptiveness
At the outset, we address Applicant’s contention that the Examining Attorney
applied the wrong standard in analyzing whether its proposed mark is descriptive.
Applicant argues that “[t]he standard that should be applied is whether the mark is
suggestive . . . from [TMEP] 1209.01(a)” instead of merely descriptive from TMEP
§ 1209.01(b).22 However, the TMEP sections Applicant cites are not discrete
standards, rather proposed trademarks are evaluated along a spectrum of
distinctiveness from generic to fanciful. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (“Marks are often classified in categories of generally increasing
distinctiveness[:] . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5)
fanciful.”); see also N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d at 1366 (the spectrum “[w]hen arranged in
an ascending order . . . roughly reflects the[] eligibility for trademark status and the
degree of protection accorded”). In determining that Applicant’s proposed mark is
merely descriptive, the Examining Attorney considered the spectrum and found that
the proposed mark was not suggestive.23
22 6 TTABVUE 9.
23 As the Examining Attorney explained, “all the relevant guidance provided in TMEP
§§ 1209.01(a), (b) and the like is considered by an examining attorney” and “[i]n evaluating
such a [descriptiveness] refusal, an examining attorney then evaluates where a mark falls on
the continuum between highly distinctive (i.e., fanciful or arbitrary) on the one end and those
that are generic on the other end (as discussed in TMEP §§ 1209.01(a), (b)). Only after all due
consideration is given to a mark, is it then determined to be merely descriptive (in that

Serial No. 98814134
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Turning to our analysis, for a composite word mark such as Applicant’s proposed
mark WIDE TRACK, we “examine the meaning of each component [term]
individually, and then determine whether the mark as a whole is merely descriptive.”
DuoProSS Meditech, 695 F.3d at 1255. If WIDE and TRACK are each individually
merely descriptive of the goods, we assess whether their combination in “Applicant’s
mark ‘conveys any distinctive source-identifying impression contrary to the
descriptiveness of the individual parts.’” Fat Boys, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *14-15
(quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2003). If each
component “retains its merely descriptive significance in relation to the goods, the
combination results in a composite that is itself merely descriptive.” Fat Boys, 2016
TTAB LEXIS 150, at *15.
1. Definitions
The Examining Attorney provided the following dictionary definitions of the
proposed mark’s component terms:
• WIDE: “having much extent between the sides: BROAD”; 24 and
• TRACK: “the tread of an automobile tire”.25
Considered individually, and together, the terms convey the same meaning in
relation to Applicant’s tires and solid tires, namely tires which have a broad tread.
instance) and a refusal issued to the applicant. That is what was done in this instance.” 8
TTABVUE 7.
24 June 9, 2025 Office Action at 5 (definition from MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY).
25 Id. at 19 (definition from MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY); 8 TTABVUE 26 (definition of
“track” in American English from COLLINS DICTIONARY). See also June 9, 2025 Office Action
at 35 (Wikipedia entry for “Tire tread” stating “[t]he tread of a tire or track refers to the
rubber on its circumference that makes contact with the road or the ground”).

Serial No. 98814134
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As such, Applicant’s proposed mark merely describes a characteristic or feature of
Applicant’s goods.
Applicant does not dispute the meaning of “wide,” or that such meaning is
descriptive in relation to its tires. However, Applicant asserts, without any
explanation, that the definition of “track” from Merriam-Webster Dictionary is “an
obscure definition.”26 As discussed previously, dictionaries are a competent source of
evidence of the relevant purchasers’ understanding of a term. See Bayer AG, 488 F.3d
at 964 (“Evidence that a term is merely descriptive to the relevant purchasing public
may be obtained from any competent source, such as dictionaries . . . .”) (citation
omitted). And the Board regularly accepts evidence of definitions from Merriam-
Webster Dictionary.27 Additionally, the definition proffered by the Examining
Attorney is from the current online edition of Merriam-Webster Dictionary.28
Further, the Examining Attorney provided a definition of “track” from Collins
Dictionary which confirms the same meaning.29 To the extent Applicant is arguing
that the definition is obscure because it is the sixth listed definition, as explained
above, we evaluate descriptiveness in relation to Applicant’s goods, and this definition
is specific to “tires.” See Chamber of Commerce, 675 F.3d at 1300 (“Whether a mark
26 6 TTABVUE 9.
27 See, e.g., In re Jimmy Moore LLC, No. 86353015, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 382, at *8-9 (TTAB
2016) (taking judicial notice of definitions found at merriam-webster.com); In re Zuma Array
Ltd., No. 79288888, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *14-15 & n.18 (TTAB 2022) (taking judicial
notice of definition from online MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY in affirming descriptiveness
refusal); In re Nursecon, LLC, No. 88052194, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 545, at *25 nn.63-64 (TTAB
2024) (same).
28 June 9, 2025 Office Action at 17, 19 (accessed June 9, 2025).
29 8 TTABVUE 26.

Serial No. 98814134
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is descriptive cannot be determined in the abstract. Descriptiveness must be
evaluated in relation to the particular goods for which registration is sought . . . .”)
(citation omitted).
Applicant also argues that the definition the Examining Attorney relies on for
“track” “is at odds with a definition proposed by the National Institute of Standards
of the Department of Commerce, and others that differentiate the terms ‘track’ and
‘tread.’”30 Applicant states that:
a TRACK is not a TREAD as has been acknowledged by the
United States’ Federal Governments own documentation.
A “tire tread” is the design on the circumference of a tire
(aka the part of the tire that comes into contact with the
ground). A “tire track” is (a) the path or line left behind by
a tire as it rolls along the ground or (b) the imprint of a tire
on the surface of another object, such as pavement.
References providing support for this have been provided
into the record, See Guide for the Examinations of
Footwear and Tire Impressions and other documentation
of record.31
Yet, Applicant has only filed a two-page document which states at the beginning,
“Page 1 of 5 Guide for the Examination of Footwear and Tire Impression Evidence
30 6 TTABVUE 9. Applicant’s brief lacks any citation to evidence in the record and, as such,
it is not clear what Applicant is referencing when it refers to “others.” The Board’s rules
require that: “Citation to evidence in briefs should be to the documents in the electronic
record for the subject application or registration by date, the name of the paper under which
the evidence was submitted, and the page number in the electronic record.” Trademark Rule
2.142(b)(3); see also TBMP § 1203.01 (“When referring to the record, the applicant . . . should
cite to the prosecution history for the application, currently the TSDR database. Citation
format should be by date, name of the paper under which the evidence was submitted and
the page number in the electronic record, for example: November 4, 2013 Office Action, TSDR
p. 2.”). To the extent we are able to determine which documents Applicant is referencing in
its brief we have discussed that material herein. Applicant should endeavor in any future
filing to include the required citations to the record.
31 6 TTABVUE 14.

Serial No. 98814134
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(03/2006).”32 The excerpt appears to be some type of index or overview of the
referenced Guide, and while it includes a url,33 the exact source of the document is
not otherwise clear from the face of the excerpt. Regardless, the document does not
contain the definitions that the Applicant references above.34 Applicant also filed an
excerpt from a manual published by the University of North Carolina on crime scene
evidence and expert testimony which contains a discussion of collecting evidence of
tire track impressions.35 This document also does not contain the definitions that
Applicant cites above.36 Additionally, these sources do not appear to be directed to
the relevant consuming public, i.e., the average purchaser of tires and solid tires, but
rather to crime scene examiners and/or other law enforcement personnel.
Applicant concedes that WIDE TREAD is descriptive, but insists that WIDE
TRACK is not based on its preferred definitions of “track” for which, as discussed
32 June 25, 2025 Response to Office Action at 8-9.
33 Id. at 8 (https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2016/10/26/swgtread_08_guide_for
_the_examination_of_footwear_and_tire_impression_evidence_200603.pdf).
34 Indeed, the excerpt explicitly states: “2. Terminology Refer to the Standard for Terminology
Used for Forensic Footwear and Tire Impression Evidence for a definition of terms used in
this document.” Id. at 8. This “Standard for Terminology” is not included in the excerpt
Applicant submitted.
35 Id. at 10-15.
36 As discussed above, this document is not directed to the relevant consuming public, but to
the extent we do consider it, it further supports that a track is a tire tread as defined in the
dictionary definitions submitted by the Examining Attorney, that these terms are used
interchangeably, and that such use is descriptive. Specifically, the manual excerpt refers to
collection of evidence of “tire track impressions,” i.e., marks made by the track (or tread) of a
tire, and also refers to “tire track evidence.” See id. at 11 (“A properly qualified witness can
examine the distinguishing marks and features of a . . . tire track impression . . . .”), 12 (“If
the . . . tire track impression reveals details of minute cuts, gouges, and distinctive signs of
wear and tear (sometimes called ‘randomly acquired characteristics’) that are consistent in
location and degree with similar details found on defendant’s known sample, then the analyst
may be able to make a more positive identification.”).

Serial No. 98814134
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above, Applicant did not provide evidentiary support.37 Applicant argues that a track
is a “result of a use” of a tire, i.e., the imprint left by the tire on a surface, and not a
“use” of a tire, and as such does not meet the standard for a merely descriptive mark
as set out in TMEP § 1209.01(b).38 But we agree with the Examining Attorney that
Applicant’s arguments based on a different meaning of “track” are “[a] distinction
without a difference for mere descriptiveness purposes.”39 If “track” means the
imprint or path of a tire, such a meaning is still descriptive in relation to Applicant’s
proposed mark and goods.40 Namely, WIDE TRACK would describe a feature or
characteristic of a tire leaving a broad tread imprint.41
37 6 TTABVUE 14 (“Had the applicant been attempting to register WIDE TREAD instead of
WIDE TRACK, then the Examining Attorney would have had an excellent argument for a
merely descriptive rejection.”). Applicant’s argument ignores the dictionary definitions and
other evidence showing that “track” and “tread” have been used interchangeably in relation
to tires.
38 Id. at 9.
39 8 TTABVUE 11.
40 This is confirmed by the Examining Attorney’s dictionary evidence which also defines
“track” as “a mark or series of marks or other discoverable evidence left by a . . . thing that
has passed, as a . . . wheel rut.” Id. at 25. Additionally, Applicant submitted screenshots from
what appears to be a blog at tirehubz.com. While the screenshots do not identify any
information about the author’s background or expertise, the blog does state that tire tracks
“can be used to identify the make, model, and size of a tire, as well as the direction in which
a vehicle was traveling” and that “[t]here are many different features of a tire track that can
be analyzed in order to identify the make and model of the vehicle, as well as the specific tires
that were used. Some of the most common features that are looked at include the width,
depth, and pattern of the tread.” June 25, 2025 Response to Office Action at 20. This further
supports that “track,” even under Applicant’s definition, is descriptive.
41 Applicant also asserts that its mark is suggestive because “imagination is required” and
also refers to “incongruity” and “incongruous word combinations.” 6 TTABVUE 12-14. But
Applicant does not include any argument, explanation, or evidence about how its mark is
incongruous or requires imagination to determine its meaning, rather it just lists a series of
cases where other trademarks were found suggestive, or otherwise not merely descriptive.
Accordingly, we have not considered these undeveloped statements in our analysis. See
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“issues

Serial No. 98814134
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2. Website Evidence
The Examining Attorney also provided evidence from various websites and online
forums showing use of “wide track” in relation to tires to describe the broad tread or
surface of the tires, including the following:
42
Applicant claims that this use excerpted from www.protire.com/tires/wide-track/
depicts Applicant’s goods and contends that this is “the only cited use of WIDE
TRACK with tires provided as evidence.”43 Relevant evidence of descriptiveness
includes materials showing “the context in which a mark is used on labels, packages,
or in advertising material directed to the goods.” Abcor, 588 F.2d at 814. Accordingly,
such advertising material for Applicant’s goods is relevant here and confirms the
descriptiveness of Applicant’s proposed mark. And while there is other evidence of
adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived”) (citation omitted); In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021
TTAB LEXIS 168, at *11 n.26 (TTAB 2021) (“Because there is no argument or record evidence
directed to these factors, we have not considered them in our analysis of the likelihood of
confusion.”).
42 June 9, 2025 Office Action at 31. The text highlighted by the Examining Attorney states:
“Wide-track forklift tires are broad, durable tires that provide enhanced stability, better
traction, and reduced ground pressure, making them ideal for uneven or soft surfaces.”
43 6 TTABVUE 15.

Serial No. 98814134
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record using “wide track” with tires, “[t]he fact that Applicant may be the first or only
user of a term does not render the term distinctive if, as here, it has been shown to
be merely descriptive of the goods identified in the application.” Zuma Array, 2022
TTAB LEXIS 281, at *21 (citation omitted).
Other marketplace evidence shows car enthusiasts and others in the automotive
field using “wide track” to refer to the broad tread of tires including the following:
• Logisnext (www.logisnextamericas.com): An article titled “Choosing the
Right Forklift Tires” discusses different tire styles “from smooth press-ons
to traction, grooved or wide-track tires” and explains that “[w]ide-track
traction tires [are] designed for all-season indoor-outdoor use.”;44
• Bimmerpost (www.m3post.com): In discussing “the golden sweet spot on
tire size” one user stated: “No reason to run any bigger since 1) 17” track
tires are cheaper and 2) 17” and 265mm Wide track tires are lighter than
18” and 275mm.”;45
• Mustang Forum (www.mustang6g.com): Under the post heading “How
long do your tires last?” one user in discussing street set-up versus track
set-up commented that, “[f]or most of the life of the car it was 2.3 front
camber, 0 toe, 1.6 rear camber, slight rear toe in, which wasn’t enough to
save the shoulders of wide track tires pinched on narrow stock wheels.”;46
• Reddit (www.reddit.com): Under the post heading “Why is there so much
variation in tire tread width for the same section width?” one user posted:
“Personally, I run Falken RT660 or BFG Rival when I need streetable wide
track tires.”;47 and
• Reddit (www.reddit.com): Under the post heading “370z Steering concern?”
one user posted: “My original remark is probably true ... Massively wide
track tires with some camber will make it very ‘dart-y’ on public roads.”48
44 October 14, 2025 Final Office Action at 13-15.
45 Id. at 16, 23.
46 Id. at 31, 36
47 Id. at 7, 10.
48 Id. at 26-27.

Serial No. 98814134
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3. Third-Party Registrations
Applicant argues that “the Examining Attorney’s logic is inconsistent with
treatment of other marks by the Trademark Office” and points to third party
registrations of what it describes as “the same mark with other goods” as support that
its proposed mark WIDE TRACK is not descriptive.49 Applicant submitted evidence
of eight third-party registrations with its request for reconsideration.50 However, only
one of the registrations covers the same mark WIDE TRACK (and it disclaims
“track”), and all of the registrations have low probative value because the “registered
marks present dissimilar circumstances” consisting either of different marks and/or
different goods.51 In re The Consumer Prot. Firm PLLC, No. 87445801, 2021 TTAB
LEXIS 67, at *28-29 (TTAB 2021) (discounting third-party registrations in analysis
of genericness for marks that “include design elements, or have the relevant wording
disclaimed”). Further, half of the registrations confirm rather than refute
49 6 TTABVUE 15-17.
50 November 12, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 7-14. Applicant also submitted with its
June 25, 2025 Response to Office Action (at 24-27, 29-31), evidence of an additional six
trademark registrations and one application for marks consisting of, or including the words
WIDE TRACK or TRACK, some of which covered tires. Applicant does not reference this
evidence in its brief, all of these registrations have been cancelled, and the application has
been abandoned, and as such we do not consider them. See In re Kysela Pere et Fils, Ltd., No.
77686637, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 70, at *7 (TTAB 2011) (“‘dead’ or cancelled registrations have
no probative value at all”); Kemi Organics, LLC v. Gupta, No. 92065613, 2018 TTAB LEXIS
149, at *17 (TTAB 2018) (“abandoned application has no probative value other than as
evidence that the application was filed”) (citation omitted).
51 November 12, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 7 (WIDE-MOUTH for “water bottles for
small birds, animals, and rodents”), 8 (WIDE SPAN for “metal safety gates for babies,
children, and pets”), 9 (WIDE CLIMBER for “tires”), 10 (WIDE TRAXX for “footwear”), 11
(WIDE TRACK for “electric vacuum cleaners for commercial use”), 12 (WIDE TRAX for “pool
cleaning machines and component parts thereof, namely wheels and tires”), 14 (WIDE-TRAX
for “wheeled bags”). We do not consider the one additional registration (id. at 13) because it
is cancelled. See n. 50.

Serial No. 98814134
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descriptiveness as they are either registered under Section 2(f), on the Supplemental
Register, or the relevant term is disclaimed.52 Moreover, “[e]ven if some prior
registrations had some characteristics similar to [Applicant’s] application, the
[US]PTO’s allowance of such prior registrations does not bind the Board . . . .” In re
Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that “prior
registrations do not conclusively rebut the Board’s finding that ULTIMATE is
descriptive in the context of this mark”).
C. Conclusion
Upon consideration of the applicable law, the evidence of record, and the
arguments of Applicant and the Examining Attorney, we find that Applicant’s
proposed mark WIDE TRACK immediately conveys to consumers a characteristic or
feature of Applicant’s tires and solid tires, and as such is merely descriptive.
Decision: We affirm the refusal to register Applicant’s proposed mark WIDE
TRACK under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.
52 November 12, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 7-9, 11. See Cold War Museum, Inc. v.
Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“an applicant’s reliance on
Section 2(f) during prosecution presumes that the mark is descriptive”); In re Ye Mystic Krewe
of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 412, at *10 (TTAB 2025) (“seek[ing]
registration on the Supplemental Register, [is] an admission that the mark is descriptive at
the time of registration”); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. Quaker Oil Corp., 453 F.2d 1296,
1299 (CCPA 1972) (by disclaiming a term in a mark in the application, applicant “admitted
the merely descriptive nature of the mark and acknowledged that it did not have an exclusive
right therein at that time”).