Tsao Thomas Gai Tei

Mailed: September 11, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
————
In re Tsao Thomas Gai Tei
————
Serial No. 98273801
————
Leo M. Loughlin & Davide F. Schiavetti of Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & Manbeck, P.C.,
for Tsao Thomas Gai Tei.
Amy Kean, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 121,
Richard White, Managing Attorney.
————
Before Lykos, English, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lavache, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Tsao Thomas Gai Tei, seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the composite mark below (PARTNERS disclaimed).
The application identifies the following services:
Business consultation; business administration services; office function
services and affairs in the nature of filing documents, searching for data
in the computer files of others, maintaining records of ownership of
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Serial No. 98273801
2
stocks, shares and securities, tracking and tracing of documents, letters,
packages, parcels in transit; advertising and promotional services;
advertising services provided over the internet; business management;
general business networking referrals services, namely, promoting the
goods and services of others by passing business leads and referrals
among group members; business organization consultancy;
management in the form of advisory services for business; business
information; business management consultancy; business operations
management and consultation; business recruiting consultation;
business marketing consultation; business research; compilation of
information into computer databases; cost price analysis; provision of
business statistical information; database management; systemization
of information into computer databases; arranging of commercial events
in the nature of business trade shows and introductions; arranging
business introductions in the nature of business networking, on-line and
offline professional networking, providing networking opportunities for
individuals seeking employment services; advisory services in the field
of business data analysis; industrial asset management services,
namely, auctioning, liquidating and remarketing industrial assets of
others, in International Class 35;
Financial advisory services relating to assets management; financial
services, namely, investment advice, investment and financial
consultation and investment of funds in the fields of private equity,
public equity and debt investment services for others; incubation
services, namely, providing financing to freelancers, start-ups, existing
businesses and non-profits; financial affairs and monetary affairs,
namely, financial information, management and analysis services;
public funding in the nature of investment of funds for others in the
fields of public equity; private and institutional funding services in the
nature of venture capital and private equity fund investment,
management of private equity and venture capital funds services;
funding sourcing in the nature of business intermediary services
relating to the matching of potential private investors with
entrepreneurs needing funding; management of financial assets;
venture capital as services for the finding of venture capital, namely,
venture capital fund management; venture capital financing services for
the provision of venture capital; venture capital financing; venture
capital fund management; venture capital investment management;
venture capital services, namely, providing financing to emerging and
start-up companies; capital investment; establishing mutual funds for
others; funds investment; acquisition for financial investment in the
nature of asset and investment acquisition, consultation, advisory and
development; arranging of investments, namely, investment

Serial No. 98273801
3
management, capital investment, advice relating to investments,
financial investment brokerage, fund investment consultation,
investment of funds, investment research and monitoring financial
markets for investment purpose; investment management; capital fund
investment; capital investments; financial investment in field of
securities, private equity, venture capital, debt financing, debt
restructuring; financial investment services in the nature of brokerage,
investment fund transfer and transaction services; financial investment
advisory services; providing venture capital, namely, providing
financing to emerging and start-up companies; providing working
capital; providing development capital funding; private equity fund
investment services, in International Class 36; and
Business education and training services, namely, developing and
facilitating customized leadership and business development programs;
providing business coaching services in the nature of business training
in the field of executive, leadership, entrepreneurship, private equity
and venture capital industry coaching; providing business education
programs to employees and executives of start-ups companies and
existing businesses; arranging and conducting of conferences,
congresses, seminars, symposiums and training workshops in the field
of leadership development, executive coaching, business development,
business planning and business development connection, in
International Class 41.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of likelihood of
confusion, citing the standard-character mark GOBI CAPITAL (CAPITAL
disclaimed), which is registered on the Principal Register for “Financial management;
1 Application Serial No. 98273801, filed November 16, 2023, each class based on an allegation
of a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15
U.S.C. § 1051(b). The application includes the following mark description and color claim:
“The mark consists of the stylized wording ‘GOBI PARTNERS’ in black under the design of
a mountain range formed by two orange chevrons.” The colors black and orange are claimed
as features of the mark. Applicant has disclaimed the exclusive right to use PARTNERS
apart from the mark as shown.

Serial No. 98273801
4
Hedge fund investment services; Investment management,” in International Class
36.2
After the Examining Attorney issued a final refusal, Applicant appealed and filed
a request for reconsideration, which the Examining Attorney denied. The appeal then
resumed and has been briefed. As explained below, we affirm the likelihood-of-
confusion refusal under Section 2(d) only as to the identified services in International
Class 36.
I. Applicant’s Motion to Strike the Examining Attorney’s Untimely Brief
As a preliminary matter, we address Applicant’s motion requesting that we strike
the Examining Attorney’s brief because it was filed three days late.3
In an order issued on February 23, 2026, the Board notified the Examining
Attorney that Applicant had filed an appeal brief and that, in accordance with
Trademark Rule 2.142(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(b)(1), the Examining Attorney’s brief
in response must be filed within 60 days of the order’s issue date.4 Thus, Applicant is
2 Registration No. 4651230, issued on December 9, 2014; renewed.
The TTABVUE and Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) citations in this
opinion refer respectively to entries in the Board’s electronic docket and to the downloadable
PDF version of the electronic application file. For TTABVUE citations, the number preceding
the TTABVUE designation is the docket entry number and any numbers following indicate
the relevant page numbers within the docket entry.
3 Applicant’s Motion to Strike, 12 TTABVUE. Applicant maintained its objection to the
Examining Attorney’s brief in its reply brief, 13 TTABVUE 2 n.1.
4 Order Forwarding Appeal to Examining Attorney, 10 TTABVUE.

Serial No. 98273801
5
correct that the Examining Attorney’s brief was due no later than April 24, 2026,5
and was therefore late when filed on April 27, 2026.
When an examining attorney’s brief is filed late, the Board may decline to consider
it in the absence of an adequate explanation for the late filing. See In re Tenn.
Walking Horse Breeders’ & Exhibitors’ Ass’n, No. 73260490, 1984 TTAB LEXIS 135,
at *2 n.3; TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP)
§ 1203.02(b) (2026). Here, the Examining Attorney’s brief did not acknowledge or
explain the late filing, nor did the Examining Attorney otherwise request that the
late brief be accepted.6 Therefore, we grant Applicant’s motion and have not
considered the Examining Attorney’s brief on the merits.7
However, this does not automatically result in the reversal of the refusal. While
we do not have the benefit of the Examining Attorney’s brief in deciding the appeal,
we may nonetheless consider the arguments set forth in the Examining Attorney’s
5 This date is based on the five remaining calendar days in February 2026 (February 24th
through February 28th), 31 days in March, and 24 days in April, for a total of 60 days. The
deadline date, April 24, 2026, was a non-holiday Friday and thus a regular business day.
Accordingly, no adjustment to the deadline applies. See Trademark Rule 2.196, 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.196 (“Whenever periods of time are specified in this part in days, calendar days are
intended. When the day, or the last day fixed by statute or by regulation under this part for
taking any action or paying any fee in the Office falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or Federal
holiday within the District of Columbia, the action may be taken, or the fee paid, on the next
succeeding day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal holiday.”).
6 In a memorandum issued on June 1, 2026, the Board notified the Examining Attorney of
Applicant’s reply brief and the motion to strike the Examining Attorney’s brief. See 14
TTABVUE. Thus, if the Examining Attorney was not initially aware of the brief’s lateness,
she should have learned of it upon reviewing the June 1st memorandum and Applicant’s
Reply Brief.
7 In its reply brief, Applicant separately objected to the evidence attached to the Examining
Attorney’s brief. See Applicant’s Reply Brief, 13 TTABVUE 2-3. But, because we have not
considered the Examining Attorney’s brief on the merits, Applicant’s objection is moot.

Serial No. 98273801
6
Office actions, including the denial of the request for reconsideration. See TBMP §
1203.02(b).
II. Likelihood of Confusion
Trademark Act Section 2(d), in relevant part, prohibits registration of a mark
that “so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office . . . as to be
likely, when used on or in connection with the goods [or services] of the applicant, to
cause confusion.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). To determine whether confusion is likely, we
analyze all probative evidence relevant to the factors set out in In re E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See also In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key DuPont factors are the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks and respective services because the “fundamental inquiry
mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential
characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.” Federated
Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976). Here, we
have considered each DuPont factor that is relevant and for which there is evidence
and argument of record. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
Varying weight may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he various
evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular
determination.”). Ultimately, however, “each case must be decided on its own facts

Serial No. 98273801
7
and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d
1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
A. Scope of the Examining Attorney’s Refusal
Before turning to our analysis, we need to define the scope of the Examining
Attorney’s Section 2(d) refusal. Originally, the refusal also cited Registration No.
3832622, which included services in International Classes 35 and 41.8 During
prosecution, the Examining Attorney argued that the Class 35 and Class 41 services
listed in Registration No. 3832622 are legally identical to Applicant’s services in
Classes 35 and 41, and that the Class 36 services in Registration No. 4651230 are
legally identical to Applicant’s Class 36 services.9
However, the Examining Attorney ultimately withdrew the refusal as to
Registration No. 3832622, thereby limiting the refusal to Registration No. 4651230.10
Because the Examining Attorney’s arguments as to the remaining cited registration
focus solely on the relatedness of Applicant’s Class 36 services and the cited
registration’s Class 36 services, and none of the evidence properly of record pertains
to the relatedness of Applicant’s other services in Classes 35 and 41 and the cited
8 See June 22, 2024 Nonfinal Office Action at TSDR 2-5; February 26, 2025 Final Office Action
at TSDR 2-7; October 9, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 1-3.
9 See June 22, 2024 Nonfinal Office Action at TSDR 4-6.
10 The Examining Attorney’s brief indicates the refusal is withdrawn as to Registration No.
3832622. See 11 TTABVUE 2. And Applicant acknowledged this withdrawal in its reply brief.
See 13 TTABVUE 2. Although we have not considered the Examining Attorney’s brief on the
merits, we nonetheless recognize the Examining Attorney’s express withdrawal of this
portion of the refusal, as judicial economy counsels against deciding an issue that both the
Examining Attorney and Applicant agree is not before us.

Serial No. 98273801
8
registration’s Class 36 services, we construe the Examining Attorney’s refusal to be
limited to Applicant’s services in Class 36.
B. Comparison of the Services
We begin our analysis with the second DuPont factor, concerning the similarity or
dissimilarity and nature of the respective services, i.e., the relatedness of the services.
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. In determining relatedness, we must consider the services
as they are identified in Applicant’s application and the cited registration. See Stone
Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
The parties’ services need not be competitive, or even move in the same channels
of trade, to support a holding of likelihood of confusion. DeVivo v. Ortiz, No. 91242863,
2020 TTAB LEXIS 15, at *36. Rather, “[i]t is sufficient that the respective . . . services
are related in some manner, or that the conditions and activities surrounding the
marketing of the . . . services are such that they would or could be encountered by the
same persons under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that
they originate from the same source.” Id. (citing Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also 7-Eleven, Inc. v.
Wechsler, No. 91117739, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 28, at *18.
Registration may be refused as to an entire class of services in an application if
the applicant’s mark as used in connection with any of its identified services in that
class is likely to cause confusion with the registrant’s mark for any of the services
listed in the cited registration. See SquirtCo v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (holding that a single good from among several may sustain a finding of

Serial No. 98273801
9
likelihood of confusion); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335,
1336 (CCPA 1981) (indicating that likelihood of confusion must be found if there is
likely to be confusion with respect to any item that comes within the identification of
goods in the application).
Applicant’s application identifies various services in International Class 36,
including “financial affairs and monetary affairs, namely, financial information,
management and analysis services”; “management of financial assets”; “investment
management”; and “funds investment.” The cited registration lists “financial
management; hedge fund investment services; [and] investment management,” in
International Class 36.
The Examining Attorney argues that the respective services are legally identical
because the broad wording used to identify registrant’s services encompasses the
more narrowly identified services in Applicant’s application.11 See In re Solid State
Design Inc., No. 87269041, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *16 (noting that, where the goods
in an application or registration are broadly described, they are deemed to encompass
all the goods of the nature and type described therein); In re Hughes Furniture Indus.,
No. 85627379, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 65, at *3 (“Applicant’s broadly worded
identification of ‘furniture’ necessarily encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified
‘residential and commercial furniture.’”).
We agree that some of the respective services are legally identical. For instance,
“financial management” in the registration encompasses “management of financial
11 See February 26, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 7-8.

Serial No. 98273801
10
assets” in the application. And “funds investment” in the application encompasses
“hedge fund investment services” in the cited registration. More significantly,
however, the identifications in the application and registration share identical or
nearly identical wording. Specifically, both identify “investment management.” And
the registration identifies “financial management,” while the application identifies
“financial affairs and monetary affairs, namely, financial information,
management and analysis services” (emphasis added).
Applicant nonetheless contends that the respective services “are much different”
and “used for entirely different purposes” because Registrant is “a highly exclusive
organization that manages approximately $2.1 billion dollars in funds from only eight
clients,” while Applicant “is a more modest operation that offers its services to a wide
array of smaller potential consumers, including start-ups and non-profits.”12
Applicant attempts to bolster this contention by pointing out that “no evidence has
been submitted by the Examining Attorney . . . that financial services for multibillion
dollar corporations and financial services for companies who are either struggling or
in their infancy are the type to be advertised together or offered under the same
mark.”13 However, as the Examining Attorney points out, we may not impose
limitations that do not appear in the identification of services, based on purported
real-world conditions or other extrinsic evidence of actual use.14 See Stone Lion, 746
12 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 9 TTABVUE 16-17.
13 Id.
14 See February 26, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 8.

Serial No. 98273801
11
F.3d at 1324 (rejecting appellant’s argument that the court should “disregard the
broad scope of services recited in its application, and to instead rely on the parties’
current investment practices”); In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168,
at *37-38 (“[B]ecause there are no restrictions in the goods identifications in either
the application or the cited registration, we may not import restrictions into the
identifications based on alleged real[-]world conditions of the sort argued by
Applicant . . . or consider extrinsic evidence regarding Applicant and Registrant
themselves.” (cleaned up)). Simply put, Applicant’s characterization of the respective
services is not reflected in the wording used to identify them. Thus, Applicant’s
argument that the parties’ services differ is unavailing.
Because we find that the respective services are identical in part, the second
DuPont factor weighs heavily in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
C. Trade Channels and Classes of Consumers
Next, we consider established, likely-to-continue channels of trade, the third
DuPont factor. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. In this case, there are no restrictions in the
identifications as to the services or channels of trade. Therefore, as to those of
Applicant’s services that are identical in part to Registrant’s services, we presume
that the trade channels and classes of purchasers are the same. See In re Viterra Inc.,
671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding Board entitled to presume that trade
channels and classes of purchasers were the same where the respective goods were
identical); In re Am. Cruise Lines, Inc., No. 87940022, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 363, at *5;
In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *6, aff’d per
curiam, 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

Serial No. 98273801
12
Applicant asserts that the respective services would not be encountered by the
same consumers under circumstances that would lead to confusion.15 Applicant
seems to base this assertion on the supposed differences in the nature of the
respective services as they are actually offered in the marketplace.16 As we have
already explained above, this argument carries no weight because we must base our
decision on the services as they are identified in the application and cited registration.
See Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1323.
Thus, the third DuPont factor also weighs in favor of a conclusion that confusion
is likely.
D. Comparison of the Marks
The first DuPont factor focuses on the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in
their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. See
Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d
1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). Similarity as to any
one of these elements may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are
confusingly similar. See Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA
1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely
to cause confusion.”); Inn at St. John’s, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13. Further, where
the services are identical or legally identical, the degree of similarity between the
marks necessary to support a determination that confusion is likely declines. In re
15 See Applicant’s Reply Brief, 13 TTABVUE 4.
16 See id.

Serial No. 98273801
13
Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Century 21 Real Estate Corp.
v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
All elements of the respective marks must be considered. See Viterra, 671 F.3d at
1362 (“[M]arks must be viewed ‘in their entireties,’ and it is improper to dissect a
mark . . ., including when a mark contains both words and a design.”); In re Nat’l
Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that “marks must be
compared in their entireties”). That said, “there is nothing improper in stating that,
for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a
mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their
entireties.” Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d at 1058.
Here, Applicant’s composite mark is (PARTNERS disclaimed)
and the registered mark is GOBI CAPITAL (CAPITAL disclaimed).
While the respective marks appear together above, this placement does not reflect
the actual conditions under which consumers are likely to encounter the marks in the
marketplace. Thus, when assessing these marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-
side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar
in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc,
866 F.3d 1315, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368). “The
focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general
rather than a specific impression of trademarks.” In re Box Sols. Corp., No. 76267086,
2006 TTAB LEXIS 176, at *14.

Serial No. 98273801
14
Here, the Examining Attorney focuses on the fact that both marks share, and start
with, the term GOBI, noting that it is the only distinctive, non-disclaimed word in
each mark.17 That is, GOBI appears to be arbitrary as applied to the respective
services, in view of the evidence of record showing that the term refers to one of the
world’s largest deserts.18 The terms PARTNERS and CAPITAL, on the other hand,
are descriptive, if not generic, terms as applied to the identified services and are
disclaimed accordingly. See, e.g., In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364,
2025 TTAB LEXIS 412, at *10 (noting that a disclaimer is “an implicit concession
that [a] term is descriptive”). Therefore, we agree with the Examining Attorney that
GOBI is the dominant element in both Applicant’s mark and the registered mark.
See, e.g., Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1371 (finding VEUVE was a prominent feature of the
relevant mark because it was the first word in the mark); In re QuickPayNet, Ltd.,
No. 85925162, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 130, at *10 (finding consumers would focus
primarily on the first portion of each respective mark); Hughes Furniture, 2015 TTAB
LEXIS 65, at *16 (“Disclaimed matter generally will not constitute the dominant part
of a mark.”); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 TTAB
LEXIS 60, at *8 (“[I]t is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be
impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered.”).
In reaching this finding, we acknowledge but reject Applicant’s argument that,
because of its color and relative prominence, the orange chevron design is the
17 February 26, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 4-5.
18 See id. at 18-27 (entries from the online version of THE COLUMBIA GAZETTEER OF THE
WORLD and Wikipedia providing information on the Gobi Desert).

Serial No. 98273801
15
dominant element of its mark.19 In short, we find that, while the chevron design is a
significant element of Applicant’s mark, the word GOBI should be accorded greater
weight in our analysis because that is the element that the relevant consumers are
likely to use to identify the source of, and call for, Applicant’s services. See Viterra,
671 F.3d at 1362 (“In the case of a composite mark containing both words and a
design, ‘the verbal portion of the mark is the one most likely to indicate the origin of
the goods to which it is affixed.’” (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581-
82 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); L.C. Licensing, Inc. v. Berman, No. 91162330, 2008 TTAB
LEXIS 756, at *9 (“[I]t is well settled that if a mark comprises both a word and a
design, then the word is normally accorded greater weight because it would be used
by purchasers to request the goods.”).
Because the marks share the same dominant element, GOBI, we find that they
look and sound similar. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018 TTAB
LEXIS 281, at *25 (finding marks more similar than dissimilar where the marks
shared the same dominant element, which was identical in sound and meaning); In
re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 108, at *5 (finding
marks at issue are similar in sight and sound, because they share the term
LAROQUE, even though the applied-for mark contained a design element and
additional disclaimed wording).
19 See Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 9 TTABVUE 12 (arguing that “the chevron design is given a
distinctive, eye-catching orange color and sleek design, as opposed to the wording” and that
“consumers who access the Applicant’s services online would find the design element portion
of the mark much more prominently displayed than the word portion”).

Serial No. 98273801
16
The shared dominant element GOBI also gives the respective marks a similar
connotation. We have no evidence, or reason to believe, that the addition of the
descriptive terms PARTNERS and CAPITAL to the respective marks would alter the
marks’ connotation or commercial impression, especially when applied to identical
services. Nor does the addition of “the design of a mountain range formed by two
orange chevrons” necessarily alter the commercial impression of Applicant’s mark or
significantly differentiate it from the cited mark. Some consumers may perceive the
design as a visual reference to the Gobi Desert, which, according to the evidence of
record, is bordered by mountains, including the Gobi Altay mountain range.20 Other
consumers who are unfamiliar with the Gobi Desert may view the chevron design as
a stylized depiction of mountains or simply an abstract design. In any event, because
both marks share the same distinctive word GOBI, and the cited mark does not
contain any differentiating design element, whatever connotation the relevant
consumers are likely to attribute to the literal element of Applicant’s mark could also
be attributed to the literal element of cited mark and vice versa. See, e.g., In re
Morinaga Nyugyo KK, No. 86338392, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 448, at *27-28 (“[W]hile the
marks are not identical, they are similar enough that their use on identical or closely
related goods is likely to cause confusion.”); In re Max Cap. Grp., No. 77186166, 2010
TTAB LEXIS 1, at *17 (finding that the addition of a design element to a word that
20 Id. at 18, 21. We are unpersuaded by Applicant’s contention that “the Gobi Desert is not
considered a particularly mountainous desert” and that “deserts are not particularly known
for being mountainous.” Applicant’s Appeal Brief, 9 TTABVUE 12. In short, the evidence of
record makes clear that mountains define the borders of, and are thus associated with, the
Gobi Desert. See February 26, 2025 Final Office Action at TSDR 18, 21.

Serial No. 98273801
17
is identical to another mark did not reduce likelihood of confusion, especially where
the respective services were legally identical); see also In re Charger Ventures, 64
F.4th 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[A]n additional word or component may
technically differentiate a mark but do little to alleviate confusion.”). Overall, the
similarities in sound, appearance, and connotation of the two marks result in a
similar commercial impression.
Indeed, given the marks’ similar overall commercial impression, consumers
familiar with the services offered under the cited mark could reasonably assume that
Applicant’s services offered under its mark are from the same source, and that
Applicant’s mark is merely a variation of, or derivative of, the cited mark, or vice
versa. See, e.g., In re Comexa Ltda., No. 75396043, 2001 TTAB LEXIS 274 (applicant’s
use of term AMAZON and parrot design for chili sauce and pepper sauce is likely to
cause confusion with registrant’s AMAZON mark for restaurant services); SMS, Inc.
v. Byn-Mar Inc., No. 91068062, 1985 TTAB LEXIS 32, at *4 (finding applicant’s
marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by
consumers with opposer’s preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established
line of clothing”); Gastown Inc. v. Gas City, Ltd., 1975 TTAB LEXIS 95, at *10-11
(“The similarity of the marks [GASTOWN and GAS CITY] . . . is a sufficient basis
upon which to predicate a holding of likelihood of confusion because the average
purchaser normally retains but a general or overall rather than a specific recollection
of the many trademarks that he encounters in his daily excursions into the different
marketplaces of our society.”) (no number in original).

Serial No. 98273801
18
In sum, we have considered both marks in their entireties and we find that
Applicant’s mark is similar to the cited mark in terms of sound, appearance,
connotation, and overall commercial impression. The first DuPont factor therefore
weighs in favor of a conclusion that confusion as to source is likely.
E. Purchasing Conditions and Sophistication of Purchasers
Under the fourth DuPont factor, we consider “[t]he conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Applicant argues that, “[b]ased on the very nature of the
services offered by both parties, which can be broadly characterized as financial
investment and management, consumers would already be expected to exercise a
high degree of care when making their purchasing decisions.”21 These consumers,
Applicant contends, are unlikely to be confused.22
We agree that, based on the nature of financial and investment services, some
consumers of these services are likely to exercise an elevated level of care in making
a purchasing decision. But, because the respective services, as identified here, are not
limited to particular classes or types of purchasers, or to specific trade channels, we
must presume that they are available to all potential purchasers of such services,
including members of the general public. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222
F.3d 943, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming Board finding that where the identification
is unrestricted, “we must deem the goods to travel in all appropriate trade channels
21 Applicant’s Reply Brief, 13 TTABVUE 4.
22 Id. at 4-5.

Serial No. 98273801
19
to all potential purchasers of such goods”). We must also presume that the standard
of care for purchasing decisions in connection with these services is that of the least
sophisticated potential purchaser. See Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325. In this case, that
least sophisticated purchaser is a member of the general public who may have less
knowledge about the identified services and exercise less diligence in their
purchasing decisions concerning the services. And, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we must conclude that the least sophisticated purchasers here will not
exercise anything other than ordinary care in selecting the services. In any event,
even sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion, especially
where, as here, the services are identical in part and would be offered under similar
marks. See Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1208 (citing Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc.,
902 F.2d 1546, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming the Board’s reasoning that even
sophisticated purchasers may be confused by similar marks)).
Accordingly, we find that the fourth DuPont factor weighs, at most, slightly
against a conclusion that confusion is likely.
III. Conclusion
Having considered all of the arguments and evidence of record pertaining to the
relevant DuPont factors, we find that the marks are similar in terms of sound,
appearance, connotation, and overall commercial impression; that Applicant’s
services and Registrant’s services are identical in part; and that, as to those services
that are identical, the trade channels and classes of purchasers are the same. All
these factors weigh in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely. The remaining

Serial No. 98273801
20
factor relating to purchasing conditions and purchaser sophistication weighs, at most,
slightly against a conclusion that confusion is likely.
On balance, the factors favoring a likelihood of confusion—similarity of the marks,
relatedness of the services, and overlapping trade channels—outweigh the sole factor
slightly against—purchaser sophistication.
We therefore conclude that source confusion is likely.
Decision: The refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) to register Applicant’s
mark is affirmed as to the services in International Class 36. Accordingly, the
application should proceed to publication in the Trademark Official Gazette only as
to the services in International Classes 35 and 41.