SHM Ventures, LLC

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: August 5, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re SHM Ventures, LLC
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Serial No. 99019667
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SHM Ventures, LLC, pro se (by Sonam Makharia, President).
Jennifer Shannon, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 105,
Jennifer Williston, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Larkin, Casagrande, and Stanley, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant SHM Ventures, LLC, applied to register the mark THE SKIN
MIXOLOGY (in standard-character format, SKIN disclaimed) on the Principal
Register for goods ultimately identified as “Non-medicated skin care preparations,
namely, facial and body moisturizers, serums, and toners; none of the foregoing being
bath salts, non-medicated body soaks, bath milk; and none of the foregoing being
custom-blended aromatherapy creams, lotions, oils, massage oils, or exfoliating body
scrubs; and none of the foregoing relating to electric hair styling tools,” in

Serial No. 99019667
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International Class 3.1 Registration was refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), due to likelihood of confusion with two standard-character
marks, owned by different companies:2 MIXOLOGY (in standard-character format)
for goods identified as “Custom-blended aromatherapy bath and body products,
namely, creams, lotions, oils, massage oil, exfoliating body scrubs” in International
Class 3;3 and THE BATH MIXOLOGIST (in standard-character format, “BATH”
disclaimed) for goods identified as “Bath and body products, namely, bath salts, non-
medicated body soaks and bath milk” in International Class 3.4
After final refusal, Applicant appealed.5 Briefs were filed,6 and the appeal is now
ready for decision. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the refusal to register.
EVIDENTIARY MATTER
Before we assess the merits of the appeal, we need to resolve an evidentiary issue.
Applicant’s brief contains an appendix with exhibits comprising screenshots of
1 Application Ser. No. 99019667 was filed on January 27, 2025, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), alleging a bona fide intent to use the mark for the
identified goods.
2 A third registered mark was also initially cited as a bar to registration, see July 11, 2025,
Nonfinal Office Action, but the November 14, 2025, Final Office Action withdrew the refusal
to the extent it was based on that third registration. See id. at TSDR 2. Please note that
citations to specific pages of prosecution filings will be to .pdf-format versions of the
documents as downloaded from the USPTO’s TSDR electronic trademark docketing system.
3 Reg. No. 3803922 issued on June 15, 2010, and is renewed.
4 Reg. No. 3816216 issued on July 13, 2010, and is renewed.
5 See 1 TTABVUE. References to the briefs and record cite to the Board’s TTABVUE
electronic docket system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” represents the docket number
of the filing in TTABVUE and any numbers immediately following “TTABVUE” represent
the specifically-cited page(s), if any.
6 See 4 TTABVUE (Applicant’s brief); 6 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney’s brief).

Serial No. 99019667
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several webpages.7 The Examining Attorney objects because Applicant did not place
these screenshots in the record during examination.8
We are generally more flexible about evidence in appeals than in our trial cases.
See, e.g., In re I-Coat Co., No. 86802467, 2018 WL 2753196, at *3 (TTAB 2018);
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 1208 (2026).
One core, anchoring rule in appeals, however, is this: “The record should be complete
prior to the filing of an appeal. Evidence should not be filed with the Board after the
filing of a notice of appeal.” Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d). If, as here,
a valid objection is lodged on that basis, we won’t consider the untimely evidence. See,
e.g., In re Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964, 2020 WL 2094122, at *2 (TTAB 2020); In
re Fallon, No. 86882668, 2020 WL 6255423, at *2 (TTAB 2020). Applicant could have
requested suspension of the appeal and a remand to submit additional evidence,
based on a showing of good cause. See, e.g., Info. Builders, 2020 WL 2094122, at *2
n.5; Fallon, 2020 WL 6255423, at *2; In re Holiday Inns, Inc., 1984 WL 62814, at *3
n.3 (TTAB 1984). But Applicant did not do that. We therefore sustain the Examining
Attorney’s objection and will not consider this late-submitted evidence.9
7 See 4 TTABVUE 5-8. The appendix contains what appears to be screenshots from six
different websites which, according to Applicant, use the terms “mixology” or “mixologie” in
the skin care field.
8 See 6 TTABVUE 2.
9 We realize Applicant appears pro se, but rules are rules, and they apply equally to all
parties who appear before the USPTO and the Board. The Examining Attorney twice
encouraged Applicant to consult with an experienced trademark attorney. See, e.g., July 11,
2025, Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 7; November 14, 2025, Final Office Action, at TSDR
7-8.

Serial No. 99019667
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ANALYSIS
The likelihood-of-confusion refusal was based on two different registrations. We’ll
start with Registration No. 3803922 for MIXOLOGY. If necessary, we’ll then turn to
the other registration.
I. Section 2(d) generally
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). We determine whether confusion
is likely by analyzing all probative facts properly in evidence that are relevant to the
likelihood-of-confusion factors listed in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2023). We don’t address all thirteen factors listed in du Pont by rote, but
rather focus on those factors addressed in the briefs and on which there is relevant
evidence in the record. See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th
1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946-
47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We then weigh our findings on these factors to determine if, on
balance, confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381; In re
Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

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II. Applicant’s argument that the mark in the cited registration is
weak
Applicant addresses the sixth du Pont factor first. The sixth factor is “[t]he
number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” 476 F.2d at 1361. This
factor “is a measure of the extent to which other marks weaken the [registered]
mark.” Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citation
omitted). “The weaker [the senior] mark, the closer an applicant’s mark can come
without causing a likelihood of confusion … .” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Applicant argues that the term “mixology” is
“a conceptually weak and diluted term” in the “beauty field” or “skincare industry.”10
Due to this alleged weakness, Applicant urges us to find that consumers will “look to
the remaining elements of [the] mark”—like the term SKIN—to identify and
distinguish the source of the goods.11
This argument, however, is based entirely on the untimely evidence that
Applicant submitted in its appeal brief.12 But because we sustained the Examining
Attorney’s objection to this late-submitted evidence, there is no supporting evidence
properly of record. We therefore find this factor to be neutral. See, e.g., Keystone
Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Franklin Inv. Corp., No. 92066927, 2024 WL 3771168, at *17-
10 See 4 TTABVUE 2-3.
11 See id. at 3.
12 See id. at 2-3 (discussing the evidence attached to the brief).

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18 (TTAB 2024) (holding that the sixth factor is neutral where there is no evidence of
record to support a finding of weakness).13
III. Comparison of the marks
The only other likelihood-of-confusion factor Applicant addresses is the first du
Pont factor: “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at
1361. Because the comparison of the marks is always an important inquiry, see, e.g.,
Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976),
we next set forth the parameters governing how we compare the marks.
We assess marks on the basis of their “appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); accord i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1324.
Similarity in all aspects is not required, however. This factor supports refusal “if the
similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.” Krim-
Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (citation omitted);
see also Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 740 (CCPA 1953) (“it is proper
13 The likelihood-of-confusion factors present us with questions of fact upon which we make
factual findings. See, e.g., Bullshine Distillery LLC v. Sazerac Brands, LLC, 130 F.4th 1025,
1031 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“Each of the DuPont factors presents a question of fact.”) (citation
omitted). We can’t make a finding of fact on a likelihood-of-confusion factor without evidence
upon which to base the finding. Cf. In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“With
respect to core factual findings in a determination of patentability, however, the [Patent]
Board cannot simply reach conclusions based on its own understanding or experience—or on
its assessment of what would be basic knowledge or common sense. Rather, the Board must
point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings.”).

Serial No. 99019667
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to consider [the marks’] appearance, sound and meaning … but a combination of all
three factors need not necessarily exist”) (cleaned up; citations omitted).
We do not compare the marks side-by-side, as though in a laboratory. Rather, we
keep in mind both that consumers depend on their recollection of marks to which
they’ve previously been exposed and that their memories are fallible. See, e.g., In re
St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master
Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981).
While we compare marks in their entireties, see, e.g., Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. v.
Georgallis Holdings, LLC, 826 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016), sometimes “one
feature of a mark may be more significant than another, and it is not improper to give
more weight to this dominant feature in determining the commercial impression
created by the mark.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Finally, “[s]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d at 752 (citation omitted). “The proper test is … whether the marks
are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons
who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the
parties.” i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted); see also Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Knox Indus. Corp., 277 F.2d 945, 947 (CCPA 1960) (“The issue is
whether the marks are confusingly similar, not whether they are identical.”) (citation
omitted).

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Here, the mark in the cited registration is MIXOLOGY in standard characters.
Applicant’s mark is THE SKIN MIXOLOGY, also in standard characters, and
Applicant disclaimed any rights in the term SKIN after the Examining Attorney
found that the term is merely descriptive as to Applicant’s goods (skin care
preparations).14 Generally, words that do not inherently identify source due their
descriptive nature play a lesser role in the commercial impression consumers take
away from the mark as a whole. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297,
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he non-source identifying nature of the words ‘Co.’ and
‘Club’ and the disclaimers thereof constitute rational reasons for giving those terms
less weight in the analysis.”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d
1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Given the descriptive nature of the disclaimed word
‘Technologies,’ the Board correctly found that the word ‘Packard’ is the dominant and
distinguishing element of PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES.”); see also Sabhnani v.
Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 WL 6072822, at *18 (TTAB 2021)
(observing the “penchant of consumers to shorten marks and drop the non-source-
identifying word”) (cleaned up; citations omitted). So while SKIN creates a visual and
sound difference, we find it plays a relatively small role in the overall commercial
impression of the mark THE SKIN MIXOLOGY. The dominant element in the
mark—the element that drives its overall impression—is MIXOLOGY.
14 See July 11, 2025, Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 5; October 3, 2025, Response to
Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 3.

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Applicant resists this notion, arguing that, because it believes that the shared
term (MIXOLOGY) is weak, consumers will indeed differentiate the marks based on
the additional term SKIN in Applicant’s mark.15 Applicant’s theory is that the term
SKIN “materially anchors [its] mark in the field of skincare,” but MIXOLOGY,
appearing alone in the registered mark, has no skin care connotation.16 The main
problem with this argument is that, like Applicant’s goods, the registrant’s goods are
in the skin care field, too. And we have to assess the connotation of the terms in marks
in the context of the goods or services at issue. See, e.g., Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak
Prods. Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 WL 252340, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (“It is obvious … that
the significance of a mark must be determined not in the abstract, but rather in
relation to the goods or services to which it is applied, and the context in which it is
used, because that is how the mark is encountered by purchasers.”) (citations
omitted); see also St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751 (assessing connotation of the
shared term in the context of the respective goods and services at issue); Coach Servs.,
668 F.3d 1356 at 1369 (same). So adding SKIN to the term MIXOLOGY wouldn’t
make the connotation of the registered mark different from that of the same term in
Applicant’s mark.17 We note as well that Applicant’s theory that MIXOLOGY has
15 See 4 TTABVUE 3-4.
16 See id. at 4.
17 Applicant does not argue that the article “THE” plays any significant role in the overall
commercial impression of its mark. And, generally, we have noted that the word “the” adds
little to a mark’s overall commercial impression. See, e.g., In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC,
No. 86490930, 2016 WL 3915986, at *9 (TTAB 2016); In re Thor Tech, Inc., No. 78634024,
2009 WL 1098997, at *2 (TTAB 2009); U.S. Nat’l Bank of Ore. v. Midwest Sav. and Loan
Ass’n, 1977 WL 22507, at *5 (TTAB 1977); see also Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp., 376
F.2d 324, 324 (CCPA 1967) (finding LILLY to be the dominant part of the mark THE LILLY).

Serial No. 99019667
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different connotation in the marks to consumers is unsupported by any evidence.18
See, e.g., Acomb v. Polywood Plastics Corp., No. 91054738, 1975 WL 21253, at *3
(TTAB 1975) (“Speculation and surmise is no substitute for evidence.”); see also In re
Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., No. 74517872, 1996 WL 754046, at *3 (TTAB 1996)
(rejecting the “unsupported hypothesis that only consumers on the east coast of the
United States are likely to recognize NY [in the mark] as an abbreviation for New
York”).
Thus, while the marks are not identical, we find them to be very similar overall in
that the term MIXOLOGY, which is the entirety of the registered mark, is the
dominant element in creating the overall commercial impression of Applicant’s mark.
IV. Comparison of the goods
The second likelihood-of-confusion factor assesses “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity
and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration.” du
Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. This, along with the comparison of the marks, is a key
consideration. Federated Foods, 544 F.2d at 1103 (“The fundamental inquiry
mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential
characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”).
The Examining Attorney argues that the goods are closely related.19 Applicant’s
brief does not address this factor.
18 Indeed, the premise of Applicant’s argument is that MIXOLOGY is weakened by third-
party use in the skin care field, but we have excluded the only evidence of record that could
have supported that premise.
19 See 6 TTABVUE 3, 8-9.

Serial No. 99019667
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We compare the goods or services as they are set forth in the application and cited
registration, see, e.g., Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1307; i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1325,
focusing on how consumers perceive the respective goods/services. See, e.g., St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d at 752 (the second factor “considers whether the consuming public
may perceive the respective goods and services of the parties as related enough to
cause confusion about the source or origin of the goods and services”) (cleaned up;
citations omitted).
The first stop in any comparison of the goods/services is the identifications in the
application and the registration. The application originally identified “Non-medicated
skin care preparations” broadly and, as such, the Examining Attorney found that it
encompassed the more narrowly-identified goods in the registration: “Custom-
blended aromatherapy … body products, namely, creams, lotions, oils, massage oil,
exfoliating body scrubs.”20 That meant Applicant’s goods, as originally identified,
were legally identical in part to the goods in the cited registration for MIXOLOGY.
See, e.g., Fat Boys, 2016 WL 3915986, at *10 (“Inasmuch as Registrant’s goods are
encompassed within the scope of Applicant’s goods, the respective goods are legally
identical in part.”); In re Aquamar, Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 WL 4269973, at *4
(TTAB 2015) (“turning first to the goods and channels of trade, they are in part
identical, as Applicant and Registrant both offer “frozen fish,” and Registrant’s “non-
live fish” encompasses Applicant's fresh processed fish.”).
20 See July 11, 2025, Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 5-6.

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In response, Applicant amended the application to try to carve out the goods
identified in the registration by limiting its non-medicated skin care preparations to
“facial and body moisturizers, serums, and toners” and adding the exclusionary
language “none of the foregoing being custom-blended aromatherapy creams, lotions,
oils, massage oils, or exfoliating body scrubs.”21
Despite the amendment, we find that the goods identified in the application and
the registration, as amended, still overlap. That’s because, while the application
might exclude “custom-blended aromatherapy” versions of skin-care moisturizers, the
product category “moisturizers” in the amended application covers moisturizers in
any physical form, including cream form, lotion form, and oil form, so long as they are
not “custom-blended aromatherapy” versions of those products. And the evidence of
record shows that other skin care companies offer moisturizers (as in the application)
in the form of creams, lotions, and oils (as in the registration).22
Applicant does not point to any evidence in the record that the exclusion of
“custom-blended aromatherapy” versions of its products changes basic physical
nature and moisturizing purpose of the products or renders them non-competitive
with custom-blended aromatherapy versions. Nor does our review reveal any such
21 See October 3, 2025, Response to Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 1.
22 See, e.g., November 14, 2025, Final Office Action, at 29 (TREE HUT “hydrating” (i.e.,
moisturizing) body oil); id. at 32-33 (TREE HUT “moisturizing” body lotions); id. at 57-58
(DR. TEAL’s lotion to “soften skin with 24-hour moisture”); id. at 58 (DR. TEAL’S “body oils”
said to “hydrate[ ] skin” and “lock in moisture”); (DR. TEAL’s scrubs said to both “exfoliate”
and “moisturize skin”); id. at 62 (DR. TEAL’S “lotion” “with 24-hour moisture”); id. at 63, 64
(DR. TEAL’S “body oil” that “locks in moisture” or provides “24-hour moisture”); id. at 86
(BATH & BODY WORKS “hydration” body creams); id. at 108 (HERBIVORE “hydration gel
cream”).

Serial No. 99019667
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evidence. Skin care products in the form of oils, lotions, and creams encompass
moisturizers. Applicant’s attempted carve-out of “custom-blended aromatherapy”
types of moisturizing products does not fully exclude non-custom-blended “creams,
lotion, [and] oils” used to moisturize skin.
Beyond the legal identity in part of the respective identified goods, there is
evidence that the goods are closely related. Specifically, the record contains evidence
that several companies offer the goods identified in the application (facial and body
moisturizers) and the goods identified in the cited registration (body creams, lotions,
oils, and scrubs) under the same mark (sometimes combined in the same product).23
This is evidence that consumers perceive the respective goods as related. See, e.g.,
Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2024); Detroit Athl.,
903 F.3d at 1306; Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267. The more consumers are
exposed to companies offering good X and good Y under one mark, the more they tend
to see those goods as related in the trademark sense (i.e., that they emanate from a
single source).
We find that the goods are legally identical in part. At minimum, they are closely
related.
V. Comparison of the channels of trade and classes of customers
Two more factors that can bear on whether confusion is likely are “[t]he similarity
or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels” and “buyers to
23 See November 14, 2025, Final Office Action, at TSDR 24-33 (Tree Hut); id. at 43-84 (Dr.
Teal’s); id. at 85-89 (Bath and Body Works); id. at 102 (Anihana); id. at 108 (Herbivore).

Serial No. 99019667
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whom sales are made.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361; In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204,
1207 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It is relevant to consider the degree of overlap of consumers
exposed to the respective services … .”). Where goods and/or services are “deemed
legally identical in part … , they must also be presumed to travel in the same
channels of trade to the same classes of consumers.” Nazon v. Ghiorse, No. 91216729,
2016 WL 3876810, at *9 (TTAB 2016) (citation omitted); accord Stone Lion Cap.
Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Medline
Indus., Inc., No. 87680078, 2020 WL 1485709, at *5 (TTAB 2020); In re Solid State
Design Inc., No. 87269041, 2018 WL 287909, at *7 (TTAB 2018). This presumption is
bolstered by the third-party use evidence discussed in the preceding subsection,
which shows that several companies sell moisturizers and other creams, oils, lotions,
and scrubs together on their skin care-product websites.
When it comes to the final weighing and balancing of the factors, these two factors,
while typically not as important as similarities in the marks and goods, will lend
additional support to a conclusion that confusion is likely.
VI. Weighing the findings on the relevant factors together
Having made findings on each of the relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors, our
final step is to consider those findings together to determine if they indicate that
confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384.
In this case, the marks are very similar and the goods are legally identical or, at
bare minimum, closely related. These are two key confusion factors. See, e.g.,
Federated Foods, 544 F.2d at 1103 (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d)

Serial No. 99019667
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goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods
and differences in the marks.”); In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 WL
22358, at *1 (TTAB 2010) (“In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key
considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods and/or services.”) (citations omitted). Here, these two key factors both
support a conclusion that confusion is likely. Further, the classes of customers and
trade channels overlap, further supporting a conclusion that confusion is likely. The
sixth du Pont factor is neutral because there is no evidence properly of record to tip
this factor in Applicant’s favor. And no factor supports the opposite conclusion. On
the record in this case, we have no difficulty concluding that confusion is likely as
between the mark in the application and that in the cited registration.
Thus, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) in view of Registration No.
3803922 for MIXOLOGY. Accordingly, there is no need to assess whether refusal is
also appropriate in view of Registration No. 3816216 for the mark THE BATH
MIXOLOGIST. See, e.g., Max Cap. Grp., 2010 WL 22358, at *7.
Decision: We affirm the refusal.