Lucien G. Lallouz

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: March 27, 2026

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

In re Lucien G. Lallouz

Serial No. 90782980

Lucien G. Lallouz, pro se.

Ashley Albano, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 105,
Jennifer L. Williston, Managing Attorney.

Before Lykos, Thurmon, and Elgin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Lykos, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Lucien G. Lallouz (“Applicant”) seeks to register on the Principal Register the
standard character mark CASA BLANCA for goods ultimately identified as “distilled
spirits, namely, spirits distilled from the blue tequilana weber variety of agave plant”

in International Class 33.2 The application includes the following translation

1 Kristin Williams was the original Trademark Examining Attorney.

2 Application Serial No. 90782980, filed June 18, 2021 under Section 1(b) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), alleging a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.

Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (““TSDR”) system in Portable Document Format (“PDF”). Citations to the record
also include references to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.

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statement: “The English translation of ‘Casa Blanca’ in the mark is ‘A House that is
White.’”
Applicant appeals the Trademark Examining Attorney’s final refusal to register
the mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground
that CASA BLANCA so resembles the typed3 mark CASABLANCA on the Principal
Register for “wine” in International Class 33, that it is likely to cause confusion or
mistake or to deceive.4 The appeal is briefed.5 For the reasons explained below, we
reverse the refusal to register.6
I. Likelihood of confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that:
[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a
mark or trade name previously used in the United States
by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used
on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
3 Marks appearing in typed format in all capital letters without a claim as to standard
characters are treated as the equivalent of a standard character mark. TRADEMARK MANUAL
OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“TMEP”) § 807.03(i) (“Typed Drawings”) (Nov. 2025).
4 U.S. Registration No. 2306760, registered January 11, 2000 under Trademark Act Section
44(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e), based on Chilean Registration No. 361.143 which expired October
22, 2000. The U.S. registration forming the basis for the refusal was renewed for a second
ten-year term on March 2, 2019 under Trademark Act Sections 8 and 9, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058,
1059.
5 Applicant filed its initial appeal brief on January 25, 2024. See 17 TTABVUE. The Board
found good cause to permit supplemental briefing in view of two separate remands. See
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (“TBMP”) § 1201.03 (2025)
and cases cited therein. Applicant’s supplemental briefs were filed on July 12, 2025 and
September 10, 2025. See 24 & 31 TTABVUE. The Examining Attorney filed a single brief on
November 6, 2025. See 33 TTABVUE.
6 The evidentiary and procedural objections Applicant raises in its September 10, 2025
supplemental brief at 31 TTABVUE 13-14 are moot in light of our reversal of the refusal.

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15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of
all of the probative evidence of record bearing on the likelihood of confusion. In re
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited
in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015); see also In re
Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023); In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In making our determination, we have
considered each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See In re
Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 353 (Fed.
Cir. 2011). “Each case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often
subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarity
or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d
1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156,
1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168,
at *10 (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”)
(quoting Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA
1976)). These factors, as well as others raised by the Examining Attorney and
Applicant, are discussed below. In our final balancing analysis, we will accord a

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specific weight to each factor to determine if confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger
Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381; Majestic Distilling, 315 F.3d at 1319.
A. The marks
We begin with the first DuPont factor, the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks
in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.
See Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d
1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one
of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn
at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (quoting In re Davia,
No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *21-24), aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed.
Cir. 2019)); accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA
1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely
to cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena
Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d
1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser,
who normally retains a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks.” In
re St. Julian Wine Co., No. 87834973, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 196, at *13.
In this case, we are comparing a word mark in a foreign language, CASA
BLANCA, with an English language mark, CASABLANCA.7 U.S. consumers familiar
7 We reject Applicant’s contention that the proper basis for comparison of the cited mark is
not the registration certificate but how the mark is depicted on the product labeling. In an ex
parte appeal, our determination under the first DuPont factor is based on the mark as it
appears in the registration, not how the mark may or may not be used in commerce. See

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with Spanish may understand Applicant’s mark CASA BLANCA as meaning “white
house” or “house that is white.” Registrant’s goods are identified as “wine” and as
noted above, the registration was originally based on a Chilean registration. The
record shows that that CASABLANCA refers to the “Casablanca Valley” region in
Chile which is known for producing wines.8 Carolina Wine Brands USA
(www.carolinawinebrandsusa.com) describes Registrant’s wine as “a pioneer in its
namesake valley” the Casablanca Valley of Chile.9 See In re Zuma Array Ltd., No.
79288888, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *23 (Board considered information on
applicant’s website about the nature of goods sold under its proposed mark SMART
BEZEL). Some U.S. consumers, especially those proficient in Spanish, may glean
distinct meanings and commercial impressions from each mark.10
Drawing such a conclusion, however, would ignore the other salient considerations
under the first DuPont factor, the appearance and sound of each mark. “[I]t would be
improper to compare a foreign word mark with an English word mark solely in terms
of connotation or meaning.” In re Ness & Co., No. 73778311, 1991 TTAB LEXIS 6, at
Trademark Rule 2.52, 37 C.F.R. § 2.52 (the drawing on an application shows the mark sought
to be registered); see, e.g., i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1324 (the correct inquiry requires
comparison of the applied-for mark with the registrant’s mark on the certificate).
8 See, e.g., December 13, 2023 Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 49 (printout of a map of
the Casablanca Valley in Chile depicting in a pie chart the availability of grape by percentage
accessed on 5/17/2023).
9 December 13, 2023 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 174-175.
10 We do not consider Applicant’s opening statement in any of its briefs that “the name
‘CASABLANCA’ evokes a sense of intrigue and escape, immortalized by the classic film set
in Casablanca, Morocco, during World War [II].” See, e.g., Applicant’s Second Supplemental
Brief, p. 4; 31 TTABVUE 5. Applicant offered no evidence to support this assertion.

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*2. Some U.S. consumers (including those familiar with Spanish) would not translate
Applicant’s mark CASA BLANCA into English but instead would “take it as it is,” In
re Tia Maria, Inc., 1975 TTAB LEXIS 130, at *4, and would immediately notice that
the marks are virtually identical in sight and sound. The sole distinction in
appearance is the space between the letters “A” and “B” in the middle of Applicant’s
mark separating the words “casa” from “blanca.” The marks are pronounced in almost
the same manner; if there is any difference at all in cadence and emphasis, it is only
slight. Consumers do not focus on minutia but rather overall impressions. See In re
John Scarne Games, Inc., 1959 TTAB LEXIS 31, at *2 (“Purchasers of game boards
do not engage in trademark syllable counting — they are governed by general
impressions made by appearance or sound, or both.”).
We find that overall the marks are nearly identical in appearance and sound. As
noted above, similarity in any one of these elements suffices to find the marks
confusingly similar. See Inn at St. John’s, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13. This DuPont
factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
B. The similarity or dissimilarity of the goods and the similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels
We now turn to the second and third DuPont factors, a comparison of the goods
and the established, likely-to-continue trade channels. Both factors are assessed
based on the language of the identifications in the application and cited registration.
See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Cai v.
Diamond Hong, 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The second DuPont factor
“considers whether the consuming public may perceive the respective goods [ ] of the

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parties as related enough to cause confusion about the source or origin of the goods.”
Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting St.
Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 752 (cleaned up) (citation omitted)). By contrast, the third
DuPont factor addresses the question of whether the goods move from producer to
consumer in the same commercial pathways (e.g., brick-and-mortar retail stores,
supermarkets, online specialty retailers, or wholesale distributorships).
Applicant’s goods identified as “distilled spirits, namely, spirits distilled from the
blue tequilana weber variety of agave plant” are a specific type of tequila, and
Registrant’s goods are “wine.” While both goods fall within the general category of
alcoholic beverages, “[t]here is no per se rule that holds that all alcoholic beverages
are related.” In re White Rock Distilleries Inc., No. 77093221, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 601
at *8 (citing G. H. Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes Ltd., 917 F.2d 1292 (Fed. Cir.
1990) and Nat’l Distillers and Chem. Corp. v. William Grant & Sons, Inc., 505 F.2d
719 (CCPA 1974)). We must therefore decide this appeal on the record before us.
The Examining Attorney submitted evidence from the following third-party
winery, distillery, and U.S. importer/distributorship websites as well as blogs
purporting to show that tequila and wine are related under the second DuPont factor:
Kiepersol, a distillery and winery located on a family
owned estate in Texas where “[e]ach brand is named after
a hero in our family” featuring Pierre’s branded Texas
Tequila and Kiepersol branded wine;11
11 March 22, 2023 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 4-19.

Serial No. 90782980
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Round Barn Winery Brewery Distillery produces
handcrafted small batch artisan spirits such as tequila-
style agave as well as wine under the mark Round Barn;12
Skurnik is a U.S. distributor with a worldwide portfolio of
unaffiliated wine and distilled spirits brands, including
several types of tequila;13
E&J Gallow Winery is a U.S. wine producer and distributor
of unaffiliated wine and tequila brands;14
Old Town Tequila is an online retailer specializing in
alcoholic beverages and offers for retail purchase wine and
tequila from various brands;15
An article entitled “Reynolds Family Winery: Producing
Wine and Tequila on the Silverado Trail” posted on the blog
Wine Routes about a producer of both items;16
Latitude Beverage Company is a “Boston-based company
behind a growing portfolio of national wine and spirits
brands” including 90+Cellars, Iron Side and Corte Fiore
branded wines as well as Zarpado branded tequila;17
Boisset Collection is a multinational company whose
properties include wineries located in California and Casa
Obsidiana, a tequila producer located in Mexico;18
Mount Hope, located in Pennsylvania in “the Heart of
Amish Country” offers for sale Bravucon branded tequila
as well as Becky’s Blush, Heartland Harvest, Jacob’s
Choice and Quilter’s Delight branded wines;19
12 Id. at 20-31.
13 Id. at 32-43.
14 Id. at 44-58.
15 August 25, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 16-19.
16 Id. at 22-26.
17 Id. at 33-36.
18 Id. at 44-47.
19 Id. at 48-61.

Serial No. 90782980
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Dai One, a wine and tequila producer, offers both
beverages under the same “Dai One” mark such as Dai One
2018 California Autumn Red Blend and Dai One Tequila
Anejo;20 and
Tequilas & Wine is a wholesale importer/exporter of
various brands of wine and tequila such as Envidia
branded wine and Don Nacho tequila.21
The problem with the Examining Attorney’s evidence is that it conflates evidence
of the trade channels for wine and tequila with the relationship between the
beverages themselves. With the exception of Round Barn and Dai One, none of the
entities described above produce and market both tequila and wine under the same
trademark. Two examples of third-party marketplace uses is unconvincing, especially
when there is no indication whether Applicant’s specific type of tequila is made by
any of these wineries/distilleries.
The Examining Attorney also contends that the goods are related because they
are complementary beverages often used together as cocktail mixers. In support, she
submitted the following recipes posted online incorporating both beverages as
ingredients:
Chowhound, “Tequila and Wine Come Together for One
Devilish Cocktail” and instructions to make “devil’s
margarita” with a red wine float;22
Cupcakes & Cutlery, “Red Wine Cocktails with Tequila are
unique and delicious” and providing recipes pairing wine
and tequila. The article touts “[w]hile this may be your first
20 Id. at 62-66.
21 Id. at 98-102.
22 August 25, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 8-11.

Serial No. 90782980
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experience with wine cocktails, wine is surprisingly
versatile when used as a mixer.” (emphasis in original);23
The Spruce Eats provides a recipe for Raspberry Tequila
Sangria that incorporates wine and tequila, assuring the
reader that “[y]es, you can combine those two alcoholic
beverages.”;24
Casamigos, provides a recipe for wine and tequila
cocktail;25 and
Food Republic, “Add Tequila to Your Sangria for a
Summery Twist on a Margarita.”26
Complementary use may show relatedness depending on the particular facts of
the case. See In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (“The extent to which particular food products are deemed related will
depend on the facts of each individual case. … we take notice that the products ‘bread’
and ‘cheese’ are often used in combination.”). “There is, of course, no per se rule that
all [ingredients] appearing in the same recipe be considered related for Section 2(d)
purposes. It is not unusual for recipes to contain many different ingredients and
consumers are not likely to assume merely from the fact that two items are called for
in the same recipe that they necessarily emanate from the same source of origin.”
Davia, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *18.
The recipes alone do not establish that wine and tequila rise to the level of
complementary goods frequently used together in cocktail mixers. The mere existence
23 Id. at 79-92.
24 Id. at 103-107.
25 Id. at 108.
26 Id. at 116-120.

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of a handful of cocktail recipes incorporating wine and tequila does not mean that
consumers recognize both beverages as ingredients commonly used together for
cocktail recipes. Only one of the recipes is for a well-known cocktail, the margarita,
and an unusual type, the Devil’s Margarita, which features a wine float. Some of the
other recipes call for adding tequilas to sangria, a non-traditional choice.27 The
remaining cocktail recipes are obscure because “wine is not among the most common
cocktail mixers.”28 Equally important, we cannot extrapolate from this evidence that
consumers following each recipe believe that these ingredients come from the same
source. There is no evidence that the recipes use the same brands producing both
wine and tequila. For the most part, wine and tequila are distinct types of alcoholic
beverages consumed individually, not together, and this evidence fails to show
otherwise.
Lastly, the Examining Attorney postulates that wine and tequila are related
because tequila can be made using wine-making techniques. The Examining Attorney
cites to a single article describing “tequila-obsessed friends in Napa’s wine business
joined together with the goal of creating ultra-premium tequilas using wine making
techniques”29 as evidentiary support. Again, this evidence fails to show wine and
tequila offered to consumers from the same entity under the same trademark.
With only two examples of third-party marketplace uses under the same mark
27 Id. at 79-92.
28 Chowhound, “Tequila and Wine Come Together for One Devilish Cocktail” and instructions
to make “devil’s margarita” with a red wine float submitted with August 25, 2025 Denial of
Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 8-11.
29 Id. at 27-28.

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and no third-party registration evidence of tequila and wine emanating from the
same source under the same trademark, the Board is unable to find a relationship
between Applicant’s and Registrant’s particular type of alcoholic beverages. The
Examining Attorney has failed to establish on this record that Applicant’s and
Registrant’s particular types of alcoholic beverages are related. See, e.g., White Rock
Distilleries, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 601, at *9 (finding Office had failed to establish that
wine and vodka infused with caffeine are related goods because “there is no evidence
that vodka, much less applicant's specific type of vodka, and wine emanate from a
single source under a single mark” or that “energy vodka infused with caffeine and
wine are ingredients for any particular cocktails such that we could consider them
complementary products that would be bought and used together.”). Perhaps on a
more developed record we would find otherwise. The second DuPont factor weighs
against finding a likelihood of confusion.
This brings us to the “established, likely-to-continue channels of trade.” DuPont,
476 F.2d at 1361. Unlike the record on the second DuPont factor, the record includes
competent evidence showing overlapping trade channels and classes of consumers.
Because there are no limitations or restrictions as to trade channels or classes of
purchasers in the respective identifications of goods, we must presume that
Applicant’s tequila and Registrant’s wine would be marketed in all normal trade
channels for such goods and to all normal classes of purchasers of such goods. See
Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(language in the identifications control, regardless of any actual marketplace

Serial No. 90782980
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evidence of “the particular channels of trade, or the class of purchasers to which sales
of the goods or services are directed”). The evidence discussed above shows that the
normal trade channels for both tequila and wine includes U.S. importers, wholesale
distributors, online retailers, and the premises of winery/distillery tasting rooms.
This reflects the U.S. three‑tier licensing system, where alcoholic beverages typically
move from producers and importers to wholesaler distributors and then to retailers
to be consumed on premise at bars, restaurants, and tasting rooms as well as through
brick-and-mortar liquor stores and online specialty retailers. The normal classes of
purchasers of wine and tequila include bar patrons, restaurant patrons and retail
purchasers of alcoholic beverages of legal drinking age.
Applicant counters that “in retail settings, wines are typically segregated and
displayed separately from distilled spirits, a segregation that extends to online
platforms and restaurant menus.”30 This argument is unavailing. Consumers
browsing the aisles in retail liquor establishments are likely to “jaunt to another
counter or section of the store” and encounter a variety of alcoholic beverages and
spirits, including wine and tequila. See Monarch Wine Co. v. Hood River Distillers,
Inc., 1977 TTAB LEXIS 129, at *6.
The third DuPont factor therefore weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of
confusion.
C. Purchasing conditions
The fourth DuPont factor evaluates “[t]he conditions under which … sales are
30 31 TTABVUE 21.

Serial No. 90782980
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made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
A heightened degree of care when making a purchasing decision may tend to
minimize likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re N.A.D., Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999-1000
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (because only sophisticated purchasers exercising great care would
purchase the relevant goods, there would be no likelihood of confusion merely because
of the similarity between the marks NARCO and NARKOMED). Conversely, impulse
purchases of inexpensive goods may tend to have the opposite effect. Palm Bay Imps.,
396 F.3d at 1376.
The respective identifications of Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are not limited
in any manner as to purchasers, conditions of sale or price. We must therefore assume
that both types of alcoholic beverages are available to all consumers of legal age who
purchase tequila or wine, including ordinary consumers who may buy inexpensive
tequila and wine on impulse. See Sock It To Me, Inc. v. Fan, No. 91230554, 2020 TTAB
LEXIS 201, at *24-25 (where there are no limitations in the identification, goods
encompass “all goods of the type identified, without limitation as to their nature or
price”) (citation omitted). Although some consumers might be more sophisticated
about purchasing wine and tequila, others may not be as knowledgeable. See, e.g., In
re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 108, at *29 (“Wine
purchasers are not necessarily sophisticated or careful in making their purchasing
decisions, and where, as here, the goods are identified without any limitations as to
trade channels, classes of consumers or conditions of sale, we must presume that
Applicant’s and Registrant’s wine encompasses inexpensive or moderately-priced

Serial No. 90782980
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wine.”). Basing our analysis “on the least sophisticated potential purchaser,” Stone
Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014), we
deem this DuPont factor neutral.
D. Strength or weakness of cited mark
Lastly, we address the sixth DuPont factor, the “number and nature of similar
marks in use on similar goods.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. This DuPont factor “is a
measure of the extent to which other marks weaken the assessed mark.” See Spireon,
Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (inter partes context). “The
weaker [the cited] mark, the closer an applicant’s mark can come without causing a
likelihood of confusion and thereby invading what amounts to its comparatively
narrower range of protection.” Id. at 1338 (internal citations omitted).
In determining the strength or weakness of the cited mark, we consider both its
inherent strength, based on the nature of the mark itself, and, if there is evidence in
the record of marketplace recognition of the mark, its commercial or marketplace
strength. Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362; see also In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d
1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual
strength … and its marketplace strength ….”); Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea
Inc., No. 91118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 330, at *62. Conceptual or inherent strength
is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness. Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1353-54.
Distinctiveness is “often classified in categories of generally increasing
distinctiveness[:] ... (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5)
fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). “Commercial

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strength, on the other hand, is the marketplace recognition value of the mark.”
Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “Evidence
of third-party use of similar marks on similar goods is relevant to show that a mark
is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.” Palm Bay Imps.,
396 F.3d at 1371; see also Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH v. New
Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
The cited mark CASABLANCA is registered on the Principal Register without a
claim of acquired distinctiveness, and thus carries a presumption of validity under
Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), that it is inherently distinctive.31
See, e.g., New Era Cap Co. v. Pro Era, LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at
*29. That said and as we noted earlier, the record shows that “Casablanca” refers to
wine originating from the Casablanca Valley in Chile,32 making the cited mark highly
suggestive. “Marks that are … highly suggestive are entitled to a narrower scope of
protection, i.e., are less likely to generate confusion over source identification, than
their more fanciful counterparts.” Spireon, 71 F.4th at 1362 (quoting Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
31 We will not entertain Applicant’s contention that the registered mark is geographically
descriptive under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), because it amounts to
a “thinly veiled” collateral attack on the registration. See In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc., 105
F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1997). An ex parte appeal is not the proper forum; rather, such
allegations may only be brought in a formal cancellation proceeding. Id.
32 See, e.g., December 13, 2023 Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 49 (printout of a map of
the Casablanca Valley in Chile depicting in a pie chart the availability of grape by percentage
accessed on 5/17/2023); see also id. at 203-216 (TTBGov Wine Label: Appellation of Origin
printout from www.ttb.gov accessed on 7/5/2023).

Serial No. 90782980
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To show public exposure and consumer impressions, Applicant made of record
evidence from more than 1,200 search results for “Casablanca Valley” from U.S.
websites.33 By way of illustration, the excerpts from WINE ENTHUSIAST show different
wine brands such as Primus, Veramont and Lapostelle using “Casablanca Valley” in
advertising their wines for retail sale to U.S. consumers:34
33 December 13, 2023 Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 35-42 (search results for
“casablanca valley” from www.wineenthusiast.com accessed on 7/5/2023); see also id. at 44-
171 (search results for “Casablanca valley” from wine-searcher.com accessed on 7/5/2023). In
general, search result summaries are of limited value. See TBMP § 1208.03 and cases cited
in Notes 14-18. But here the search result summaries carry weight because they clearly show
the type of wine, brand name, price and geographical region of origin.
We further add that examining attorneys are not required to establish that a particular
online source or website “has significant web traffic” to establish its competence just as there
is no requirement to establish the circulation or actual readership of a magazine or
newspaper. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 86261962, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *30. The
converse of this principle applies with equal force to applicants making website evidence of
record in an ex parte appeal. “Even websites that are not frequently visited still demonstrate
how the authors use the term or phrase and how that term or phase will be perceived by the
readers.” Id.
34 December 13, 2023 Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 38.

Serial No. 90782980
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Further evidence consists of printouts from Wine-Searcher.com of numerous wine
brands bearing the moniker “Casablanca Valley, Chile” directly after their marks and
varietal.35 Representative examples are reproduced below:36
35 December 13, 2023 Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 44-170 (printouts of the search
result summary https://wine-searcher.com/regions-casablana+valley accessed on 7/5/2023).
36 Id. at 44-46. The fact that the labels from the printouts are blurry does not diminish the
probative value of this evidence. Each search result clearly indicates to the right of each label
in English the brand of wine (e.g., Carolina Wine, Vinamar, Emiliana); the type of wine (e.g,
Savinnon Blanc, pinot noir); the price in U.S. dollars; and the region and country of origin
(Casablanca Valley, Chile).

Serial No. 90782980

Home | Regions { Chile / Casablanca Valley | Most Popular

Most Popular Casablanca Valley Wines

< Back to Casablanca Valley Wines

Most Popular Best Best Value Most Expensive Cheapest
ace
Region Navigation w
Q 31,078th in popularity
® $11/750mI
Root 1 Pinot Noir, Casablanca Valley, Chile
#& Pinot Noir
@ 33,639th in popularity
® $11/ 750m!

Casas del Bosque Reserva Pinot Noir, Casablanca Valley, Chile
®& Pinot Noir

- @ 33,639th in popularity
® $15/750mI

Cono Sur 'Quebrada Alta’ Single Vineyard Block 5 Chardonnay, Casablanca
Valley, Chile
& Chardonnay

‘aul Q 34,004th in popularity :

® $16 /750m

P

hitps:vewew.wine-searcher.coniregions-casahlanca+ valley 26 ww

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Serial No. 90782980
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Third-party marketplace use of “Casablanca Valley” for wine in this manner does not
demonstrate commercial weakness because none of the examples involve use of
“Casablanca Valley” as a trademark. But with over 1200 examples, it is a strong
indicator of conceptual weakness as it signals geographic origin. “It is well settled
that articles obtained from the Internet, websites, and blog posts are admissible as

Serial No. 90782980
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evidence of information available to the consuming public and of the way in which a
term is being used or would be understood by the relevant public.” Wal-Mart Stores,
2019 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *30 (internal citations omitted). Consumers encountering the
cited mark CASABLANCA for wine are likely to perceive the mark as shorthand for
the Casablanca Valley region in Chile.
Based on this evidence, we find that the cited mark CASBLANCA is highly
suggestive and falls on the lower end of the conceptual strength spectrum, making its
scope of protection relatively limited. See In re Hartz Hotel Servs., No. 76692673, 2012
TTAB LEXIS 75, at *13 (“the mark GRAND HOTEL is highly suggestive, and
therefore the scope of protection to which the cited registration is entitled is quite
limited.”). The sixth DuPont factor therefore weighs against a likelihood of confusion.
E. Weighing the DuPont Factors
The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there has been evidence and argument. Where not all of the relevant factors
point in the same direction, we must explain “the weight [we] assigned to the relevant
factors” as well as “the results of that weighing.” Charger Ventures LLC, 65 F.4th at
1379 (citation omitted). “No mechanical rule determines likelihood of confusion, and
each case requires weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.”
In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[T]he
weight afforded to each factor depends on the circumstances” and “[a]ny single factor
may control a particular case.” Stratus Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Commc’ns Inc.,

Serial No. 90782980
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955 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
We have carefully considered all of the evidence made of record, as well as all of
the arguments related thereto. The marks are virtually identical in sound and
appearance, meaning that the first DuPont factor weighs heavily in favor of
concluding that confusion is likely. The evidence shows that tequila and wine travel
in the same ordinary trade and distribution channels and will be marketed to the
same potential consumers, which strongly favors a likelihood of confusion.
On the other hand, the Examining Attorney failed to submit competent evidence
that the goods are related, tipping the second DuPont factor heavily against finding
a likelihood of confusion. The cited mark CASABLANCA is highly suggestive of wine
originating from the Casablanca Valley of Chile, meaning that it has a large degree
of conceptual weakness. With a relatively limited scope of protection, the sixth
DuPont factor weighs strongly against a likelihood of confusion. The fourth DuPont
factor of purchaser care is neutral.
On balance, the lack of competent evidence to prove the relatedness between the
goods, combined with the cited mark’s relative conceptual weakness in connection
with wine, outweighs the virtual similarity of the marks and overlapping trade
channels. We conclude that confusion is unlikely.
Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal is reversed.