Howco, Inc.

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: March 19, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Howco, Inc.
_____
Serial No. 98105034
_____
Susan S. Jackson of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP,
for Howco, Inc.
Valerie Kaplan, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 107,
Leslie Bishop, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Larkin, English, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant Howco, Inc. seeks registration on the Principal Register of the mark
HOWCO in standard-character format. During examination, the application was
amended to identify services falling within International Classes 35, 36, and 37. The
Examining Attorney issued a final refusal only as to some of the services. The USPTO
later granted Applicant’s request to divide the application, which permitted Applicant
to move forward as to the unrefused services by putting them in a newly-numbered
application. This appeal concerns only Application Serial No. 98105034 (the “parent”

Serial No. 98105034
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application), which identifies the following services as to which registration has been
refused:
• Consulting in the field of car washes, namely, consulting on entire car wash
business, specifically initial planning of the site in the nature of business
project management consulting, business project management, car wash
equipment decisions, and daily business operations, in International Class
35; and
• Consulting in the field of car washes, namely, consulting on entire car wash
business, specifically financial planning, in International Class 36.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration based on Section 2(d) of
the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), due to likelihood of confusion with two
marks, both registered on the Principal Register and owned by the same registrant:
HOWCO, in standard-character format;2 and .3 Both of these
registrations list many goods and services. The refusal here, however, was based only
on (1) some of their listed services in Classes 35, and (2) all of the services in Class
36, namely:
• Class 35: business management and operational business management and
administration services; business auditing of industrial processes; business
management of manufacturing and industrial processes; business time
management of manufacturing and industrial processes; business
feasibility studies; information, advisory and consultancy services relating
1 Application Serial No. 98105034 was filed on July 27, 2023, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming a date of first use anywhere and in
commerce of October 1972. The application that identifies the services as to which there was
no refusal was assigned Serial No. 98976450.
2 Reg. No. 6303832 (the ’832 or “standard-character” registration) issued on March 30,
2021, with a date of first use anywhere of 1982 and first use in commerce of 1996.
3 Reg. No. 6331510 (the ’510 registration) issued on April 27, 2021, with a date of first use
anywhere and in commerce of October 14, 2014.

Serial No. 98105034
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to all of the aforesaid services for the oil and gas industry, namely, business
management advice; financial auditing of industrial processes; and
• Class 36: Financial service, namely, financial planning; commodity
brokerage of raw materials; brokerage of commodities; commodity
brokerage of metals; commodity brokerage of low alloy steels, stainless,
duplex and super duplex aluminium, nickel and super alloys; information,
advisory and consultancy services relating to all of the aforesaid services,
namely, financial planning consulting.
After the Examining Attorney made the refusal final,4 Applicant appealed5 and
requested reconsideration.6 We suspended the appeal and remanded the application.7
The Examining Attorney denied reconsideration,8 after which the appeal resumed.9
Applicant filed a brief,10 as did the Examining Attorney.11 Applicant filed a reply brief
as well.12 The case is now ready for decision. For the reasons explained below, we
affirm the refusal to register.
Before we begin the substantive Section 2(d) analysis, we note that, compared to
the cited HOWCO standard-character mark, the mark in the ’510 Registration
4 See Nov. 26, 2024, Final Office Action. Citations in this opinion to the application record
refer to the version of the documents as downloaded in .pdf format from the Trademark
Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) database of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO).
5 See 1 TTABVUE. References to the briefs and appeal record cite to the Board’s TTABVUE
electronic docket system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” represents the docket number
assigned to the cited filing in TTABVUE and any number immediately following “TTABVUE”
identifies the specifically-cited page(s), if any.
6 See May 22, 2025, Request for Reconsideration.
7 See 2 TTABVUE.
8 See 4 TTABVUE.
9 See 5 TTABVUE.
10 See 6 TTABVUE.
11 See 8 TTABVUE.
12 See 11 TTABVUE.

Serial No. 98105034
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has additional points of distinction from Applicant’s mark: namely, it
depicts the literal element in a specific typeface and contains a design element. If we
refuse registration based on the standard-character ’832 Registration, the application
will stand refused irrespective of the ’510 Registration. If, however, we conclude that
confusion is unlikely in view of the standard-character registration, then confusion
is, if anything, less likely as to the mark in the ’510 Registration. We therefore don’t
see a need to address the refusal to the extent it is based on the ’510 Registration.
See, e.g., In re Morinaga Nyugyo K.K., No. 86338392, 2016 WL 5219811, at *3 (TTAB
2016); In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 WL 22358, at *2 (TTAB 2010).
ANALYSIS
A. Section 2(d) refusals generally
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). We determine whether confusion
is likely by analyzing all probative facts in evidence relevant to the likelihood-of-
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
1361 (CCPA 1973). See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2023). Though du Pont lists thirteen numbered factors, we generally address only
those that are relevant and material to the case before us. See, e.g., Shen Mfg. Co. v.
Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous.

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Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Typically, those are the
factors that the parties address and on which there is relevant evidence in the record.
See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.
2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). After
making findings on the relevant factors, we then weigh them together to determine
if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64
F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
B. Comparison of the marks
We start with “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as
to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at
1371. This has been termed a “predominant inquiry” in the likelihood of confusion
analysis. Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Applicant’s brief does not address this factor. The Examining Attorney makes the
obvious point that HOWCO and HOWCO are identical.13 We agree, so this factor will
weigh in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely when we weigh all the factors
upon which we’ve made findings.
C. Comparison of the services
We next examine “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or
services as described in an application or registration.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. We
13 See 10 TTABVUE 4.

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compare the services as they are set forth in the application and the ’832 Registration.
See, e.g., In re Detroit Athl. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This, too, is a
factor of “considerable importance” when weighing whether confusion is likely or not.
See, e.g., Pink Lady Corp. v. L.N. Renault & Sons, Inc., 265 F.2d 951, 953 (CCPA
1959); Pep Boys–Manny, Moe and Jack v. Edwin F. Guth Co., 197 F.2d 527, 528-29
(CCPA 1952); see also Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098,
1103 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the
cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or
services] and differences in the marks.”).
“Because each class in Applicant’s multi-class application is, in effect, a separate
application, we consider each class separately, and determine whether the Examining
Attorney has shown a likelihood of confusion with respect to each.” In re OSF
Healthcare Sys., No. 88706809, 2023 WL 6140427, at *4 (TTAB 2023) (cleaned up;
citation omitted). Comparing the services in Class 35, the application identifies:
Consulting in the field of car washes, namely, consulting on entire
car wash business, specifically initial planning of the site in the
nature of business project management consulting, business
project management, car wash equipment decisions, and daily
business operations.
The registered mark lists “business management and operational business
management … services” with no restrictions as to field. That means that this
particular service includes all business fields, including the car-wash field. See, e.g.,
In re AC Webconnecting Holding B.V., No. 85635277, 2020 WL 5544272, at *13 (TTAB
2020) (services that are “identified without limitation … must be presumed to

Serial No. 98105034
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include” all specific subsets of those services within the broad identification); Sw.
Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., No. 94002242, 2015 WL 4464550, at *17 (TTAB 2015)
(same), aff’d mem., 652 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). So, as to that relatively broadly-
worded service in the registration, Applicant’s field restriction is not a material
difference.
Turning from the field(s) to the type of services themselves, the registration lists
“business management … services.” The application lists “consulting on … business
project management.” Consulting is a specific type of business management service.14
And “business project management” is a subset of “business management.”
The application and registration also overlap in that the respective services both
cover operational aspects of the businesses. The registration identifies “operational
business management” services. The application covers “consulting” on the subject of
“daily business operations.”
Thus, despite using non-identical language, Applicant’s specifically-defined Class
35 services fall, in these two respects, within the more simply-recited and broader
“business management and operational business management … services” identified
in the registration. The services are legally identical to that extent. See, e.g., In re
Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1405-06 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming Board’s holding
14 This is clear as a definitional matter. We take judicial notice of the Cambridge
Dictionary’s definition of “consulting” and one of its examples of use in a sentence: “consulting
… the activity or business of giving expert advice about a particular subject: … Management
consulting helps the world’s leading organizations become even more effective.” https://
dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/consulting (checked on Mar. 19, 2026). See
B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (taking
judicial notice of a dictionary definition); Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 740
(CCPA 1953) (same).

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of likely confusion of “legally identical services” where applicant’s mark was for
“restaurant services specializing in Southern-style cuisine” and registration was for
“hotel, motel, and restaurant services”); In re RiseSmart, Inc., No. 85050089, 2012
WL 6137597, at *4 (TTAB 2012) (“applicant’s ‘personnel placement and recruitment
services’ and ‘employment counseling and recruiting services; employment
outplacement services’ encompass registrant’s identified ‘temporary personnel
services’ and, as such, are legally identical”); see generally Int’l Paper Co. v. Valley
Paper Co., 468 F.2d 937, 938 (CCPA 1972) (where the “registration description is
broad enough to cover the goods [of the applicant], … the legal effect of this fact is
that the goods and channels of trade are to be considered the same for the purposes
of this opposition”).15
Turning to Class 36, the application identifies “Consulting in the field of car
washes, namely, consulting on entire car wash business, specifically financial
planning.” These services are encompassed within the first of the several services
identified in the ’832 Registration, which are unrestricted as to field: “Financial
service, namely, financial planning.” Just as in Class 35, Applicant’s Class 36 services
also are legally identical in-part to the Class 36 services identified in the ’832
Registration. See, e.g., Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1405-06; RiseSmart, 2012 WL
6137597, at *4.
15 We do not think that either the application’s or the ’832 Registration’s identification of
services is ambiguous in any material respect. But even if either were, we’d have to resolve
any ambiguity in favor of the registrant. E.g., CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 1983); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336-37
(CCPA 1981); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., No. 73280084, 1983 WL 51846, at *1 (TTAB 1983).

Serial No. 98105034
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Applicant highlights that its services are restricted to the field of car washes and
contends that the services in the ’832 Registration are restricted to a different field:
“the Oil & Gas industry.”16 According to Applicant, the services do not overlap. We
reject this argument.
First, there is no mention of the oil and gas industry in the Class 36 services listed
in the ’832 Registration. And as to the Class 35 services in the ’832 Registration—
which does mention the oil and gas industry in one of the relevant listed services—
this argument misreads the identification in the registration. The specific Class 35
services in the ’832 Registration we found to overlap with Applicant’s Class 35
services contain no limitation to the oil and gas sectors. The ’832 Registration
mentions the oil and gas sector only with respect to a different service: “information,
advisory and consultancy services relating to all of the aforesaid services for the oil
and gas industry, namely, business management advice.” This service is set off from
the services we cited by semicolons, and we did not make any finding concerning this
service.17
Punctuation matters generally, and one area where it particularly matters is
trademark prosecution. The current version (Nov. 2025) of the TRADEMARK MANUAL
OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE sets forth the USPTO’s long-standing view as to the
16 See 6 TTABVUE 16.
17 To find a likelihood of confusion requiring refusal of registration, we need find that
confusion as to source is likely between Applicant’s service and only one of the services listed
in the ’832 Registration. See, e.g., SquirtCo v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir.
1983); In re Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964, 2020 WL 2094122, at *3 (TTAB 2020).

Serial No. 98105034
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respective roles of commas and semicolons in identifying multiple goods or services
in one class:
TMEP § 1402.06(a) Limiting the Identification of Goods
and Services:
… In general, commas are used in identifications to separate
items within a particular category of goods or services, while
semicolons are used to separate distinct categories of goods or
services within a single class. See TMEP §1402.01(a). Goods or
services within semicolons typically stand alone and
independently from the other goods or services in the
identification.
On this point, the TMEP cites In re Midwest Gaming & Entertainment LLC, No.
85111552, 2013 WL 1442237, at *4 (TTAB 2013). In that decision, the Board found
that, because a semicolon separated the two relevant clauses in registrant’s
identification, “restaurant and bar services” in one clause was a discrete category of
services that stood alone and was independent from the services set forth on the other
side of the semicolon, which concerned the provision of “banquet and social function
facilities for special occasions.” Thus, the applicant there could not argue that its
casino-limited bar services differentiated those bar services from the unrestricted bar
services in the cited registration. We have a similar situation here.18
Applicant resists this notion by pointing to remarks that the owner of the cited
registration made during the prosecution of the application that matured into the
18 Unlike in this case, it’s a different story where a limitation follows a recitation of various
services separated only by commas. See Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050, 2023 WL
417620, at *7 n.35 (TTAB 2023) (where services identified as “restaurants, coffee shops, ices
parlors, [and] snack bars with take-out for flavored and fruit ice products, and specifically
excluding frozen yogurt” were “not separated by a semicolon, they each [were] subject to the
limiting language in the recitation”) (citing, inter alia, Midwest Gaming).

Serial No. 98105034
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’832 Registration.19 Applicant highlights that, in arguing that confusion was unlikely
between the now-registered mark HOWCO and a prior registration for the mark
H.O.W. (which was initially cited against the registered HOWCO mark), the owner
of the ’832 HOWCO Registration responded to an Office action by arguing that it had
“narrowed its goods and services” to the “oil and gas sectors.” According to Applicant,
we should take this to mean that confusion is unlikely between HOWCO and
HOWCO.20
We disagree. The goods and services in the ’832 Registration at issue at that time
were “transportation services” in Class 39,21 and the registration cited against it was
19 See 6 TTABVUE 17. Though Applicant’s brief says “see attached” when it refers to this
prosecution filing of the owner of the ’832 Registration, it isn’t attached. But that’s actually
a good thing. As we regularly state in our opinions, applicants should not attach evidence to
their appeal briefs to us. See, e.g., In re Integra Biosciences Corp., No. 87484450, 2022 WL
225424, at *3 (TTAB 2022); Info. Builders, 2020 WL 2094122, at *2 n.4; In re Michalko, No.
85584271, 2014 WL 2531202, at *1 (TTAB 2014). Rather, they should simply cite to the
document in the prosecution record containing the evidence, identifying where, in the record,
it is. See Trademark Rule 2.142(b)(3), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(b)(3) (“Citation to evidence in briefs
should be to the documents in the electronic record for the subject application or registration
by date, the name of the paper under which the evidence was submitted, and the page number
in the electronic record.”). But Applicant didn’t do that either. That can be a problem for a
party before the Board because “[i]t is not the function of the Board to scour the record in
search of facts or evidence to support a party’s position.” DC Comics v. Cellular Nerd LLC,
No. 91246950, 2022 WL 17832492, at *18 n.81 (TTAB 2022); see also In re Thermo
LabSystems, Inc., No. 78204502, 2007 WL 809858, at *6 n.7 (“It is applicant’s obligation to
point to particular items of evidence that support its position, not to invite the … Board to
search for it.”). Though we had no obligation to search the file for what Applicant was
referring to, we did, and we found it. See Oct. 1, 2024, Response to Nonfinal Office Action, at
TSDR 9-27.
20 See 6 TTABVUE 17-19.
21 The ’832 Registration covers goods in Class 6, as well as a host of services in Classes 35,
36, 39, and 40. See April 04, 2024, Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 9-12. Only the services in
Classes 35 and 36 were cited as bars to registration in this case (and only some of the services
in Class 35).

Serial No. 98105034
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for the H.O.W. mark “for freight transportation services.”22 In its response, the owner
of the ’832 Registration said that its transportation services were limited to the “oil
and gas sectors.”23 But this case involves a different compared mark (Applicant’s
identical HOWCO mark) and does not involve transportation services (or any services
in Class 39), but rather the ’832 Registration’s business management services (a
service the registration does not limit to any particular business sector). Thus, we do
not think the statement at issue has any material bearing on the circumstances we
face in this case. See In re Sela Prods., LLC, 2013 WL 2951800, at *3 (TTAB 2013)
(“The owner of Registration No. 3503756 for FORZA POWER TECHNOLOGIES
made its statements in the context of the citation of FORZA for a hydrogen fuel cell
power generator, goods which are very different from those at issue herein, and
therefore its statements cannot be treated as indicating its position with respect to
applicant’s mark and goods in this appeal.”).
In summary, we find the services in classes 35 and 36 in the application identical
in part to services in those classes in the ’832 Registration. In the final weighing of
the relevant factors, this will count in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.
D. Comparison of the trade channels and classes of customers
Another consideration in determining whether confusion is likely is “[t]he
similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” du Pont,
476 F.2d at 1371. It is also “relevant to consider the degree of overlap of consumers
22 See Oct. 1, 2024, Response to Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 18.
23 See id.

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exposed to the respective services ….” In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); see also du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361 (listing “buyers to whom sales are
made”). We make our assessment of the trade channels and customer classes based
on the services as set forth in the application and the ’832 Registration. See, e.g.,
Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1308; Glamorene Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 538
F.2d 894, 896 (CCPA 1976).
The Examining Attorney argues that, because the services are “legally identical,”
they are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of
purchasers.”24 Enlisting the aid of the argument we just rejected in which Applicant
urged us to limit the overlapping services in the ’832 Registration to the oil and gas
industry, Applicant argues that the respective trade channels and classes of
customers are different.25 Because this argument rests on a premise we rejected, it
necessarily fails. We find the trade channels and classes of customers identical in
part. Thus, these two factors will count in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely
when we conduct our final weighing.
E. The length of time during and conditions under which there has
been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
du Pont lists “[t]he length of time during and conditions under which there has
been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion” as a potentially relevant
consideration. 476 F.2d at 1371. Applicant’s brief states:
24 10 TTABVUE 8 (citing, inter alia, In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
25 6 TTABVUE 19-20.

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[Applicant] submits that registrant and [Applicant]’s marks have
been in concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
Registrant claims a date of first use in the US of 1996 whereas
[Applicant]’s mark not only has an earlier date of first use but has
been in use in the US for its services since at least as early as
1972.26
du Pont prefaces its list of factors with the statement “the following, when of record,
must be considered ….” Id. (emphasis added). While Applicant’s brief points out that
there is no evidence of actual confusion, a statement in a brief is not itself evidence.
See, e.g., In Simulations Publ’ns, 521 F.2d 797, 798 (CCPA 1975); In re Burndy Corp.,
300 F.2d 938, 940 (CCPA 1962). There is, for example, no declaration in the record
attesting to Applicant’s lack of knowledge of any instances of actual confusion.
Further, as to the length of time of concurrent use, Applicant points to the date
claimed in its application, but, again, provides no evidence of use. Applicant cannot
simply rely on the date of first use it set forth in its application. See Trademark Rule
2.122(b)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(2) (“The allegation in an application for registration,
or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or
registrant; a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence.”).27
26 Id. at 19.
27 The likelihood-of-confusion factors present us with questions of fact to determine. See,
e.g., Bullshine Distillery LLC v. Sazerac Brands, LLC, 130 F.4th 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2025)
(“Each of the DuPont factors presents a question of fact.”) (citation omitted). We can’t make
a finding of fact on a likelihood-of-confusion factor without evidence upon which to base the
finding. Cf. In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“With respect to core factual
findings in a determination of patentability, however, the [Patent] Board cannot simply reach
conclusions based on its own understanding or experience—or on its assessment of what
would be basic knowledge or common sense. Rather, the Board must point to some concrete
evidence in the record in support of these findings.”).

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Beyond the lack of evidence upon which we could make a factual finding on this
point, we further note that the “[l]ack of evidence of actual confusion or mistake, of
course, does not preclude a finding of likelihood of confusion.” In re Calgon Corp., 435
F.2d 596, 597 (CCPA 1971). Even if Applicant had placed a probative declaration in
the record, we’d still be getting only half the story, because the owner of the cited
registration is not a party to this case. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944,
2020 WL 1639916, at *9 (TTAB 2020); In re Inspection Tech. Inc., No. 73287613, 1984
WL 62802, at *2 (TTAB 1984).28
Finally, we note that this factor “requires us to look at actual market conditions,
to the extent there is evidence of such conditions of record.” Guild Mortgage, 2020 WL
1639916, at *8. But, as we pointed out earlier, Applicant has given us no actual
evidence on this factor.
This factor is neutral.
F. Conclusion as to whether confusion is likely
Having made findings on all the relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors as
concerns the standard-character registration, our final step is to assess these findings
together to determine if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely. See, e.g.,
Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384.
28 For obvious reasons, we do not require USPTO examining attorneys to try to determine
if actual confusion has taken place. See Inspection Tech., 1984 WL 62802, at *2 (“Moreover,
for the Examining Attorney to attempt to show actual confusion … would be an impossible
undertaking.”); see generally In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the
USPTO “is an agency of limited resources” and “cannot be expected to shoulder the burden
of conducting market research”) (citations omitted).

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Here, one factor is neutral and the rest—including the two key ones, the identity
of the marks and the partial overlap of the services—weigh in favor of a conclusion
that confusion is likely. With no factors weighing against that conclusion, we have no
difficulty concluding that confusion is likely as to the standard-character ’832
Registration.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed.