Medtherapy Biotechnology Inc.

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: February 25, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Medtherapy Biotechnology, Inc.
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Serial No. 98071706
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Anthony Laurentano and Christopher D. Casavale of Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLP, for Medtherapy Biotechnology, Inc.
Faith Beaudry-Torres, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 126, Jeffrey
Look, Managing Attorney.
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Before Heasley, Thurmon and Lebow, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Thurmon, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Medtherapy Biotechnology, Inc. (“Applicant”) filed an application to register the
standard character mark MEDTHERAPY on the Principal Register for
“Pharmaceutical research services; research and development of cancer
pharmaceuticals,” in International Class 42.1 The Trademark Examining Attorney
1 Application Serial No. 98071706 was filed on July 5, 2023, alleging a bona fide intent to
use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b). The Application originally included goods in International Class 5 and additional
services in International Class 42, but these additional goods and services were deleted
during prosecution of the Application.

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finally refused registration under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(e)(1), finding the mark merely descriptive of the services. The appeal has
been briefed and is ready for decision. We affirm the refusal.
Section 2(e)(1) – Merely Descriptive – Analysis
Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), precludes registration of
a mark on the Principal Register which, when used in connection with the
applicant’s goods or services, is merely descriptive of them. “A term is deemed to be
merely descriptive of goods or services, within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1), if it
forthwith conveys an immediate idea of an ingredient, quality, characteristic,
feature, function, purpose or use of the goods or services.” In re Zuma Array Ltd.,
No. 79288888, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 281, *5 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). “A mark need not immediately convey an idea of each and every specific
feature of the goods in order to be considered merely descriptive; it is enough if it
describes one significant attribute, function or property of the goods [or services].”
Id. (quoting In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB LEXIS
150, *4 (citing In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). In addition, “a
mark need not be merely descriptive of all recited goods or services in an
application. A descriptiveness refusal is proper ‘if the mark is descriptive of any of
the [goods or] services for which registration is sought.’” Zuma Array, 2022 TTAB
Citations to the prosecution file are to entries in the USPTO’s Trademark Status &
Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in .pdf format. Citations to the appeal record are to
TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system.

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LEXIS 281 at *5-6 (quoting Chamber of Com. of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2012)).
“Whether a mark is merely descriptive is evaluated in relation to the particular
goods [or services] for which registration is sought, the context in which it is being
used, and the possible significance that the term would have to the average
purchaser of the goods [or services] because of the manner of its use or intended
use,” In re Fallon, No. 86882668, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 464, *21, and “‘not in the
abstract or on the basis of guesswork.’” Id. (quoting Fat Boys, 2016 TTAB LEXIS
150, *4)). “Whether a mark is merely descriptive or not is determined from the
viewpoint of the relevant purchasing public.” Zuma Array, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 281,
*9. “We ask whether someone who knows what the goods and services are will
understand the mark to convey information about them.” Fallon, 2020 TTAB LEXIS
464, at * 21.
In this appeal, we focus on the “research and development of cancer
pharmaceuticals” services, because the applied-for mark is more directly pertains
to these services. The ultimate consumers of such services, or perhaps more
accurately, the ultimate beneficiaries, are persons with cancer. The consumer group
also includes health care providers involved in cancer care and other persons
making medical decisions for cancer patients.
“Evidence of the public’s understanding of [a] term . . . may be obtained from any
competent source, such as purchaser testimony, consumer surveys, listings in
dictionaries, trade journals, newspapers[,] and other publications.” Id. “These

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sources may include Websites, publications, and use in labels, packages, or in
advertising material directed to the goods.” In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d
1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).
This appeal involves the mark, MEDTHERAPY, that combines two words
frequently used together to identify “medication therapy,” which is, as we explain
more below, the treatment of a medical condition using medication. The “cancer
pharmaceuticals” that Applicant pursues through its “research and development”
are intended to be used in medication therapy--that is, these drugs are intended for
use in treating cancer. The correct test is whether the phrase forthwith conveys an
immediate idea of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, feature, function, purpose
or use of the goods [or services].” Fat Boys, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, *10.
We begin with the obvious. An applicant cannot combine two descriptive or
generic words into a compound word to avoid the descriptive or generic nature of
the combination. DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d
1247, 1255-56 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding the composite mark SNAP SIMPLY SAFER
was merely descriptive because the combination did not create any new meaning
apart from the descriptive words); In re Aquamar, Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 TTAB
LEXIS 178, at *6 7 (“There is no evidence that combining ‘mar’ and ‘azul’ into a
single term without a space between the constituent words results in the mark
creating a commercial impression any different from MAR AZUL with a space
between the constituent words[.]”); In re Best W. Fam. Steak House, Inc., No.

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315241, 1984 TTAB LEXIS 173, *1 (BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER are
“practically identical”).
Applicant combined “med” and “therapy” into a single word, but the two
component terms retain their well-established meanings given the nature of the
identified services. One who strives to create new drugs to treat cancer should be
encouraged in the efforts, but the end result of such efforts is to provide medication
therapy (or med therapy) to cancer patients. Applicant has presented no evidence
that these terms take on some new meaning within the applied-for mark.
The term “med” has a number of meanings, though most of these meanings are
related to medicine in some way. Of particular significance here is the common use
of “med” as an abbreviation for “medication or a dose of medication.” Denial of
Request for Reconsideration dated April 11, 2025, at 5. “A term is merely descriptive
when it is a recognized abbreviation for the goods or services in the application ….”
In re Nursecon, LLC, No. 88052194, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 545, *19. The term “therapy”
also has numerous meanings, but these include “the treatment of a physical
problem or an illness,” as the Examining Attorney established. Denial of Request
for Reconsideration dated April 11, 2025, at 8.
Applicant does not dispute the meanings of these terms, and instead focuses on
the “research and development” part of the identified services. 8 TTABVUE 11-12
(arguing that Applicant is not a health care provider while offering a definition of
“therapy” that is similar to the one recited above). The problem with Applicant’s
argument is that its “research and development” services are not some general or

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abstract services that might be useful in a variety of contexts. Rather, Applicant
provides these services for the express purpose of developing “cancer
pharmaceuticals.” Cancer drugs are used to treat cancer, which means the very
drugs Applicant develops will be used in medication therapy or med therapy. When
the mark directly describes the intended purpose of the services, the mark is merely
descriptive under Section 2(e)(1). In re Capital Formation Counselors, Inc., 1983
TTAB LEXIS 87, *9 (“[W]e find that ‘CAPITAL FORMATION COUNSELOR’S,
INC.’ is merely descriptive of a feature or desired result of applicant’s services ….”).
Applicant ignores the purpose or objective of its research and development
services, arguing that “the determination must be made in relation to the provision
of ‘research and development services’ and the proper attributes must be ascribed
to said services when making this determination.” 8 TTABVUE 12. But that is only
a partial recitation of the services identified in the Application. As we noted above,
we focus on the services that are directly tied to cancer pharmaceuticals, but the
first identified services are “pharmaceutical research and development,” which also
aim to develop medications for use in therapy. Perhaps some pharmaceuticals have
purposes other than for therapy, but it is beyond dispute that many, very likely
most, pharmaceuticals are used as part of therapy for an illness or condition.
Applicant does not avoid the scope of Section 2(e)(1) by combining two
descriptive terms into one. Our decision in Nursecon, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 545, is
instructive. The mark in that appeal was NURSECON for “Arranging and
conducting special events for social entertainment purposes” in International Class

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41. The evidence showed the applicant provided these services at meetings or
conventions of nurses. Id. at *20-21. The mark, therefore, was a combination of the
generic term “nurse” and the abbreviation “con” (for convention). Because the
services were often provided at nurse conventions, the Board found the mark merely
descriptive, even though the two terms were combined into a single word mark.
The same is true here, but there is more. The record shows that the combined
terms are used in the medical field to connote medication therapy, just as one might
expect.
• The Medical Therapy Accident Clinic & Rehab Center uses the shorthand
“med therapy” on its website and in the domain name for its website. Final
Office Action dated November 25, 2024, at 6-7.
• Central Pharmacy refers to “med therapy management” a term it states
is “used for a program to help you manage your medications and health
conditions.” Id. at 16.
• First Databank Health refers to “med therapy” in connection with a goal
of increasing patient engagement. Denial of Request for Reconsideration
dated April 11, 2025, at 25.
• An article posted on the Fierce Healthcare website refers to “med therapy
management,” a service offered under some health plans. Id. at 29.
This evidence, combined with the established and undisputed definitions of
“med” and “therapy,” are more than sufficient to support a showing that the
MEDTHERAPY mark is merely descriptive. Applicant’s arguments have been
considered, but mostly miss the point. The mark need not directly describe
everything involved in the identified services. It is enough if the mark describes an
intended purpose or use of the services, as the record clearly establishes is true in
this appeal. Stereotaxis, 429 F.3d at 1041.

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Finally, Applicant provided no evidence to rebut the Trademark Examining
Attorney’s showing, relying instead on attorney argument. Evidence of the meaning
and typical uses of the mark, or the terms that make up the mark, is critical in
evaluating a Section 2(e)(1) refusal. Attorney argument that contradicts the record
is not persuasive. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (“Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.”). Applicant also
argued the doubts must be resolved in favor of the applicant, but we find no doubt
here. The applied-for mark MEDTHERAPY is merely descriptive of the services
identified in the Application. For this reason, we affirm the Section 2(e)(1) refusal
to register.
Decision: The Section 2(e)(1) refusal is affirmed.