NAD Grid Corp

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: February 25, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re NAD Grid Corp.
_____
Serial No. 97503369
_____
Khanh T. Glatzel of Rimon P.C.,
for NAD Grid Corp.
Karen Bush, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 108,
Kathryn E. Coward, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Wellington, Heasley, and Allard,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Allard, Administrative Trademark Judge:
NAD Grid Corp. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark AMPUP (in standard characters) for the following goods and services:
• Battery performance monitors; Computer software platforms,
downloadable, for managing electric vehicle charge stations and locations,
locating a nearby charge station for vehicles, creating electric vehicle
charge schedules, managing charge station access control, setting charge
station prices, tracking and optimizing electric vehicle energy usage with
load management, providing charging insights of users’ vehicles, tracking
Co2 and other sustainability metrics, managing and processing users’
charging station revenues, monitoring charging activity and vehicle
telematics, providing reimbursement for electric vehicle drivers’ home
charging activities; Downloadable computer software for creating
searchable databases of information and data, in International Class 9; and

Serial No. 97503369
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• Providing temporary use of non-downloadable cloud-based software for
managing electric vehicle charge stations and locations, locating a nearby
charge station for vehicles, creating electric vehicle charge schedules,
managing charge station access control, setting charge station prices,
tracking and optimizing electric vehicle energy usage with load
management, providing charging insights of users’ vehicles, tracking Co2
and other sustainability metrics, managing and processing users’ charging
station revenues, monitoring charging activity and vehicle telematics,
providing reimbursement for electric vehicle drivers’ home charging
activities; Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring software for
managing electric vehicle charge stations and locations, locating a nearby
charge station for vehicles, creating electric vehicle charge schedules,
managing charge station access control, setting charge station prices,
tracking and optimizing electric vehicle energy usage with load
management, providing charging insights of users’ vehicles, tracking Co2
and other sustainability metrics, managing and processing users’ charging
station revenues, monitoring charging activity and vehicle telematics,
providing reimbursement for electric vehicle drivers’ home charging
activities, in International Class 42.1
Registration has been refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used on the goods and
services identified above, so resembles the marks
1 Application Serial No. 97503369 was filed on July 14, 2022 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claim of first use anywhere and
use in commerce on March 17, 2019 in both classes.
The mark appears on the drawing page as “ampUp” but “this does not change the nature of
the mark from standard character to special form.” New Era Cap Co. v. Pro Era, LLC, No.
91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at *4 n.1 (TTAB 2020). “Our reference to the mark in all
uppercase letters reflects the fact that an applied-for term in standard character form is not
limited to any particular font style, size, or color.” Id. (citing Trademark Rule 2.52, 37
C.F.R. § 2.52).

Serial No. 97503369
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(“NETWORKS” disclaimed)2 and ,3 both owned by same entity,
and both registered for “Charging station services for electric vehicles,” in
International Class 37, that Applicant’s mark is likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, or to deceive.
After the refusal was made final, the application was abandoned.4 Applicant
subsequently and simultaneously filed a Petition to Revive, which included a Request
for Reconsideration,5 and a Notice of Appeal.6 After the Request for Reconsideration
was denied,7 Applicant filed a Request for Remand to allow the Examining Attorney
an opportunity to consider a proposed amendment to its identification.8 The request
was granted, and jurisdiction was restored to the Examining Attorney,9 who accepted
2 Registration No. 5939747, issued December 17, 2019. A Sections 8 and 15 combined
declaration has been accepted and acknowledged. The mark is described as “consist[ing] of
the wording ‘AMPEDUP! NETWORKS’. There are two arrows in the shape of a circle with a
lighting [sic] bolt centered in the middle. The wording ‘AMPEDUP!’ appears to the right with
the wording ‘NETWORKS’ at the bottom.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
3 Registration No. 5945898, issued December 24, 2019. A Sections 8 and 15 combined
declaration has been accepted and acknowledged. The mark is described as “consist[ing] of
the wording ‘AMPEDUP! INSIDE’. There are two arrows in the shape of a circle with a
lighting [sic] bolt centered in the middle. The wording ‘AMPEDUP!’ appears to the right with
the wording ‘INSIDE’ at the bottom.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
4 January 3, 2024 Notice of Abandonment.
5 March 4, 2024 Request for Reconsideration at 1.
6 1 TTABVUE (Notice of Appeal).
References to the documents relating to the appeal refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online
docketing system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry
number; the number(s) following “TTABVUE” refer to the page number(s) of that particular
docket entry.
7 4 TTABVUE.
8 9 TTABVUE.
9 10 TTABVUE.

Serial No. 97503369
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Applicant’s request to delete “Charging station services for electric vehicles,” in
International Class 37 from the application; the Section 2(d) refusal was maintained
and continued as to the remaining classes, both listed above.10 The appeal then
resumed.11 Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed briefs.12 We affirm the
refusal.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office … as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods
[or services] of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ….”
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of
all of the probative evidence of record bearing on the likelihood of confusion factors.
In re E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”);
see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We
consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re
Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Varying weights may be
assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence presented. See Citigroup
Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil
10 11 TTABVUE.
11 12 TTABVUE.
12 Applicant’s brief appears at 13 TTABVUE and the Examining Attorney’s brief appears at
15 TTABVUE.

Serial No. 97503369
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Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he various evidentiary factors may play
more or less weighty roles in any particular determination.”).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key factors are the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks and the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976). These two factors, together with others, including the third, fourth and
sixth, are addressed herein.
We focus our Section 2(d) analysis on the cited mark
(“NETWORKS” disclaimed) (“Cited Mark” or “Cited Registration”)13 because we find
this mark and the recited services most similar to Applicant’s mark and its identified
goods and services. In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 1, at
*19-20 (TTAB 2010) (comparing applicant’s mark to most similar cited mark).
Because we find confusion likely between Applicant’s mark and the Cited Mark, we
need not consider the other mark forming the basis of the refusal.
A. The Strength or Weakness of the Cited Mark
Under the fifth and sixth DuPont factors, we consider the strength of the Cited
Mark, and the extent to which that strength may be attenuated by “[t]he number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. The
mark’s strength may vary along a spectrum from very strong to very weak. Joseph
Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
13 Reg. No. 5939747.

Serial No. 97503369
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2017). When considering the strength of the Cited Mark, we assess both its
conceptual strength and its commercial strength. In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622
F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A mark’s strength is measured both by its
conceptual strength (distinctiveness) and its marketplace strength (secondary
meaning).”).
Applicant argues that “[t]he common matter between Applicant’s Mark and the
cited marks is diluted.”14 Applicant argues that “amp” is short for “Ampere,” and is
“used commonly in the space of electrical, energy, or to indicate an increased level of
energy.”15 We agree with the Examining Attorney that Applicant did not make of
record any evidence of third-party use,16 so we need not consider whether the mark
is commercially weak; rather, we consider whether the mark has some conceptual
weakness. The record shows that AMPED is the verb form of AMP and that AMP is
short for AMPERE.17 According to the dictionary evidence, AMP is defined as
“informal: to make (someone) more excited or energetic.”18 We take judicial notice
that AMPERE is defined as “the practical meter-kilogram-second unit of electric
current that is equivalent to a flow of one coulomb per second or to the steady current
produced by one volt applied across a resistance of one ohm.”19
14 13 TTABVUE 11.
15 13 TTABVUE 11.
16 15 TTABVUE 6.
17 August 16, 2023 Final Office Action at 6.
18 August 16, 2023 Final Office Action at 6.
19 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ampere,
accessed on February 24, 2026. Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050, 2023 TTAB LEXIS
14, at *27 n.41 (TTAB 2023) (“The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions,

Serial No. 97503369
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With this dictionary definition in mind, we acknowledge that Registrant’s mark
has some conceptual weakness when used with “Charging station services for electric
vehicles,” as it is suggestive of charging services. At the same time, however, because
the Cited Mark is registered on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired
distinctiveness, we must presume that Cited Mark is inherently distinctive, i.e., that
it is at worst suggestive of Registrant’s services. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (registration is
“prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark”); In re Fiesta Palms, LLC,
No. 76595049, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 51, at *9 (TTAB 2007) (when mark is registered on
the Principal Register, “we must assume that it is at least suggestive”). As an
inherently distinctive registered mark, is entitled to protection
against a confusingly similar mark. The question we answer below is whether
Applicant’s mark is close enough for confusion to occur despite the Cited Mark being
conceptually somewhat weak.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties, considering their appearance,
sound, meaning and commercial impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. See also In re
Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “Similarity in any one
of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn
including online dictionaries that exist in printed format or have regular fixed editions.”),
aff’d, 823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Serial No. 97503369
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at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (TTAB 2018), aff’d
per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617,
2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *3-4 (TTAB 2014)). “[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but
is a matter of degree.” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(quoting Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2012)).
Because the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the
marks in their entireties, our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks
into their various components. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1985). See also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA
1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal;
rather, it must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”).
Nonetheless, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or
less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. Stone Lion Cap.
Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Nat’l
Data, 753 F.2d at 1058 (“[T]here is nothing improper in stating that, for rational

Serial No. 97503369
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reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided
the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.”).
Recall that Applicant seeks registration of the mark AMPUP in standard
character format.
Also recall that the Cited Mark is . We are not persuaded
by Applicant’s argument that the lightning bolt design is the dominant portion of the
mark because it appears first.20 As an initial matter, and as is typically the case, we
find that the literal elements AMPEDUP! NETWORKS are the dominant elements
of the mark notwithstanding the accompanying design. See In re Viterra Inc., 671
F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he verbal portion of a word and design mark
likely will be the dominant portion.”). Here, the lightning bolt enclosed by two arrows
forming a circle reinforces and emphasizes the literal element AMPEDUP!, where
“AMP” as we discussed earlier, is a unit of electric current,21 and the two arrows
forming a circle suggest the ongoing act of charging.
Focusing on the literal elements of the Cited Mark, we find that the AMPEDUP!
portion is the dominant element of the mark for two reasons, starting with the fact
that it is the lead word in the mark. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (VEUVE as first word
is a prominent feature of the marks); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of
20 13 TTABVUE 10, 11-12.
21 See discussion supra Section I(A).

Serial No. 97503369
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Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[U]pon encountering each mark, consumers
must first notice this identical lead word.”). Second, Registrant has disclaimed the
term NETWORKS, acknowledging that the term is either descriptive or generic of
the identified services and thus has less significance in our likelihood of confusion
determination. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Regarding descriptive terms, this court has noted that the ‘descriptive
component of a mark may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on the
likelihood of confusion.’”) (quoting Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d at 1060).
Comparing the marks, they are virtually identical in sight and sound inasmuch
as they share the AMP and UP elements, which appear in the same order in both
marks, i.e., AMPUP compared to AMPEDUP.
The marks also have similar connotations because of the shared use of the terms
AMP and UP in the same order. As discussed earlier, AMP and AMPED are merely
different tenses of the same verb (AMP),22 where, as mentioned, AMP is defined as
“informal: to make (someone) more excited or energetic” and, notably, the verb is
“often used with up,”23 causing the marks to have similar connotations. Because they
have similar connotations, they engender similar commercial impressions. The Cited
Mark’s incorporation of an exclamation point does not change this inasmuch as
punctuation generally does not alter the commercial impression of a mark.
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 807.14(c) (2025) and cases
22 August 16, 2023 Final Office Action at 6.
23 August 16, 2023 Final Office Action at 6-8 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY).

Serial No. 97503369
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cited therein. We see no reason to deviate from this general proposition here, as the
exclamation point reinforces through punctuation the energy and excitement the
mark intends to convey through its literal elements AMPEDUP. For these reasons,
we find the marks, when considered in their entireties, to be highly similar and are
not persuaded by Applicant’s arguments that the marks are dissimilar because they
differ in the number of words and, as a result, the number of syllables.24 In re Sela
Prods., LLC, No. 77629624, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 175, at *12-13 (TTAB 2013) (“We
agree that the marks have a different number of words and syllables …. However,
these distinctions between the marks that applicant points out do not serve to
distinguish them.”); In re John Scarne Games, Inc., 1959 TTAB LEXIS 31, at *1
(TTAB 1959) (“Purchasers … do not engage in trademark syllable counting — they
are governed by general impressions made by appearance or sound, or both.”).
Where marks are highly similar, the first factor weighs heavily in the likelihood
of confusion analysis. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir.
2024) (when marks are highly similar, the first factor should weigh “heavily” in the
confusion analysis).
C. Similarity or Dissimilarity and Nature of the Goods and Services,
and Similarity or Dissimilarity of Established and Likely-to-
Continue Channels of Trade
We now turn to “the second and third DuPont factors, which respectively consider
the ‘similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an
application or registration,’ and ‘the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-
24 13 TTABVUE 11, 13-14.

Serial No. 97503369
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to-continue trade channels.”‘ See Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086,
2021 TTAB LEXIS 464, at *24 (TTAB 2021) (quoting Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at
1303). We compare the goods and services as they are identified in the involved
application and the Cited Registration. In re St. Julian Wine Co., No. 87834973, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 196, at *8 (TTAB 2020).
Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods and services need not be identical or even
competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. On-line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc.,
229 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). The goods and services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the
circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the
mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.” Coach Serv., 668 F.3d at
1369 (quoting 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler, No. 91117739, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 58, at *28-
29 (TTAB 2007)).
“Evidence of relatedness may include news articles or evidence from computer
databases showing that the relevant goods [or services] are used together or used by
the same purchasers; advertisements showing that the relevant goods [or services]
are advertised together or sold by the same manufacturer or dealer; or copies of prior
use-based registrations of the same mark for both applicant’s goods [or services] and
the goods [or services] listed in the cited registration.” In re Embiid, No. 88202890,
2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *30 (TTAB 2021). In addition, “[t]he application and
registration themselves may provide evidence of the relationship between the [goods
and] services.” Monster Energy, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *19-20. See also Bose Corp.

Serial No. 97503369
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v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“On the face of the
registrations themselves, QSC’s [amplifiers and power amplifiers] and the
ACOUSTIC WAVE [loudspeaker systems and music systems consisting of a
loudspeaker system, amplifier and other items] are related.”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding the Board erred in
concluding that there was insufficient evidence of relatedness, because it “did not
consider the important evidence already before it, namely the ITU application and
[opposer’s] registrations”).
When considering the issue of relatedness, the “Examining Attorney need not
prove, and we need not find, similarity as to each product [and service] listed in the
description of goods [and services]” in each class in the application. St. Julian Wine,
2020 TTAB LEXIS 196, at *10. “‘[I]t is sufficient for finding a likelihood of confusion
if relatedness is established for any item [or service] encompassed by the
identification of goods [and services] within a particular class in the application.’” Id.
at *10 (quoting In re Aquamar, Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 178, at *9 n.5
(TTAB 2015)); see also Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335,
1336 (CCPA 1981).
Because each class in Applicant’s multi-class application is, in effect, a separate
application, we would typically consider each class separately and determine whether
the Examining Attorney has shown a likelihood of confusion with respect to each. In
re OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 88706809, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 353, at *9-10 (TTAB 2023).
Here, however, we focus on the following goods and services from each class:

Serial No. 97503369
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• Computer software platforms, downloadable, for managing electric vehicle
charge stations and locations, locating a nearby charge station for vehicles,
creating electric vehicle charge schedules, managing charge station access
control, setting charge station prices, tracking and optimizing electric vehicle
energy usage with load management, providing charging insights of users’
vehicles, tracking Co2 and other sustainability metrics, managing and
processing users’ charging station revenues, monitoring charging activity and
vehicle telematics, providing reimbursement for electric vehicle drivers’ home
charging activities, in Class 9; and
• Providing temporary use of non-downloadable cloud-based software for
managing electric vehicle charge stations and locations, locating a nearby
charge station for vehicles, creating electric vehicle charge schedules,
managing charge station access control, setting charge station prices, tracking
and optimizing electric vehicle energy usage with load management, providing
charging insights of users’ vehicles, tracking Co2 and other sustainability
metrics, managing and processing users’ charging station revenues,
monitoring charging activity and vehicle telematics, providing reimbursement
for electric vehicle drivers’ home charging activities, in Class 42.
In this case, because Applicant’s Class 9 software goods and its Class 42 software
services share identical functionality, and differ only by their introductory language
(i.e., “Computer software platforms, downloadable” versus “Providing temporary use
of non-downloadable cloud-based software”), we consider them together.
Focusing in detail on Applicant’s identified goods and services set out above,
Applicant seeks registration of its mark in Class 9 for downloadable software and 42
non-downloadable software, both for, among other things, “locating a nearby charge
station for vehicles.” The Cited Registration identifies “Charging station services for
electric vehicles.” We find that there is an obvious, inherent relationship between
Applicant’s identified goods and services and Registrant’s services; the identifications
in the application and registration themselves support a finding that the goods and
services have a close niche relationship involving electric vehicle charging stations.

Serial No. 97503369
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See Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267 (the identifications of goods and services in
the subject application and cited registration may be evidence of relatedness).
In addition to this inherent relationship, third-party website evidence of record
shows providers of electric vehicle charging stations also provide software pertaining
to charging stations including software for locating charging stations.25 This includes
website evidence from Electrify America, ChargePoint, Shell, Tesla and EVBox.
Indeed, Applicant concedes that these entities “offer charging station services or
installation of charging equipment and an app or software to use in conjunction with
their charging stations.”26 This evidence shows that consumers are accustomed to
encountering Applicant’s goods and services together with Registrant’s identified
services offered under the same mark by a single source. See, e.g., Detroit Athletic,
903 F.3d at 1306 (crediting relatedness evidence that third parties use the same mark
for the goods and services at issue because “[t]his evidence suggests that consumers
are accustomed to seeing a single mark associated with a source that sells both”);
Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267 (evidence that “a single company sells the goods
and services of both parties, if presented, is relevant to a relatedness analysis”).
Our determination is bolstered by the fact that the involved application was
amended to delete its Class 37 services in its entirety, i.e., “Charging station services
25 May 2, 2023 Office Action at 4-5; August 16, 2023 Office Action at 3-4,
We agree with Applicant (13 TTABVUE 16) that the website evidence for PlugShare
(www.plugshare.com) does not show that charging stations are offered under the mark and
do not consider it to support a showing of relatedness. See May 2, 2023 Office Action at 6;
August 16, 2023 Office Action at 5.
26 13 TTABVUE 16.

Serial No. 97503369
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for electric vehicles.” This deleted service is identical to the service identified in the
Cited Registration. Here, the original identification of the involved application tends
to indicate that there is a relationship between Applicant’s goods and services and
Registrant’s services. See, e.g., Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Houston Comput. Servs. Inc., 918
F.2d 937, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding a relationship between the applicant’s
“modems” and the opposer’s “computer programs,” holding that the relationship
between the goods “is shown,” in part, “by [applicant’s] original application, which
indicates [applicant] itself used the mark OCTOCOM for both modems and computer
programs”).27 See also In re Binion, No. 76590702, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 701, at *12
(TTAB 2009) (“As evidenced by applicant’s original recitation of services that
included ‘restaurant services,’ coupled with the inclusion of such services in his prior
registrations, it is clear that there is a close relationship between, on the one hand,
casino, gaming, hotel and bar services and, on the other, restaurant services.”).
Applicant argues that “[t]he Internet evidence provided by the Examiner shows
that Shell, ChargePoint, Electrify America, Tesla, and EVBox offer charging station
services or installation of charging equipment and an app or software to use in
conjunction with their charging stations.”28 “The app or software offered by these
companies,” Applicant adds, “are ancillary to their goods and services, much like an
27 Although Applicant states in its Request for Remand that the deletion is necessary because
it “does not offer” these identified services “at this time” (9 TTABVUE 2), the original
application was filed alleging use of the mark with these services under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
28 13 TTABVUE 16.

Serial No. 97503369
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operating manual offered with cars or other machines.”29 Apart from this conclusory
argument, however, Applicant does not cite to any particular evidence of record or
make any additional evidence of record to support its position that the software is
ancillary. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.”). Inasmuch as Applicant offers no
evidence to support its argument, Applicant’s argument does not detract from the fact
that the third-party website evidence discussed above shows that Applicant’s
identified goods and services and the services of the Cited Registration are offered by
others under the same mark. Even if we were persuaded by Applicant’s arguments,
the inherent relatedness of Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods and services is still
established by the identifications themselves and bolstered by the fact that
Applicant’s original application included services identical to those in the Cited
Registration, which Applicant subsequently deleted in an attempt to overcome the
Section 2(d) refusal.
Further, because there are no restrictions regarding channels of trade, classes of
consumers or prices in the identifications of the involved application or the Cited
Registration, we must presume that the identified goods and services are sold in the
ordinary or normal trade channels for such goods and services, to all consumers for
such goods and services, and without any price limitation. Specifically, the goods and
services are directed to the same class of consumers, namely, owners of electric
vehicles. Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
29 13 TTABVUE 16.

Serial No. 97503369
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2000) (“When the registration does not contain limitations describing a particular
channel of trade or class of customer, the goods or services are assumed to travel in
all normal channels of trade.”). Here, the Internet evidence demonstrating that
Applicant’s identified goods and services are related to Registrant’s identified
services also supports a finding that the goods and services move in overlapping
channels of trade, namely, the third-party websites offering charging stations and
related software. See e.g., Embiid, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *42-43 (Board found
“channels of trade and classes of customers plainly overlap” where record
demonstrated relevant goods sold together on third-party websites and offered and
registered under a single mark by numerous businesses); In re Toshiba Med. Sys.
Corp., No. 79046106, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 447, at *21 (TTAB 2009) (website evidence
shows same or overlapping channels of trade and classes of customers).
Because Applicant’s identified goods and services are inherently related to
Registrant’s identified services and travel through overlapping channel of trade, the
second and third DuPont factors support a conclusion that confusion is likely.
D. Conditions Under Which and Buyers to Whom Sales Are Made
The fourth DuPont factor considers the likely care exercised by relevant
consumers. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 (“The conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.”). Applicant
argues its target consumers “are professionals using software to manage charging
stations that they own and manage.”30 According to Applicant, “[t]hese consumers
30 13 TTABVUE 18.

Serial No. 97503369
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invest a lot of money into setting up their charging stations and also possess technical
knowledge to own and operate a charging station.”31 Applicant, however, submitted
no evidence that its consumers are “professionals,” nor did it offer evidence of the
pricing of its identified goods or services or of the level of care used when buying such
goods and services.
Because there is no evidence that the least sophisticated purchaser would exercise
anything more than ordinary care, the fourth DuPont factor is neutral in our analysis.
See Turdin v. Trilobite, Ltd., No. 9400250, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *31 (TTAB 2014)
(finding the fourth DuPont factor neutral where “there is argument in the briefs on
the du Pont factor regarding the conditions of sale and purchaser sophistication, but
no evidentiary support for the arguments”).
E. Conclusion: Weighing the DuPont Factors
Here, the marks are highly similar, causing the first factor to weigh heavily in
favor of a likelihood of confusion. Applicant’s goods and services are inherently
related to Registrant’s identified services, and the channels of trade overlap, so the
second and third DuPont factors also weigh in favor of a likelihood of confusion. The
Cited Mark has some conceptual weakness under the sixth DuPont factor; the fourth
factor, however, is neutral. Here, the first three factors outweigh any conceptual
weakness of the Cited Mark and, as a result, we conclude that confusion is likely.
31 13 TTABVUE 18.

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Decision
The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed as to all classes.