Century Sports, Inc. and Millennium Products, LLC v. Ross Bicycles LLC

jv Mailed: January 30, 2026
Cancellation No. 92088576
Century Sports, Inc. and Millennium
Products, LLC
v.
Ross Bicycles LLC
Before Goodman, Thurmon, and Bradley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
By the Board:
This case comes before the Board for consideration of Respondent’s construed
motion for summary judgment. The motion is contested.
The Board has considered the parties’ briefs and arguments, addresses the record
only to the extent necessary to set forth its analysis and findings, and does not repeat
or address all of the parties’ arguments. See Guess? IP Holder LP v. Knowluxe LLC,
No. 92060707, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 482, at *5 (TTAB 2015).
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
THIS ORDER IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB

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2
I. Background
Respondent, Ross Bicycles LLC, owns Registration No. 7287477 on the Principal
Register for the mark ROSS, in standard characters, for “Bicycles” in International
Class 12.1
In a prior proceeding, Opposition No. 91265264 (“Prior Proceeding”), Century
Sports, Inc. and Millennium Products Group, LLC opposed registration of the
application underlying Respondent’s Registration No. 7287477 on the ground of
likelihood of confusion. 4 TTABVUE 10. There, the Board granted a motion for
summary judgment on the basis of issue preclusion, finding no genuine dispute of
material fact that the finding in a separate prior cancellation proceeding2 that the
opposers had abandoned their ROSS mark precluded the opposers from asserting
priority. Id. After the opposers amended their notice of opposition in the Prior
Proceeding to allege likelihood of confusion, fraud, and lack of bona fide intent to use,
the Board granted a motion to dismiss the likelihood of confusion and fraud claims
with prejudice. Id. The Prior Proceeding then proceeded on the lack of bona fide intent
to use claim. Id. at 10-11. After the opposers failed to submit evidence during their
designated testimony period, on April 19, 2023, the Board denied the opposers’ motion
to reopen their testimony period. Id. at 17. The Board granted Respondent’s motion
1 The underlying Application Serial No. 87673601 was filed on November 6, 2017 based on
Respondent’s alleged intent to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). The registration issued January 23, 2024.
2 Cancellation No. 92067406, involving Century Sports, Inc. and Respondent.

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for involuntary dismissal under Trademark Rule 2.132(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.132(a), and
dismissed the opposition with prejudice. Id.
On May 30, 2023, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
issued a notice of allowance to Respondent’s Application Serial No. 87673601.
Respondent timely filed its statement of use on November 14, 2023, and the USPTO
issued Registration No. 7287477 on January 23, 2024.
On June 8, 2025, Petitioners, Century Sports, Inc. and Millennium Products,
LLC, filed the instant proceeding seeking to cancel Respondent’s Registration No.
7287477 on the grounds of lack of bona fide intent to use at the time Respondent’s
application was filed and nonuse at the time Respondent filed its statement of use
(“Instant Proceeding”).
On July 17, 2025, in lieu of an answer to the petition to cancel, Respondent filed
a “motion to dismiss,” arguing that “the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel bar Petitioner from raising these arguments again” based on the Prior
Proceeding. 4 TTABVUE 3. On August 1, 2025, the Board construed Respondent’s
filing as a motion for summary judgment inasmuch as the motion relies on matters
outside the pleadings. 5 TTABVUE. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
II. Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine disputes as
to any material facts, thus allowing the case to be resolved as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of

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demonstrating the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact, and that it is
entitled to a judgment under the applicable law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986); Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1987). A factual dispute is genuine if, on the evidence of record, a reasonable
fact finder could resolve the matter in favor of the non-moving party. See Opryland
USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Olde Tyme
Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 202 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Evidence on summary
judgment must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Lloyd’s Food Prods.,
Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Opryland USA, 970 F.2d at 850.
The Board may not resolve genuine disputes as to material facts; it may only
ascertain whether genuine disputes as to material facts exist. See Lloyd’s Food
Prods., 987 F.2d at 767; Olde Tyme Foods, 961 F.2d at 202.
B. Claim Preclusion
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, also called res judicata, a valid and final
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff on
the same claim or a claim that could have been raised in the earlier action if it is
based on the same transactional facts as the adjudged claim. See Urock Network, LLC
v. Sulpasso, No. 92058974, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 293, at *11 (TTAB 2015) (citing Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Under claim preclusion, “a second suit will be
barred by claim preclusion if: (1) there is identity of parties (or their privies); (2) there
has been an earlier final judgment on the merits of a claim; and (3) the second claim

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is based on the same set of transactional facts as the first.” Jet Inc. v. Sewage Aeration
Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)).
1. Identity of the Parties
The record shows that the parties in the Instant Proceeding are the same as or
are in privity with the parties to the Prior Proceeding. There is no dispute that
Respondent and Petitioner Century Sports, Inc. were parties to the Prior Proceeding.
The second opposer in the Prior Proceeding is identified as Millennium Products
Group, LLC, and the second petitioner in the Instant Proceeding is Millennium
Products, LLC, without “Group” in the name.3 In the Prior Proceeding, Century
Sports, Inc. and Millennium Products Group, LLC alleged ownership of a pending
application for the mark ROSS. 4 TTABVUE 10. In the Instant Proceeding, Century
Sports, Inc. and Millennium Products, LLC allege ownership of a pending application
for the mark ROSS, filed on October 2, 2020, which was eight days before the notice
of opposition in the Prior Proceeding was filed.4 1 TTABVUE 4. Although Millennium
Products Group, LLC and Millennium Products, LLC have different corporate names,
both allege in pleadings co-ownership with Century Sports, Inc. of an application for
the mark ROSS.
3 Todd Wengrovsky, who is representing Petitioners in the Instant Proceeding, also
represented the opposers in the Prior Proceeding. 1 TTABVUE 7 and 4 TTABVUE 14.
4 The notice of opposition in the Prior Proceeding was filed on October 10, 2020. 4 TTABVUE
10.

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Even if the entities are not the same, Millennium Products, LLC is in privity with
Century Sports, Inc. as co-owner of an application for the ROSS mark that existed at
the time the Prior Proceeding was filed. Thus, the interests of Millennium Products,
LLC were aligned with and represented by its co-owner Century Sports, Inc. in the
Prior Proceeding. As a result, we find no genuine dispute of material fact that
Millennium Products, LLC and Century Sports, Inc. are in privity. See Litchfield v.
Goodnow’s Adm’r, 123 U.S. 549, 551 (1887) (“[T]he term privity denotes mutual or
successive relationship to the same rights of property.”).
The first element of claim preclusion is therefore satisfied.
2. Final Judgment on the Merits of a Claim
The Board’s order dismissing the Prior Proceeding with prejudice is a final
judgment. “A judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject
matter operates as res judicata, in the absence of fraud or collusion, even if obtained
upon a default.” Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 550-51 (1947) (quoting Riehle v.
Marolies, 279 U.S. 218, 225 (1929)); Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 220
F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“default judgments can give rise to res judicata”);
Flowers Indus. Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp., No. 91070572, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 2,
at *7 (TTAB 1987) (claim preclusion applied “even when the prior judgment resulted
from default, consent, or dismissal with prejudice”); Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc’y of
Am., Inc., Bass Pro Lures, Inc., No. 91060035, 1978 TTAB LEXIS 114, at *13 (TTAB
1978) (“[T]he application of a legal doctrine which would be appropriate to a judgment
after trial is equally appropriate to a judgment by default.”). In the Prior Proceeding,

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the Board granted a motion for involuntary dismissal for failure to submit evidence
and denied the notice of opposition with prejudice. 4 TTABVUE 17. Accordingly, there
is no genuine dispute of material fact that there was an earlier final judgment on the
merits of a claim.
The second element of claim preclusion is therefore satisfied.
3. Same Set of Transactional Facts
Petitioner’s motion implicates the defensive doctrine of “bar,” wherein the Board
must analyze whether a plaintiff can bring a subsequent action against a defendant.
See Jet Inc., 223 F.3d at 1363. As noted above, “[t]his bar extends to relitigation of
‘claims that were raised or could have been raised’ in an earlier action.” Urock, 2015
TTAB LEXIS 293, at *11 (citing Allen, 449 U.S. at 94) (emphasis provided in Urock).
“Thus, under claim preclusion, a plaintiff is barred from a ‘subsequent assertion of
the same transactional facts in the form of a different cause of action or theory of
relief.’” Id. (quoting Vitaline Corp. v. General Mills Inc., 891 F.2d 273, 275 (Fed. Cir.
1989)). Factors relevant to determining whether the claims are based on the same set
of transactional facts include whether the facts are so woven together as to constitute
a single claim in their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether,
taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial purposes. Id. at *14 (citing
comment b to Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)).
The lack of bona fide intent to use claim is based on the same set of transactional
facts as the same claim raised in the Prior Proceeding. After dismissing the likelihood
of confusion and fraud claims in the Prior Proceeding, the Board “informed the parties

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that the case would proceed on the claim of lack of bona fide intent to use.” 4
TTABVUE 10-11. In the Instant Proceeding, Petitioners allege that Respondent did
not have a bona fide intent to use its mark in commerce at the time it filed its
application. 1 TTABVUE 5. While the amended pleading from the Prior Proceeding
was not made of record for the purposes of this motion, any facts pertinent to the lack
of bona fide intent to use claim related to Respondent’s intent at the time in which it
filed its application that matured into the subject registration. See Tequila Cuadra
S. de RL de CV v. Manufacturera de Botas Cuadra, S.A. de C.V., No. 91282327, 2025
TTAB LEXIS 207, at *12 (TTAB 2025) (quoting Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays
Cap. Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2022)) (“The central inquiry in a lack of bona
fide intent to use claim is whether at the time of filing the application ‘the applicant’s
intent to use the mark was firm and not merely intent to reserve a right in a mark.’”).
The opposers in the Prior Proceeding had the opportunity to seek evidence to support
their claim through discovery and submit any evidence during its trial period but
failed to serve initial disclosures, take any discovery, or submit any evidence. 4
TTABVUE 14. The lack of bona fide intent to use claims in the Instant Proceeding
and the Prior Proceeding involve the intent of the same party, at the same time, with
respect to the same application and mark. Even if Petitioners believe Respondent’s
statement of use and specimen are “new corroborating evidence,” the claim is still
based on the same nucleus of facts around Respondent’s intent at the time it filed the
application. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001) (Claim preclusion

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bars “successive ligitation of the very same claim, whether or not relitagation of the
claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.”).
The nonuse claim, however, is not based on the same set of transactional facts as
the claim raised in the Prior Proceeding. Generally, claim preclusion does not bar
claims based on facts occurring after the filing of the prior complaint. See Lucky
Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 590 U.S. 405, 414 (2020) (citing
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582, 600 (2016)). Petitioners allege
that “Respondent’s mark was not in use in commerce in connection with Respondent’s
goods at the time of the filing of the statement of use and specimen for Respondent’s
Application.”5 1 TTABVUE 6. The order dismissing the Prior Proceeding issued on
April 19, 2023. 4 TTABVUE 9. On May 30, 2023, the USPTO issued to Respondent a
notice of allowance, allowing Respondent until November 30, 2023 to file a statement
of use.6 Respondent filed its statement of use on November 14, 2023. Thus, the
relevant time frame and events for the nonuse claim occur after the Prior Proceeding
terminated, meaning the opposers could not have raised the nonuse claim in the Prior
Proceeding. Accordingly, the nonuse claim is not based on the same set of
transactional facts as the claims raised in the Prior Proceeding.
The third element of claim preclusion therefore is satisfied only as to the lack of
bona fide intent to use claim.
5 Although Petitioners allege that Respondent failed to use its mark in commerce at the time
the statement of use was filed, Respondent was required to use its mark in commerce by the
statement of use deadline. See Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., No. 92057132,
2017 TTAB LEXIS 437, at *40 (TTAB 2017).
6 Notice of Allowance of May 30, 2023.

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C. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion)
Although Respondent’s argument focuses on claim preclusion, the motion also
states that Petitioners’ claims are barred by collateral estoppel, also known as issue
preclusion.
Collateral estoppel applies when “a matter has been litigated and decided.” Migra
v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984); see also B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015). In order for collateral
estoppel to apply as a defensive bar to subsequent litigation, Respondent must
establish the following four requirements: (1) the issue to be determined must be
identical to the issue involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been
actually litigated in the prior action; (3) the determination of the issue must have
been necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the party precluded must have had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
Mayer/Berkshire Corp. v. Berkshire Fashions Inc., 424 F.3d 1229, 1232 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citing Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1979)). The “actually litigated”
requirement is “generally satisfied if the parties to the original action disputed the
issue and the trier of fact resolved it.” Mother’s Rest. Inc. v. Mama’s Pizza, Inc., 723
F.2d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting Cont’l Can Co. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590,
596 (7th Cir. 1979)).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is not appropriate under these circumstances.
In the Prior Proceeding, the Board granted a motion for involuntary dismissal for
failure to submit evidence and dismissed the opposition with prejudice. 4 TTABVUE

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17. Thus, the Prior Proceeding terminated with no issues being presented to and
decided by a trier of fact. Because neither the bona fide intent to use nor nonuse
claims were actually litigated in the Prior Proceeding, the claims are not barred by
collateral estoppel. Haider Capital Holding Corp. LLC v. Skin Deep Laser MD, LLC,
2021 TTAB LEXIS 338, No. 94003006, at *6-7 (TTAB 2021) (issue was not actually
litigated in prior cancellation proceeding involuntarily dismissed for failure to
prosectue under Trademark Rule 2.132(a)).
D. Summary
We find no genuine dispute of material fact that the parties to the proceedings are
identical or were in privity, there was a prior final judgment on the merits, and that
the lack of bona fide intent to use claim is based on the same set of transactional facts
as the same claim in the Prior Proceeding. Accordingly, Respondent’s motion for
summary judgment based on claim preclusion is granted with respect to the lack of
bona fide intent to use claim.
Respondent’s motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to the nonuse
claim.
III. Petitioner’s Amended Petition to Cancel
On August 1, 2025, the Board construed Respondent’s motion as a motion for
summary judgment and suspended proceedings pending disposition of the motion. 5
TTABVUE. The order stated that “[a]ny paper filed during the pendency of this
motion which is not germane thereto will be given no consideration.” Id. at 2. On
August 6, 2025, Petitioners filed an amended petition to cancel. 6 TTABVUE. The

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Board reiterated that Respondent’s motion was construed as a motion for summary
judgment, and although an amended petition to cancel would be an appropriate
response to a motion to dismiss, the amended petition to cancel was not germane to
the construed motion for summary judgment and would not be considered. 7
TTABVUE.
Petitioners’ response to the motion for summary judgment again seeks to amend
the petition to cancel. 8 TTABVUE 3-5, 8-12. In view of the decision on the construed
motion for summary judgment, and that Respondent has yet to file its answer, the
amended petition to cancel is accepted as Petitioners’ one amendment as a matter of
course. 8 TTABVUE 8-12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 507.02 (2025) (“As a practical matter,
because the time to answer set by the Board’s institution order is greater than 21
days, a plaintiff may amend its complaint once as a matter of course beyond the initial
21 days from serving it until the defendant files either an answer or a Rule 12(b), (e)
or (f) motion.”).
However, the lack of bona fide intent to use and fraud claims are stricken from
the amended petition to cancel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1); TBMP § 506.01.
As explained above, Petitioners lack of bona fide intent to use claim is barred by
claim preclusion.
With respect to fraud, Petitioner failed to sufficiently plead the claim. To plead a
fraud claim, Petitioner must allege facts showing that Respondent knowingly made
a false, material representation in the prosecution of its application with the intent

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to deceive the USPTO. See In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In
alleging fraud, the pleading must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Petitioner’s allegations of fraud incorporate the allegations from the nonuse claim,
alleging that the statement of use and specimen are fraudulent, material
misrepresentations. 8 TTABVUE 11-12. However, Petitioner’s allegations regarding
the falsity of the statement of use and specimen are based “upon information and
belief.” Id. at 11. But allegations of fraud based on “information and belief” with no
allegation of “specific facts upon which the belief is reasonably based” are insufficient
to meet the particularity required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Asian & W. Classics B.V. v.
Selkow, No. 92048821, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 643, at *2 (TTAB 2009) (citing Exergen
Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Petitioner also
fails to allege that Respondent intended to deceive the USPTO. Because Petitioner
failed to plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud and failed to
plead the indispensable element of intent, the fraud claim is not sufficiently pleaded.
Generally, it is the Board’s practice to grant leave to amend an insufficient
pleading, if leave to replead would not be futile. Dragon Bleu (SARL) v. VENM, LLC,
No. 91212231, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 352, at *13 n.10 (TTAB 2014). Accordingly,
Petitioner is allowed until March 4, 2026 in which to file and serve a second amended
petition to cancel that properly pleads the fraud claim, failing which the proceeding
will proceed on the nonuse claim only.

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In turn, Respondent is allowed until April 3, 2026 in which to file and serve an
answer or otherwise respond to the second amended petition to cancel, if filed, or to
the amended petition to cancel, as modified by this order, if a second amended petition
to cancel is not filed and served by the deadline set forth above.
IV. Proceedings Resumed
Proceedings are resumed. The proceeding schedule is reset as set forth below.
Time to Answer 4/3/2026
Deadline for Discovery Conference 5/3/2026
Discovery Opens 5/3/2026
Initial Disclosures Due 6/2/2026
Expert Disclosures Due 9/30/2026
Discovery Closes 10/30/2026
Plaintiff's Pretrial Disclosures Due 12/14/2026
Plaintiff's 30-day Trial Period Ends 1/28/2027
Defendant's Pretrial Disclosures Due 2/12/2027
Defendant's 30-day Trial Period Ends 3/29/2027
Plaintiff's Rebuttal Disclosures Due 4/13/2027
Plaintiff's 15-day Rebuttal Period Ends 5/13/2027
Plaintiff's Opening Brief Due 7/12/2027
Defendant's Brief Due 8/11/2027
Plaintiff's Reply Brief Due 8/26/2027
Request for Oral Hearing (optional) Due 9/5/2027
Generally, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to Board trials. Trial testimony is
taken and introduced out of the presence of the Board during the assigned testimony
periods. The parties may stipulate to a wide variety of matters, and many
requirements relevant to the trial phase of Board proceedings are set forth in
Trademark Rules 2.121 through 2.125, 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.121-2.125. These include
pretrial disclosures, the manner and timing of taking testimony, matters in evidence,
and the procedures for submitting and serving testimony and other evidence,
including affidavits, declarations, deposition transcripts and stipulated evidence.

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Trial briefs shall be submitted in accordance with Trademark Rules 2.128(a) and (b),
37 C.F.R. §§ 2.128(a) and (b). Oral argument at final hearing will be scheduled only
upon the timely submission of a separate notice as allowed by Trademark Rule
2.129(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.129(a).