Teikoku USA Inc.

Mailed: December 31, 2025
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
————
In re Teikoku USA Inc.
————
Serial No. 98422574
————
Kristen Ruisi and Sara Krastins of Venable LLP,
for Teikoku USA Inc.
Gabrielle Marotta, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 103
Stacy Wahlberg, Managing Attorney.
————
Before Wellington, Heasley, and Bradley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Teikoku USA Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
standard character mark DYNAPUMP for the following goods:
combined pumps for machines and liquid cooled electric motors for
machines for pumping liquids; pumps for machines for pumping liquids;
liquid cooled electric motors for machines for pumping liquids; pumps for
machines that are jacketed for cooling and heating; liquid cooled electric
motors for machines jacketed for cooling and heating; submersible pumps
featuring liquid cooled electric motors for machines; non-cooled, high
temperature insulated liquid cooled pumps for machines featuring electric
motors for machines for pumping high temperature liquids; oil circulation
pumps for machines; industry and underwriter complaint [sic] pumps for
machines featuring liquid cooled electric motors for machines for pumping
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Serial No. 98422574
2
liquids; self-priming volute pumps for machines featuring liquid cooled
electric motors for machines,
in International Class 7.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Trademark Act (“the Act”) Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of
likelihood of confusion based on the registered standard character mark DYNAPUMP
for goods and services, including:
artificial lift systems for pumping oil, gas, and water from wells; oil and
gas well production and performance optimization equipment,
in International Class 7.2
After the Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant requested
reconsideration and filed an appeal. The Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration and the appeal resumed. Both Applicant and the Examining Attorney
filed briefs. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the refusal.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Act, in relevant part, prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion.” 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d). To determine whether confusion is likely, we analyze all probative
1 Application Serial No. 98422574, filed February 27, 2024, based on Applicant’s allegation
of first use of the mark anywhere and in commerce on May 11, 1953, under Trademark Act
Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
2 Registration No. 5532576 issued August 7, 2018; Sections 8 and 15 declaration accepted.
The registration also covers services in Classes 37, 40 and 42; however, the refusal to
registration only pertains to the above-listed Class 7 goods in the registration.

Serial No. 98422574
3
evidence relevant to the factors set out in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d
1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key DuPont factors are the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks and the relatedness of the respective goods or services,
because the “fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect
of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA
1976). Here, we have considered each DuPont factor that is relevant and for which
there is evidence and argument of record. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Varying weight may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he various
evidentiary factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular
determination.”). Ultimately, however, “[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts
and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d
1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
A. Comparison of the Marks
We turn now to the first DuPont factor, which focuses on the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation,
and commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at

Serial No. 98422574
4
1361). Similarity as to any one of these elements may be sufficient to support a
finding that the marks are confusingly similar. See Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form,
spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”); accord In re Inn at St. John’s,
LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13, aff’d mem., 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
In this case, Applicant’s mark, DYNAPUMP, is identical to the cited mark,
DYNAPUMP. Thus, the marks are clearly the same in appearance and sound. We
also find the marks have the same connotation or commercial impression in
connection with the respective goods that, as discussed later, involve powered
pumps.3 In other words, the same suggestive meaning is being conveyed the marks.
Accordingly, the first DuPont factor weighs strongly in favor of a conclusion that
confusion is likely.
B. The Goods and Their Channels of Trade
We turn now to the second and third DuPont factors, which concern the
relatedness of the goods and the channels of trade for the goods. DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361. In this analysis, we must consider the goods as they are identified in Applicant’s
application and the cited registration. See Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap.
LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston
3 We take judicial notice that “dyna-” is defined as a combining form meaning “power.”
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 5th Digital Edition. Copyright 2025
HarperCollins Publishers. See B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design Inc., 846 F.2d
727, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“dictionaries and encyclopedias may be consulted”); In re Mr.
Recipe, LLC, No. 86040643, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 80, at *8 n.3 (Board may take judicial notice
of information from authoritative sources).

Serial No. 98422574
5
Comp. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). It is sufficient for a finding of
likelihood of confusion as to a class of goods in the application if relatedness is
established for any one of the recited goods within that class in the application.
Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981).
We also keep in mind that, “where identical marks are involved, as is the case
here, the degree of similarity between the goods that is required to support a finding
of likelihood of confusion declines.” In re i.am.symbolic, No. 85044494, 2015 TTAB
LEXIS 369, at *16 (citing Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1207 (“[E]ven when goods . . . are not
competitive or intrinsically related, the use of identical marks can lead to the
assumption that there is a common source.”)).
Here, the Examining Attorney argues that “the cited goods ‘oil and gas well
production and performance optimization equipment’ are broad enough to compass
the applicant’s various pump and motor goods”4 and that because “[t]he goods of the
parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of
purchasers [they] are ‘presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same
class of purchasers,’”5 quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
In support, the Examining Attorney submitted Internet evidence—comprising
screenshots from 10 third-party websites—that “demonstrates that the applicant's
various pump and motor goods are merely a more narrow type of the cited goods,
specifically the cited goods ‘oil and gas well production and performance optimization
4 8 TTABVUE 9.
5 8 TTABVUE 10.

Serial No. 98422574
6
equipment.’”6
The Examining Attorney also submitted screenshots from Applicant’s website
showing Applicant’s “canned motor pumps” include a model described as compliant
with “API 685, a strict safety standard in the oil & gas and petrochemical fields” and
“[s]uitable for pumping high temperature, high pressure hydrocarbons mainly in
petroleum refining processes.”7 Another “canned motor pump” is described as
“providing safer, more economical operation through reduced long-term cost of
ownership” and, on the same page, a “metering pump” that is “suitable for handing
toxic or combustible hazardous liquids … slurry and high-viscosity liquids.”8
Applicant’s website also specifically touts that “Teikoku USA Inc … offer[s] a
complete line of sealless, leakproof canned motor pumps fully conforming to
[American Petroleum Institute standard] API 685 Sealless Centrifugal Pumps for
Petroleum, Heavy Duty Chemical, and Gas Industry.”9 (Emphasis in bold added).
Applicant, on the other hand, argues that “[t]he products offered by Applicant and
the products offered under the Cited Registration are vastly different, as are the
applications served.”10 Specifically, Applicant focuses on the “artificial lift systems for
pumping oil, gas, and water from wells” listed in the registration and argues:11
6 8 TTABVUE 12. Third-party website screenshots were attached to Office Action issued
November 27, 2024.
7 4 TTABVUE 9; Applicant’s website evidence attached to Office Action issued May 13, 2025.
8 4 TTABVUE 10.
9 4 TTABVUE 18.
10 6 TTABVUE 10.
11 6 TTABVUE 10-11.

Serial No. 98422574
7
Machine pumps are not surface mounted artificial lift systems. Machine
pumps do not operate or provide the same function as surface mounted
artificial lift systems. This is well-known by the purchasers of Applicant’s
products and the purchasers of the products sold under the Cited
Registration. ... Canned motor pumps and artificial lift systems serve
separate and distinct industries, and accordingly do not travel through the
same channels of trade.
…
The goods offered under Applicant’s Mark and those offered under the
Cited Registration simply do not have the same functionality. Applicant’s
goods are canned motor pumps. Canned motor pumps are a centrifugal
pump which means they transport liquids by the conversion of rotational
kinetic energy. Artificial lift systems function completely differently.
Artificial lift systems are used to increase the pressure in oil wells to
stimulate production of oil to the surface.
In response to the Examining Attorney’s submission of evidence showing
Applicant manufactures pumps used in the oil and gas industry, it asserts:12
None of the products sold under Applicant’s Mark meets these standards
or is suitable for use in any of the markets referenced in the paragraph
cited by the Examiner. The products sold under Applicant’s Mark are a
small pump range for limited circulation and boost applications used in
general industrial markets. The products sold under Applicant’s Mark
have a maximum motor size of approximately 16 HP.
Here, we agree with the Examining Attorney in that giving a full sweep to the
identifications of goods in the application and cited registration, as we must, the
Registrant’s “oil and gas well production and performance optimization equipment”
is broad enough to encompass Applicant’s identified pumps, some of which are fairly
broadly described in the application, including “pumps for machines for pumping
liquids” and “oil circulation pumps for machines.” See S.W. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled,
Ltd., No. 94002242, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 176, at *60-61 (where the goods or services in
12 6 TTABVUE 12.

Serial No. 98422574
8
an application or registration are broadly described, they are deemed to encompass
all the goods or services of the nature and type described therein) (citation omitted);
In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 85627379, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 65, at *10
(“Applicant’s broadly worded identification of ‘furniture’ necessarily encompasses
Registrant’s narrowly identified ‘residential and commercial furniture.’“). As the
evidence demonstrates, the pumps described in the application constitute the type of
“equipment”13 that may be used for “production and performance optimization” in the
“oil and gas well industry.” Indeed, as evidenced by Applicant’s own website, some of
its pumps are touted as “more economical” and “safe” and for specific use in the field
of extracting or moving in the oil and gas industry.
Although Applicant argues that it only uses the mark, DYNAPUMP, on limited
range and size of pumps that are not for use in the oil and gas industry, such
limitations are not contained in Applicant’s identification of goods. Thus, again giving
a full sweep to Applicant’s identification of goods, as we must, we construe the
identification to include pumps that are larger or more powerful and for use in the oil
and gas industry, like those shown on Applicant’s website and that fall within the
scope of Registrant’s goods.
Given that Registrant’s goods partially encompass Applicant’s goods, we find they
are in-part legally identical. Moreover, as to the channels of trade, we must presume
that these legally identical goods will be offered in the same trade channels to the
13 The Examining Attorney submitted a dictionary definition of the word “pump” as “a piece
of equipment that is used to cause liquid, air, or gas to move from one place to another.” Office
Action issued November 27, 2024, at TSDR p. 31.

Serial No. 98422574
9
same classes of consumers. Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1362 (even though there was no
evidence regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the Board was
entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); see
also Genesco Inc. v. Martz, No. 91121296, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 123, at *28 (“Given the
in-part identical and in-part related nature of the parties’ goods, and the lack of any
restrictions in the identifications thereof as to trade channels and purchasers, these
clothing items could be offered and sold to the same classes of purchasers through the
same channels of trade.”).
Even if we did not find Registrant’s goods to encompass Applicant’s goods, the
Internet evidence submitted by the Examining Attorney demonstrates that the goods
are closely related. For example, the Flintec website describes various types of pumps
as being “the heart of the oil extraction industry,” and these include “rod lift pumps
… electrical submersible pumps (ESPs) … hydraulic pumps.”14 Another company’s
website, Oberdorfer, describes its pumps as “used to transfer liquids in for mixing
applications in chemical-add trailers for [oil] fracking.”15 Another company, SLB,
describes pumps like those described in the application, e.g., “pumps for machines for
pumping liquids,” as being able to “increase efficiency, reduce costs … simplify
maintenance … save time” in connection with “complex refinery services and crude
oil transfer.”16 Thus, Applicant’s pumps may serve the same purpose as Registrant’s
14 Office Action issue November 27, 2024, at TSDR p. 40.
15 Office Action issue November 27, 2024, at TSDR p. 45.
16 Office Action issue November 27, 2024, at TSDR p. 50.

Serial No. 98422574
10
equipment for “oil and gas well production and performance optimization” or may be
an integral part of systems like Registrant’s “artificial lift systems for pumping oil,
gas, and water from wells.”
In sum, we find Registrant’s goods partially encompass Applicant’s goods and they
are thus in-part legally identical; these legally identical goods may be offered to the
same classes of consumers in the same trade channels. Accordingly, the second and
third DuPont factors also weigh strongly in favor of finding confusion likely. Also,
even should the respective goods not be found legally identical, the evidence
establishes a close relationship between them and, in that case, the second DuPont
factor weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
C. Applicant’s Prior (Cancelled) Registration and Coexistence With
Cited Registration ‘Without Consumer Confusion’
Under the seventh and eighth DuPont factors, we consider the nature and extent
of actual confusion, if any, in light of the length of time and conditions under which
there has been contemporaneous use of the subject marks. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
Applicant argues:17
Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Registration coexisted on the Principal
Register of the USPTO from August 7, 2018 to March 16, 2020—a period
of nearly three years. The Cited Registration Registered on August 7, 2018.
Applicant previously owned U.S. Registration No. 598464 for DYNAPUMP
in Class 7. U.S. Registration no. 598464 registered on November 23, 1954
and was maintained on the Principal Register of the USPTO until March
16, 2020. Although this registration was subsequently cancelled, Applicant
never ceased use of Applicant’s Mark. This means Applicant’s Mark and
the Cited Registration have continued to coexist in U.S. commerce without
consumer confusion since August 7, 2018— nearly seven years.
17 6 TTABVUE 8.

Serial No. 98422574
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The Examining Attorney does not give proper credence to the fact that
Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Registration previously coexisted on the
Principal Register of the USPTO without consumer confusion for a period
of nearly three years and continued to coexist in U.S. commerce for nearly
seven years without any instances of consumer confusion.
At the outset, we note that Applicant’s prior (cancelled) registration, for the
standard character mark DYNAPUMP, was for “centrifugal sealless magnetic pumps
adapted for use in domestic hot water heating systems.” These goods are explicitly
limited in their field of use to “domestic hot water heating systems,” in contrast to the
more broadly described pumps in the involved application, which can be construed to
encompass pumps for use in the oil and gas well industry.
Moreover, as the Examining Attorney points out, the putative period of
coexistence of the cited registration and Applicant’s prior registration was actually
approximately a few days over 1 year and 7 months, and not “nearly 3” years.18 In
addition, although Applicant does not cite to the Board precedential decision In re
Strategic Partners, Inc., No. 77903451, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 80, the Examining
Attorney points out that any attempt to do so is unavailing.19
18 8 TTABVUE 17.
19 8 TTABVUE 17. The Strategic Partners decision is generally considered in the context of
the thirteenth and final DuPont factor, pertaining to “any other established fact probative of
the effect of use.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. In Strategic Partners, the Board reversed a
Section 2(d) refusal on appeal based on the following unique set of facts: (1) the marks in
applicant’s prior registration and application were virtually identical (“no meaningful
difference” existed between them, such that they were “substantially similar”); (2) the goods
were identical in part; and (3) the prior registration had co-existed for at least five years with
the cited registration (both being more than five years old and thus immune from attack on
likelihood of confusion grounds). 2012 TTAB LEXIS 80, at *6-8. As the Examining Attorney
correctly notes in the appeal brief, none of these circumstantial facts are present in this
appeal (“applicant’s prior registration is cancelled, and had been cancelled for nearly four (4)
years since the filing date of this instant application … applicant’s prior registration is not

Serial No. 98422574
12
Finally, we point out that Applicant’s “uncorroborated statements of no known
instances of actual confusion are of little evidentiary value.” Majestic Distilling, 315
F.3d at 1317 (“lack of evidence of actual confusion carries little weight, especially in
an ex parte context”) (citation omitted).20 Additionally, given the ex parte context,
“there has been no opportunity to hear from Registrant about whether it is aware of
any reported instances of confusion.” In re Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 17, at *23.
Accordingly, we find the seventh and eighth DuPont factors neutral.
D. Alleged ‘Highly Sophisticated Consumers’
Under the fourth DuPont factor, we consider the conditions under which the goods
are likely to be purchased, e.g., whether on impulse or after careful consideration, as
well as the degree, if any, of sophistication of the consumers. DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361.
Applicant argues:21
Applicant’s customers and the customers of the owner of the Cited
Registration are highly sophisticated consumers skilled and
knowledgeable in their respectable fields. Paired with the fact that both
parties’ products have high price points, it is highly unlikely that any
consumers would be confused as to the source of the parties’ respective
goods.
for the same goods. Particularly, the prior registration owned by the applicant was for vastly
different and limited goods.” 8 TTABVUE 18.
20 We note as well that this argument is simply attorney argument, unsupported by any
declaration or other evidence in the record. See, e.g., Icon Health and Fitness, Inc. v. Strava,
Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Attorney argument is not evidence.”) (citation
omitted); In re Simulations Publ’ns, Inc., 521 F.2d 797, 798 (CCPA 1975) (“Statements in a
brief cannot take the place of evidence.”) (citation omitted).
21 6 TTABVUE 13.

Serial No. 98422574
13
Applicant, however, did not submit any evidence such as consumer declarations
or affidavits to substantiate its contention that consumers of its and Registrant’s
goods are “highly sophisticated skilled and knowledgeable.” Nor is there sufficient
evidence to accurately identify the range of price points for the goods.
Nevertheless, given the intrinsic nature of involved goods, particularly those
goods we find to be legally identical or closely related, it stands to reason these will
be purchased by discriminating professionals or equally sophisticated purchasing
agents with specialized knowledge in the oil and gas well industry. These are
consumers who understandably will exercise greater than ordinary care. See
Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. VigiLanz Corp., No. 91154210, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 84,
at *51 (“Just based on the products involved in this proceeding, one would expect that
all of the purchasers would exercise a high degree of care when making their
purchasing decision.”).
The fourth DuPont factor therefore weighs against a likelihood of confusion.
II. Conclusion
The first DuPont factor strongly favors a finding of a likelihood of confusion
because Applicant’s mark and the cited mark are identical in sight, sound and
connotation. In addition, the second and third DuPont factors also strongly support a
finding that confusion is likely because certain goods listed in the application are
encompassed by Registrant’s broadly described “Oil and gas well production and
performance optimization equipment,” and these legally identical goods are

Serial No. 98422574
14
presumably found in the same trade channels. The evidence also shows that the goods
of Applicant and Registrant are otherwise closely related.
Though the respective consumers of the involved goods will likely exercise care in
their purchasing decisions given the technical nature of the goods, and this tends to
favor a finding that confusion is not likely, this factor is far outweighed by the other
aforementioned factors. On balance, we thus conclude on this record that Applicant’s
mark is likely to cause confusion with the registered mark.
Decision: The refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) to register Applicant’s
mark is affirmed.