Rosetta Stone LLC v. Lauren Jemeyson LLC

RSC Mailed: July 8, 2026
Opposition No. 91290354
Rosetta Stone LLC
v.
Lauren Jemeyson LLC
Before Heasley, Cohen, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
By the Board:
This proceeding comes before the Board for consideration of Opposer’s fully
briefed motion for partial summary judgment, filed May 29, 2025, on its claim of lack
of bona fide intent to use.
In reaching our decision, we considered all of the parties’ arguments and
supporting evidence properly of record, although we do not find it necessary to discuss
all of them in our opinion. See, e.g., Guess? IP Holder L.P. v. Knowluxe LLC, No.
92060707, 2015 WL 9702438, at *1 (TTAB 2015).
I. Background
Applicant seeks registration on the Principal Register of the standard character
mark LORETTA STONE for “Consulting services about education; Educational
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
THIS ORDER IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB

Opposition No. 91290354
2
services, namely, developing curriculum for educators; Training services in the field
of public speaking” in International Class 41.1
Opposer filed a notice of opposition against registration of Applicant’s mark on
the grounds of likelihood of confusion and dilution by blurring, based on numerous
ROSETTA STONE formative registrations.2 On October 31, 2025, Opposer filed an
amended notice of opposition adding a claim of lack of bona fide intent to use under
Trademark Act Section 1(b).3
In its operative answer Applicant denies the salient allegations in the amended
notice of opposition. Applicant did not assert any affirmative defenses.4
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is an appropriate method of disposing of cases in which there
is no genuine dispute with respect to any material fact, thus allowing the case to be
resolved as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary
judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact remaining for trial and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1987).
All evidence must be viewed in a light favorable to the non-movant, in this case
Applicant, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant’s favor.
1 Application Serial No. 97653169, filed October 28, 2022, based on Applicant’s allegation of
a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce.
2 1 TTABVUE.
3 20 TTABVUE. The Board granted the motion for leave to amend on October 20, 2025. 19
TTABVUE.
4 21 TTABVUE.

Opposition No. 91290354
3
Lloyd’s Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Opryland
USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In
deciding a summary judgment motion, the Board may not resolve disputes of material
fact; it may only ascertain whether such disputes exist. Lloyd’s Food Prods., 987 F.2d
at 767; Opryland USA, 970 F.2d at 849; Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961
F.2d 200, 202 (Fed. Cir. 1992). A factual dispute is genuine if, on the evidence of
record, a reasonable fact finder could resolve the matter in favor of the non-moving
party. See Lloyd’s Food Prods., 987 F.2d at 767; Olde Tyme Foods, Inc., 961 F.2d at
202.
Only upon submission of such evidence does the burden then shift to the non-
movant to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact to be
resolved at trial. Enbridge, Inc. v. Excelerate Energy LP, No. 91170364, 2009 WL
3541047, *3 (TTAB 2009). At that point, the non-moving party may not rest on mere
allegations, but must designate specific portions of the record or produce additional
evidence showing the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Venture Out Props. LLC v. Wynn Resort Holdings, LLC, No.
91167237, 2007 WL 39112, at *3 (TTAB 2007).
To prevail on summary judgment here, Opposer must demonstrate that the
record shows no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that, as a matter of law,
Opposer has an entitlement to a statutory cause of action and Applicant had no bona
fide intent to use the mark LORETTA STONE in commerce on or in connection with
the services identified in the involved application, as of the application’s filing date.

Opposition No. 91290354
4
A. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Entitlement to a statutory cause of action under Section 13 or 14 of the
Trademark Act must be established in every Board inter partes case. See Corcamore,
LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Austl. Therapeutic Supplies
Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014)). To
establish entitlement, a plaintiff must demonstrate (i) an interest falling within the
zone of interests protected by the statute and (ii) a reasonable belief in damage
proximately caused by the registration or continued registration of the mark. See
Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1303.
In this case, we find no genuine dispute of material fact that Opposer has
established its entitlement by properly making of record its pleaded registrations,
forming the basis of a likelihood of confusion claim under Trademark Act Section 2(d),
15 U.S.C. 1052(d), that is not wholly without merit.5 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Laser
Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lincoln Nat’l Corp. v. Anderson, No.
91192939, 2014 WL 879506, at *3 (TTAB 2014). Therefore, for purposes of this
motion, Opposer has proven its entitlement to bring a statutory cause of action.
Having established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to its
entitlement to oppose registration on the ground of likelihood of confusion, Opposer
may also pursue its claim of lack of bona fide intent to use. See Coach Servs., Inc. v.
5 13 TTABVUE 29-140. We further note Applicant has not contested Opposer’s entitlement
to a statutory cause of action.

Opposition No. 91290354
5
Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Once an opposer
meets the requirements for standing it can rely on any of the statutory grounds set
forth in [the statute].”); Illyrian Import, Inc. v. ADOL Sh.p.k., No. 91234244, 2022
WL 970321, at *11 (TTAB 2022).
B. Lack of Bona Fide Intent to Use
Trademark Act Section 1(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1), states,
[A] person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the
good faith of such person, to use a trademark in commerce may request
registration of its trademark on the principal register … .
Whether an applicant had a bona fide intention to use its mark in commerce is an
objective determination based on all of the circumstances. See, e.g., M.Z. Berger & Co.
v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club LP
v. Sherman, No. 91172268, 2008 WL 4149008, at *6 (TTAB 2008). The evidentiary
bar for showing bona fide intent to use is not high, but requires more than “a mere
subjective belief.” M.Z. Berger, 787 F.3d at 1375. The objective evidence must indicate
an intention to use the mark that is “firm” and “demonstrable.” Id. at 1376; Swiss
Grill Ltd. v. Wolf Steel Ltd., No. 91206859, 2015 WL 5675642, at *7 (TTAB 2015).
As a general matter, the factual question of intent is unsuited to disposition on
summary judgment. See Copelands’ Enters., Inc. v. CNV, Inc., 945 F.2d 1563, 1567
(Fed. Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, one way an opposer can establish its prima facie case
of no bona fide intent on summary judgment is by proving the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact that applicant has no documentary evidence to support its
allegation in the application of its claimed bona fide intent to use the mark in

Opposition No. 91290354
6
commerce as of the application filing date. See Saul Zaentz Co. v. Bumb, No.
91156452, 2010 WL 2783892, at *5 (TTAB 2010); Commodore Elec. Ltd. v. CBM K.K.,
No. 91086336, 1993 WL 156479, at *5 (TTAB 1993). If the opposer meets this burden,
the burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with evidence raising a genuine
dispute of material fact that either explains or outweighs the lack of documentary
evidence. Id. Where there is no evidence of an applicant’s bona fide intent to use the
mark at issue on the claimed goods or services as of the filing date of the application,
entry of summary judgment on a claim that the applicant had no bona fide intent to
use the mark in commerce when it filed its involved application may be warranted.
See Honda Motor Co. v. Winkelmann, No. 91170552, 2009 WL 962810 (TTAB 2009).
1. Summary of Parties’ Arguments and Evidence
Opposer contends the evidence demonstrates that when the application was filed
Applicant only had an ill-defined concept in mind and it did not involve the services
identified; Applicant has not taken any steps to develop, market, or offer any product
or service; and “Applicant has no actual plan relating to the use of the applied-for
mark.”6 In particular, Opposer relies on Applicant’s deposition testimony that the
offering under LORETTA STONE is meant to be a product or good, not a service.7
Opposer also relies on the fact that Applicant stated that “no such documents exist”
in response to requests for documents pertaining to pricing, manufacturing, and types
6 13 TTABVUE 3, 11-14, 21-22.
7 Id. at 6, 11-12.

Opposition No. 91290354
7
of consumers; and Applicant never produced documents to support its testimony that
a business plan was developed and expenses were incurred.8
Opposer maintains the only documentary evidence produced by Applicant (other
than a trademark search report) consists of “placeholder steps intended to reserve
future rights in the Mark;” namely reserving but not using a domain name and social
media handles, and working with a consultant beginning nearly a year after the filing
of the application to develop logos, without any association with a business plan or
use of the mark.9 As to the trademark search report, Opposer argues this alone is
insufficient to show a bona fide intent to use the mark as Applicant’s deposition
testimony indicates it did not review, or rely on, the report.10
In support, Opposer submitted excerpts from the March 13, 2025, deposition of
Applicant’s sole member, Lauren Jemeyson Heatherley,11 copies of Applicant’s
written discovery responses,12 and correspondence between the parties’ counsel from
March 31, 2025 through April 9, 2025 wherein Opposer requested any supplemental
production from Applicant and to confirm there were no additional documents.13
Opposer also submitted a declaration from its counsel attesting to the authenticity of
8 Id. at 9.
9 Id. at 14-20.
10 Id. at 20-21. Ms. Heatherley appeared both in her individual capacity and as Applicant’s
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) representative. Roy Decl., ¶ 4 (13 TTABVUE 27).
11 13 TTABVUE 141-178.
12 Id. at 183-207.
13 Id. at 208-216.

Opposition No. 91290354
8
the exhibits and that “Applicant has not produced any business plans or documents
showing its revenues and expenses relating to its applied-for mark.”14
In response, Applicant submitted a declaration from Ms. Heatherley attesting,
inter alia, that as of the filing date of the application, she “intended to build a
comprehensive ethical technology, apprenticeship, and community education
platform under that name,” wherein LORETTA STONE was “to be the core persona
representing the following: the ethical AI architecture, emotional-safety-forward
technology, the apprenticeship program, the nonprofit chapter model, and the
overarching Canon and Q2C system.”15 Ms. Heatherley further generally states that
at the time of filing Applicant had “already begun executing a comprehensive,
multilayered business plan” as well as developing (among other things) a business
plan, algorithmic frameworks, the multi-entity structure, and curriculum outlines.16
Ms. Heatherley also provides testimony regarding the following activities, taken
since the filing of the involved application:
• “drafting the business plan, outlining 5-year forecasts, building capital
schedules, producing technical architecture, drafting inter-entity contracts,
beginning the operational charters, starting apprentice frameworks,
preparing nonprofit documentation, developing project milestone
schedules, building the foundational IP logic, and assembling valuation
materials”;
• engaging services of LegalZoom for trademark search reports from April
2022 through March 2024;
• engaging a brand and technology studio, whose services helped “firm the
language needed to describe, shape, and form the service catalog design;”
• reserving the domain name LorettaStone.com and creating a website; and
14 Id. at 26-28.
15 Heatherley Decl., ¶¶ 2, 7 (23 TTABVUE 24-25).
16 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5, 9.

Opposition No. 91290354
9
• establishing the Instagram account _loretta_stone.17
Applicant further submitted exhibits consisting of:
• September 22, 2022 email from LegalZoom Trademark Customer Support
requesting a signature for a “continuation agreement”;18
• “Search Report” for LORETTA STONE for consulting and education
services in International Class 41, dated April 26, 2022;19
• an image stating: VISUAL BRAND FOUNDATIONS for LORETTA
STONE, with a date of Janaury 16, 2024;20
• email exchanges between Applicant and the brand and technology studio,
on October 9, 2023;21
• undated image from a website, showing use of LORETTA STONE;22
• undated screenshot of Instagram page for the handle _loretta_stone_;23
• undated “Loretta Stone Business Plan,” “Loretta Stone Platform – Detailed
Technical Requirements Documents,” “Loretta Stone Platform
Requirements Document,” and “Loretta Stone Brand Identity System”;24
and
• undated document titled “Comparative Analysis: Loretta Stone vs. Similar
Platforms.”25
Applicant argues that the above evidence demonstrates its bona fide intent to use
the applied-for mark at the time of the application, as well as its ongoing bona fide
intent.26 Applicant further contends Opposer’s arguments fail to account for the
startup nature of Applicant’s business and the “inherently complex” nature of the
17 Id. at ¶¶ 15-19 (23 TTABVUE 26-27).
18 23 TTABVUE at 30-31.
19 Id. at 32.
20 Id. at 33.
21 Id. at 34-35.
22 Id. at 36.
23 Id. at 37.
24 Id. at 38-53.
25 Id. at 54.
26 Id. at 13-16.

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proposed services, which involve artificial intelligence and are “inherently
intertwined” with the products from Applicant’s business model.27
In its reply brief Opposer objects to Applicant’s submission of the business plan,
as well as the documents concerning platform requirements, brand identity, and
market comparison. Opposer asserts these document were not produced in discovery,
despite being sought and Applicant’s representation there were no other responsive
documents. Opposer further contends Applicant has neither justified its failure to
produce the documents nor authenticated them.28
2. Analysis and Determination
As an initial matter, we address Opposer’s objection to the documents submitted
with Applicant’s response brief, which essentially seeks application of the estoppel
sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). “Under the estoppel sanction, a party that
fails to provide information may, upon motion or objection by its adversary, be
precluded from using that information or witness at trial, ‘unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).” Great Seats Inc. v.
Great Seats Ltd., No. 91189540, 2011 WL 4871871, at *3 (TTAB 2011); TBMP
§ 527.01(e). The estoppel sanction applies on summary judgment as well as at
trial. Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 WL 252340, at *2
n.5 (TTAB 1988). Opposer specifically requested business plans from Applicant,
Applicant failed to produce any responsive documents, and after Opposer’s repeated
27 Id. at 16-18.
28 24 TTABVUE 3-4.

Opposition No. 91290354
11
inquiries Applicant stated there were no additional documents. In view of Applicant’s
affirmative statement that it had no responsive documents, and the lack of any
explanation from Applicant as to why the documents were not produced earlier, we
find that the estoppel sanction applies and we decline to consider the plans.29 See
Great Seats, 2011 WL 4871871, at *4-5. In any event, the plans are undated and do
not pertain to any of the applied-for services.30
We now turn to our analysis of Opposer’s motion on its lack of bona fide intent to
use claim. The lack of any documentary evidence of Applicant’s intent prior to filing
the application suffices as objective proof that Applicant lacks a bona fide intent to
use the mark in commerce. See Commodore Elecs. Ltd., 1993 WL 156479, at *5.
Opposer has met this burden by showing that Applicant failed to produce any
documents or other objective proof that it had a bona fide intent to use the applied-
for mark for the International Class 41 services as of the application filing date.
The only documentary evidence generated prior to the filing of the involved
application was a trademark search report. However, as set forth above, the Board
looks at the totality of the evidence when considering the question of an applicant’s
bona fide intent to use a mark. Thus, although “in some cases, a trademark clearance
may be probative evidence of a bona fide intent to use,” the Board has consistently
29 We hasten to add that even if we had considered these documents it would not change the
ultimate result.
30 For example, the business plan identifies “Lorretta Stone [as] an ethical data
infrastructure platform designed to help people turn lived experience into valuable
intellectual property (‘brainprints’) without compromising privacy,” and a “tech product;” and
the “Detail Technical Requirements Document” states “Loretta Stone is a modular, privacy-
first SaaS platform.” (23 TTABVUE 38, 42).

Opposition No. 91290354
12
held that neither the mere filing of an application nor a trademark search is sufficient
to establish an applicant’s intent. Swatch AG v. M. Z. Berger & Co., Inc., No.
91187092, 2013 WL 5655834, at *12 (TTAB 2013); see also Swiss Grill Ltd. v. Wolf
Street Ltd., No. 91206859, 2015 WL 5675642, at *9 (TTAB 2015). Nor did Applicant
provide clear testimony regarding its intent. For example, Ms. Heatherley testified
that “Loretta Stone is offering a product or a good,” not services, and that the intended
product is “an AI-enabled design … [that is] going to be a software application that is
leveraging the algorithm … blending the disciplines between finance, business, and
womanhood.”31 Further, in its prior response to Interrogatory No. 14, Applicant
described the nature of Applicant’s business as “online professional and personal AI
enabled time optimization products and services.”32 However, in her deposition, Ms.
Heatherley testified that Applicant’s answer should be modified to “strike ‘and
services’ at the end, because it would be just products.”33 The lack of any other
documentation from the time of filing, plus the testimony regarding Applicant’s
intent to offer goods (not services) under the mark, is highly probative of Applicant’s
lack of bona fide intent to use the applied-for mark for the identified services at that
time. See A&H Sportswear Co. v. Yedor, No. 91235843, 2019 WL 1453071, at *5-6
(TTAB 2019) (statement of intent to use mark, unsupported by evidence of any
activities undertaken to actually commence such use, insufficient to stave off
31 Heatherley Dep. Tr. 90:11-91:2 (13 TTABVUE 168-69).
32 13 TTABVUE 187.
33 Heatherley Dep. Tr. 136:3-10 (13 TTABVUE 173).

Opposition No. 91290354
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summary judgment); Swiss Grill Ltd., 2015 WL 5675642, at *9 (applicant’s vague
claims about communications, meetings, or events which took place one or two years
after the filing date, and which did not relate to the mark in question, were found
insufficient to show bona fide intent at the time of filing); see also Vans, Inc. v.
Branded, LLC, No. 92066859, 2022 WL 3369641, at *7 (TTAB 2022) (the absence of
business records strengthens the case that there has not been use of a mark,
particularly when witness testimony is not clean and definite) (citaitons omitted).
Because Opposer has established its prima facie case, the burden now shifts to
Applicant to rebut the prima facie case by producing evidence which would establish
it had the requisite bona fide intent to use the mark for the applied-for services when
it filed its application. Applicant has failed to do so. Applicant’s remaining
documentary evidence is largely undated, and Applicant has not provided testimony
as to the specific time when any of its various plans, website, or social media accounts
were created.34 Nonetheless, it appears from the heading utilized in Ms. Heatherley’s
declaration that the documents were likely the result of activity taken after the filing
of the application.35 Generally, the strongest documentary proof of bona fide intent to
34 Regardless, the mere registration of a domain name, or social media account, does not
accord service mark rights. See In re Suuberg, No. 88234650, 2021 WL 5944419, at *4 (TTAB
2021) (citations omitted).
35 Ms. Heatherley’s references to “engaging” the brand and technology studio, reserving the
domain name and creating the website, and establishing the Instagram account, each appear
under the heading: “My Preparations Since Filing Reinforce My Original Intent.” Heatherley
Decl., ¶¶ 17-19 (23 TTABVUE 26). However, we note that while Ms. Heatherley states
“drafting the business plan” similarly occurred since the filing of the application, she also
states she had begun developing the business plan at the time of filing. Compare id., at ¶ 15
with id., at ¶ 5 (23 TTABVUE 26, 24).

Opposition No. 91290354
14
use in commerce will have been created prior to, or at the latest on, the filing date of
the involved application. See Societe des Produits Nestle S.A. v. Candido Vinulaes
Taboada, No. 91232597, 2020 WL 4530518, at *16 (TTAB 2020). Documents created
post-filing have been found relevant to, but not dispositive of, an applicant’s intent at
the time of filing, for example, where the evidence corroborates other evidence of the
applicant’s intent as of the filing date. See id. Here, in addition to the trademark
search report, the only other evidence of Applicant’s intent as of the filing date is Ms.
Heatherley’s declaration and deposition testimony, neither of which contain specific
details evincing Applicant’s intent to offer the applied-for services.
More importantly, none of Applicant’s remaining documentary evidence pertains
to any of the applied-for services, instead only discussing “concepts”, technology-
based products, or intellectual property management. For example, the emails with
the branding studio seek to discuss “concepts”36 and the website discusses the use of
automation, building passive income portfolios, and an “IP Management-as-a-
Service.”37
Applicant fails to identify any concrete actions related to the applied-for services.
Moreover, Applicant’s discovery responses, deposition, and own declaration in
support of its summary judgment response evince nothing more than a generalized
speculative concept of some nebulous good or service, perhaps at some indefinite time
36 23 TTABVUE 34-35.
37 id. at 36.

Opposition No. 91290354
15
in the future.38 See Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 2020 WL 4530518, at *17 (finding
Applicant’s business plan “lacking in sufficient detail to demonstrate a bona fide
intent”); Loreal S.A. v. Macron, No. 91184456, 2012 WL 1267956, at *12 (TTAB 2012)
(“Applicant’s very generalized and non-specific reference to licensing and outsourcing
as potential strategies to bring the product to market at an unspecified time in the
future … is, to say the least, woefully deficient in showing a bona fide intent to use
the mark.”); Lincoln Nat’l. Corp., 2014 WL 879506, at *7 (TTAB 2014) (an applicant’s
“idealistic hopes” to build a business around a mark “for potential use of some
undetermined goods or services at some indefinite time in the future” do not suffice
to show bona fide intent to use).
Because there is no documentary evidence of Applicant’s bona fide intent to use
the involved mark in commerce for the applied-for services at the time its application
was filed, and Applicant has not come forth with sufficient testimonial evidence to
explain its lack of documentary evidence, or otherwise establish the requisite intent,
Applicant has failed to rebut Opposer’s prima facie case by establishing Applicant
had the requisite bona fide intent to use the mark for the applied-for services when
it filed its application.
38 The statement, made solely in the response brief, that Applicant’s principal hosted a retreat
to promote the mark and services to her professional network, is also insufficient to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding Applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark for
the applied-for services. This statement is both unsworn and entirely lacking in factual detail.
See also Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“attorney argument
is no substitute for evidence”).

Opposition No. 91290354
16
III. Decision
Applicant has had multiple opportunities -- in responding to written discovery,
during its deposition, and in responding to Opposer’s motion -- to come forward with
evidence to show any concrete steps taken or plans made to actually use its mark in
connection with the applied-for services contemporaneous with filing its involved
application; such as manufacturing, licensing or marketing efforts, a functioning
website, correspondence with potential licensees, marketing plans, business plans, or
the creation of labels or promotional materials. See A&H Sportswear, 2019 WL
1453071, at *5 (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Omnisource DDS LLS, No.
91178539, 2010 WL 5099661, at *5 (TTAB 2010)). Applicant has similarly had
multiple opportunities to explain its applied-for services and how they relate to any
additional products or Applicant’s plans.
Having considered the arguments and evidence on summary judgment, and
having drawn all justifiable inferences in favor of Applicant as the non-movant,
Opposer has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to
Applicant’s lack of bona fide intent to use Applicant’s mark for the applied-for services
as of the filing date of the application; and Applicant has not rebutted this prima facie
case with any probative evidence that bears upon its intent to use.
Accordingly, Opposer’s motion for partial summary judgment on the claim of a
lack of bona fide intent to use is granted.39 Judgment is entered against Applicant,
39 Because our decision on Opposer’s lack of bona fide intent to use claim is dispositive of this
proceeding, we need not reach Opposer’s likelihood of confusion and dilution claims. See

Opposition No. 91290354
17
the opposition is sustained under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and Application Serial
No. 97653169 is refused registration.
Yazhong Investing Ltd. v. Multi-Media Tech. Ventures, Ltd., No. 92056548, 2018 WL
2113778, at *13 n.52 (TTAB 2018).