Matthew Sinnreich

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: June 30, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Matthew Sinnreich
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Serial No. 98724722;
Serial No. 98724776
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Mark Terry of Mark Terry PA, for Matthew Sinnreich
Catherine Lee, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 110,
Loksye Lee Riso, Managing Attorney.
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Before Goodman, Larkin and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Goodman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Matthew Sinnreich (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of
the following marks 1 and
1 Application Serial No. 98724722 was filed on August 29, 2024, based upon Applicant’s
allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). The application describes the mark as follows: “The
mark consists of the words ‘PHILIPPE BRANCA’ in stylized font.” Color is not claimed as a
feature of the mark. The application includes the statement “The name(s), portrait(s), and/or
signature(s) shown in the mark does not identify a particular living individual.”

Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776
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2 both for “Furniture; Furniture made of wood; Living
room furniture; Lounge furniture” in International Class 20; and “Hats; Pants;
Shirts; Shorts; Socks; Collared shirts; Polo shirts; T-shirts; Tops as clothing” in
International Class 25.3
Page references to the application record are to the .pdf version of documents obtained from
the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, an online database.
References to the briefs on appeal refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system. In Serial
Nos. 98724722 and 98724776, Applicant’s brief is at 6 TTABVUE and the Examining
Attorney’s brief at 8 TTABVUE. Applicant attached to both briefs evidence that was
submitted during prosecution. This was unnecessary and duplicative.
2 Application Serial No. 98724776 was filed on August 29, 2024, based upon Applicant’s
allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). The application describes the mark as follows: “The
mark consists of the stylized wording ‘PHILIPPE’, below which is the stylized wording
‘BRANCA’ enclosed in a shaded rectangular carrier.” The application includes the statement:
“The name(s), portrait(s), and/or signature(s) shown in the mark does not identify a
particular living individual.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
3 These appeals present common questions of law and fact and the records are substantially
similar. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, we consolidate these cases for purposes
of appeal and decide them in this single opinion. In re S. Malhotra & Co. AG, No. 79194076,
2018 TTAB LEXIS 344, at *3; TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF
PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 1214 (2026). We have considered all arguments and evidence filed in
each case. Unless otherwise stated, references are to the record and briefs in Application
Serial No. 98724722.
Although consolidated, we determine whether the Examining Attorney has shown likelihood
of confusion with respect to each multi-class application and each class of goods within the
applications. Cf. N. Face Apparel Corp. v. Sanyang Indus. Co., No. 91187593, 2015 TTAB
LEXIS 328, at *32 (“Because each class in Applicant’s multi-class application is, in effect, a
separate application, we consider each class separately [where appropriate], and determine
whether [the Examining Attorney] has shown a likelihood of confusion with respect to each.”).
See e.g., In re OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 88706809, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 353, at *40-41
(considering section 2(d) claim against all identified classes, but finding confusion likely only
with respect to one class while finding it was unlikely with respect to two other classes).

Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776
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The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s
marks under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground
that Applicant’s marks are likely to cause confusion with two Principal Register
standard character BRANCA marks, both with a Section 2(f) claim, and owned by the
same entity for, inter alia,
Furniture, namely, bedroom furniture, cabinets, chests of drawers,
computer furniture, dining room furniture, kitchen cabinets, living room
furniture, sofas, coffee tables, end tables, wall mirrors, office furniture,
outdoor furniture, shelves, stools, ottomans, room divider screens,
bookcases, umbrella stands, picture frame moldings and picture frames
in International Class 20;4 and
for “scarves” in International Class 25.5
When the refusals were made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the requests for
reconsideration, the appeals were resumed. We affirm the refusals to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination of
4 Registration No. 3880435, issued November 23, 2010, renewed. The registration also
identifies goods in International Classes 4, 11, 21, 24, 27 and services in Class 35. The
Examining Attorney has argued that all the listed goods and services in the registration are
related to Applicant’s Class 20 goods. However, we list the most relevant Class 20 goods
above.
5 Registration No. 4386237 issued August 20, 2013, renewed. The registration includes the
following statement “The name(s), portrait(s), and/or signature(s) shown in the mark
identifies the surname of Alessandra ‘Branca’ whose consent(s) to register is made of record.”

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likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts
in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of confusion factors set forth in In re
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See
also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We consider
each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild
Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re Country Oven, Inc., No.
87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 381, at *2.
Varying weight may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented, and not all DuPont factors are relevant in every case. See In re Charger
Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“In any given case, different
DuPont factors may play a dominant role and some factors may not be relevant to the
analysis.”); Stratus Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Commc’ns Inc., 955 F.3d 994, 998
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Not all DuPont factors are relevant in each case, and the weight
afforded to each factor depends on the circumstances. Any single factor may control
a particular case.”) (citation omitted).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key factors are the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks and the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103
(CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and
differences in the marks.”). These factors, and others, are discussed below.

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A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods
The second DuPont factor considers “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature
of the goods or services as described in an application or registration.” DuPont, 476
F.2d at 1361. It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is
established for any item encompassed by the identification of goods within a
particular class in the application or registration. See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen.
Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981).
Class 20 Goods (Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776)
Applicant’s Class 20 goods in both applications and Registrant’s Class 20 goods
(Reg. No. 3880435) identify “living room furniture” and are identical in part. In
addition, Applicant’s identified “furniture” and “furniture made of wood” are broad
enough to encompass Registrant’s more narrowly described bedroom “furniture,
cabinets, chests of drawers, computer furniture, dining room furniture, living room
furniture, coffee tables, end tables, office furniture, outdoor furniture, stools,
ottomans, and bookcases.” See In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 85627379,
2015 TTAB LEXIS 65, at *10 (applicant’s broadly worded identification of “furniture”
necessarily encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified “residential and
commercial furniture.”). Therefore, some of the goods in Class 20 in the cited
registration also are legally identical in part with the goods identified in the
applications.6
6 The Examining Attorney also submitted webpages and third-party registrations to show
the relatedness of Applicant’s Class 20 goods to the other classes listed in one of the cited
BRANCA registrations (Reg. No. 3880435), see n.4. However, this evidence was unnecessary
because the record already establishes literal and legal identity between Applicant’s Class

Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776
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Class 25 Goods (Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776)
Applicant’s Class 25 goods in both applications are “Hats; Pants; Shirts; Shorts;
Socks; Collared shirts; Polo shirts; T-shirts; Tops as clothing” while Registrant’s
goods (Reg. No. 4386237) are “scarves.”
The Examining Attorney provided website evidence from various companies (e.g.,
American Eagle, Kenneth Cole, Ralph Lauren, Tommy Hilfiger, Burberry, LL Bean,
Anthropologie, Ann Taylor, and J.Crew) that collectively show that scarves and other
clothing items such as those identified by Applicant (i.e., hats, shirts, socks, shorts,
and pants) are commonly offered by the same brands under the same mark.7 We find
Applicant’s clothing goods and Registrant’s scarves are related.
B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Trade Channels
We next consider the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels” and classes of consumers.8 DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
The classes of consumers for Applicant’s furniture and clothing goods and
Registrant’s furniture and scarves are the general public.
Class 20 (Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776)
Because the Class 20 goods are in part identical and legally identical, we presume
they are offered to the same classes of consumers and move through the identical
20 goods and the Class 20 goods in the cited registration based on the language of the
respective identifications. As indicated, relatedness as to every class of goods (or even every
good in a class) is not required for purposes of DuPont factor 2. Applicant did not address the
relatedness of the goods in his briefs.
7 March 10, 2025 Office Action, pp. 81-87, 226-247, 248-316; 322-349, 351-393; September 12,
2025 Office Action pp. 11-110.
8 Applicant did not address trade channels in his briefs.

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trade channels. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (even though
there was no evidence regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the
Board was entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of
confusion).
Class 25 (Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776)
As to the Class 25 goods, the Examining Attorney’s webpage evidence shows that
scarves and clothing items, such as those identified by Applicant, are offered through
the same trade channels.9 Therefore, the trade channels overlap for these goods.
C. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial
impression. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361).
Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar. In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4.
Marks must be considered in their entireties, but “in articulating reasons for
reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
their entireties.” In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
9 March 10, 2025 Office Action, pp. 81-87, 226-247, 248-316; 322-349, 351-393; September 12,
2025 Office Action pp. 11-110.

Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776
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The test under the first DuPont factor is not whether the marks can be
distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the
marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that
confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to
result. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2012). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains
a general, rather than specific, impression of trademarks. See Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v.
Akea, LLC, No. 91196527, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 166, at *17; Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott
Paper Co., No. 91055167, 1975 TTAB LEXIS 236, at *6. Additionally, “[w]hen marks
would appear on virtually identical goods or services, the degree of similarity
necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1. Applicant’s Arguments for Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776
For both of his marks, Applicant argues that PHILIPPE BRANCA and BRANCA
are textually, audibly, and visually distinct, and that while his marks and the cited
marks share the common term BRANCA, the addition of PHILIPPE creates
“differences in visual appearance, phonetics, and cadence.”10
Applicant also argues that both of his marks differ in sound from the cited marks,
are audibly distinguishable, articulated in four syllables, and vocalizing them
produces a “flowing, multi-part rhythm.”11 Applicant asserts that “phonetic
10 6 TTABVUE 4, 5.
11 6 TTABVUE 4, 5.

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differences are important in the furniture and apparel industries, where brand names
are often spoken in advertisements, word-of-mouth recommendations, and fitness
discussions.”12 Applicant argues that both his marks are “more formal and
individualized,” and the “word PHILIPPE serves as the dominant portion.”13
Applicant submits that both his PHILIPPE BRANCA marks reinforce “the brand
identity as European while adding a decorative, ornamental quality consistent with
the cursive font consumers associate with nostalgia European motif.”14 Applicant
asserts that PHILIPPE BRANCA conveys a person-based, European, aristocratic,
and luxurious impression, whereas BRANCA alone simply means “white” in
Portuguese.15 Applicant also argues that both of his marks and the cited marks are
different in their entireties, in sound, meaning and commercial impression.16
For the stylized mark (Serial No. 98724722),
Applicant points to differences in appearance with Applicant’s mark using cursive
uppercase and lowercase font, while the cited marks are in “plain word format.”17
12 6 TTABVUE 5.
13 6 TTABVUE 4,7.
14 6 TTABVUE 7, 9.
15 6 TTABVUE 9.
16 6 TTABVUE 10.
17 6 TTABVUE 7. Applicant mentions a design portion, 6 TTABVUE 6-7, but this mark is
stylized and does not contain a design element. We also do not consider the stylized wording
in Applicant’s mark as a design because the mark is not so highly stylized to be viewed as a
design and is easily recognizable as the wording PHILIPPE BRANCA. Compare, e.g., In re
TSI Brands, Inc., No. 75/615,925, No. 75/615,925 2002 TTAB LEXIS 270, at *18 (“[T]he
degree of stylization and integration of the letters forming both of registrant's ‘AK’ and design
marks is so high that they are more properly treated, in our view, as being akin to pure design

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Applicant argues that his stylized mark “provide[s] different appearances” and is
“distinct in look, feel, and commercial impression.”18 Applicant argues that the use of
a stylized font with upper and lower case letters renders his mark and the cited
standard character marks “wholly different.”19 Applicant also argues that the marks
differ in appearance and sound due to the additional term PHILIPPE.20
Applicant points out that the mark (Serial No.
98724776), contains a design element which makes it “different” from the cited marks
that have no design portion.21 Applicant states that his mark consists of “the word
PHILIPPE in stylized font using cursive uppercase and cursive lowercase font
followed by the word BRANCA in stylized font using uppercase font.”22 Applicant
points out that the “cited marks uses [sic] a standard upper-case font and,
marks rather than simply stylized displays of word marks”; highly stylized AK marks not
confusingly similar with AK American Khakis) with In re Instruteck Corp., 1974 TTAB
LEXIS 266 , at *5 (no number in original) (although the marks containing the terms IC “were
presented in different graphic displays,” the letters were readily discernible and would
project this significance to individuals viewing them, notwithstanding additional word and
design elements in registrant’s mark).
18 6 TTABVUE 7.
19 6 TTABVUE 7, 8.
20 6 TTABVUE 4-5.
21 6 TTABVUE 6 (brief, Serial no. 98724776).
22 6 TTABVUE 6, 7. (brief, Serial no. 98724776).

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importantly, the cited marks have no design portion.” (emphasis in original).23
Applicant argues that the lack of a design portion in the cited marks and “the
difference in font, case, and design renders the marks wholly different” in
appearance.24 Applicant also argues that the marks differ in appearance and sound
due to the additional term PHILIPPE. 25
2. Examining Attorney’s Arguments
The Examining Attorney points out that both cited marks are in standard
characters, and could be presented in the same “lettering style” as Applicant’s marks,
and that the BRANCA portion of PHILIPPE BRANCA creates similarities in
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression, especially since
consumers have a propensity to shorten trademarks.26
We now consider whether Applicant’s marks and the cited marks are similar or
dissimilar.
Serial No. 98724722
Applicant’s mark is the stylized mark and
both cited marks are the standard character marks BRANCA.
23 6 TTABVUE 6. (brief, Serial no. 98724776).
24 6 TTABVUE 7, 8, (brief, Serial no. 98724776). Although there is a background carrier
design element, we do not consider the stylized literal portion in Applicant’s word and design
mark as a design because the mark is easily recognizable as the wording PHILIPPE
BRANCA. See n.17.
25 6 TTABVUE 4-5, (brief, Serial no. 98724776).
26 8 TTABVUE 4, 5.

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In comparing PHILIPPE BRANCA with BRANCA, we note that Applicant’s mark
encompasses the entirety of the registered marks, making them similar. Likelihood
of confusion often has been found where the entirety of one mark is incorporated
within another. Hunter Indus., Inc. v. Toro Co., No. 91203612, 2014 TTAB LEXIS
105, at *33 (PRECISION and PRECISION DISTRIBUTION CONTROL found
similar).
Because the cited marks are in standard character form without a claim to any
particular display, they may be presented in any manner, including in the same size,
font, and uppercase and lowercase letters as Applicant’s mark. Trademark Rule
2.52(a), 37 CFR § 2.52(a). See, e.g., Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp. Inc., 637
F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“If the registrant ... obtains a standard character
mark without claim to any particular font style, size or color, the registrant is entitled
to depictions of the standard character mark regardless of font style, size, or color....”
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although Applicant argues otherwise, the mere
stylization of the words PHILIPPE BRANCA in Applicant’s mark is insufficient to
distinguish the respective marks. Squirtco v. Tomy Corp, 697 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (“[T]he argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where
one party asserts rights in no particular display. By presenting its mark merely in a
typed drawing, a difference cannot legally be asserted by that party”). We must
assume that the registrant could display its standard character BRANCA marks in
the same letter style in which BRANCA appears in Applicant’s marks.

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The marks resemble each other in appearance and sound as to the shared term
BRANCA. The term PHILIPPE in Applicant’s mark is a point of difference in
appearance and sound.
Applicant argues that PHILIPPE is the dominant term in his mark. However, we
find that the shared term BRANCA is the more significant term and that PHILIPPE
modifies BRANCA. “Applicant has added the given name [Philippe] to [his] mark, but
the addition of a given name to a recognizable surname has limited distinctive
capability. A surname preceded by a given name is a common, highly conventional
combination of word elements, and the mark [Philippe Branca] could well be
interpreted as a more specific reference to a person or company that is otherwise
identified by the designation [Branca].” Harry Winston, Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem
Corp., No. 91153147, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 284, at *103-104 (citing In re Chatam Int’l,
Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“the first name JOSE modifies the surname
GASPAR and serves to emphasize that GASPAR is a name”; JOSE GASPAR GOLD
likely to be confused with GASPAR’S ALE)).
As to connotation and commercial impression, Applicant argues that the cited
marks BRANCA have meaning in a foreign language;27 however, there is no evidence
in the record which establishes any foreign language meaning of BRANCA, nor is
there evidence that purchasers would readily translate the word BRANCA.
Additionally, the cited registrations’ issuance under Section 2(f) is consistent with
27 Applicant also made this argument in its response to the office action and on
reconsideration, but did not submit any evidence or translations in support. September 10,
2025 Response to Office Action; December 12, 2025 Request for Reconsideration.

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treatment as a surname, with one of the registrations including a consent from
Alessandra Branca, an individual.
We find that both Applicant’s mark and the cited marks suggest a name. The cited
marks, BRANCA, suggest a surname, while PHILIPPE BRANCA suggests a full
name. See In re Chatham Int’l, 380 F.3d at 1343 (the Court stated “[w]ith respect to
JOSE [in JOSE GASPAR GOLD], the Board correctly observed that the term simply
reinforces the impression that GASPAR is an individual’s name. Thus, in accord with
considerable case law, the JOSE term does not alter the commercial impression of
the mark . . . . In sum, the first name JOSE modifies the surname GASPAR and
serves to emphasize that GASPAR is a name.”) (citations omitted); In re SL&E
Training Stable, Inc., No. 78806669, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 55, at *11, (EDELMAN “is a
clearly recognizable and prominent element in applicant’s [SAM EDELMAN] mark,”
SAM modifies the surname EDELMAN “and therefore emphasizes the EDELMAN
portion”).
Moreover, consumers viewing the cited BRANCA marks may see them as a
shortened form of Applicant’s PHILIPPE BRANCA mark. See Big M. Inc. v. United
States Shoe Corp., No. 94000556, 1985 TTAB LEXIS 8, at *10-11 (“we cannot ignore
the propensity of consumers to often shorten trademarks and, in the present case,
this would be accomplished by dropping the ‘T.H.’ [from T.H. MANDY] in referring to
registrant’s stores.”).
“[S]imilarity of connotation or commercial impression alone is sufficient to support
a finding of likelihood of confusion between marks and this is true even if the marks

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exhibit aural or visual dissimilarity when they convey the same general idea or
stimulate the same mental reaction.” Polo Fashions, Inc., et al. v. La Loren, Inc., No.
91063923, 1984 TTAB LEXIS 152, at *11. We find that the connotation and
commercial impressions of Applicant’s marks and the cited marks are very similar.
When we consider the marks in their entireties, we find the marks are similar in
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Chatham Int’l, 380
F.3d at 1343 (JOSE GASPAR GOLD for tequila confusingly similar to GASPAR’S
ALE for beer and ale).
Serial No. 98724776
Applicant’s mark is a word and design mark. When
a mark comprises both word(s) and a design, the literal portion is normally accorded
greater weight because it will be used by purchasers to request the goods. CBS Inc.
v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Dakin’s Miniatures, No.
74706577, 1999 TTAB LEXIS 636, at *8.
The rectangular design feature of Applicant’s mark that surrounds the surname
BRANCA and frames it forms a background or “carrier” (as indicated by Applicant’s
description of the mark) which is not distinctive. In re Hughes Furniture, 2015 TTAB
LEXIS 65, at *17-18 (“[C]ommon design elements (consisting of a rectangle enclosing
the literal elements and two horizontal lines) . . . merely serve as carriers for the
wording and do not include a distinctive element with strong source-identifying

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characteristics.”); Guess? Inc. v. Nationwide Time Inc., No. 91078773, 1990 TTAB
LEXIS 55, at *5 (“ordinary geometric shapes such as circles, ovals, squares, etc., even
when not used as a background for other marks, are regarded as non-distinctive”)
(citation omitted).
The dominant portion of Applicant’s mark is the literal
portion (Phillipe Branca) because the rectangular design element is a background
carrier that does not serve to distinguish the mark and is not spoken. Applicant
acknowledges that consumers will call for the goods orally.
The literal portion of Applicant’s mark incorporates the entirety of the registered
marks, BRANCA, which increases the similarity between them. As already
explained, the cited registrations are in standard characters, and the rights are not
in any particular display. Therefore, Registrant’s marks BRANCA can be displayed
in the same block capital font as shown for the name BRANCA in Applicant’s mark,
making Applicant’s arguments about differences in appearance non-persuasive. As to
the literal portion of Applicant’s mark, the BRANCA portion results in similarities in
appearance and sound with the cited marks, while the term PHILIPPE is a point of
difference.
Applicant argues that PHILIPPE in his mark is dominant; it is in larger type.
Notwithstanding the smaller type used for the literal BRANCA portion of Applicant’s
mark, we find that BRANCA makes a significant contribution to the commercial

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impression of Applicant’s mark, especially since it is set off with its own carrier which
emphasizes the term. It is appropriate to give BRANCA equal if not greater weight,
especially since PHILIPPE modifies BRANCA. In re Chatam Int’l, 380 F.3d at 1341
(“the first name JOSE modifies the surname GASPAR and serves to emphasize that
GASPAR is a name”). In this regard, the Board has recognized the practice of
identifying or referring to individuals (and their names used as trademarks) by
surnames alone. Seligman & Latz, Inc. v Merit Mercantile Corp., No. 91064335, 1984
TTAB LEXIS 103, at *7 (“While applicant’s mark possesses only the surname portion
of opposer’s [ADRIEN ARPEL] mark, we do not believe that this difference is
sufficient to avoid likelihood of confusion, especially in light of the evidence of record
of use of ARPEL alone in connection with opposer’s products and the common
propensity to refer to individuals (and their names used as trademarks) by surnames
alone.”).
As to connotation and commercial impression, there is no evidence in the record
that establishes any foreign language non-surname meanings of BRANCA, and in
any event, there is no evidence that purchasers would readily translate the words in
this manner. As already explained, Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks suggest a
name. The first name PHILIPPE in Applicant’s mark modifies the surname
BRANCA, identifying which individual with the surname BRANCA it is, whereas
BRANCA alone generally identifies all persons with the surname. See Modern Shoe
Co. v. B. B. Walker Shoe Co., 1971 TTAB LEXIS 131, at *6 (no number in original)
(“We have here a surname ‘WALKER’ and a full name ‘JOHNNIE WALKER.’ The

Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776
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full name would represent an individual. The surname ‘WALKER’ does not per se
identify any particular individual but it does identify any and all persons who bear
that surname, including ‘JOHNNIE WALKER.’”). Consumers may see the BRANCA
cited marks as simply an abbreviated form of the literal portion of Applicant’s
PHILIPPE BRANCA and design mark. See In re SL&E Training Stable Inc., 2008
TTAB LEXIS 55, at *11 (SAM EDELMAN and EDELMAN found to be similar
because the first name “Sam” simply modified “Edelman” and consumers “may see it
as an abbreviated form of applicant’s mark SAM EDELMAN.”).
We find Applicant’s word and design mark and the cited marks similar in
connotation and commercial impression. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342,
1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (ML similar to ML MARK LEES).
Comparing the marks in their entireties, we find that there are strong similarities
between the marks in terms of appearance, sound, meaning and commercial
impression, particularly because the marks share the surname BRANCA which is the
only element in the cited registrations and is a clearly recognizable and prominent
element in the literal portion of Applicant’s PHILIPPE BRANCA word and design
mark.
II. Conclusion
In both applications, the similarity of the marks, the goods, and the trade channels
all weigh in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.

Serial Nos. 98724722 and 98724776
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Decision: The Section 2(d) refusals to register Applicant’s marks
(Serial No. 98724722) and (Serial
No. 98724776) are affirmed.