Ryan Morar

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: June 23, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Ryan Morar
_____
Serial No. 98088555
_____
Robert M. Schwartz, of Robert M. Schwartz, P.A.,
for Ryan Morar.
Mackenzie Olson, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 112,
Matthew Cuccias, Managing Attorney
_____
Before Wellington, Casagrande, and O’Connor, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant Ryan Morar seeks Principal Register registration of the mark
JETPACK HOM(M)E (in standard characters; “HOMME” disclaimed) for “Shirts,
pants, sweaters, dresses, skirts, shoes; Outerwear, namely, coats, jackets, anoraks,
parkas, blazers, hooded sweatshirts, windbreakers, rain jackets,” in International
Class 25.1 The application was refused under Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), due
1 Application Ser. No. 98088555 was filed on July 17, 2023, under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming a date of first use anywhere and in commerce
of February 28, 2018. The application states that “[t]he English translation of ‘HOMME’ in
the mark is ‘MAN’.” Originally, the application also identified “Bags, namely, handbags,

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to likelihood of confusion with the standard-character mark JETPACK, which is
registered on the Principal Register for “Backpacks; All-purpose carrying bags” in
International Class 22.2
After final refusal,3 Applicant requested reconsideration and appealed.4 We
suspended the appeal and remanded to the Examining Attorney to consider the
reconsideration request.5 After the request was denied,6 the appeal resumed.7 Both
Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed appeal briefs.8 Applicant filed a reply
brief.9 For the reasons explained below, we affirm the refusal to register.
ANALYSIS
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or
purses, bags with shoulder straps, gym bags, duffle bags” in International Class 18 and
“Jewelry” in International Class 14, but Applicant deleted these goods during prosecution.
2 Registration No. 5232078 issued on June 27, 2017 (Section 8 declaration accepted and
Section 15 declaration acknowledged).
3 See Nov. 11, 2024, Final Office Action. Any citations to specific pages of prosecution filings
will be to .pdf-format versions of the documents as downloaded from the USPTO’s TSDR
electronic trademark docketing system. There had been other refusals and requirements
during prosecution, but they were resolved.
4 See May 22, 2025, Request for Reconsideration; Notice of Appeal; 1 TTABVUE.
References to the briefs and record cite to the Board’s TTABVUE electronic docket system.
The number preceding “TTABVUE” represents the docket number of the filing in TTABVUE
and any number immediately following “TTABVUE” is the specifically-cited page(s), if any.
5 See 2 TTABVUE.
6 See October 14, 2025, Denial of Reconsideration.
7 See 5 TTABVUE.
8 See 6 TTABVUE (Applicant’s brief); 8 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney’s brief).
9 See 9 TTABVUE.

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to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). We determine whether confusion
is likely by analyzing all probative facts in evidence relevant to the likelihood-of-
confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
1361 (CCPA 1973). See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2023). Though du Pont lists thirteen numbered factors (some with subparts), we
generally address only those that are relevant and material to the case before us, see,
e.g., Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Octocom
Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Typically, these are the factors addressed in the briefs and on which there is relevant
evidence in the record. See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th
1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946-
47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We then weigh our findings on these factors to determine if, on
balance, confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381; In re
Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
A. Comparison of the marks
The first likelihood-of-confusion factor assesses “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity
of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Because the comparison of the marks is
always an important inquiry, see, e.g., Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308
F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544
F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976), we next set forth the parameters governing how we
compare the marks.

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We assess marks on the basis of their “appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); accord In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Similarity in all aspects is not required, however. This factor
supports refusal “if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to
cause confusion.” Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA
1968) (citation omitted); see also Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 740
(CCPA 1953) (“it is proper to consider [the marks’] appearance, sound and meaning
… but a combination of all three factors need not necessarily exist”) (cleaned up;
citations omitted). We do not compare the marks side-by-side, as though in a
laboratory. Rather, we keep in mind both that consumers depend on their recollection
of marks to which they’ve previously been exposed and that their memories are
fallible. See, e.g., In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981).
We compare marks in their entireties. See, e.g., Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. v.
Georgallis Holdings, LLC, 826 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Sometimes, however,
“one feature of a mark may be more significant than another, and it is not improper
to give more weight to this dominant feature in determining the commercial
impression created by the mark.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668
F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
“Similarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” St. Helena Hosp., 774
F.3d at 752 (citation omitted). “The proper test is … whether the marks are

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sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who
encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”
i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Knox Indus. Corp., 277 F.2d 945, 947 (CCPA 1960) (“The issue is whether the marks
are confusingly similar, not whether they are identical.”) (citation omitted).
Here, Applicant’s mark is JETPACK HOM(M)E and the cited mark is JETPACK.
The first term in Applicant’s mark constitutes the entirety of the registered mark.
Generally, first words tend to contribute relatively more to the overall commercial
impression of a multi-term mark. See, e.g., Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1992). To JETPACK, Applicant adds
“HOM(M)E,” but Applicant has disclaimed exclusive rights in the term HOMME. A
disclaimer is evidence that the term is not distinctive in connection with the goods.
Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1565 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. Quaker Oil Corp., 453 F.2d 1296, 1299 (CCPA
1972). While disclaimed terms are part of the mark as a whole and thus must be
considered, they tend not to be the dominant contributor to a mark’s overall
commercial impression. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1382; Hewlett-
Packard, 281 F.3d at 1266; see also Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019,
1022 (CCPA 1977) (“When one incorporates the entire arbitrary mark of another into
a composite mark, inclusion in the composite mark of a significant, nonsuggestive
element will not necessarily preclude a likelihood of confusion. And inclusion of a

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merely suggestive or descriptive element, of course, is of much less significance in
avoiding a likelihood of confusion.”) (citations omitted).
Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney focused too much on the
“JETPACK” component of Applicant’s mark and did not give “fair weight” to
“HOM(M)E,” which Applicant says makes a “significant contribution” to the “the
appearance, sound, sight and commercial impression of applicant’s mark.10 Applicant
cites In re Hearst Corp., 982 F.2d 493 (Fed. Cir. 1992), for the proposition that “marks
tend to be perceived in their entireties, and all components thereof must be given
appropriate weight.”11 According to Applicant, the “(M)” part of “HOM(M)E” renders
it visually distinctive and shows that the term might or might not have the second
“M.” With two M’s, it means “man,” as in the translation statement. But, with one M,
it spells “home.”12 According to Applicant, the option to ignore or “read-out” one of the
M’s signals Applicant’s “brand’s intention to be unisex ….”13
What an applicant intends its mark to communicate is, however, irrelevant. We
base our decisions on what the evidence shows consumers will perceive, which may
or may not be what a mark owner intends. See, e.g., Hydra Mac, Inc. v. Mack Trucks,
Inc., 507 F.2d 1399, 1400 (CCPA 1975); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., No.
10 6 TTABVUE 4. Applicant does not argue, nor do we see, that the Examining Attorney
ignored the “HOM(M)E” component of Applicant’s mark.
11 See id.
12 See id. at 5-6.
13 See 6 TTABVUE 6. The Examining Attorney objects to the website excerpt Applicant
embeds in its brief as support for this intended “unisex” connotation because it wasn’t made
part of the record during prosecution. We sustain the objection. See Trademark Rule 2.141(d),
37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d) (“[t]he record should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal. Evidence
should not be filed with the Board after the filing of a notice of appeal.”).

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91176791, 2011 WL 5014005, at *21 (TTAB 2011). And while we agree with
Applicant’s exhortation to follow the Federal Circuit’s guidance to consider the mark
as a whole, giving appropriate weight to its component parts in assessing the mark’s
overall commercial impression, we disagree with Applicant that the Examining
Attorney did not follow this rule.
The Examining Attorney argues that “the descriptive term ‘HOMME’ has been
disclaimed and so is less significant in forming the commercial impression of
Applicant’s mark. Specifically, consumers may assume that applicant’s mark
comprises the men’s clothing line of registrant’s branded products.”14 As we
mentioned, the word JETPACK comes first, and in that position is more likely to be
remembered and, on top of that, the second word HOMME is descriptive and has been
disclaimed for that reason. Those two circumstances constitute “rational reasons” for
giving HOMME less weight in the analysis of the overall commercial impression of
Applicant’s mark. See, e.g., Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1305; see also Century 21, 970
F.2d at 876 (Board correctly found that “Century” is the “dominant element of
CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA due to applicant’s disclaimer of the rest of its mark”
and because “upon encountering each mark, consumers must first notice this
identical lead word”). Like the Examining Attorney, we find that the dominant
element in the commercial impression of Applicant’s mark as a whole is the first term
JETPACK, and “HOM(M)E” does less work in creating the mark’s overall commercial
impression. And, as the Examining Attorney asserts, consumers familiar with the
14 See 8 TTABVUE 6.

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registered mark may mistakenly think Applicant’s mark signifies a line of goods by
the registrant that is directed to men.
Applicant reminds us that the marks sound and look different because its mark
adds HOM(M)E to the first word JETPACK.15 True enough, but they’re also partially
aurally and visually identical to the extent they lead with JETPACK. Given the
greater impact of the leading JETPACK portion of the mark, these differences do not
override the marks’ overall similarity. In our final weighing, this important factor
will support a conclusion that confusion is likely.
B. Comparison of the goods
The second likelihood-of-confusion factor looks at “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity
and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration.” du
Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. “Even if the goods and services in question are not identical,
the consuming public may perceive them as related enough to cause confusion about
the source or origin of the goods and services.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press,
Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); In re Rsch. & Trading
Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“It is … not necessary that the goods [or
services] of the parties be identical in order to sustain a finding of likelihood of
confusion.”) (citations omitted). Relatedness is not “an all-or-nothing factor” but
“should be analyzed along a sliding scale.” Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont
Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
15 See 6 TTABVUE 7.

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One way to show that consumers perceive products or services as related is to
show that several companies offer the goods or services in an application and those
in a cited registration under the same mark. See, e.g., Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2024); Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1306; Hewlett-Packard,
281 F.3d at 1267. The more consumers are exposed to companies selling good X and
good Y under one mark, the more they tend to see those goods as related, in the sense
that they emanate from a single source. Here, the Examining Attorney placed in the
record evidence that several other companies do exactly that.16
In the same vein, evidence that third parties have registered the same mark for
both types of goods is relevant. See, e.g., Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC,
No. 91223352, 2022 WL 2188890, at *24 (TTAB 2022); In re Country Oven, Inc., No.
87354443, 2019 WL 6170483, at *5 (TTAB 2019); see also In re Halo Leather Ltd., 735
F. App’x 722, 727 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here, the Examining Attorney placed in the record
dozens of use-based third-party registrations covering the goods of Applicant as well
as those of Registrant.17
16 Ralph Lauren, March 22, 2024 Nonfinal Office Action, at TSDR 14-21; Michael Kors, id.
at 22-31; Kate Spade, id. at 32-39; Brooks Brothers, Nov. 22, 2024, Final Office Action, at
TSDR 9-16; American Eagle, id. at 17-28; Gap, id. at 49-56; LL Bean, id. at 57-66; Tommy
Hilfiger, id. at 67-74; Cookies, Oct. 14, 2025, Denial of Reconsideration, at TSDR 17-27; Fjäll
Räven, id. at 28-33; and adidas, id. at 34-43.
17 GR81, Reg. No. 6680622, Oct. 14, 2025, Denial of Reconsideration, at TSDR 44-45;
Reg. No. 7526600, id. at 46-47; S.R. STUDIO. LA. CA., Reg. No. 6190063, id. at 48-49;
SUNDRINE & design, Reg. No. 5951327, id. at 50-51; MS.MISSUS, Reg. No. 7663449, id. at
52-64; DEREK LAM 10 CROSBY, Reg. No. 5016700, id. at 67-68; SEVEGO, Reg. No.
6157087, id. at 69-70; MEAN MODÉ & design, Reg. No. 7140250, id. at 71-72; LONDON

Serial No. 98088555
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Applicant does not address this copious evidence of many third-parties using or
registering the same mark for clothing items (as in the application) and backpacks
and all-purpose carrying bags (as in the cited registration). Instead, Applicant simply
urges that, because the goods aren’t identical, “Applicant’s goods may be
differentiated from registrant’s goods.”18 This reflects a misunderstanding of the
relevant inquiry. “[T]he confusion found to be likely is not as to the products but as
to their source.” Hydra Mac, 507 F.2d at 1400 (citation omitted). Moreover, the goods
“need not be identical—the evidence need only establish that the respective products
are related in some manner and/or that the circumstances surrounding their
marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate
BOVAUNT, Reg. No. 7244308, id. at 73-74; FISH LAKE CO & design, Reg. No. 7553647, id.
at 75-76; THOUGHTLESS, Reg. No. 6336268, id. at 77-78; TANGERINE TEMPLE, Reg. No.
4240402, id. at 79-80; GUARANTEED FOR GOOD, Reg. No. 7852254, id. at 81-82; D.RT
(stylized), Reg. No. 6798244, id. at 83-84; UNFAILING GOODS, Reg. No. 4629386, id. at 85-
86; BUCKLE, Reg. No. 4185395, id. at 87-88; TRIPP NYC, Reg. No. 5225881, id. at 89-90;
FOLEY + CORINNA, Reg. No. 7485635, id. at 91-92; NICESTUFF (stylized), Reg. No.
5903736, id. at 93-94; ARI, Reg. No. 7083882, id. at 95-96; DK (stylized), Reg. No. 7504150,
id. at 97-98; JM (stylized), Reg. No. 7409167, id. at 99-100; KRE PRIME, Reg. No. 7673266,
id. at 101-02; T (stylized), Reg. No. 6980900, id. at 103-04; BONNIE BIANCA & design, Reg.
No. 5269434, id. at 105-06; ARC'TERYX, Reg. No. 7839969, id. at 107-08; G S GUGLIELMO
& STEPHANNO (stylized), Reg. No. 5978855, id. at 113-14; THE NORTH FACE & design,
Reg. No. 2097715, id. at 117-18; HOT SHOT, Reg. No. 6458974, id. at 119-20; ATTEMPTED
LOVER, Reg. No. 7158004, id. at 121-23; BALL & PARLAY, Reg. No. 6330376, id. at 124-25;
B (stylized), Reg. No. 3407818, id. at 126-27; CIMARRON, Reg. No. 3427982, id. at 128-29;
SEE ROSE GO (stylized), Reg. No. 5599511, id. at 130-32; BOSTON PROPER, Reg. No.
4315892, id. at 133-34; GUITAR DUEL ACADEMY, Reg. No. 5291784, id. at 135-36; MOSHE
YOSSEL, Reg. No. 6065048, id. at 137-38; WILSON, Reg. No. 6013232, id. at 139-40. A few
of the third-party registrations the Examining Attorney placed in the record have since been
cancelled, we do not list them here.
18 6 TTABVUE 7-8.

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from the same source.” Apex Bank v. CC Serve Corp., 156 F.4th 1230, 1234 (Fed. Cir.
2025)) (cleaned up; citation omitted).19
The evidentiary record persuades us that the goods are related. This factor will
weigh in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely when we do our final weighing
and balancing of the relevant confusion factors.
C. Comparison of the channels of trade
Another factor that may bear on whether confusion is likely is “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at
1361. Applicant does not address this factor. The Examining Attorney points out that
the third-party websites, cited in the preceding section, show that “the goods share
similar trade channels” with “[b]ags often being featured as accessories to clothing in
the evidence referenced above.”20
We agree that the record shows overlapping trade channels. This factor lends
some support to a conclusion that confusion is likely.
19 Applicant’s original application listed “Bags, namely, handbags, purses, bags with
shoulder straps, gym bags, duffle bags,” listing a date of first use of the mark as to these
goods of October 31, 2019. Applicant deleted these goods after receiving the initial Office
action citing the JETPACK registration. See Sept. 23, 2024, Response to Nonfinal Office
Action. This is further evidence of the relatedness of the clothing goods and the goods in the
cited registration because Applicant itself used the mark on various types of bags. See, e.g.,
Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 941 (relatedness of applicant’s “modems” and opposer’s “computer
programs” was shown,” in part, “by [applicant’s] original application, which indicates
[applicant] itself used the mark OCTOCOM for both modems and computer programs”); In
re HerbalScience Grp., LLC, No. 77519313, 2010 WL 5651672, at *3 (TTAB 2010) (the
applicant’s concession that its identified goods and those of the registrant can emanate from
a single source under a single mark was supported by the fact that “applicant originally
included nutritional supplements and dietary supplements in its identification of goods.”).
20 See 8 TTABVUE 10.

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D. Applicant’s argument that there is no evidence of actual
confusion
du Pont lists “[t]he length of time during and conditions under which there has
been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion” as a potentially relevant
consideration. 476 F.2d at 1371. Applicant’s brief contains one sentence on this point:
“Applicant further notes that USPTO records indicate that to date Applicant’s Mark
has been in continuous, concurrent use with the cited mark in U.S. Registration No.
5232078 for approximately nine years without evidence of instances of actual
confusion of which Applicant is aware.”21
Significantly, du Pont prefaces its list of factors with the statement “the following,
when of record, must be considered ….” Id. (emphasis added). While Applicant’s
brief says that there is no evidence of actual confusion, a statement in a brief is not
itself evidence. In Simulations Publ’ns, 521 F.2d 797, 798 (CCPA 1975); In re Jackson
Int’l Trading Co., No. 77600412, 2012 WL 3157151, at *3 (TTAB 2012); see also In re
Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 297 F.2d 941, 944-45 (CCPA 1962) (“statements made
over the signature of counsel are not evidence of the facts averred”). There is, for
example, no declaration in the record attesting to Applicant’s lack of knowledge of
any instances of actual confusion.
Further, as to the length of time of concurrent use, Applicant points only to the
dates claimed in its application and the cited registration but provides no evidence of
either its own use or that of the owner of the cited registration. Applicant cannot
21 6 TTABVUE 6.

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simply rely on the date of first use it set forth in the application or registration to
prove concurrent use. See Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(2) (“The
allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not
evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant; a date of use of a mark must be
established by competent evidence.”).22 Finally, we note that this factor “requires us
to look at actual market conditions, to the extent there is evidence of such conditions
of record.” In re Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944, 2020 WL 1639916, at *8 (TTAB
2020). But, as noted, Applicant has given us no actual evidence on this factor.
Beyond the lack of evidence upon which we could make a factual finding on this
point, we note that the “[l]ack of evidence of actual confusion or mistake, of course,
does not preclude a finding of likelihood of confusion.” In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d
596, 597 (CCPA 1971).23
22 The likelihood-of-confusion factors present us with questions of fact upon which we make
factual findings. See, e.g., Bullshine Distillery LLC v. Sazerac Brands, LLC, 130 F.4th 1025,
1031 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“Each of the DuPont factors presents a question of fact.”) (citation
omitted). We can’t make a finding of fact on a likelihood-of-confusion factor without evidence
upon which to base the finding. Cf. In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“With
respect to core factual findings in a determination of patentability, however, the [Patent]
Board cannot simply reach conclusions based on its own understanding or experience—or on
its assessment of what would be basic knowledge or common sense. Rather, the Board must
point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings.”).
23 Even if Applicant had placed probative evidence in the record, we’d still be getting only
half the story, because the owner of the cited registration is not a party to this case. See, e.g.,
In re Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944, 2020 WL 1639916, at *9 (TTAB 2020); In re Inspection
Tech. Inc., No. 73287613, 1984 WL 62802, at *2 (TTAB 1984). In addition, for obvious reasons,
we do not require USPTO examining attorneys to try to determine if actual confusion has
taken place. See Inspection Tech., 1984 WL 62802, at *2 (“Moreover, for the Examining
Attorney to attempt to show actual confusion … would be an impossible undertaking.”); see
generally In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the USPTO “is an agency
of limited resources” and “cannot be expected to shoulder the burden of conducting market
research”) (citations omitted).

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We find no evidence that persuades us that this factor should be anything but
neutral.
E. Weighing the findings on the relevant factors together
Having made findings on each of the relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors, our
final step is to assess together the findings we have made on the relevant factors to
determine if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely as to the marks before
us. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384.
The comparison of the marks is always an important factor. See, e.g., Federated
Foods, 544 F.2d at 1103 (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the
cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”); In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 WL 22358,
at *1 (TTAB 2010) (“In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations
are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods and/or
services.”) (citations omitted). Applicant’s mark, while not identical to that of the
cited registration, is very similar to it. This factor weighs squarely in favor of a
conclusion that confusion is likely.
The evidence also shows that consumers view the respective goods as related. This
is a factor of “considerable importance” in the likelihood of confusion inquiry. See Pink
Lady Corp. v. L.N. Renault & Sons, Inc., 265 F.2d 951, 953 (CCPA 1959); Pep Boys-
Manny, Moe and Jack v. Edwin F. Guth Co., 197 F.2d 527, 528-29 (CCPA 1952); see
also Federated Foods, 544 F.2d at 1103 (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by
§ 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of

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the goods and differences in the marks.”). This factor, too, supports a conclusion that
confusion is likely.
The evidence further shows that the trade channels overlap. This further points
to confusion being likely.
The alleged lack of actual confusion is neutral.
Apart from one neutral factor, the relevant factors all point in the same direction:
that confusion is likely. On this record, we have no difficulty concluding that
confusion is likely.
Decision: We affirm the refusal.