CourtListener 9426358•Claybrooks, Sondra L. v. Insight Global, LLC
Claybrooks, Sondra L. v. Insight Global, LLC
CourtListener 9426358Tennworkcompapp14 de set. de 2023
Texto completo
FILED
Sep 14, 2023
03:22 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Sondra L. Claybrooks ) Docket No. 2020-06-0489
)
v. ) State File No. 23248-2020
)
Insight Global, LLC, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Robert V. Durham, Judge )
Affirmed and Remanded
In the third interlocutory appeal in this case, the employee contends the trial court issued
a scheduling order without her input. The employee alleged multiple injuries due to a fall
in the employer’s bathroom. Previously, the employee appealed the entry of a scheduling
order, and we affirmed the court’s order. On remand, the trial court issued a new
scheduling order that, among other things, set an expedited hearing and a hearing on a
motion for summary judgment that had been filed by the Subsequent Injury and
Vocational Recovery Fund to be heard on the same day. The employee failed to attend
the hearing, although she was reportedly present in the building. She requested a
continuance in writing, which the court denied. The court then granted the motion for
summary judgment as well as the employer’s oral motion to dismiss the request for
expedited hearing, but it denied the employer’s motion to dismiss the case in its entirety.
In the second appeal, we again affirmed the court’s order. On remand, the court held a
scheduling conference and issued another scheduling order, which the employee has now
appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision, find the employee’s appeal to be
frivolous, award attorneys’ fees for the frivolous appeal, and remand the case.
Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding
Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.
Sondra L. Claybrooks, Antioch, Tennessee, employee-appellant, pro se
L. Blair Cannon, Atlanta, Georgia, for the employer-appellee, Insight Global, LLC
Patrick A. Ruth, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Subsequent Injury and
Vocational Recovery Fund
1
Factual and Procedural History
This is the third interlocutory appeal in this case. In the first appeal, we set out the
following relevant facts and procedural history as follows:
Sondra Claybrooks (“Employee”) asserts she suffered various injuries as
the result of a work-related fall on May 9, 2019, while working for Insight
Global, LLC (“Employer”). Since that time, she has received treatment
from various medical providers for symptoms related to her right hand,
right wrist, right elbow, hip, and low back. On March 3, 2021, the trial
court issued an expedited hearing order denying Employee’s claim for
temporary disability benefits and payment of certain past medical expenses.
That order was not appealed.
Following the issuance of the court’s expedited hearing order in
March 2021, several disputes arose regarding the provision of a panel of
physicians, Employee’s requests for additional medical treatment, and
written discovery requests. The court set approximately eight status
hearings between April 2021 and December 2021. In November 2021,
Employee filed a motion for temporary disability and medical benefits,
which the court treated as a request for an expedited hearing. The court set
such a hearing for January 21, 2022, but the hearing was continued at
Employee’s request on two occasions. Following the court’s granting of
Employee’s second motion for a continuance, the court set several more
status hearings. In April 2022, Employee filed two requests for expedited
hearings and a motion to compel discovery.
On August 5, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing to address
Employee’s motion to compel discovery and a request filed by Employer
for a scheduling hearing. During that hearing, Employee stated she wished
to proceed with a second expedited hearing to address her claim for
additional medical benefits. The second expedited hearing was scheduled
for September 26, 2022. The Court also set a scheduling hearing to occur
telephonically on August 25, 2022.
Claybrooks v. Insight Global, LLC, No. 2020-06-0489, 2022 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.
LEXIS 39, at *1-3 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 28, 2022) (footnotes omitted).
After the first scheduling hearing, the court entered a scheduling order setting certain
deadlines. Employee appealed the scheduling order, arguing that it was inappropriate to
enter a scheduling order prior to an expedited hearing and before she had reached
maximum medical improvement. We affirmed the court’s order, concluding that
2
Employee offered no explanation as to how the trial court erred and noting that trial
courts retain the discretion to control their dockets and the pace of litigation. Id. at *3-5.
In our decision resolving the second interlocutory appeal, we set out additional
relevant facts and procedural history, stating:
Upon remand [following the first appeal], the court issued a new scheduling
order that, among other things, set an expedited hearing for March 6, 2023.
In the meantime, the Subsequent Injury and Vocational Recovery Fund
(“SIF”) filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Employee had not
provided sufficient evidence to establish that she is permanently and totally
disabled, a material fact necessary to trigger any obligations on the part of
SIF. The motion was set to be heard on the same date as the expedited
hearing.
Employee filed a response to the motion, to which she attached
hundreds of pages of medical records, and further stated in her response
that SIF should not be dismissed as it “did not object when asked in a
hearing in 2022.” Employee further averred she was “denied a records
review [at a hearing in August 2022] . . . therefore I am unable to proceed.”
The hearing on March 6, 2023 began timely, but Employee was not
present in the courtroom. The court’s order recites the events of that day,
stating that after approximately ten minutes, the bailiff notified the court
and the parties that Employee was present in the building. The court
paused the proceedings to give Employee time to come into the courtroom.
After another twelve minutes had passed, the court asked the bailiff to bring
Employee into the courtroom. The bailiff returned with a note from
Employee indicating she was ill and wanted a continuance. The bailiff then
indicated Employee had left the premises.
The court orally denied the motion for a continuance given the late
nature of the request, as well as the numerous delays that had previously
occurred in the case. It proceeded to hear SIF’s motion for summary
judgment. Employer made an oral motion to dismiss either the entire claim
or, at a minimum, the request for an expedited hearing, given Employee’s
failure to prosecute. The court issued an order granting SIF’s summary
judgment motion, stating that Employee “did not submit any admissible
evidence establishing a material question of fact as to whether she was
permanently and totally disabled from her . . . work-related fall.” In a
separate order, the court denied Employee’s request for continuance,
granted Employer’s motion to dismiss the request for expedited hearing,
and denied Employer’s motion to dismiss the claim in its entirety.
3
Claybrooks v. Insight Global, LLC, No. 2020-06-0489, 2023 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.
LEXIS 24, at *4-6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 30, 2023). Employee appealed
the trial court’s decision, and we again affirmed the court’s order, finding the trial court
did not err in concluding Employee had not come forward with genuine issues of material
fact to support potential liability on the part of SIF. Id. at *11-12. We also held that the
court did not err in declining to grant Employee’s request for a continuance or in
dismissing her request for an expedited hearing in light of her refusal to come into the
courtroom despite being present in the building. Id. at *12-13. 1
On July 6, 2023, the trial court convened a telephonic scheduling hearing. At
some point during the teleconference, the call was disconnected. The court’s scheduling
order indicates the disconnection occurred after Employee’s objections to the deadline for
taking expert depositions was overruled. In her brief on appeal, Employee asserts the
trial court’s line was disconnected while she and the opposing attorney remained on the
line. Regardless, the call was discontinued, and the trial court entered a scheduling order
on July 7 setting deadlines for discovery, motions, and other pre-trial disclosures, as well
as a deadline for alternative dispute resolution. The order also scheduled trial for
November 6, 2023. Employee has appealed the entry of the court’s most recent
scheduling order.
Standard of Review
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2022). As we have noted previously, a trial court
is afforded broad discretion to control the progress of cases on its docket and also “has
the necessary discretion to control the pace of litigation through the use of case
supervision and docket management.” Valladares v. Transco Products, Inc., Nos. 2015-
01-0117, 2015-02-0118, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Workers’
Comp. App. Bd. July 27, 2016). We review such determinations under an abuse-of-
discretion standard which “contemplates that before reversal the record must show that a
judge ‘applied an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or
reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining.’” Hubbard v. Sherman-Dixie
1
Thereafter, Employee filed another notice of appeal on June 7, 2023, in which she indicated she was
appealing a “motion order” entered on March 30, 2023, and an “other order” entered on March 30, 2023.
We filed an order on June 9 dismissing the appeal, noting that there were no such orders and that, even if
there were, any appeal of those orders would be untimely. We also observed that if Employee intended to
appeal our opinion issued on May 30, 2023, such an appeal was not permitted by statute. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(2)(A) (In interlocutory appeals, “[t]he decision of the workers’ compensation appeals
board is not subject to further review.”) Employee also filed a Request for Administrative Review of a
Specialist’s Order, a process that applies only to injuries occurring before July 1, 2014. That request was
administratively dismissed.
4
Concrete, Indus., No. E2010-02219-WC-R3-WC, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 965, at *11 (Tenn.
Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 18, 2011) (quoting State v. Farrell, 277 S.W.3d 372, 378
(Tenn. 2009)). We are also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’
compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of
statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor either the employee or the
employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2022).
Analysis
On her notice of appeal, Employee states
[t]he statement given by the sitting judge is incorrect, the conference call
began at 2pm after some time on the call the [line] was disconnect [sic] to
Judge Durham. The other parties on the line [B]lair [C]annon and I do not
recall the other party on the line. Blair Cannon said: I believe that Judge
Durham[’s] line was disconnected. The other party stated that it was on his
end. The Judge did not comment because he was not on the line.
In her brief on appeal, Employee voices the same disagreement with the trial court’s
representation of the sequence of events concerning the end of the most recent
teleconference and indicated her intention to call Employer’s counsel and the attorney for
SIF as witnesses in court. Employee raises other issues concerning discovery, documents
she alleges are missing from the Bureau’s electronic filing system, her purported lack of
access to information, disputes about medical care, and the granting of SIF’s motion for
summary judgment. 2 We have already addressed several of these issues in prior
opinions.
Although Employee has filed a brief, her arguments lack any legal basis and
instead reflect a general dissatisfaction with the litigation process. In the current appeal,
as in her previous appeals, Employee has failed to assert or explain how the trial court
has allegedly erred. Moreover, Employee has offered no cogent legal argument
supporting any alleged factual or legal errors. In short, Employee has identified no
appealable issue. As such, we are unable to discern any factual or legal issues for review.
2
Employee continues to express dissatisfaction with the dismissal of SIF from the litigation, and she
references certain statements and representations allegedly made by SIF’s prior counsel. She has also
expressed her dissatisfaction that SIF has not provided medical care. Employee misunderstands the role
of Tennessee’s Subsequent Injury and Vocational Recovery Fund. SIF cannot be held responsible for the
provision of medical benefits under Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law, and it is responsible for
disability benefits only when an injured employee is deemed permanently and totally disabled and has a
prior disability. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a)(1). As we noted in our opinion addressing
Employee’s second appeal, Employee has presented no evidence that she is permanently and totally
disabled as a result of her work injuries or that she experienced a previous disability of which Employer
was aware. The trial court’s dismissal of SIF does not impact Employee’s potential entitlement to
benefits from Employer if she satisfies the applicable burden of proof at trial.
5
As we have previously observed, the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is not
the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or
arguments for him or her.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn.,
301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). We cannot comb the record for possible errors and
raise issues and arguments for Employee, as we would then be acting as her counsel,
which the law clearly prohibits. See Webb v. Sherrell, No. E2013-02724-COA-R3-CV,
2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015). As mandated by
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(c)(7), we must presume the trial court’s
factual findings are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.
Finally, we conclude Employee’s appeal is frivolous. As we have noted
previously, a frivolous appeal is one that is devoid of merit or brought solely for delay.
Yarbrough v. Protective Servs. Co., Inc., No. 2015-08-0574, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App.
Bd. LEXIS 3, at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 25, 2016); see also Burnette
v. WestRock, No. 2016-01-0670, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 66, at *15
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 31, 2017) (“Stated another way, a frivolous appeal
is one that . . . had no reasonable chance of succeeding.” (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)). Litigants “should not be required to endure the hassle and expense of
baseless litigation. Nor should appellate courts be required to waste time and resources
on appeals that have no realistic chance of success.” Yarbrough, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp.
App. Bd. LEXIS 3, at *10-11 (internal citations omitted).
The appellate process is not the appropriate mechanism to express vague
dissatisfaction with the trial court process. Instead, an appellant must assert and explain
how the trial court erred in making specific determinations or issuing specific orders.
Employee has failed to satisfy this burden. In each appeal she has filed, she has failed to
provide any legal argument in support of her position, and she has failed to identify with
any specificity how she believes the trial court erred. Accordingly, we find Employee’s
current appeal to be frivolous and, pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-22-
.09(4), we award Employer’s counsel attorneys’ fees to be paid by Employee in the
amount of $100.00.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court, award
attorneys’ fees for a frivolous appeal, and remand the case. Costs on appeal have been
waived.
6
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Sondra L. Claybrooks ) Docket No. 2020-06-0489
)
v. ) State File No. 23248-2020
)
Insight Global, LLC, et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Robert V. Durham, Judge )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced
case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 14th day
of September, 2023.
Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Email
Sondra L. Claybrooks X slclay2228@gmail.com
aclaybrooks1@gmail.com
L. Blair Cannon X blair.cannon@thehartford.com
Patrick A. Ruth X patrick.ruth@tn.gov
Robert V. Durham, Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims
Matthew Keene
Acting Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-532-1564
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov
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