Engel v. Geary

#30312-r-PJD
2023 S.D. 69

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

****
ABBY ENGEL, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

COLLIN GEARY, Defendant and Appellant.

****

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
CODINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

****

THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. SPEARS
Judge

****

ANTHONY J. TEESDALE
Brookings, South Dakota Attorney for defendant and
appellant.

KALEB PAULSEN of
Lockwood & Zahrbock Kool Law Office
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and
appellee.

****

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
OCTOBER 3, 2023
OPINION FILED 12/28/23
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DEVANEY, Justice

[¶1.] Abby Engel, a South Dakota resident, commenced a divorce action in

South Dakota against nonresident defendant Collin Geary. In a pro-se filing, Geary

objected to the sufficiency of the service of process and to the South Dakota circuit

court’s jurisdiction. The court overruled Geary’s objections, and after a one-day

divorce trial, during which Geary did not appear, the court entered a judgment and

decree of divorce granting Engel a divorce and awarding the parties certain

property. Geary appeals, claiming that the circuit court did not have authority to

enter orders against him or his property interests because it did not acquire

personal jurisdiction over him. We reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

[¶2.] Engel and Geary were married on January 12, 2022, in California.

Engel is originally from South Dakota, but at the time of the marriage, she was

stationed in California on active duty with the United States Marine Corps.

According to Engel, approximately eight months after their marriage, on September

2, 2022, Geary kicked her out of the home and the two separated. She was on leave

with the Marines at the time and returned to South Dakota.

[¶3.] On September 27, 2022, Engel commenced a divorce action against

Geary in South Dakota, asserting extreme cruelty or, in the alternative,

irreconcilable differences as grounds. Her complaint requested an equitable

division of the parties’ property and debts and an order requiring that Geary pay

her attorney fees. An affidavit of service completed by a process server in California

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stated that Geary was served on October 22, 2022, via substitute service on his

roommate, with the summons and verified complaint, among other documents.

[¶4.] On November 16, 2022, Geary, acting pro se, filed a South Dakota

Unified Judicial System form for self-represented litigants titled, “Responding

Affidavit,” and attached documents in support, including notarized typed

statements by himself and his roommate. Geary asserted that he was not served

with the verified complaint and summons but, instead, was served with a document

titled, “Stipulation and Agreement.” He further noted that it was only after he

contacted the clerk of courts’ office in Codington County, South Dakota, that he

received the summons and complaint via email on November 14, 2022. Geary’s

affidavit requested that the circuit court dismiss Engel’s divorce action for “lack of

jurisdiction and or improper service of required documents.”

[¶5.] At a hearing on January 30, 2023, set by Engel to establish a

scheduling order for the divorce trial, the circuit court first addressed what it

construed to be Geary’s “objection” to the “[c]ourt having jurisdiction to hear this

divorce matter.” Geary appeared telephonically without counsel. He argued that

Engel failed to properly serve him because he was not served with the documents

identified in the process server’s affidavit of service. He advised the court that he

had commenced a divorce action in California on October 25, 2022, and argued that

California would be the more appropriate place to handle the divorce action because

the marriage occurred in California and Engel lived and worked in California. He

also noted that he does not own assets or property in South Dakota.

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[¶6.] During this hearing, both Geary and Engel testified. In response to

questions by counsel for Engel, Geary reiterated his view that he was not properly

served. In response to questions concerning what would need to be resolved as part

of the divorce, Geary agreed that he and Engel did not have any children, joint

credit cards, or outstanding medical debt. He also agreed that Engel took her

personal property with her when the couple separated and that he does not

personally own any land. However, Geary testified that a matter in dispute

concerned a debt associated with damage to his pickup resulting from an accident

he claimed Engel caused. In his view, Engel should be responsible for the debt. He

also testified that a tax liability could be a matter of dispute, although he was

unsure because it was something related to Engel’s taxes.

[¶7.] Engel testified that she joined the military in January 2019 and was

stationed in California when she and Geary were married. After she and Geary

separated, she was honorably discharged from the service and returned to South

Dakota. She further testified that while she was in the military, she always

maintained her South Dakota residency. Engel claimed that the couple’s property

had already been divided; however, she did not testify about the debt associated

with the damage to the truck or the tax liability.

[¶8.] At the close of the hearing, Engel’s counsel argued that Geary did not

establish insufficient service of process and that proceeding on the divorce action in

South Dakota would be proper because Engel is a South Dakota resident. Engel’s

counsel also claimed that because the parties had already divided their personal

property, they “each need to take what’s in their name already and go their

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separate ways.” During his closing argument, Geary reasserted his argument that

“California seems to be the most appropriate forum for [the divorce] to be heard”

and noted that he has had no contact with the State of South Dakota.

[¶9.] The circuit court issued an oral ruling denying Geary’s request to

dismiss the action, finding that Engel filed for divorce in South Dakota as a South

Dakota resident and that the South Dakota divorce action was commenced prior to

Geary filing for divorce in California. The court did not specifically address in this

oral ruling whether Geary was properly served; however, from the court’s earlier

remarks during the hearing, it seemed to reject the claim that any service of process

issues affected the court’s jurisdiction. The court issued a written order on

February 2, 2023, concluding that it “has jurisdiction over the parties and this

matter pursuant to federal and state law based upon [Engel] being an active duty

member who is a resident of South Dakota[.]” It further ordered that “form [sic]

non-convenience is not applicable based upon the length of the marriage, the

location of the property, the size of the marital estate, the parties owning no real

property, and the number of witnesses.” The court set the divorce trial to commence

on March 7, 2023.

[¶10.] On February 27, 2023, Geary, now represented by South Dakota

counsel via a special appearance to challenge jurisdiction, filed a motion for the

circuit court to reconsider its decision entered in the February 2 order and to

bifurcate the divorce trial to allow the court in California to resolve property-related

matters. Geary argued that South Dakota lacks personal jurisdiction over him

because he was not properly served, he has not subjected himself to the jurisdiction

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of the South Dakota court, and he does not have sufficient minimum contacts for a

South Dakota court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. He noted that the

circuit court did not analyze this question during the January 30 hearing or in its

written February 2 order. Geary also filed a motion to continue the March 7 divorce

trial to allow time for a hearing on his motion to reconsider and bifurcate. In an

email response, the circuit court denied Geary’s motions.

[¶11.] Neither Geary nor his counsel appeared at the divorce trial on March

7. At the commencement of trial, counsel for Engel told the circuit court that after

speaking with Geary’s counsel, it was his understanding that Geary’s counsel

ceased representing him after the court denied Geary’s motions because his

representation was limited to a special notice of appearance in furtherance of

Geary’s jurisdictional claim. The court then read on the record its email ruling

denying Geary’s motions and directed counsel for Engel to proceed. Engel was the

only witness to testify at the divorce trial. In addition to testifying about

circumstances she believed warranted granting her a divorce based on extreme

cruelty, she testified about matters related to her property interests and Geary’s.

[¶12.] At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court issued an oral ruling,

finding that it had personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter

jurisdiction over the divorce. The court granted Engel a divorce based on extreme

cruelty. In light of Engel’s testimony during the divorce trial and both parties’

testimony on January 30, the court found that Engel has “the property to which

[she is] entitled” and “Geary has the property to which he is entitled[.]” The court

therefore said that “no further division of property is required[.]” However, the

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court then entered specific directives as it relates to the parties’ property, including

bank accounts and debts.

[¶13.] In its written judgment and decree of divorce, the circuit court restated

its finding that Engel is entitled to a divorce based on extreme cruelty and the

parties are to retain all items currently in their possession and be the sole owners of

such property. Consistent with its oral ruling, the court entered specific orders

related to the parties’ property. The court listed the vehicles purportedly owned by

Geary and awarded those vehicles to him. The court did not list specific financial

accounts owned by Geary; however, it ordered that he retain any and all financial

accounts solely in his name. The court specifically listed accounts owned by Engel

and awarded those solely to her. The court also awarded each party sole ownership

of their retirement accounts and life insurance policies. In regard to disputed

property matters raised at both the January 30 and March 7 proceedings, the court

ordered that Geary be responsible for the damage to his truck from the accident

that Geary claimed Engel caused. The court also ordered Geary and Engel to file

their 2022 taxes as married but filing separate and that Geary claim $40,834.11 as

income on his taxes reflecting income he generated by selling tools using Engel’s

eBay account. The court found that “this division of property and debts is just and

equitable and that neither party shall owe the other party a cash equalizing

payment.”

[¶14.] On March 29, 2023, Geary, through his same South Dakota counsel,

filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to vacate and amend the judgment and

decree of divorce. Geary once again argued that the circuit court lacked personal

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jurisdiction over him. He noted that the court failed to conduct the necessary

analysis when a party challenges personal jurisdiction, namely whether the Long

Arm Statute applies and whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with federal

due process requirements. He then asserted that no such personal jurisdiction

existed under the applicable law. Geary thus argued that the judgment and decree

of divorce must be vacated to the extent it adjudicated his property interests or

imposed financial obligations on him. The record does not contain the circuit court’s

ruling on this motion; however, Engel claims in her brief on appeal that the court

denied it.

[¶15.] Geary appeals, asserting that the circuit court did not have personal

jurisdiction over him and thus could not enter personal judgments against him or

against his property interests.

Standard of Review

[¶16.] “We review issues regarding a court’s jurisdiction as questions of law

under the de novo standard of review.” Daktronics, Inc. v. LBW Tech Co., Inc., 2007

S.D. 80, ¶ 2, 737 N.W.2d 413, 416 (quoting Grajczyk v. Tasca, 2006 S.D. 55, ¶ 8, 717

N.W.2d 624, 627).

Analysis and Decision

[¶17.] On appeal, Engel does not argue or identify any facts establishing that

the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Geary. Instead, she contends that

Geary waived the right to challenge personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, that

this issue need not be considered because the circuit court did not exceed its

jurisdiction by entering the divorce decree at issue here.

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Whether Geary waived his challenge to personal jurisdiction

[¶18.] Engel contends that Geary did not preserve his right to challenge

personal jurisdiction because, in her view, he did not raise the issue until his

counsel filed a motion to reconsider after the January 30 hearing. Engel notes that

Geary used the word “jurisdiction” in his responding affidavit and in his arguments

during the January 30 hearing. However, she asserts that Geary was referring

solely to the circuit court’s jurisdiction over the divorce, not his person.

[¶19.] It is well settled that the defense of personal jurisdiction can be waived

if it is not raised in the first responsive pleading or by motion before the first

responsive pleading. Grajczyk, 2006 S.D. 55, ¶ 9, 717 N.W.2d at 628 (quoting 5C

Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1391, at

515 (3d ed 2004)). Under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(2), “[e]very defense, in law or fact, to a

claim for relief in any pleading . . . shall be asserted in the responsive pleading

thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the

pleader be made by motion: . . . (2) Lack of jurisdiction over the person[.]”

[¶20.] Geary did not use the specific phrase “personal jurisdiction” in his

responding affidavit or in his arguments during the January 30 hearing. However,

a review of the affidavit as a whole and the January 30 hearing transcript reveals

that Geary was challenging the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction over him.

Although he stated in his notarized statement attached to his responding affidavit

that he does “not agree or consent that the County of Codington, South Dakota have

[sic] jurisdiction over this matter[,]” his arguments in support of this claim refer to

his lack of contact with South Dakota. (Emphasis added.) For example, he asserted

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that he and Engel “lived in California at the time of the marriage”; “[t]he marriage

license was issued in the City of Laguna Hill, County of Orange, State of

California”; and they “both still currently reside in California.” Also, during the

hearing, Geary argued multiple times that the court does not have jurisdiction

because he does not live in South Dakota and does not own property in this State.

He specifically asserted that he has “no contact with South Dakota” and that he “did

not agree to relinquishing jurisdiction to South Dakota[.]” Further, when the circuit

court asked whether he had any additional arguments related to the court’s

jurisdiction, Geary replied that it “looks like probably a violation of due process

rights for South Dakota to take jurisdiction of this case.” Finally, during his closing

argument, Geary asserted that “Ms. Engel far exceeds the minimum contact for her

to be considered a California resident” and he has “no contact, whatsoever, with the

State of South Dakota[.]”

[¶21.] Geary’s contentions—where he resides, the type of contacts he has had

with the forum state, his lack of ownership of property in the forum state, his lack

of consent to jurisdiction, and due process concerns—specifically bear on the

question whether the circuit court here could exercise personal jurisdiction over

him. As this Court has said, “[t]he Due Process Clause affords protection against

judgments of a forum with which a person has no meaningful contacts, ties, or

relations.” State v. Grand River Enterp., Inc., 2008 S.D. 98, ¶ 12, 757 N.W.2d 305,

309. See also Kustom Cycles, Inc. v. Bowyer, 2014 S.D. 87, 857 N.W.2d 401 (looking

at the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, including the presence of

defendant’s physical property in the forum state); Met Life Auto and Home Ins. Co.

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v. Lester, 2006 S.D. 62, 719 N.W.2d 385 (examining whether the nonresident party

agreed to submit to the South Dakota circuit court’s jurisdiction).

[¶22.] However, Engel further argues that Geary needed to be more specific

on whether he was raising an issue with personal or subject matter jurisdiction and

his failure to “unambiguously” object to personal jurisdiction warrants deeming the

defense waived. As support, Engel directs this Court to Alger v. Hayes, 452 F.2d

841, 843 (8th Cir. 1972), a case in which she claims the federal court concluded that

an ambiguous objection to personal jurisdiction is insufficient to preserve the

defense. However, the court’s decision in Alger actually supports concluding that

Geary preserved his challenge to the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction. While the

court in Alger determined that the “defendant’s responsive answer that the court

‘lacks jurisdiction’ was ambiguous as to whether jurisdiction over the person or

jurisdiction over the subject matter was the basis of the attack,” the court then

“look[ed] to the subsequent proceedings for clarification of defendant’s intent.” Id.

So too here, even if Geary’s responding affidavit did not use the words “personal

jurisdiction,” the arguments he made at the January 30 hearing were sufficient to

clarify that he was objecting to personal jurisdiction. See Grajczyk, 2006 S.D. 55,

¶ 16, 717 N.W.2d at 630 (viewing the party’s objection to the propriety of the service

of process in context when concluding that although the defendant “did not

specifically use the phrase ‘substitute service,’” the “objection to ‘no service’ was

enough to preserve an objection to the sufficiency of the substitute service”).

[¶23.] Notably, when the circuit court denied Geary’s motion to reconsider, it

did not conclude that Geary waived the right to challenge the circuit court’s

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jurisdiction. On the contrary, the court acknowledged that it might not have

jurisdiction to determine issues related to the parties’ property. In this regard, the

court informed the parties that issues concerning jurisdiction could be raised

anytime. Further, the court stated that while it has “jurisdiction to at least hear

the evidence and grant a divorce,” the court’s jurisdiction “[a]s to the debt and

property issues, [ ] may change depending on how the evidence comes in at the

trial[.]” Based on our review of the record, Geary sufficiently preserved his

challenge to the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction.

Whether the circuit court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over
Geary

[¶24.] As noted above, Engel does not argue that the circuit court had

personal jurisdiction over Geary, likely because it is clear the court did not. A

South Dakota court’s authority to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant implicates two inquiries—whether jurisdiction exists under our Long

Arm Statute, SDCL 15-7-2, and if it does, “whether the proposed assertion of

jurisdiction comports with federal due process requirements[,]” Daktronics, 2007

S.D. 80, ¶ 4, 737 N.W.2d at 416 (citation omitted). The due process inquiry

examines whether the nonresident defendant has “sufficient minimum contacts

with South Dakota to conclude that the assertion of jurisdiction does not offend

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. ¶ 5.

[¶25.] Here, none of the facts pled in Engel’s complaint and nothing in the

testimony presented at the January 30 hearing supports a conclusion that personal

jurisdiction over Geary exists under South Dakota’s Long Arm Statute. Further,

nothing in the record establishes that Geary has “certain minimum contacts with

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[South Dakota] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” See Kustom Cycles, 2014 S.D. 87, ¶ 10,

857 N.W.2d at 406–07 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., Off. of Unemp’t Comp. &

Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)). This Court

applies “a three-step analysis in determining whether a defendant has minimum

contacts sufficient to give South Dakota personal jurisdiction over that defendant.”

Id. ¶ 10, 857 N.W.2d at 407.

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws. Second, the cause of action must
arise from [the] defendant’s activities directed at the forum
state. Finally, the acts of [the] defendant must have substantial
connection with the forum state to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over [the] defendant a reasonable one.

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Marschke v. Wratislaw, 2007 S.D. 125, ¶ 15,

743 N.W.2d 402, 407). Geary has not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of

conducting activities in South Dakota and has thus not invoked the benefits and

protections of its laws. Neither the marriage nor the divorce arose from Geary’s

activities in South Dakota, and Engel has not identified any acts by Geary that

suggest a substantial connection to South Dakota. See Davis v. Otten, 2022 S.D. 39,

¶ 12, 978 N.W.2d 358, 363 (providing that the party seeking to establish personal

jurisdiction has the burden of making a prima facie showing of such jurisdiction).

As such, the circuit court erred in finding in its oral ruling and written judgment

and decree of divorce that it has personal jurisdiction over Geary.

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Whether the circuit court entered orders against Geary in excess of its
authority

[¶26.] Geary acknowledges that because Engel is a South Dakota resident,

the circuit court “had a legitimate interest and the capability to grant Engel a

divorce[.]” 1 However, he argues that because the court did not have personal

jurisdiction over him, the court erred when it entered orders affecting his property

interests. As support, he directs this Court to Estin v. Estin, a case in which the

United States Supreme Court determined that one court’s jurisdiction to determine

the parties’ marital status does not give that same court jurisdiction to decide

“every other legal incidence of the marriage” absent personal jurisdiction over the

parties whose property interest is being affected. 334 U.S. 541, 545, 68 S. Ct. 1213,

1216, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1561 (1948). “Jurisdiction over an intangible can indeed only

arise from control or power over the persons whose relationships are the source of

the rights and obligations.” Id. at 548, 68 S. Ct. at 1218. “The result,” the Court

explained “is to make the divorce divisible[,]” such that a court with personal

jurisdiction over only one spouse to the action has authority to dissolve the

marriage, but it does not have authority to determine the parties’ property rights

and obligations incident to the marriage. Id. at 549, 68 S. Ct. at 1218.

1. As this Court has explained, “The domicil of one spouse within a State gives
power to that State . . . to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted.” Wells
v. Wells, 451 N.W.2d 402, 404 (S.D. 1990) (quoting Williams v. State of N.C.,
325 U.S. 226, 229–30, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 1095, 89 L. Ed. 1577 (1945)). Further,
“[c]ircuit courts may not refuse to hear divorce proceedings properly
commenced first in South Dakota, in favor of another state’s jurisdiction.”
Langdeau v. Langdeau, 2008 S.D. 44, ¶ 18, 751 N.W.2d 722, 729 (emphasis
omitted).
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[¶27.] Engel does not appear to dispute the propriety of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Estin or the concept of a divisible divorce. This is not surprising, given

that this concept has been applied by many courts. 2 In fact, this Court has

recognized the concept, albeit in a different scenario, in Lustig v. Lustig, by

referring to the “divisible divorce doctrine” in a parenthetical when determining

that a South Dakota circuit court must decide the parties’ divorce, while the

Minnesota court could decide child custody. 1997 S.D. 24, ¶ 14, 560 N.W.2d 239,

245 (citing Smith v. Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785, 787 (N.D. 1990)).

[¶28.] Engel nevertheless contends the circuit court did not err under the

circumstances because “[t]o the extent that the divorce decree touched on the

marital estate (such as it was) and the parties’ property interest, it did so based on

judicial admissions by Mr. Geary.” She further contends that “[i]t is clear the court

did not believe it was dividing the marital estate because the court did not value the

property and did not take up the argument of whether the property was marital or

separate.”

[¶29.] A review of the circuit court’s oral ruling and written judgment and

decree of divorce does not support Engel’s assertion that the court acted within its

authority as it relates to the parties’ property. While both parties testified that

Engel took her personal property to South Dakota and Geary retained his in

2. She cites a secondary source for the view that courts across the nation have
held that the divisible divorce doctrine applies to the equitable division of
property. 1 Equit. Distrib. of Property, 4th § 3:12 (Feb. 2023) (providing that
“courts uniformly agree that the standard established by the Supreme Court
cases applies to equitable distribution” even though the Supreme Court has
not been asked to consider the issue).
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California after the parties separated, the court nevertheless entered orders

specifically awarding certain items of property and corresponding debts to each

party as typically done when dividing marital property, including their vehicles,

bank accounts, credit cards, retirement accounts, and life insurance policies.

Further, although the parties have not asserted claims against each other’s

personal property, the transcript from the January 30 hearing makes clear that

Geary disputed his obligation to pay for damage he testified Engel caused to his

pickup and any obligation related to a tax obligation that he believed Engel wanted

him to be responsible for. As it relates to these two matters, the circuit court

entered personal judgments against Geary, making him responsible for both the

truck damage and the tax obligation and ordering him to file his 2022 taxes in a

manner that claims this tax obligation. Tellingly, after entering specific directives

relating to the parties’ property in its written judgment and decree, the court stated

that “this division of property and debts is just and equitable and that neither party

shall owe the other party a cash equalizing payment.” (Emphasis added.) Thus,

contrary to Engel’s view of the court’s decision, it did in fact divide the parties’

property.

[¶30.] Long ago, in Nelson v. Nelson, this Court examined whether a South

Dakota circuit court erred in adjudicating the nonresident wife’s action for a

division of property and award of alimony against the husband, a South Dakota

resident, when the wife had previously obtained a judgment and decree of divorce in

California that did not divide property or award alimony. 71 S.D. 342, 24 N.W.2d

327 (1946). While the California court granted the wife a divorce, it did not dispose

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of the husband’s property or decide alimony because it did not have jurisdiction over

the husband—he made no appearance in the California action and did not own

property in California. This Court acknowledged California’s lack of jurisdiction,

noting that “[t]he great weight of authority is to the effect that where a divorce has

been granted to the wife, in another state, on substituted service, and where the

husband has made no appearance in the action and has no property in that state,

the court granting the divorce has no jurisdiction to award alimony.” Id. at 345, 24

N.W.2d at 329. However, as it pertained to the wife’s action in South Dakota, the

Court concluded that the South Dakota court had jurisdiction to divide property and

award alimony because the husband resided in South Dakota and owned property

here. Id. at 345–46, 24 N.W.2d at 329.

[¶31.] Although the scenario is flipped here because South Dakota, not

California, is adjudicating matters related to the parties’ property, Nelson supports

the determination that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to enter a personal

judgment against Geary or enter orders related to his property because the South

Dakota court did not have personal jurisdiction over him and his property was not

in South Dakota. As this Court more recently explained, “[t]he consistent

constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal

claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.”

Spiska Eng., Inc. v. SPM Thermo-Shield, Inc., 2011 S.D. 23, ¶ 8, 798 N.W.2d 683,

686 (citation omitted); see also Kulko v. Cal. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S. Ct.

1690, 1696, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978) (“It has long been the rule that a valid judgment

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imposing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only

by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.”).

[¶32.] We therefore conclude that the circuit court erred when it entered

orders relating to the division of property and when it imposed obligations on Geary

personally. 3 On remand, the circuit court is directed to vacate these directives from

the judgment and decree of divorce.

[¶33.] Reversed and remanded.

[¶34.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, SALTER, and MYREN, Justices,

concur.

3. In her brief on appeal, Engel contends that even if the circuit court did not
have personal jurisdiction over Geary, it had jurisdiction to determine the
parties’ rights to her “personal property or any property otherwise held in
South Dakota[.]” However, she does not cite law in support of this
proposition or to support that the circuit court could, without personal
jurisdiction over Geary, make an equitable division of the parties’ property as
requested by Engel in her complaint for divorce. We therefore decline to
address Engel’s argument. See Veith v. O’Brien, 2007 S.D. 88, ¶ 50, 739
N.W.2d 15, 29, superseded on other grounds by statute (noting that the failure
to cite supporting authority waives argument).
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