State v. Albaidhani

#31131-r-RG
2026 S.D. 24

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff,

v.

SAMIR ALBAIDHANI, Defendant and Appellee,

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
LODGE NO. 1 AND JOHN DOE
OFFICERS ONE AND TWO, Interested Persons and
Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

THE HONORABLE SUSAN M. SABERS
Judge

JEFFREY R. BECK
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorney for appellants and
interested parties.

KYLIE BECK
EMILY HERBERT of
Minnehaha County Public
Defender’s Office
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and
appellee Samir Albaidhani.

ARGUED
MARCH 18, 2026
OPINION FILED 04/22/26
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GUSINSKY, Justice

[¶1.] Two officers of the City of Sioux Falls Police Department (Officers One

and Two) were involved in a foot-chase with Defendant Samir Albaidhani wherein

Albaidhani shot and injured Officer One. Albaidhani was charged with two counts

of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer, three counts of

aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, and several other offenses. The

Minnehaha County State’s Attorney included the Officers’ unredacted names in the

warrant, the affidavit in support of the warrant, and the complaint that was filed

with and accepted by the Second Circuit Clerk of Courts. Officers asserted their

rights as crime-victims under Article VI, § 29 of the South Dakota Constitution

(Marsy’s Law) and requested to have their names and initials redacted from public

filings, thereafter filing a writ of mandamus asking the court to order such

redactions. The Officers’ mandamus action was denied, and they subsequently

intervened in the underlying criminal action against Albaidhani. After a hearing

before the circuit court, the Officers’ request for redactions under Marsy’s Law and

SDCL 15-15A-13 was denied. Officers One and Two are represented under a

collective bargaining unit—the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 1—and they

appeal the circuit court’s order. We reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural History

[¶2.] As reported in the parties’ submissions, Officers One and Two

attempted to stop a stolen vehicle driven by Albaidhani on April 3, 2025.

Albaidhani had absconded parole and was suspected of being armed. While

attempting the stop, Albaidhani exited the car and fled on foot. Officers One and

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Two followed in pursuit. Albaidhani is accused of shooting at Officers One and Two

while they chased him, allegedly injuring one before fleeing. Albaidhani was

eventually apprehended near Beresford after trading gunfire with other law

enforcement officers who are not involved in this appeal. Albaidhani was arrested

and taken to the hospital to be treated for injuries he sustained in the shootout.

[¶3.] Albaidhani was released from the hospital the next day after receiving

appropriate medical care. The Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s Office filed an

affidavit in support of a warrant and a complaint with the Second Circuit Clerk of

Courts. The first and last names of Officers One and Two were not redacted from

the filings. Upon receipt, the clerk of courts accepted the filings. A warrant was

then issued for Albaidhani’s arrest, and he was taken into custody. Albaidhani was

charged with several offenses, including attempted first-degree murder of a law

enforcement officer and aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer.

Officers One and Two invoked their rights under Marsy’s Law and requested that

the circuit court seal the current and future filings.

[¶4.] On April 4, 2025, without making a formal motion before the circuit

court in the criminal matter, the Officers filed a writ of mandamus requesting

redaction of their names from the public filings. The Officers requested that “their

names, initials, or any information that could be use[d] to identify them be

prohibited from publicly accessible records or from disclosure by the Defendant.”1

1. The parties make reference to “identifying information” in the complaint and
affidavit originally filed with the Second Circuit, but no other identifying
information was included in these documents aside from the Officers’ first
and last names. Thus, as it relates to these filings, the only pieces of
(continued . . .)
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On the same day, the circuit court “issued an informal order by email” directing the

clerk to designate as confidential2 all filings in the criminal matter while the

mandamus action was pending. The Officers consented to providing Albaidhani

with unredacted copies of the filings, however, so long as Albaidhani or his counsel

did not disclose or discuss the Officers’ names with the public.

[¶5.] The mandamus proceeding was assigned to an out-of-circuit judge, and

a hearing was held on the narrow issue of whether a writ of mandamus was an

available remedy. The court determined mandamus relief was improper and

unavailable in this case, finding that “SDCL § 15-15A-13 and Marsy’s Law provide

the [Officers] with a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy before the trial court, in

the ordinary course of law.” Without reaching the merits of the writ, the mandamus

court directed Officers One and Two to seek a remedy within the underlying

criminal action pursuant to Marsy’s Law and SDCL 15-15A-13.3

________________________
(. . . continued)
“identifying information” at issue here are the first and last names of the
Officers.

2. “‘Confidential’ means any records not accessible to the public as provided by
§ 15-15A-7. A document marked as ‘confidential’ means that the document
will not be accessible to the public but will be accessible to court personnel
and attorneys or parties in the case as permitted by applicable law or court
order.” SDCL 16-21A-1(3). On the other hand, “‘Sealed’ means any record
where access is restricted by order of the court. A document marked ‘sealed’
will not be accessible to the public but will be accessible to court personnel
and attorneys or parties in the case as permitted by applicable law or court
order.” SDCL 16-21A-1(4)

3. The mandamus ruling is not before us for review, but we note at the outset
that the mandamus court’s order instructed the Officers to seek a remedy
under both Marsy’s Law and SDCL 15-15A-13, which is our general court
rule relating to requests to prohibit public access to information in court
(continued . . .)
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[¶6.] Officers One and Two then filed a motion with the circuit court in the

criminal action, requesting the court to “protect from public consumption the

names, initials, or any identifying information of the [Officers] . . . pursuant to their

constitutional protections provided under Marsy’s Law.” Specifically, the Officers

requested that the circuit court order the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s

Office to redact the Officers’ names and any identifying information from all current

and future public filings. They further requested that the court order the Second

Circuit Clerk of Courts to remove or redact this same information as well as reject

any future filings where the Officers’ identifying information is unredacted.

[¶7.] The defense objected, arguing first that Marsy’s Law does not apply to

law enforcement officers, as officers choose to take on a “unique role . . . when

becoming a law enforcement officer, [and] events occurring while in their official

capacity do not afford officers the ability to be viewed as a victim hidden from the

public eye.” The defense further argued that SDCL 15-15A-13 provides an available

remedy for officers, and that placing a protective order upon Albaidhani and his

________________________
(. . . continued)
records. But Marsy’s Law is a constitutional provision and is sufficient—
without the additional procedural requirements of SDCL 15-15A-13—to allow
victims to request redaction of their names. See generally State v. Waldner,
2024 S.D. 67, ¶ 22, 14 N.W.3d 229, 237 (“[T]he plain language of Marsy’s Law
creates a constitutional right for a victim to seek enforcement of certain
rights in any trial or appellate court, and it directs the ‘court or other
authority with jurisdiction [to] act promptly on such request, affording a
remedy by due course of law for the violation of any right.’” (second alteration
in original)); see also In re Implicated Individual, 2023 S.D. 16, ¶ 17, 989
N.W.2d 517, 523 (“SDCL 15-15A-13 simply provides a procedure for a party
seeking ‘to prohibit public access to information in a court record’ when ‘there
are sufficient grounds to prohibit access according to applicable
constitutional, statutory and common law.’” (emphasis added)).

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counsel would violate Albaidhani’s constitutional right “to a reasonable

investigation, the right to confront an accuser, the right to public proceedings, and

the right to present a complete defense.” The circuit court ordered unredacted

filings to remain under seal until the motion was fully determined but that

Albaidhani still be provided with unredacted copies.

[¶8.] The circuit court held a hearing on the matter and ultimately denied

the Officers’ motion. In its written memorandum decision, the circuit court did not

discuss whether a law enforcement officer could be considered a “victim” under

Marsy’s Law, deeming it “not necessary to reach that issue to resolve the present

Motion to Seal.” The court thereby “assume[d] without deciding” that the Officers

qualified as victims. The court started its analysis by determining that subsection 5

of Marsy’s Law “does not expressly provide a right to prevent the disclosure of any

and all identifying information” or a right to “complete anonymity” because the

plain language of the subsection does not mention “identifying information.” In

denying the Officers’ motion, the circuit court noted:

Although an individual’s name is among the many facts that
may be used to locate that individual, a name alone does not
provide location details about the individual. Nothing in the
plain language of Marsy’s Law prevents the disclosure of a
victim’s name. And, if it did, courts would be forced to weigh
that right against a defendant’s right to confront adverse
witnesses in a public trial—a balancing that this [c]ourt need
not perform on the facts presented here.

[¶9.] The court then determined the narrow issue presented to it was

whether the court had the power under South Dakota law to “force the parties to

redact their filings”—deciding it did not. Officers One and Two appeal this order,

raising two issues, which we restate as follows: (1) whether law enforcement officers

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may qualify as “victims” under Marsy’s Law; and (2) whether the circuit court erred

when it determined Officers One and Two were not entitled to have their names

redacted from public filings under Marsy’s Law.

Analysis and Decision

1. Whether law enforcement officers may qualify as
“victims” under Marsy’s Law.

[¶10.] “[T]his Court reviews de novo issues of constitutional interpretation.”

Dakota Constructors, Inc. v. Hanson Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2023 S.D. 38, ¶ 12,

994 N.W.2d 222, 227 (citing Holborn v. Deuel Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2021 S.D. 6,

¶ 22, 955 N.W.2d 363, 374). “When interpreting constitutional text, the goal is to

discern the most likely public understanding of a particular provision at the time it

was adopted.” Betty Jean Strom Tr. v. SCS Carbon Transp., LLC, 2024 S.D. 48,

¶ 53, 11 N.W.3d 71, 90 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 828 (2010)

(Thomas, J., concurring in part)). In doing so, we begin with the plain text of the

constitutional provision(s) and give the words “the meaning they have in common

use unless there are very strong reasons to the contrary.” Doe v. Nelson, 2004 S.D.

62, ¶ 9, 680 N.W.2d 302, 305 (citation omitted). We “give regard to the whole

instrument” and will not interpret the Constitution so as to render any provision

meaningless. S.D. Auto. Club, Inc. v. Volk, 305 N.W.2d 693, 696 (S.D. 1981) (citing

Bd. of Regents v. Carter, 89 S.D. 40, 228 N.W.2d 621 (1975)); In re McKennan’s Est.,

126 N.W. 611, 617 (S.D. 1910) (“[I]t must be presumed that every word [of a

constitutional provision] was advisedly selected, inserted for a purpose, and

intended to have its due weight in determining what organic principles have been

established.” (citation omitted)).

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[¶11.] In discussing whether Officers One and Two were entitled to

protections under Marsy’s Law, the circuit court “assume[d] without deciding” that

the Officers qualified as victims, choosing to dispose of the matter on other grounds.

But whether the Officers are entitled to Marsy’s Law protections is a threshold

question, thus requiring us to consider whether the Officers are entitled to “victim”

status under Marsy’s Law.

[¶12.] The constitutional amendment known as Marsy’s Law was passed by

ballot initiative in November 2016. The South Dakota Legislature later proposed

amendments to Marsy’s Law that were adopted by voters in 2018. Subsection 5 of

Marsy’s Law, the most relevant subsection in this case, provides that crime victims

have:

The right, upon request, to prevent the disclosure to the public,
or the defendant or anyone acting on behalf of the defendant in
the criminal case, of information or records that could be used to
locate or harass the victim or the victim’s family, or which could
disclose confidential or privileged information about the victim[.]

S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29(5). “As used in this section, the term, victim, means a

person against whom a crime or delinquent act is committed.”4 Id. § 29(19).

Nothing in the plain language of Marsy’s Law excludes a class, such as law

enforcement officers, from the definition of “victim.”

[¶13.] While this is a matter of first impression for us, the Ohio Supreme

Court has recently considered whether police officers can be “victims” under Marsy’s

Law. See State ex rel. GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police

4. This definition is similar to the definition of “victim” found in SDCL 22-1-
2(53), which states: “‘Victim,’ any natural person against whom the defendant
in a criminal prosecution has committed or attempted to commit a crime[.]”

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Dep’t, No. 2023-1327, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2025 WL 3274795 (Ohio 2025). In

GateHouse, similar to the facts alleged in this case, two officers were “targeted by a

criminal offender during a shootout” after the offender led officers on a high-speed

chase. Id. at *1. The Columbus Police Department redacted the officers’ body

camera footage of the shootout to “conceal the identities of the officers,” and the

Columbus Dispatch sought the unredacted footage, “including the portions where

[the officers] are identified.” Id. at *1–2. The Dispatch claimed the officers were not

entitled to Marsy’s Law protections because “police officers performing their public

duties can never be victims under Marsy’s Law.” Id. at *1.

[¶14.] The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed. Id. In its review, the court

pointed both to Ohio’s Marsy’s Law and its “Victim Privacy Law.” Id. at *2–3. Its

“Victim Privacy Law” provides crime victims with the right, on request, to have

their “name, address, or other identifying information” redacted from all publicly

released case documents. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2930.07(D)(1)(a)(i) (West 2023).

Ohio defines a victim as “a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent

act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of

the offense or act.” GateHouse, 2025 WL 3274795, at *2–3 (quoting Ohio Const.,

art. I, § 10a(D)). The court held that police officers squarely fall within the scope of

Marsy’s Law, and that “because police officers are persons against whom crimes can

be committed, they can be victims under [Marsy’s Law].” Id. at *4.

[¶15.] We note that neither the circuit court nor the litigants had the benefit

of GateHouse when this matter was decided. But we find the Ohio Supreme Court’s

analysis of the “victim” issue persuasive. Upon a plain reading of South Dakota’s

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Marsy’s Law, a victim is “a person against whom a crime or delinquent act is

committed.” S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29(19) (emphasis added). A law enforcement

officer is a “person” under every reasonable interpretation of the word. See Person,

Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining a “person” as “a human being”).

Neither party disputes that Albaidhani is charged with committing a “crime or

delinquent act” when he allegedly fired his weapon and injured Officer One.

Indeed, Albaidhani is charged with attempted first-degree murder of a law

enforcement officer and aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer—both

“crimes” under South Dakota’s penal code. See SDCL 22-4-3 (specifying the

punishment for “attempted first degree murder” against a law enforcement officer);

see also SDCL 22-18-1.05 (specifying the punishment for attempted aggravated

assault of a law enforcement officer). Lastly, it is undisputed that these alleged acts

were committed “against” Officers One and Two, as they were the targets of

Albaidhani’s alleged crimes.

[¶16.] Albaidhani argues that despite the plain language of Marsy’s Law, “the

law is silent as to whether a law enforcement officer is considered a victim under

Marsy’s Law[.]” He further argued below that a defendant has a presumption of

innocence, and that “[t]here is no victim of a defendant who is innocent of the

offenses alleged against them.” Both of these arguments are untenable for several

reasons. First, Albaidhani’s interpretation would require this Court to add

language to the constitutional amendment exempting law enforcement officers, who

are “persons,” from the definition of “victim.” This, of course we cannot do. See In

re Rhoden, 2026 S.D. 7, ¶ 22, 32 N.W.3d 369, 376 (“[W]e cannot interpret the

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Constitution to include language that is not there.” (citation omitted)). Second,

were we to adopt Albaidhani’s position regarding the presumption of innocence,

Marsy’s Law would be rendered partially obsolete, as there would be no “victim” of a

crime until after a defendant was convicted. As it was drafted and passed, the plain

language of Marsy’s Law protects “a person,” and law enforcement officers

undoubtably fit that definition. Officers One and Two, having been persons against

whom a crime has allegedly been committed, qualify as victims under Marsy’s Law

and are entitled to request its protections.

2. Whether the circuit court erred when it determined
Officers One and Two were not entitled to have their
names redacted from public filings under Marsy’s
Law.

[¶17.] Having concluded that law enforcement officers qualify as “victims”

under Marsy’s Law, we must now discuss whether Officers were entitled to its

protections in this case. As above, we review de novo issues of constitutional

interpretation. Dakota Constructors, 2023 S.D. 38, ¶ 12, 994 N.W.2d at 227.

[¶18.] As an initial matter, we must note that the circuit court concluded it

did not have the power under South Dakota law to “force the parties to redact their

filings” in accordance with Marsy’s Law. We disagree. The circuit court has the

authority to issue an order for a party to file records in accordance with Marsy’s

Law. After all, Marsy’s Law prohibits disclosure of certain information to the

public. Courts of competent jurisdiction are vested with the power to enforce the

rights enumerated in Marsy’s Law. That power necessarily includes the authority

to compel parties to redact information from public filings. See also SDCL 16-21A-

5(1) (“A party electronically filing a document that is not accessible to the public in

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whole or in part is responsible for redaction or designating the document as

confidential or sealed before transmitting it to the court.” (emphasis added)).

[¶19.] Officers One and Two advance the theory that their names and initials

could be used to locate or harass them, and that this information is thereby

protected by Marsy’s Law. Albaidhani contends that such is not the case, and that

the Officers “are requesting the absolute right to privacy that the Court has held

crime victims do not have.” Albaidhani makes specific reference to the Officers’

“complete anonymity” that would seemingly implicate the defendant’s constitutional

right to a public trial or to confront adverse witnesses. But nothing in Marsy’s Law

requires the circuit court to redact information in documents provided to the

defendant, and that is not what the Officers are requesting here. The Officers are

requesting that their identifying information—their names and initials—be

redacted from public filings, not the filings provided to Albaidhani. We must first

consider whether the Officers’ names or initials qualify as “information or records

that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the victim’s family” under

Marsy’s Law.

[¶20.] This, too, is a matter of first impression in South Dakota. Few courts

have grappled with this specific question, but both parties cite City of Tallahassee v.

Florida Police Benevolent Assoc., Inc., 375 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 2023). In City of

Tallahassee, two officers used lethal force while detaining a suspect after the

suspect charged at them with a knife. Id. at 182. When the city proposed releasing

the officers’ names to the public, the Florida Police Benevolent Association invoked

the officers’ constitutional protections under Marsy’s Law and sought an emergency

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injunction to prevent the release. Id. at 181. The officers “asserted that they

qualified for Marsy’s Law protections because they were victims of the assaults from

which they had defended themselves.” Id. at 182. The trial court refused to issue

the injunction, but its order was reversed on appeal by the intermediate appellate

court. Id. The city petitioned the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 183.

[¶21.] On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court first addressed “whether a

victim’s name qualifies as ‘information or records that could be used to locate or

harass the victim or the victim’s family.’” Id. (quoting Fla. Const. art. 1, § 16(b)(5)).

The court concluded “Marsy’s Law guarantees to no victim—police officer or

otherwise—the categorical right to withhold his or her name from disclosure.” Id. at

183 (emphasis added). It reasoned that “[o]ne’s name, standing alone” is not the

“kind of information or record” that could be used to locate or harass the victim or

their families. Id. at 184. “[I]t communicates nothing about where the individual

can be found and bothered.” Id.

[¶22.] The Florida Supreme Court found the distinctions between “locating”

and “identifying” individuals to be significant, ultimately concluding that

“[p]rotecting crime victims from being located—as opposed to identified—is a

meaningful distinction, for exposure of a crime victim’s location creates a threat of

physical danger that exposure of his or her name alone does not generally pose.” Id.

at 185. The Tallahassee court focused almost exclusively on the “locate” component

of Marsy’s Law and conducted little to no discussion of the “harass” component. See

id. at 184 n.5 (“The City and the Coalition focus primarily on the connection

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between identifying and locating a victim, perhaps upon the assumption that

locating an individual is a predicate to his or her harassment.”).

[¶23.] Here, in relying on Tallahassee, the circuit court similarly did not

discuss the possible use of a victim’s name or initials to harass the victim. This

omission neglects a significant portion of Marsy’s Law. The plain language of

Marsy’s Law protects “information or records that could be used to locate or harass

the victim or the victim’s family.” S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29(5) (emphasis added).

“Locate” and “harass” are used in the disjunctive, each equally important to the

court’s determination. See In re Est. of Flaws, 2016 S.D. 61, ¶ 29, 885 N.W.2d 580,

588 (quoting Sutherland’s treatise on statutory construction for the proposition that

“[t]he use of the disjunctive usually indicates alternatives and requires that those

alternatives be treated separately”). To “harass” someone is “to disturb or bother

persistently” or “to intimidate or coerce, as with persistent demands or threats.”

Harass, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/harass (last visited Apr.

13, 2026).

[¶24.] An individual need not have the victim’s physical location to disturb or

bother them persistently. In the digital information age, a victim’s name could be

the first and most important piece of information used to locate or harass them. In

fact, the circuit court’s order admits as much: “Although an individual’s name is

among the many facts that may be used to locate that individual, a name alone does

not provide location details about the individual.” (Emphasis added.) In reaching

its ultimate conclusion, the circuit court placed significant weight on whether a

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piece of information or a record, in isolation, would be sufficient to locate or harass

an individual. But that is not what Marsy’s Law requires.

[¶25.] The language of Marsy’s Law is much more expansive, encompassing

information that “could be used to locate or harass” the victim. S.D. Const. art. VI,

§ 29(5) (emphasis added). “Could” in this context refers to the notion of possibility.

Unless a scenario presents itself in which a victim’s name could not be used in

locating or harassing the victim or the victim’s family, the plain language of Marsy’s

Law includes the names of crime-victims. We decline to engage in such a restrictive

reading of the provision as the Tallahassee court did. A victim’s name or initials5

qualify as information that “could be used to locate or harass the victim or the

victim’s family,” and victims are entitled to request that this information be

redacted under Marsy’s Law.

[¶26.] In looking at South Dakota’s version of Marsy’s Law, however, we

agree with the Tallahassee court and the circuit court that the plain language does

not grant an individual a “categorical right” to have their name or initials redacted.

Marsy’s Law is a constitutional provision, and it gives victims the broad right to

request redaction of information that may be used to locate or harass them. Victims

therefore have the right to request that their name or initials be redacted from court

records. But when considering whether a requestor is entitled to Marsy’s Law

protections, the circuit court must balance the rights of the requestor against other

constitutionally protected rights, including the rights of the defendant and the

5. Officers One and Two argue that their initials could be used to obtain their
names by searching publicly accessible databases.

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rights of the public. See State v. Waldner, 2024 S.D. 67, ¶ 47, 14 N.W.3d 229, 244–

45 (balancing the constitutional rights of the requestor against the constitutional

rights of the defendant). This inquiry will vary case-by-case, and the facts and

circumstances of each individual case will define the interests to be balanced by the

court.

[¶27.] Here, the circuit court acknowledged that if Marsy’s Law allowed the

court to prevent disclosure of a victim’s name, courts would be forced to conduct a

balancing test where they weigh the victim’s rights against the defendant’s and the

public’s rights. Because we hold Marsy’s Law allows the court to prevent disclosure

of a victim’s name and initials, the circuit court erred in declining to conduct such a

balancing test. Whether a victim’s name, initials, or other information should be

redacted will depend on the unique circumstances of each case and the asserted

interests that should be balanced by the court.6 Accordingly, we reverse and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[¶28.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN,

Justices, concur.

6. The State did not appear in this appeal to assert any interests as the
prosecuting authority. Nor was there any issue before the court concerning a
potential public right to access.

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