Interest of J.W.

#30810-r-PJD
2025 S.D. 38

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
IN THE INTEREST OF J.W., child,
and concerning A.B., Respondent.

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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

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THE HONORABLE STACY L. WICKRE
Judge

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OLE J. OLESEN of
Pennington County Public
Defender’s Office
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for appellant J.W.

MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General

ANGELA R. SHUTE
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for appellee State of
South Dakota.

****

ARGUED
APRIL 30, 2025
OPINION FILED 07/16/25
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DEVANEY, Justice

[¶1.] J.W. and two other juvenile boys were involved in an incident in which

one of the other boys exploded a large firework inside a vacant trailer home in their

neighborhood, resulting in significant fire and smoke damage to the trailer. When

questioned by police, J.W. initially lied about who caused the fire in order to protect

the other juveniles involved. J.W. admitted to a juvenile delinquency petition

alleging accessory to a crime. One of the juveniles paid a portion of the restitution

for the damage to the trailer, and the circuit court ordered J.W. and the third

juvenile to pay the balance of the restitution amounting to approximately $15,000.

On appeal, J.W. challenges the restitution order. We reverse.

Factual and Procedural Background

[¶2.] On July 5, 2023, law enforcement and firefighters responded to a

structural fire at a residential trailer park off Sturgis Road near Black Hawk, South

Dakota. Upon their arrival, they saw a vacant trailer home with black smoke

billowing out the windows and door. Law enforcement officers spoke to a woman

standing outside with juvenile boys. She said she was the one who called 911 after

the boys knocked on her door and reported the fire. Two of the boys, 14-year-old

J.W. and 15-year-old S.E., were interviewed by law enforcement on the scene; a

third boy, 14-year-old D.B., had left when his father picked him up soon after the

deputies arrived.

[¶3.] J.W. told the officer that he saw two kids running away from the

trailer and up the hill. He described one as about ten years old and wearing cargo

shorts, and described the other as a tall kid wearing a white hoody.

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[¶4.] While on the scene, law enforcement interviewed another woman who

lived in the trailer park. She had witnessed three juvenile boys go into the trailer

and then she heard an explosion. She also saw the boys run away and attempt to

hide, then return to the trailer. When they opened the door, black smoke came out.

She watched the boys throw something into a trash can, then saw them approach

the trailer where the 911 caller lived. This witness showed law enforcement a video

she had recorded on her cellphone, as well as a video captured on her home security

camera, that showed J.W., S.E., and D.B. engaging in these events.

[¶5.] The next day, law enforcement separately interviewed the three boys

about the fire, as documented by law enforcement reports in the record. During his

interview, J.W. stated that he was with S.E. and D.B. and they had fireworks.

According to J.W., at some point S.E. said he had an idea. S.E. took a mortar

firework, walked over to the trailer which he knew to be vacant, and kicked in the

front door. J.W. claimed that he and D.B. were telling S.E. not to do it. All three

boys entered the trailer. J.W. said that S.E. lit the mortar and threw it toward the

refrigerator in the kitchen, after which the boys ran out of the trailer and continued

running. They returned and saw the trailer was on fire. At that point, S.E. told

them to throw the fireworks in the trash can and not say anything, and he devised a

plan for them to say that two unknown boys were responsible for the fire. The boys

then knocked on the neighbor’s door and asked her to call 911. J.W. stated that

when he talked to law enforcement on the scene the day before, he lied because he

was afraid S.E. would beat him up.

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[¶6.] During their interviews, D.B. and S.E. each provided a version of the

events consistent with what J.W. explained, although D.B. and S.E. both tried to

minimize some of their own involvement. S.E. admitted that he was the one who lit

the firework inside the trailer.

[¶7.] The State filed juvenile delinquency petitions against all three

juveniles. In J.W.’s case, the petition alleged second degree burglary as well as

aiding and abetting reckless burning or exploding. Thereafter, an amended petition

was filed alleging that J.W. had committed one count of accessory to a crime under

SDCL 22-3-5(4).1 Upon J.W.’s admission to the amended petition, the court

adjudicated him to be a delinquent child. On March 28, 2024, the circuit court

entered a dispositional order placing J.W. on four months of probation and imposing

other conditions. The court set an evidentiary hearing to address restitution.

[¶8.] Only J.W. and S.E. participated in the joint restitution hearing held on

June 4, 2024, as D.B.’s case was dismissed pursuant to an agreement he reached

with the State wherein he agreed to pay $9,086.75 in restitution. At the hearing,

the State presented evidence that, as a result of the fire and smoke, the trailer

1. SDCL 22-3-5(4) provides:

A person is an accessory to a crime, if, with intent to hinder, delay, or
prevent the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction,
or punishment of another for the commission of a felony, that person
renders assistance to the other person. . . .

The term, render assistance, means to:
...
(4) Obstruct anyone by force, intimidation, or deception in
the performance of any act which might aid in the
discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution,
conviction, or punishment of the other person[.]
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sustained significant damage and was uninhabitable until repairs could be

completed. It was not insured. The trailer owner, as well as his contractor who was

still doing the repairs, testified regarding the damage and the cost of repairs. The

owner also claimed an amount for lost rental income, as he had purchased the

trailer to be used as rental property and had been unable to do so while repairs

were being made. J.W. did not testify, but his mother testified about their living

situation and her income, debts, and household expenses, as well as J.W.’s job

prospects in the area.

[¶9.] Following the hearing, both parties submitted briefs to the court. J.W.

first argued that he should not be required to pay any restitution because there was

no causal connection between the damages suffered by the trailer owner and the

conduct for which J.W. was adjudicated—i.e., his lying to police about seeing two

other kids run away from the trailer, in his effort to protect S.E. and D.B. He

acknowledged older cases from this Court that held such a causal connection need

not be shown in juvenile delinquency cases. See People ex rel. K.K., 2010 S.D. 98,

¶ 12, 793 N.W.2d 24, 28; see generally In re M.D.D., 2009 S.D. 94, ¶ 5, 774 N.W.2d

793, 795 (holding that adult restitution statutes are inapplicable to juvenile

proceedings). But he claimed those cases were no longer valid in light of subsequent

legislative amendments made in 2016 to the juvenile statutes regarding restitution.

He pointed to the amendment’s cross-reference to the criminal restitution statute

applicable to cases involving adults and argued that case law interpreting that

statute requires a causal connection to be shown before restitution may be ordered.

J.W. further argued that, if restitution were imposed, the court should limit the

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amount ordered to avoid creating serious hardship or injustice to J.W. and his

mother, who he claimed would realistically be the likely source for the payments.2

J.W. also challenged some of the amounts claimed as damages.

[¶10.] In its brief, the State requested a restitution award of $30,013.25,

imposed jointly and severally upon J.W. and S.E. This included the victim’s request

for lost rental income but excluded the amount already paid as restitution by D.B.

Although the State likewise noted the legislative amendments to the juvenile

statutes regarding restitution, it disagreed with J.W.’s interpretation of the

amendments. It argued that the prior cases remained good law and, accordingly,

under those cases no causal connection need be shown. In the alternative, the State

argued a causal connection existed under the facts of the case. The State further

contended that J.W. failed to show how he would incur serious hardship or injustice

by an order of restitution.

[¶11.] The circuit court entered a written restitution order in a memorandum

that detailed its findings and analysis of the statutes and case law governing

juvenile restitution. The court analyzed the legislative changes to the statutes

governing dispositions in juvenile delinquency cases (SDCL 26-8C-7) and in cases

involving children in need of supervision (CHINS) (SDCL 26-8B-6). In the court’s

view, K.K.’s holding that no causal connection need be shown in juvenile

2. J.W. argued that any restitution award should not exceed $2,500, citing
SDCL 25-5-15. That statute addresses parental liability for damage caused
by willful acts of a minor child and caps the amount recoverable in a civil suit
against the parents at $2,500. The circuit court ruled that this statute did
not apply to the question of restitution in a delinquency proceeding against a
juvenile. J.W. does not challenge the court’s ruling on appeal.
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delinquency cases was still valid, even after the legislative amendments. Thus, the

court applied the broad principles governing juvenile proceedings announced in K.K.

that related to the “guidance, control, or rehabilitation” of delinquent children, and

concluded that it was in J.W.’s “best interest” to require him to pay restitution. The

court made this ruling after noting that S.E. admitted to second degree burglary

and J.W. admitted to being an accessory to a crime, finding that both juveniles “had

‘some involvement in the crime’ that caused near total destruction of the trailer

home[.]”

[¶12.] Additionally, the court determined it was “reasonably satisfied” that

the purposes of affording “guidance, control, or rehabilitation” were served by using

the cost of repair of the trailer home as the appropriate measure of damages, which

it found to be $24,700 based on the evidence. The court declined to include

restitution for the claimed lost rental income after determining it was “unclear what

damages [the victim] suffered for lost rents.” Subtracting approximately $9,000

that D.B. had already paid in restitution, the court found J.W. and S.E. jointly and

severally liable for $15,613.25 in unrecovered damages. In this regard, the court

found that “the delinquent act in this case was quite serious, . . . the destruction

caused by the actions of [J.W.] and the other minor children was significant[,]” and

that “the actions of [J.W.] and the other minor children were extremely reckless and

dangerous.” The court found that requiring restitution in the amount imposed

would “serve a rehabilitative purpose and help the children understand the gravity

of the harm they caused and the danger of such reckless conduct.”

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[¶13.] The court also found there was “no credible evidence” that the

restitution order would cause J.W. serious hardship. Noting his mother’s testimony

about her financial situation, the court found the testimony was offered in relation

to J.W.’s assumption that his mother would ultimately be financially responsible for

the restitution. But, the court explained, the juvenile restitution statute speaks in

terms of the child paying restitution, not the parent. Based on the limited

testimony from J.W.’s mother, the court found that J.W. was capable of earning

income to apply toward restitution without impacting the family’s ability to afford

its household and living necessities.

[¶14.] J.W. appeals the circuit court’s restitution order, asserting the

following restated issues:

1. Whether the circuit court erred in ordering restitution
without finding a causal connection between the victim’s
damages and J.W.’s criminal act.

2. Whether the circuit court clearly erred in finding that
J.W. would not suffer serious hardship from the order of
restitution.

Analysis and Decision

[¶15.] As to the first issue, J.W. claims there is no causal connection between

the offense for which he was adjudicated—accessory to a crime stemming from his

act of lying to the police—and the victim’s damages as a result of the trailer fire.

On appeal, the State does not argue that a causal connection factually exists in this

case. Rather, the State argues, as the circuit court ruled below, that the causal

connection requirement does not apply to restitution awarded in juvenile

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delinquency adjudications. J.W. contends the circuit court erred in its ruling, and

he seeks reversal of the court’s restitution order.

[¶16.] Both sides point to a legislative amendment to the juvenile

delinquency statute regarding restitution, SDCL 26-8C-7(1), and take opposite

positions regarding the meaning of that amendment and whether it effectively

abrogates certain prior cases from this Court involving juvenile restitution. This is,

therefore, a matter of “statutory interpretation and application, which we review de

novo.” State v. Dutton, 2023 S.D. 29, ¶ 17, 993 N.W.2d 136, 141 (citing State v.

Goulding, 2011 S.D. 25, ¶ 5, 799 N.W.2d 412, 414). But first it is necessary to

discuss relevant case law and its connection to the statutes at issue.

Prior restitution decisions

[¶17.] In support of his causal connection argument, J.W. cites State v. Joyce,

a restitution case involving an adult driver of a vehicle who accidently rear-ended

another vehicle and then fled the scene. 2004 S.D. 73, 681 N.W.2d 468. He pled

guilty to a charge of leaving the scene of an accident (hit and run), and the court

ordered that he pay restitution for the other motorist’s medical expenses and

vehicle damages. Joyce appealed, claiming “he should not have been ordered to pay

restitution” because the motorist’s “damages were not caused by his leaving the

scene of the accident, but rather by the accident itself.” Id. ¶ 10, 681 N.W.2d at

469−70. This Court cited various provisions of SDCL chapter 23A-28, the chapter

governing restitution to victims of crimes, after first recognizing that “[i]t is the

policy of this state that restitution shall be made by each violator of the criminal

laws to the victims of the violator’s criminal activities to the extent that the violator

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is reasonably able to do so.” Id. ¶ 12, 681 N.W.2d at 470 (quoting SDCL 23A-28-1).

The Court noted, in particular, the definitions found in SDCL 23A-28-2:

“Restitution” is defined as “full or partial payment of pecuniary
damages to a victim.” SDCL 23A-28-2. “Victim” is defined, in
part, as “any person, as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(31), who
has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s
criminal activities[.]” SDCL 23A-28-2(5). “Criminal activities”
include “any crime for which there is a plea of guilty or a verdict
of guilty upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered
and any other crime committed after June 30, 1979, which is
admitted by the defendant, whether or not prosecuted.” SDCL
23A-28-2(2). “Pecuniary damages” include “all damages which a
victim could recover against the defendant in a civil action
arising out of the same facts or event, except punitive damages
and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss of
consortium.” SDCL 23A-28-2(3).

Id. (emphasis added). The Court held that “South Dakota’s restitution statutes

require a causal connection between a defendant’s crime and a victim’s damages.”

Id. ¶ 16, 681 N.W.2d at 471; see also State v. Hofer, 2008 S.D. 109, ¶ 28, 757 N.W.2d

790, 798 (noting that the causal connection requirement arises from the “as a result

of” language in SDCL 23A-28-2(5)). Therefore, the Court reversed the restitution

order after concluding that “Joyce’s act of leaving the scene did not cause [the

motorist’s] injuries and resulting damages.” Joyce, 2004 S.D. 73, ¶ 16, 681 N.W.2d

at 471.

[¶18.] Here, J.W. argues that, like in Joyce, his after-the-fact act of lying to

the police, which formed the basis for his admission to the amended petition, was

not causally connected to the victim’s damages that were a result of the entry into

the trailer and S.E.’s lighting of the firework. The State, citing this Court’s rulings

in M.D.D. and K.K., contends the circuit court correctly determined that the “causal

connection” requirement has no application in juvenile delinquency proceedings.

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[¶19.] In K.K., the Court addressed this very issue. 2010 S.D. 98, 793 N.W.2d

24. In that case, several teenagers broke into a bar during the night, stole items,

and caused significant damage to the building. K.K. was one of the juveniles

involved, although she did not participate in the actual burglary. She was,

however, involved in the planning of the break-in and told the others they should

get a brick to break into the bar. Afterward, she either helped them load the stolen

goods into the car or watched them being loaded. After K.K. later admitted to a

juvenile delinquency petition alleging misprision of a felony, the court ordered her

to pay restitution jointly and severally with the other juveniles. She appealed,

alleging there was no causal connection between her misprision of a felony offense

and the losses sustained by the bar owner as a result of the burglary. Id. ¶ 8, 793

N.W.2d at 27.

[¶20.] When considering the causation issue raised by K.K., we acknowledged

Joyce’s holding regarding the causal connection requirement in adult restitution

cases, which we noted is derived from SDCL 23A-28-1 and the “as a result of”

language in SDCL 23A-28-2(5). Id. ¶¶ 9−10 (citing Joyce, 2004 S.D. 73, ¶ 16, 681

N.W.2d at 471). However, we explained that “the terms of SDCL [chapter] 23A-28

do not ‘have application in juvenile proceedings.’” Id. ¶ 11 (quoting M.D.D., 2009

S.D. 94, ¶ 4, 774 N.W.2d at 794). In M.D.D., this Court noted that the language

used in the criminal restitution statutes contained terms applicable only to criminal

cases involving adults, and not juvenile proceedings. 2009 S.D. 94, ¶ 4, 774 N.W.2d

at 794. We further noted in M.D.D. that “the different language used in the

criminal restitution statutes does not reflect legislative intent that the criminal

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statutes (SDCL [chapter] 23A-28) apply to restitution in juvenile proceedings[.]” Id.

¶ 5, 774 N.W.2d at 795.

[¶21.] Relying on M.D.D., the Court determined in K.K. that the juvenile

restitution statute then in effect “broadly authorized courts to order restitution in

juvenile cases for ‘any damage done to property.’ There [was] no limiting or

restricting language akin to the ‘as a result of’ language found in the adult

restitution statutes.”3 K.K., 2010 S.D. 98, ¶ 12, 793 N.W.2d at 28. See M.D.D., 2009

S.D. 94, ¶ 6, 774 N.W.2d at 795 (noting that, unlike adult restitution statutes, the

juvenile restitution statute contained “broad, unqualified language”). We explained

that the different language used in the adult restitution statutes and the juvenile

restitution statute indicated that “the Legislature intended a different analysis in

juvenile cases.” K.K., 2010 S.D. 98, ¶ 11, 793 N.W.2d at 27−28. We noted that “the

juvenile statutes do not require that restitution be strictly associated with the crime

for which the juvenile has been adjudicated.” Id. ¶ 12, 793 N.W.2d at 28. Thus, we

held that in juvenile proceedings, no causal connection was required between the

victim’s damages and the juvenile’s criminal activities. Id. After concluding that

the best interests of a child could include imposing restitution “that is not strictly

3. When M.D.D. and K.K. were decided, the juvenile delinquency disposition
statute (SDCL 26-8C-7) authorized a court to impose the dispositions allowed
in SDCL 26-8B-6, the statute governing adjudications of CHINS, which at the
time provided in subsection (4): “The court may require the child to pay for
any damage done to property or for medical expenses under conditions set by
the court if payment can be enforced without serious hardship or injustice to
the child[.]” See 2008 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 139, §§ 1−2; see also In re M.D.D.,
2009 S.D. 94, ¶ 6 n.3, 774 N.W.2d 793, 795 n.3.
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causally related[,]” we held that, because K.K. had “some involvement” in the crime,

it was appropriate for her to make restitution.4 Id. ¶ 13, 793 N.W.2d at 29.

[¶22.] Against this backdrop, the present case requires the Court to assess

whether the holdings in M.D.D. and K.K. remain viable considering the

Legislature’s subsequent amendments to the juvenile restitution statute.

Legislative changes to juvenile statutes

[¶23.] In 2015, the Legislature made significant changes to the juvenile

justice statutes as part of a comprehensive reform act. See 2015 S.D. Sess. Laws ch.

152. While the act included a number of changes, of relevance to the issue here was

the amendment of SDCL 26-8C-7, which provides disposition alternatives to a court

in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The act struck the provision in SDCL 26-8C-7

that referred to SDCL 26-8B-6—the statute providing available disposition

alternatives including juvenile restitution. 2015 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 152, § 20.

That change appears to be inadvertent, as the Legislature enacted emergency

legislation in 2016 to again amend SDCL 26-8C-7. See 2016 S.D. Sess. Laws ch.

146.

[¶24.] Of particular note, the 2016 legislation amended subsection (1) of the

juvenile delinquency disposition statute, SDCL 26-8C-7, to add the following

alternative available to the court: “The court may require the child to pay

4. Alternatively, the Court determined that, factually, there was a sufficient
casual connection in the case. Id. ¶¶ 14−17, 793 N.W.2d at 29−30. We
rejected K.K.’s reliance on Joyce, noting that Joyce was distinguishable
because, in that case, the defendant’s crime of leaving the scene of an
accident “was committed after the infliction of injuries” and therefore “[t]he
damage was already done.” Id. ¶ 15, 793 N.W.2d at 29.
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restitution, as defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4) and under conditions set by the

court, if payment can be enforced without serious hardship or injustice to the

child[.]” 2016 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 146, § 1. The 2016 legislation also amended

SDCL 26-8B-6(4) in the CHINS chapter, eliminating the broad language referred to

in M.D.D. and K.K. that allowed a court to require a child to pay “for any damage

done to property or for medical expenses” and changing this statutory provision to

read: “The court may require the child to pay restitution, as defined in subdivision

23A-28-2(4) and under conditions set by the court[,] if payment can be enforced

without serious hardship or injustice to the child[.]” 2016 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 146,

§ 7. Additionally, the 2016 legislation added a specific reference to restitution, “as

defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4)[,]” in two other juvenile statutes. 2016 S.D. Sess.

Laws ch. 146, §§ 5−6 (amending SDCL 26-7A-129 and SDCL 26-7A-11,

respectively).

Application of current juvenile restitution statutes

[¶25.] In the present case, both parties and the circuit court agreed that, in a

juvenile delinquency proceeding, SDCL 26-8C-7(1) allows a court to order

restitution, as defined in SDCL 23A-28-2(4) as “full or partial payment of pecuniary

damages to a victim[.]” The circuit court determined, however, that in its view, the

Legislature’s specific reference to subsection (4), but not to any other subsection,

demonstrated an intention to “necessarily exclude” all other subsections in that

chapter, including the definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5). The circuit court

found it significant that the current juvenile restitution statute in the CHINS

chapter, SDCL 26-8B-6, refers to “restitution, as defined in § 23A-28-2,” which the

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court construed as the Legislature’s intent to adopt this statute in its entirety.5

(Emphasis added.) In the court’s view, the Legislature’s failure to do the same with

regard to SDCL 26-8C-7 reflected an intent to not adopt the entirety of the adult

restitution statutes for juvenile delinquency proceedings. Thus, because the court

believed that the other definitions in SDCL 23A-28-2 did not apply to juvenile

delinquency proceedings, it determined that K.K.’s holding remained valid. In other

words, the court held that no “causal connection” need be shown, as restitution was

not limited to damages occurring only “as a result of” or “strictly associated with”

the crime for which the juvenile was adjudicated. See K.K., 2010 S.D. 98, ¶ 12, 793

N.W.2d at 28.

[¶26.] On appeal, the State adopts a similar position as the circuit court and

argues the Legislature intended to maintain a distinction between adult restitution

and juvenile restitution, as reflected in M.D.D. and K.K. On the other hand, J.W.

argues that the juvenile restitution statutes are clear, certain, and unambiguous,

and the amendments evince the Legislature’s intention to treat juvenile restitution

the same way as adult restitution, thus abrogating this Court’s contrary holdings in

M.D.D. and K.K.

[¶27.] Despite the path that may have led to this point, a resolution of this

issue is rather straightforward. The starting point, of course, is “an analysis of the

statute’s text.” In re Implicated Individual, 2021 S.D. 61, ¶ 16, 966 N.W.2d 578,

5. In 2021, the Legislature amended SDCL 26-8B-6(4) to strike the reference to
“subdivision 23A-28-2(4)” and replaced it with “§ 23A-28-2”. This occurred
when the Legislature made other changes to the CHINS statutes unrelated to
the issue of restitution. See 2021 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 120.
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583. We adhere to the rule that “the language expressed in the statute is the

paramount consideration.” Puffy’s, LLC v. Dep’t of Health, 2025 S.D. 10, ¶ 38, 18

N.W.3d 134, 145. “When the language in a statute is clear, certain, and

unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and this Court’s only function is

to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.” Implicated Individual,

2021 S.D. 61, ¶ 16, 966 N.W.2d at 583.

[¶28.] The language of SDCL 26-8C-7(1) now provides: “The court may

require the child to pay restitution, as defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4) and under

conditions set by the court, if payment can be enforced without serious hardship or

injustice to the child[.]” Thus, in unambiguous terms, restitution in juvenile

delinquency proceedings is defined as “full or partial payment of pecuniary damages

to a victim[.]” SDCL 23A-28-2(4). But to understand the full import of that statute,

the terms “pecuniary damages” and “victim” must also be given meaning. Rather

than applying the rest of the definitions in SDCL 23A-28-2 when addressing the

question of whether causation must be shown, the circuit court relied instead on the

broader principles announced in M.D.D. and K.K., which interpreted the juvenile

statutes as they existed prior to the amendments. There are two problems with

that approach.

[¶29.] First, the circuit court’s approach leaves an unnecessary void in the

understanding of how to apply the definition of restitution. Indeed, a court cannot

address restitution without knowing who it applies to and what type of damages are

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implicated. The State points to definitions of “victim” in other parts of the code.6

Ironically, the circuit court did just the opposite when assessing the measure of

damages to be imposed as restitution in this case. Instead of looking elsewhere, the

court applied the definition of “pecuniary damages” found in SDCL 23A-28-2(3)

when determining the amount of restitution, and rightly so.7 Yet, the court refused

to apply the definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5) when considering whether a

causal connection with the delinquent act for which J.W. was adjudicated must be

established.

[¶30.] When a court applies the definition of “restitution” in SDCL 23A-28-

2(4), its consideration of the other definitions found within SDCL 23A-28-2 is not

6. The State cites SDCL 26-7A-36.1, which allows a victim of delinquent acts to
attend juvenile hearings and which refers to two definitions of a “victim”
found in statutes that apply in adult criminal proceedings. See SDCL 23A-
28C-4 (defining a victim as “any person being the direct subject of an alleged
act that would constitute . . . a violation of chapter 22-22”); SDCL 22-1-2(53)
(defining a victim as “any natural person against whom the defendant in a
criminal prosecution has committed or attempted to commit a crime”). The
State notes in its brief that these definitions do not contain “the ‘as a result
of’ language from SDCL 23A-28-2(5) that provides the causal connection
requirement in adult restitution cases.” It is not clear how this is helpful to
the State’s position, because the language in these definitions similarly
contemplates a causal link with a defendant’s criminal activities.

7. Notably, the definition of “pecuniary damages” in SDCL 23A-28-2(3), which
the circuit court applied when determining the measure of damages, refers to
those a victim could recover in a civil action against a defendant. Such
recovery hinges on successfully proving the damages were caused by a
defendant’s acts or omissions. And in addition to citing SDCL 23A-28-2(3),
the circuit court also noted the language of S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29(14)
(Marsy’s Law), which provides victims the “right to full and timely restitution
in every case and from each offender for all losses suffered by the victim as a
result of the criminal conduct and as provided by law for all losses suffered as
a result of delinquent conduct[.]” (Emphasis added.) Such language mirrors
the definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5) as one “who has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal activities[.]”
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only logical but required. The definitions are prefaced with the introductory clause

of SDCL 23A-28-2, which states: “Terms used by this chapter mean: . . . .” Thus, a

court should follow the clear and unambiguous language of the statute and not look

elsewhere for the meaning of the words. See State v. Turner, 2025 S.D. 13, ¶ 47, 18

N.W.3d 673, 689 (concluding that because the meaning of phrases in a statute is

provided in the definitions statute, “there is no need to engage in statutory

construction”); see also N. Border Pipeline Co. v. S.D. Dep’t of Rev., 2015 S.D. 69,

¶ 13 n.9, 868 N.W.2d 580, 584 n.9 (“[I]n declaring the meaning of a statute, a court

is not free to disregard legislative definitions of words.”). The circuit court therefore

erred in not applying the definition of victim provided in SDCL 23A-28-2(5).

[¶31.] The second problem with the circuit court’s approach is its reliance on

K.K. for the principle that no causal connection is required for juvenile restitution.

This Court’s rationale in both K.K. and M.D.D. was dependent on an interpretation

that the Legislature intended to treat juvenile restitution differently from adult

restitution, and that “the terms of [chapter] 23A-28 do not ‘have application in

juvenile proceedings.’” K.K., 2010 S.D. 98, ¶ 11, 793 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting M.D.D.,

2009 S.D. 94, ¶ 4, 774 N.W.2d at 794). Clearly, that is no longer the case, as the

reference to SDCL 23A-28-2(4) is now explicit in several places in the juvenile

statutes, and the broader juvenile restitution language referred to in those cases

was eliminated by the Legislature. It is reasonable to assume that the changes to

the statutes were made, at least in part, in response to this Court’s decisions. “We

presume the Legislature acts with knowledge of our judicial decisions.” AEG

Processing Ctr. No. 58, Inc. v. S.D. Dep’t of Rev., 2013 S.D. 75, ¶ 12, 838 N.W.2d

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843, 848 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Court also “presume[s] that the

Legislature changed the wording of the statute for a reason.” State v. Schroeder,

2004 S.D. 21, ¶ 12, 674 N.W.2d 827, 831. For these reasons, we conclude that,

because the underlying premise for M.D.D.’s and K.K.’s holdings—that the terms of

chapter 23A-28 do not apply to juvenile proceedings—has changed, the holdings of

those cases have been abrogated by the legislative amendments. We therefore

apply the ruling we announced in Joyce to juvenile restitution determinations and

hold that there must be a “causal connection” between the criminal act for which

the juvenile was adjudicated and the victim’s damages.

[¶32.] In applying the definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5) as a person

“who has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal

activities,” we must, in turn, apply the definition of “criminal activities.” This term

is defined in SDCL 23A-28-2(2) as “any crime for which there is a plea of guilty or

verdict of guilty upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered and any

other crime . . . which is admitted by the defendant[.]”

[¶33.] In the context of the juvenile proceeding here, the criminal

activities would include any crime for which J.W. was adjudicated or that he

admitted committing. J.W. admitted to being an accessory to a crime under

SDCL 22-3-5(4). Because there is no transcript of the adjudication hearing in

the record, the factual basis for the admission recited at the hearing is not

available to this Court. Thus, we consider only the amended petition, which

alleged that J.W.:

did commit the public offense of ACCESSORY TO A CRIME, in
that [he] did, with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the

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discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or
punishment of S.E. . . . and D.B. . . . for the commission of a
felony, render assistance to S.E. and D.B. by obstructing anyone
by force, intimidation, or deception in the performance of any act
which might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension,
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of S.E. and D.B., in
violation of SDCL 22-3-5(4)[.]

This type of offense is often referred to as accessory after the fact. See Dutton, 2023

S.D. 29, ¶ 11, 993 N.W.2d at 140 (“[A]n accessory after the fact is a party who,

knowing a felony has been committed, helped the principal, the individual who

committed the crime, in a way that obstructs justice.”).

[¶34.] Importantly, the only premise that can be gleaned from the existing

record is that the accessory crime for which J.W. was charged and adjudicated was

based on his initial lies to the police about allegedly seeing other kids running away

from the scene.8 Like in Joyce, this act of deception occurred after the damage to

the trailer was done. The appellate record does not contain any admissions by J.W.

to starting the fire or to aiding and abetting such acts. Therefore, because the

8. Although the parties’ briefs submitted to the circuit court on the issue of
restitution are not evidence, we note that both refer to J.W.’s admissions to
deceiving law enforcement about who started the fire when discussing the
factual basis for the accessory crime. The State’s brief noted that J.W.
specifically “admitted to concealing the other two juveniles’ identities so they
would not be discovered.” Similarly, in J.W.’s brief, he admitted that he
obstructed law enforcement by deception when he lied to them on the scene
about two other alleged children running away from the trailer and up the
hill. While the State made further arguments in its brief about J.W. going
into the trailer and failing to take actions to minimize the damage after the
fire was set, J.W. maintained, in his brief, that any other alleged involvement
in the crime, outside of his admitted deception after law enforcement arrived,
was disputed. He noted that prior to the parties reaching an agreement on
the accessory charge, he had denied the second-degree burglary and aiding
and abetting reckless burning charges in the initial petition and requested an
adjudicatory hearing. These charges were eliminated in the amended
petition.
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damage to the trailer did not occur “as a result of” J.W.’s criminal act, he is not

liable for restitution.

[¶35.] We reverse and vacate the circuit court’s restitution order imposed as

part of J.W.’s disposition. In light of our decision on this first issue, it is

unnecessary to address the second issue.

[¶36.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, SALTER, and MYREN, Justices,

concur.

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