WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., et al. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON et al.

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150 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY OF
NEW YORK, INC., et al. v. VILLAGE
OF STRATTON et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 00–1737. Argued February 26, 2002—Decided June 17, 2002
Respondent Village of Stratton (Village) promulgated an ordinance that,
inter alia, prohibits “canvassers” from “going in and upon” private resi-
dential property to promote any “cause” without first obtaining a permit
from the mayor’s office by completing and signing a registration form.
Petitioners, a society and a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses that
publish and distribute religious materials, brought this action for injunc-
tive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment
rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the
press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as
valid, content-neutral regulations, although it did require the Village to
accept narrowing constructions of several provisions. The Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed. Among its rulings, that court held that the ordinance
was content neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject
to intermediate scrutiny; rejected petitioners’ argument that the ordi-
nance is overbroad because it impairs the right to distribute pamphlets
anonymously that was recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334; concluded that the Village’s interests in protect-
ing its residents from fraud and undue annoyance and its desire to pre-
vent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its resi-
dents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation; and
distinguished this Court’s earlier cases protecting the Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses ministry.
Held: The ordinance’s provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in
door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and
receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to reli-
gious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of
handbills. Pp. 160–169.
(a) For over 50 years, this Court has invalidated on First Amendment
grounds restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering by
Jehovah’s Witnesses. See, e. g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S.
105. Although those cases do not directly control the question at issue,
they yield several themes that guide the Court. Among other things,

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those cases emphasize that the hand distribution of religious tracts is
ages old and has the same claim as more orthodox practices to the guar-
antees of freedom of religion, speech, and press, e. g., id., at 109; discuss
extensively the historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and
pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas, e. g., Schnei-
der v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 164, but recognize the
legitimate interests a town may have in some form of regulation, partic-
ularly when the solicitation of money is involved, e. g., Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306, or the prevention of burglary is a legitimate
concern, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 144; make clear that
there must be a balance between such interests and the effect of the
regulations on First Amendment rights, e. g., ibid.; and demonstrate
that the Jehovah’s Witnesses have not struggled for their rights alone,
but for those many who are poorly financed and rely extensively upon
this method of communication, see, e. g., id., at 144–146, including nonre-
ligious groups and individuals, see, e. g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S.
516, 539–540. Pp. 160–164.
(b) The Court need not resolve the parties’ dispute as to what stand-
ard of review to use here because the breadth of speech affected by the
ordinance and the nature of the regulation make it clear that the Sixth
Circuit erred in upholding it. There is no doubt that the interests the
ordinance assertedly serves—the prevention of fraud and crime and the
protection of residents’ privacy—are important and that the Village may
seek to safeguard them through some form of regulation of solicitation
activity. However, the amount of speech covered by the ordinance
raises serious concerns. Had its provisions been construed to apply
only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the
ordinance would have been tailored to the Village’s interest in protect-
ing its residents’ privacy and preventing fraud. Yet, the Village’s ad-
ministration of its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates that it applies
to a significant number of noncommercial “canvassers” promoting a wide
variety of “causes.” The pernicious effect of the permit requirement is
illustrated by, e. g., the requirement that a canvasser be identified in a
permit application filed in the mayor’s office and made available for pub-
lic inspection, which necessarily results in a surrender of the anonymity
this Court has protected. Also central to the Court’s conclusion that
the ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not
tailored to the Village’s stated interests. Even if the interest in pre-
venting fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it ap-
plies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that inter-
est provides no support for its application to petitioners, to political
campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The Village’s

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152 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Syllabus
argument that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because it serves the
two additional interests of protecting residents’ privacy and the preven-
tion of crime is unpersuasive. As to the former, an unchallenged ordi-
nance section authorizing residents to post “No Solicitation” signs, cou-
pled with their unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation
with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for unwilling listen-
ers. As to the latter, it seems unlikely that the lack of a permit would
preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversa-
tions not covered by the ordinance, and, in any event, there is no evi-
dence in the record of a special crime problem related to door-to-door
solicitation. Pp. 164–169.
240 F. 3d 553, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined,
post, p. 169. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 171. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting
opinion, post, p. 172.
Paul D. Polidoro argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Philip Brumley, Richard D. Moake,
and Donald T. Ridley.
Abraham Cantor argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondents.
David M. Gormley, State Solicitor of Ohio, argued the
cause for the State of Ohio et al. as amici curiae in support
of respondents. With him on the brief were Betty D. Mont-
gomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Elise W. Porter and Kirk
A. Lindsey, Assistant Solicitors, and the Attorneys General
for their respective States as follows: Richard Blumenthal
of Connecticut, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of
Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr.,
of Maryland, Thomas Reilly of Massachusetts, Frankie Sue
Del Papa of Nevada, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,
and Hoke MacMillan of Wyoming.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands by Herbert D. Soll, Attorney General,

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a
misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without
first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit vio-
lates the First Amendment. Through this facial challenge,
we consider the door-to-door canvassing regulation not only
as it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous
political speech and the distribution of handbills.
I
Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New
York, Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovah’s
Witnesses throughout the United States and publishes Bi-
bles and religious periodicals that are widely distributed.
Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59
members in a part of Ohio that includes the Village of Strat-
ton (Village). Petitioners offer religious literature without
cost to anyone interested in reading it. They allege that
they do not solicit contributions or orders for the sale of mer-
chandise or services, but they do accept donations.
Petitioners brought this action against the Village and its
mayor in the United States District Court for the Southern
David Collins, and Karen M. Klaver; for the Center for Individual Free-
dom by Eric S. Jaffe; for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
by Von G. Keetch; for the Electronic Privacy Information Center et al.
by Marc Rotenberg, Steven R. Shapiro, and Raymond Vasvari; and for
RealCampaignReform.org, Inc., et al. by William J. Olson, John S. Miles,
and Herbert W. Titus.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Ohio Munici-
pal League by Barry M. Byron and John E. Gotherman; and for the Inter-
national Municipal Lawyers Association et al. by Richard Ruda and James
I. Crowley.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Brennan Center for Justice by
Burt Neuborne, Deborah Goldberg, and Richard L. Hasen; and for Inde-
pendent Baptist Churches of America by Thomas W. King III.

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154 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Opinion of the Court
District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against the enforce-
ment of several sections of Ordinance No. 1998–5 regulating
uninvited peddling and solicitation on private property in the
Village. Petitioners’ complaint alleged that the ordinance
violated several constitutional rights, including the free ex-
ercise of religion, free speech, and the freedom of the press.
App. 10a–44a. The District Court conducted a bench trial
at which evidence of the administration of the ordinance and
its effect on petitioners was introduced.
Section 116.01 prohibits “canvassers” and others from
“going in and upon” private residential property for the pur-
pose of promoting any “cause” without first having obtained
a permit pursuant to § 116.03.1 That section provides that
any canvasser who intends to go on private property to
promote a cause must obtain a “Solicitation Permit” from
the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit,
and apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant
1 Section 116.01 provides: “The practice of going in and upon private
property and/or the private residences of Village residents in the Village
by canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or tran-
sient vendors of merchandise or services, not having been invited to do so
by the owners or occupants of such private property or residences, and
not having first obtained a permit pursuant to Section 116.03 of this Chap-
ter, for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining
any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting
orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services, is hereby
declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited.” App. to Brief for Respond-
ents 2a. The Village has interpreted the term “canvassers” to include
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the term “cause” to include their ministry. The
ordinance does not appear to require a permit for a surveyor since such
an individual would not be entering private property “for the purpose
of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service,
organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale
of goods, wares, merchandise or services.” Thus, contrary to the assump-
tion of the dissent in its heavy reliance on the example from Dartmouth,
post, at 172–173, 177, 179 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.), the Village’s ordi-
nance would have done nothing to prevent that tragic crime.

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fills out a fairly detailed “Solicitor’s Registration Form.” 2
The canvasser is then authorized to go upon premises that
he listed on the registration form, but he must carry the
permit upon his person and exhibit it whenever requested to
do so by a police officer or by a resident.3 The ordinance
2 Section 116.03 provides:
“(a) No canvasser, solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant merchant or tran-
sient vendor of merchandise or services who is described in Section 116.01
of this Chapter and who intends to go in or upon private property or a
private residence in the Village for any of the purposes described in Sec-
tion 116.01, shall go in or upon such private property or residence without
first registering in the office of the Mayor and obtaining a Solicitation
Permit.
“(b) The registration required by subsection (a) hereof shall be made by
filing a Solicitor’s Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor, on a form
furnished for such purpose. The Form shall be completed by the Regis-
trant and it shall then contain the following information:
“(1) The name and home address of the Registrant and Registrant’s
residence for five years next preceding the date of registration;
“(2) A brief description of the nature and purpose of the business,
promotion, solicitation, organization, cause, and/or the goods or services
offered;
“(3) The name and address of the employer or affiliated organization,
with credentials from the employer or organization showing the exact rela-
tionship and authority of the Applicant;
“(4) The length of time for which the privilege to canvass or solicit is
desired;
“(5) The specific address of each private residence at which the Regis-
trant intends to engage in the conduct described in Section 116.01 of this
Chapter, and,
“(6) Such other information concerning the Registrant and its business
or purpose as may be reasonably necessary to accurately describe the
nature of the privilege desired.” Brief for Respondents 3a–4a.
3 Section 116.04 provides: “Each Registrant who complies with Section
116.03(b) shall be furnished a Solicitation Permit. The permit shall indi-
cate that the applicant has registered as required by Section 116.03 of this
Chapter. No permittee shall go in or upon any premises not listed on the
Registrant’s Solicitor’s Registration Form.
“Each person shall at all times, while exercising the privilege in the
Village incident to such permit, carry upon his person his permit and the

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Opinion of the Court
sets forth grounds for the denial or revocation of a per-
mit,4 but the record before us does not show that any applica-
tion has been denied or that any permit has been revoked.
Petitioners did not apply for a permit.
A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not challenge
establishes a procedure by which a resident may prohibit
solicitation even by holders of permits. If the resident files
a “No Solicitation Registration Form” with the mayor, and
also posts a “No Solicitation” sign on his property, no un-
invited canvassers may enter his property, unless they are
specifically authorized to do so in the “No Solicitation Regis-
tration Form” itself.5 Only 32 of the Village’s 278 residents
same shall be exhibited by such person whenever he is requested to do so
by any police officer or by any person who is solicited.” Id., at 4a.
4 Section 116.06 provides: “Permits described in Section 116.04 of this
Chapter may be denied or revoked by the Mayor for any one or more of
the following reasons:
“(a) Incomplete information provided by the Registrant in the Solici-
tor’s Registration Form.
“(b) Fraud or misrepresentation contained in the Solicitor’s Registra-
tion Form.
“(c) Fraud, misrepresentation or false statements made in the course of
conducting the activity.
“(d) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of other Codified
Ordinances or of any State or Federal Law.
“(e) Conducting canvassing, soliciting or business in such a manner as
to constitute a trespass upon private property.
“(f) The permittee ceases to possess the qualifications required in this
chapter for the original registration.” Id., at 5a.
5 Section 116.07 provides, in part: “(a) Notwithstanding the provisions
of any other Section of this Chapter 116, any person, firm or corporation
who is the owner or lawful occupant of private property within the territo-
rial limits of the Village of Stratton, Ohio, may prohibit the practice of
going in or upon the private property and/or the private residence of such
owner or occupant, by uninvited canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers,
itinerant merchants or transient vendors, by registering its property in
accordance with Subdivision (b) of this Section and by posting upon each
such registered property a sign which reads ‘No Solicitation’ in a location

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filed such forms. Each of the forms in the record contains
a list of 19 suggested exceptions; 6 on one form, a resident
checked 17 exceptions, thereby excluding only “Jehovah’s
Witnesses” and “Political Candidates” from the list of invited
canvassers. Although Jehovah’s Witnesses do not consider
themselves to be “solicitors” because they make no charge
for their literature or their teaching, leaders of the church
testified at trial that they would honor “no solicitation” signs
in the Village. They also explained at trial that they did not
apply for a permit because they derive their authority to
which is reasonably visible to persons who intend to enter upon such
property.
“(b) The registration authorized by Subsection (a) hereof shall be made
by filing a ‘No Solicitation Registration Form’, at the office of the Mayor,
on a form furnished for such purpose. The form shall be completed by
the property owner or occupant and it shall then contain the following
information: . . . .” Id., at 6a.
6 The suggested exceptions listed on the form are:
1. Scouting Organizations
2. Camp Fire Girls
3. Children’s Sports Organizations
4. Children’s Solicitation for Supporting School Activities
5. Volunteer Fire Dept.
6. Jehovah’s Witnesses
7. Political Candidates
8. Beauty Products Sales People
9. Watkins Sales
10. Christmas Carolers
11. Parcel Delivery
12. Little League
13. Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season
14. Police
15. Campaigners
16. Newspaper Carriers
17. Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church
18. Food Salesmen
19. Salespersons. App. 229a.
Apparently the ordinance would prohibit each of these 19 categories
from canvassing unless expressly exempted.

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preach from Scripture.7 “For us to seek a permit from a
municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult to
God.” App. 321a.
Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance
was the product of the mayor’s hostility to their ministry,
but the District Court credited the mayor’s testimony that
it had been designed to protect the privacy rights of the
Village residents, specifically to protect them “from ‘flim
flam’ con artists who prey on small town populations.” 61
F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (SD Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the terms of the ordinance applied to
the activities of petitioners as well as to “business or political
canvassers,” id., at 737, 738.
The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordi-
nance as valid, content-neutral regulations that did not in-
fringe on petitioners’ First Amendment rights. The court
did, however, require the Village to accept narrowing con-
structions of three provisions. First, the court viewed the
requirement in § 116.03(b)(5) that the applicant must list the
specific address of each residence to be visited as potentially
invalid, but cured by the Village’s agreement to attach to the
form a list of willing residents. Id., at 737. Second, it held
that petitioners could comply with § 116.03(b)(6) by merely
stating their purpose as “the Jehovah’s Witness ministry.”
Id., at 738. And third, it held that § 116.05, which limited
canvassing to the hours before 5 p.m., was invalid on its face
and should be replaced with a provision referring to “reason-
able hours of the day.” Id., at 739. As so modified, the
court held the ordinance constitutionally valid as applied to
petitioners and dismissed the case.
7 Specifically, from the Book of “Matthew chapter 28, verses 19 and 20,
which we take as our commission to preach. . . . So Jesus, by example,
instituted a house-to-house search for people so as to preach the good
news to them. And that’s the activity that Jehovah’s Witnesses engage
in, even as Christ’s apostles did after his resurrection to heaven.” Id.,
at 313a–314a.

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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 240
F. 3d 553 (2001). It held that the ordinance was “content
neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject to
intermediate scrutiny.” Id., at 560. It rejected petitioners’
reliance on the discussion of laws affecting both the free ex-
ercise of religion and free speech in Employment Div., Dept.
of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990),8
because that “language was dicta and therefore not binding.”
240 F. 3d, at 561. It also rejected petitioners’ argument that
the ordinance is overbroad because it impairs the right to
distribute pamphlets anonymously that we recognized in Mc-
Intyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995), rea-
soning that “the very act of going door-to-door requires the
canvassers to reveal a portion of their identities.” 240 F. 3d,
at 563. The Court of Appeals concluded that the interests
promoted by the Village—“protecting its residents from
fraud and undue annoyance”—as well as the harm that it
seeks to prevent—“criminals posing as canvassers in order
to defraud its residents”—though “by no means overwhelm-
ing,” were sufficient to justify the regulation. Id., at 565–
566. The court distinguished earlier cases protecting the
Jehovah’s Witnesses ministry because those cases either in-
8 “The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously moti-
vated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S., at 304–307 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and
charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to
deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied
to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S.
573 (1944) (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), to direct the education of their children,
see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory
school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on reli-
gious grounds to send their children to school).” 494 U. S., at 881 (foot-
note omitted).

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volved a flat prohibition on the dissemination of ideas, e. g.,
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943), or an ordi-
nance that left the issuance of a permit to the discretion of
a municipal officer, see, e. g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U. S. 296, 302 (1940).
In dissent, Judge Gilman expressed the opinion that by
subjecting noncommercial solicitation to the permit require-
ments, the ordinance significantly restricted a substantial
quantity of speech unrelated to the Village’s interest in elimi-
nating fraud and unwanted annoyance. In his view, the Vil-
lage “failed to demonstrate either the reality of the harm or
the efficacy of the restriction.” 240 F. 3d, at 572.
We granted certiorari to decide the following question:
“Does a municipal ordinance that requires one to obtain a
permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a
political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which
contains one’s name, violate the First Amendment protection
accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse?” 534
U. S. 971 (2001); Pet. for Cert. i.9
II
For over 50 years, the Court has invalidated restrictions
on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering.10 It is
more than historical accident that most of these cases in-
volved First Amendment challenges brought by Jehovah’s
Witnesses, because door-to-door canvassing is mandated by
their religion. As we noted in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
9 In their briefs and at oral argument, the parties debated a factual issue
embedded in the question presented, namely, whether the permit contains
the speaker’s name. We need not resolve this factual dispute in order to
answer whether the ordinance’s registration requirement abridges so
much protected speech that it is invalid on its face.
10 Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U. S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308
U. S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).

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319 U. S. 105, 108 (1943), the Jehovah’s Witnesses “claim
to follow the example of Paul, teaching ‘publickly, and from
house to house.’ Acts 20:20. They take literally the man-
date of the Scriptures, ‘Go ye into all the world, and preach
the gospel to every creature.’ Mark 16:15. In doing so
they believe that they are obeying a commandment of God.”
Moreover, because they lack significant financial resources,
the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is seriously dimin-
ished by regulations that burden their efforts to canvass
door-to-door.
Although our past cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses,
most of which were decided shortly before and during World
War II, do not directly control the question we confront
today, they provide both a historical and analytical backdrop
for consideration of petitioners’ First Amendment claim that
the breadth of the Village’s ordinance offends the First
Amendment.11 Those cases involved petty offenses that
raised constitutional questions of the most serious magni-
tude—questions that implicated the free exercise of religion,
the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the press. From
these decisions, several themes emerge that guide our con-
sideration of the ordinance at issue here.
First, the cases emphasize the value of the speech in-
volved. For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the
Court noted that “hand distribution of religious tracts is an
age-old form of missionary evangelism—as old as the history
of printing presses. It has been a potent force in various
religious movements down through the years. . . . This form
of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the
First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preach-
ing from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as
the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion.
11 The question presented is similar to one raised, but not decided, in
Hynes. The ordinance that we held invalid in that case on vagueness
grounds required advance notice to the police before “casually soliciting
the votes of neighbors.” 425 U. S., at 620, n. 4.

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It also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.” Id.,
at 108–109.
In addition, the cases discuss extensively the historical
importance of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering
as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas. In Schneider v.
State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939), the peti-
tioner was a Jehovah’s Witness who had been convicted of
canvassing without a permit based on evidence that she had
gone from house to house offering to leave books or booklets.
Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts stated that “pam-
phlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissem-
ination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of
bringing them to the notice of individuals is their dis-
tribution at the homes of the people. On this method of
communication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of
which engendered the struggle in England which eventuated
in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the
press embodied in our Constitution. To require a censor-
ship through license which makes impossible the free and
unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very
heart of the constitutional guarantees.” Id., at 164 (empha-
sis added).
Despite the emphasis on the important role that door-to-
door canvassing and pamphleteering has played in our con-
stitutional tradition of free and open discussion, these early
cases also recognized the interests a town may have in some
form of regulation, particularly when the solicitation of
money is involved. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S.
296 (1940), the Court held that an ordinance requiring Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses to obtain a license before soliciting door to
door was invalid because the issuance of the license de-
pended on the exercise of discretion by a city official. Our
opinion recognized that “a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the
community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds

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for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority
to act for the cause which he purports to represent.” Id.,
at 306. Similarly, in Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court
recognized crime prevention as a legitimate interest served
by these ordinances and noted that “burglars frequently pose
as canvassers, either in order that they may have a pretense
to discover whether a house is empty and hence ripe for bur-
glary, or for the purpose of spying out the premises in order
that they may return later.” 319 U. S., at 144. Despite rec-
ognition of these interests as legitimate, our precedent is
clear that there must be a balance between these interests
and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights.
We “must ‘be astute to examine the effect of the challenged
legislation’ and must ‘weigh the circumstances and . . . ap-
praise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support
of the regulation.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Schneider, 308 U. S., at
161).
Finally, the cases demonstrate that efforts of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses to resist speech regulation have not been a strug-
gle for their rights alone. In Martin, after cataloging the
many groups that rely extensively upon this method of
communication, the Court summarized that “[d]oor to door
distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed
causes of little people.” 319 U. S., at 144–146.
That the Jehovah’s Witnesses are not the only “little peo-
ple” who face the risk of silencing by regulations like the
Village’s is exemplified by our cases involving nonreligious
speech. See, e. g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better En-
vironment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor and Council
of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S.
516 (1945). In Thomas, the issue was whether a labor leader
could be required to obtain a permit before delivering
a speech to prospective union members. After reviewing
the Jehovah’s Witnesses cases discussed above, the Court
observed:

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Opinion of the Court
“As a matter of principle a requirement of registration
in order to make a public speech would seem generally
incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free
speech and free assembly. . . .
. . . . .
“If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free
assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this
can be accomplished by the device of requiring previous
registration as a condition for exercising them and mak-
ing such a condition the foundation for restraining in
advance their exercise and for imposing a penalty for
violating such a restraining order. So long as no more
is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech and
free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction. If one
who solicits support for the cause of labor may be re-
quired to register as a condition to the exercise of his
right to make a public speech, so may he who seeks to
rally support for any social, business, religious or politi-
cal cause. We think a requirement that one must regis-
ter before he undertakes to make a public speech to en-
list support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible
with the requirements of the First Amendment.” Id.,
at 539–540.
Although these World War II-era cases provide guidance
for our consideration of the question presented, they do not
answer one preliminary issue that the parties adamantly dis-
pute. That is, what standard of review ought we use in as-
sessing the constitutionality of this ordinance. We find it
unnecessary, however, to resolve that dispute because the
breadth of speech affected by the ordinance and the nature
of the regulation make it clear that the Court of Appeals
erred in upholding it.
III
The Village argues that three interests are served by its
ordinance: the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime,

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and the protection of residents’ privacy. We have no diffi-
culty concluding, in light of our precedent, that these are
important interests that the Village may seek to safeguard
through some form of regulation of solicitation activity. We
must also look, however, to the amount of speech covered by
the ordinance and whether there is an appropriate balance
between the affected speech and the governmental interests
that the ordinance purports to serve.
The text of the Village’s ordinance prohibits “canvassers”
from going on private property for the purpose of explaining
or promoting any “cause,” unless they receive a permit and
the residents visited have not opted for a “no solicitation”
sign. Had this provision been construed to apply only to
commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably
the ordinance would have been tailored to the Village’s inter-
est in protecting the privacy of its residents and preventing
fraud. Yet, even though the Village has explained that the
ordinance was adopted to serve those interests, it has never
contended that it should be so narrowly interpreted. To the
contrary, the Village’s administration of its ordinance un-
questionably demonstrates that the provisions apply to a sig-
nificant number of noncommercial “canvassers” promoting a
wide variety of “causes.” Indeed, on the “No Solicitation
Forms” provided to the residents, the canvassers include
“Camp Fire Girls,” “Jehovah’s Witnesses,” “Political Candi-
dates,” “Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season,” and
“Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church.” The ordinance
unquestionably applies, not only to religious causes, but to
political activity as well. It would seem to extend to “resi-
dents casually soliciting the votes of neighbors,” 12 or ringing
doorbells to enlist support for employing a more efficient
garbage collector.
The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech
raises constitutional concerns. It is offensive—not only to
12 Hynes, 425 U. S., at 620, n. 4.

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Opinion of the Court
the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the
very notion of a free society—that in the context of everyday
public discourse a citizen must first inform the government
of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a
permit to do so. Even if the issuance of permits by the may-
or’s office is a ministerial task that is performed promptly
and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to
engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from
our national heritage and constitutional tradition. Three
obvious examples illustrate the pernicious effect of such a
permit requirement.
First, as our cases involving distribution of unsigned hand-
bills demonstrate,13 there are a significant number of persons
who support causes anonymously.14 “The decision in favor
of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by
a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U. S., at 341–342.
The requirement that a canvasser must be identified in a
permit application filed in the mayor’s office and available for
public inspection necessarily results in a surrender of that
anonymity. Although it is true, as the Court of Appeals sug-
gested, see 240 F. 3d, at 563, that persons who are known to
the resident reveal their allegiance to a group or cause when
they present themselves at the front door to advocate an
issue or to deliver a handbill, the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that the ordinance does not implicate anonymity
interests. The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning is undermined by
13 Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995).
14 Although the Jehovah’s Witnesses do not themselves object to a loss
of anonymity, they bring this facial challenge in part on the basis of over-
breadth. We may, therefore, consider the impact of this ordinance on the
free speech rights of individuals who are deterred from speaking because
the registration provision would require them to forgo their right to speak
anonymously. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612 (1973).

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our decision in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, Inc., 525 U. S. 182 (1999). The badge require-
ment that we invalidated in Buckley applied to petition cir-
culators seeking signatures in face-to-face interactions. The
fact that circulators revealed their physical identities did not
foreclose our consideration of the circulators’ interest in
maintaining their anonymity. In the Village, strangers to
the resident certainly maintain their anonymity, and the
ordinance may preclude such persons from canvassing for
unpopular causes. Such preclusion may well be justified in
some situations—for example, by the special state interest
in protecting the integrity of a ballot-initiative process, see
ibid., or by the interest in preventing fraudulent commercial
transactions. The Village ordinance, however, sweeps more
broadly, covering unpopular causes unrelated to commercial
transactions or to any special interest in protecting the elec-
toral process.
Second, requiring a permit as a prior condition on the ex-
ercise of the right to speak imposes an objective burden on
some speech of citizens holding religious or patriotic views.
As our World War II-era cases dramatically demonstrate,
there are a significant number of persons whose religious
scruples will prevent them from applying for such a license.
There are no doubt other patriotic citizens, who have such
firm convictions about their constitutional right to engage in
uninhibited debate in the context of door-to-door advocacy,
that they would prefer silence to speech licensed by a petty
official.
Third, there is a significant amount of spontaneous speech
that is effectively banned by the ordinance. A person who
made a decision on a holiday or a weekend to take an active
part in a political campaign could not begin to pass out hand-
bills until after he or she obtained the required permit.
Even a spontaneous decision to go across the street and urge
a neighbor to vote against the mayor could not lawfully be
implemented without first obtaining the mayor’s permission.

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Opinion of the Court
In this respect, the regulation is analogous to the circulation
licensing tax the Court invalidated in Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936). In Grosjean, while discuss-
ing the history of the Free Press Clause of the First Amend-
ment, the Court stated that “ ‘[t]he evils to be prevented
were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action
of the government by means of which it might prevent such
free and general discussion of public matters as seems abso-
lutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exer-
cise of their rights as citizens.’ ” Id., at 249–250 (quoting 2
T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed. 1927)); see
also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
The breadth and unprecedented nature of this regulation
does not alone render the ordinance invalid. Also central to
our conclusion that the ordinance does not pass First Amend-
ment scrutiny is that it is not tailored to the Village’s stated
interests. Even if the interest in preventing fraud could ad-
equately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to com-
mercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that inter-
est provides no support for its application to petitioners, to
political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular
causes. The Village, however, argues that the ordinance is
nonetheless valid because it serves the two additional inter-
ests of protecting the privacy of the resident and the preven-
tion of crime.
With respect to the former, it seems clear that § 107 of the
ordinance, which provides for the posting of “No Solicitation”
signs and which is not challenged in this case, coupled with
the resident’s unquestioned right to refuse to engage in con-
versation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protec-
tion for the unwilling listener. Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at
639 (“[T]he provision permitting homeowners to bar solici-
tors from their property by posting [no solicitation] signs . . .
suggest[s] the availability of less intrusive and more effective
measures to protect privacy”). The annoyance caused by an

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Breyer, J., concurring
uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether or not
the visitor is armed with a permit.
With respect to the latter, it seems unlikely that the ab-
sence of a permit would preclude criminals from knocking
on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the
ordinance. They might, for example, ask for directions or
permission to use the telephone, or pose as surveyers or cen-
sus takers. See n. 1, supra. Or they might register under
a false name with impunity because the ordinance contains
no provision for verifying an applicant’s identity or organiza-
tional credentials. Moreover, the Village did not assert an
interest in crime prevention below, and there is an absence
of any evidence of a special crime problem related to door-
to-door solicitation in the record before us.
The rhetoric used in the World War II-era opinions that
repeatedly saved petitioners’ coreligionists from petty prose-
cutions reflected the Court’s evaluation of the First Amend-
ment freedoms that are implicated in this case. The value
judgment that then motivated a united democratic people
fighting to defend those very freedoms from totalitarian at-
tack is unchanged. It motivates our decision today.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter and
Justice Ginsburg join, concurring.
While joining the Court’s opinion, I write separately to
note that the dissent’s “crime prevention” justification for
this ordinance is not a strong one. Cf. post, at 176–180 (opin-
ion of Rehnquist, C. J.). For one thing, there is no indi-
cation that the legislative body that passed the ordinance
considered this justification. Stratton did not rely on the
rationale in the courts below, see 61 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736
(SD Ohio 1999) (opinion of the District Court describing the

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Breyer, J., concurring
ordinance as “constructed to protect the Village residents
from ‘flim flam’ con artists”); 240 F. 3d 553, 565 (CA6 2001)
(opinion of the Court of Appeals describing interests as “pro-
tecting [the Village’s] residents from fraud and undue annoy-
ance”), and its general references to “deter[ing] crime” in
its brief to this Court cannot fairly be construed to include
anything other than the fraud it discusses specifically. Brief
for Respondents 14–18.
In the intermediate scrutiny context, the Court ordinarily
does not supply reasons the legislative body has not given.
Cf. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
529 U. S. 803, 816 (2000) (“When the Government restricts
speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the con-
stitutionality of its actions” (emphasis added)). That does
not mean, as The Chief Justice suggests, that only a gov-
ernment with a “battery of constitutional lawyers,” post, at
172, could satisfy this burden. It does mean that we expect
a government to give its real reasons for passing an ordi-
nance. Legislators, in even the smallest town, are perfectly
able to do so—sometimes better on their own than with too
many lawyers, e. g., a “battery,” trying to offer their advice.
I can only conclude that if the village of Stratton thought
preventing burglaries and violent crimes was an important
justification for this ordinance, it would have said so.
But it is not just that. It is also intuitively implausible
to think that Stratton’s ordinance serves any governmental
interest in preventing such crimes. As the Court notes,
several categories of potential criminals will remain entirely
untouched by the ordinance. Ante, at 168–169, 154, n. 1.
And as to those who might be affected by it, “[w]e have never
accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First
Amendment burden,” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govern-
ment PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 392 (2000). Even less readily
should we accept such implausible conjecture offered not by
the party itself but only by an amicus, see Brief for Ohio
et al. as Amici Curiae 5–6.

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Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
Because Stratton did not rely on the crime prevention jus-
tification, because Stratton has not now “present[ed] more
than anecdote and supposition,” Playboy Entertainment
Group, supra, at 822, and because the relationship between
the interest and the ordinance is doubtful, I am unwilling to
assume that these conjectured benefits outweigh the cost of
abridging the speech covered by the ordinance.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, for many but not all of the rea-
sons set forth in the opinion for the Court. I do not agree,
for example, that one of the causes of the invalidity of Strat-
ton’s ordinance is that some people have a religious objection
to applying for a permit, and others (posited by the Court)
“have such firm convictions about their constitutional right
to engage in uninhibited debate in the context of door-
to-door advocacy, that they would prefer silence to speech
licensed by a petty official.” Ante, at 167.
If a licensing requirement is otherwise lawful, it is in my
view not invalidated by the fact that some people will choose,
for religious reasons, to forgo speech rather than observe
it. That would convert an invalid free-exercise claim,
see Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.
v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), into a valid free-speech
claim—and a more destructive one at that. Whereas the
free-exercise claim, if acknowledged, would merely exempt
Jehovah’s Witnesses from the licensing requirement, the
free-speech claim exempts everybody, thanks to Jehovah’s
Witnesses.
As for the Court’s fairytale category of “patriotic citizens,”
ante, at 167, who would rather be silenced than licensed in a
manner that the Constitution (but for their “patriotic” objec-
tion) would permit: If our free-speech jurisprudence is to be
determined by the predicted behavior of such crackpots, we
are in a sorry state indeed.

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172 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
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Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting.
Stratton is a village of 278 people located along the Ohio
River where the borders of Ohio, West Virginia, and Penn-
sylvania converge. It is strung out along a multilane high-
way connecting it with the cities of East Liverpool to the
north and Steubenville and Weirton, West Virginia, to the
south. One may doubt how much legal help a village of this
size has available in drafting an ordinance such as the pres-
ent one, but even if it had availed itself of a battery of consti-
tutional lawyers, they would have been of little use in the
town’s effort. For the Court today ignores the cases on
which those lawyers would have relied, and comes up with
newly fashioned doctrine. This doctrine contravenes well-
established precedent, renders local governments largely im-
potent to address the very real safety threat that canvassers
pose, and may actually result in less of the door-to-door com-
munication that it seeks to protect.
More than half a century ago we recognized that canvass-
ers, “whether selling pots or distributing leaflets, may lessen
the peaceful enjoyment of a home,” and that “burglars fre-
quently pose as canvassers, either in order that they may
have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty and
hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the
premises in order that they may return later.” Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 144 (1943). These problems
continue to be associated with door-to-door canvassing, as
are even graver ones.
A recent double murder in Hanover, New Hampshire, a
town of approximately 7,500 that would appear tranquil to
most Americans but would probably seem like a bustling
town of Dartmouth College students to Stratton residents,
illustrates these dangers. Two teenagers murdered a mar-
ried couple of Dartmouth College professors, Half and Su-
sanne Zantop, in the Zantops’ home. Investigators have
concluded, based on the confession of one of the teenagers,
that the teenagers went door-to-door intent on stealing

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access numbers to bank debit cards and then killing their
owners. See Dartmouth Professors Called Random Tar-
gets, Washington Post, Feb. 20, 2002, p. A2. Their modus
operandi was to tell residents that they were conducting an
environmental survey for school. They canvassed a few
homes where no one answered. At another, the resident did
not allow them in to conduct the “survey.” They were al-
lowed into the Zantop home. After conducting the phony
environmental survey, they stabbed the Zantops to death.
See ibid.
In order to reduce these very grave risks associated with
canvassing, the 278 “ ‘little people,’ ” ante, at 163, of Stratton,
who, unlike petitioners, do not have a team of attorneys at
their ready disposal, see Jehovah’s Witnesses May Make
High Court History Again, Legal Times, Feb. 25, 2002, p. 1
(noting that petitioners have a team of 12 lawyers in their
New York headquarters), enacted the ordinance at issue
here. The residents did not prohibit door-to-door communi-
cation; they simply required that canvassers obtain a permit
before going door-to-door. And the village does not have
the discretion to reject an applicant who completes the
application.
The town had little reason to suspect that the negligible
burden of having to obtain a permit runs afoul of the
First Amendment. For over 60 years, we have categor-
ically stated that a permit requirement for door-to-door can-
vassers, which gives no discretion to the issuing authority,
is constitutional. The District Court and Court of Appeals,
relying on our cases, upheld the ordinance. The Court
today, however, abruptly changes course and invalidates
the ordinance.
The Court speaks of the “historical and analytical back-
drop for consideration of petitioners’ First Amendment
claim,” ante, at 161. But this “backdrop” is one of long-
standing and unwavering approval of a permit requirement
like Stratton’s. Our early decisions in this area expressly

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sanction a law that merely requires a canvasser to register.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306 (1940), we
stated that “[w]ithout doubt a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the
community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds
for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority
to act for the cause which he purports to represent.” In
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 116 (1943), we con-
trasted the license tax struck down in that case with “merely
a registration ordinance calling for an identification of the
solicitors so as to give the authorities some basis for investi-
gating strangers coming into the community.” And Martin,
supra, at 148, states that a “city can punish those who call
at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the
occupant and, in addition, can by identification devices con-
trol the abuse of the privilege by criminals posing as
canvassers.”
It is telling that Justices Douglas and Black, perhaps the
two Justices in this Court’s history most identified with an
expansive view of the First Amendment, authored, respec-
tively, Murdock and Martin. Their belief in the constitu-
tionality of the permit requirement that the Court strikes
down today demonstrates just how far the Court’s present
jurisprudence has strayed from the core concerns of the
First Amendment.
We reaffirmed our view that a discretionless permit re-
quirement is constitutional in Hynes v. Mayor and Council
of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976). Hynes, though striking
down a registration ordinance on vagueness grounds, noted
that “the Court has consistently recognized a municipality’s
power to protect its citizens from crime and undue annoy-
ance by regulating soliciting and canvassing. A narrowly
drawn ordinance, that does not vest in municipal officials the
undefined power to determine what messages residents will
hear, may serve these important interests without running
afoul of the First Amendment.” Id., at 616–617.

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The Stratton ordinance suffers from none of the defects
deemed fatal in these earlier decisions. The ordinance does
not prohibit door-to-door canvassing; it merely requires that
canvassers fill out a form and receive a permit. Cf. Martin,
supra. The mayor does not exercise any discretion in decid-
ing who receives a permit; approval of the permit is auto-
matic upon proper completion of the form. Cf. Cantwell,
supra. And petitioners do not contend in this Court that
the ordinance is vague. Cf. Hynes, supra.
Just as troubling as the Court’s ignoring over 60 years of
precedent is the difficulty of discerning from the Court’s
opinion what exactly it is about the Stratton ordinance that
renders it unconstitutional. It is not clear what test the
Court is applying, or under which part of that indeterminate
test the ordinance fails. See ante, at 164 (finding it
“unnecessary . . . to resolve” what standard of review applies
to the ordinance). We are instead told that the “breadth of
speech affected” and “the nature of the regulation” render
the permit requirement unconstitutional. Ibid. Under a
straightforward application of the applicable First Amend-
ment framework, however, the ordinance easily passes
muster.
There is no support in our case law for applying anything
more stringent than intermediate scrutiny to the ordinance.
The ordinance is content neutral and does not bar anyone
from going door-to-door in Stratton. It merely regulates
the manner in which one must canvass: A canvasser must
first obtain a permit. It is, or perhaps I should say was,
settled that the “government may impose reasonable restric-
tions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, pro-
vided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that
they leave open ample alternative channels for communica-
tion of the information.’ ” Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984)). Earlier

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this Term, the Court reaffirmed that this test applies to
content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions on speech
in public forums. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534
U. S. 316 (2002).
The Court suggests that Stratton’s regulation of speech
warrants greater scrutiny. Ante, at 164. But it would be
puzzling if regulations of speech taking place on another citi-
zen’s private property warranted greater scrutiny than reg-
ulations of speech taking place in public forums. Common
sense and our precedent say just the opposite. In Hynes,
the Court explained: “ ‘Of all the methods of spreading un-
popular ideas, [house-to-house canvassing] seems the least
entitled to extensive protection. The possibilities of persua-
sion are slight compared with the certainties of annoyance.
Great as is the value of exposing citizens to novel views,
home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut
himself up in his own ideas if he desires.’ ” 425 U. S., at 619
(quoting Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 406
(1954)). In Ward, the Court held that intermediate scrutiny
was appropriate “even in a public forum,” 491 U. S., at 791
(emphasis added), appropriately recognizing that speech en-
joys greater protection in a public forum that has been
opened to all citizens, see ibid. Indeed, we have held that
the mere proximity of private residential property to a pub-
lic forum permits more extensive regulation of speech taking
place at the public forum than would otherwise be allowed.
See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 483–484 (1988). Surely
then, intermediate scrutiny applies to a content-neutral reg-
ulation of speech that occurs not just near, but at, another
citizen’s private residence.
The Stratton regulation is aimed at three significant gov-
ernmental interests: the prevention of fraud, the prevention
of crime, and the protection of privacy.1 The Court con-
1 Of course, fraud itself may be a crime. I assume, as does the majority,
that the interest in preventing “crime” refers to a separate interest in
preventing burglaries and violent crimes.

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Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting
cedes that “in light of our precedent, . . . these are important
interests that [Stratton] may seek to safeguard through some
form of regulation of solicitation activity.” Ante, at 165.
Although initially recognizing the important interest in pre-
venting crime, the Court later indicates that the “absence of
any evidence of a special crime problem related to door-to-
door solicitation in the record before us” lessens this inter-
est. Ante, at 169. But the village is entitled to rely on our
assertion in Martin that door-to-door canvassing poses a risk
of crime, see Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U. S. 277, 297 (2000)
(citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41
(1986)), and the experience of other jurisdictions with crime
stemming from door-to-door canvassing, see 529 U. S., at 297;
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377,
393, n. 6 (2000).
The double murder in Hanover described above is but one
tragic example of the crime threat posed by door-to-door
canvassing. Other recent examples include a man soliciting
gardening jobs door-to-door who tied up and robbed elderly
residents, see Van Derbken, 98-Year-Old Latest Victim in
Series of Home Invasions, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 13,
2000, p. A18, a door-to-door vacuum cleaner salesman who
raped a woman, see Employers Liable for Rape by Salesman,
Texas Lawyer, Jan. 11, 1999, p. 2, and a man going door-to-
door purportedly on behalf of a church group who committed
multiple sexual assaults, see Ingersoll, Sex Crime Suspect
Traveled with Church Group, Wis. State Journal, Feb. 19,
2000, p. 1B. The Constitution does not require that Stratton
first endure its own crime wave before it takes measures to
prevent crime.
What is more, the Court soon forgets both the privacy and
crime interests. It finds the ordinance too broad because it
applies to a “significant number of noncommercial ‘canvass-
ers.’ ” Ante, at 165. But noncommercial canvassers, for ex-
ample, those purporting to conduct environmental surveys
for school, see supra, at 172–173, can violate no trespassing

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VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting
signs and engage in burglaries and violent crimes just as
easily as commercial canvassers can. See Martin, 319 U. S.,
at 144 (canvassers, “whether selling pots or distributing
leaflets, may lessen the peaceful enjoyment of a home” and
“sp[y] out” homes for burglaries (emphasis added)). Strat-
ton’s ordinance is thus narrowly tailored. It applies to
everyone who poses the risks associated with door-to-door
canvassing, i. e., it applies to everyone who canvasses door-
to-door. The Court takes what should be a virtue of the
ordinance—that it is content neutral, cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484, 501 (1996) (“[O]ur commercial
speech cases have recognized the dangers that attend gov-
ernmental attempts to single out certain messages for sup-
pression”)—and turns it into a vice.
The next question is whether the ordinance serves the im-
portant interests of protecting privacy and preventing fraud
and crime. With respect to the interest in protecting pri-
vacy, the Court concludes that “[t]he annoyance caused by
an uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether or
not the visitor is armed with a permit.” Ante, at 168–169.
True, but that misses the key point: The permit requirement
results in fewer uninvited knocks. Those who have com-
plied with the permit requirement are less likely to visit resi-
dences with no trespassing signs, as it is much easier for the
authorities to track them down.
The Court also fails to grasp how the permit requirement
serves Stratton’s interest in preventing crime.2 We have
approved of permit requirements for those engaging in pro-
tected First Amendment activity because of a commonsense
recognition that their existence both deters and helps detect
wrongdoing. See, e. g., Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534
2 It is sufficient that the ordinance serves the important interest of pro-
tecting residents’ privacy. A law need only serve a governmental inter-
est. Because the Court’s treatment of Stratton’s interest in preventing
crime gives short shrift to Stratton’s attempt to deal with a very serious
problem, I address that issue as well.

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U. S. 316 (2002) (upholding a permit requirement aimed,
in part, at preventing unlawful uses of a park and assuring
financial accountability for damage caused by the event).
And while some people, intent on committing burglaries
or violent crimes, are not likely to be deterred by the pros-
pect of a misdemeanor for violating the permit ordinance,
the ordinance’s effectiveness does not depend on criminals
registering.
The ordinance prevents and detects serious crime by mak-
ing it a crime not to register. Take the Hanover double
murder discussed earlier. The murderers did not achieve
their objective until they visited their fifth home over a pe-
riod of seven months. If Hanover had a permit require-
ment, the teens may have been stopped before they achieved
their objective. One of the residents they visited may have
informed the police that there were two canvassers who
lacked a permit. Such neighborly vigilance, though perhaps
foreign to those residing in modern day cities, is not uncom-
mon in small towns. Or the police on their own may have
discovered that two canvassers were violating the ordinance.
Apprehension for violating the permit requirement may well
have frustrated the teenagers’ objectives; it certainly would
have assisted in solving the murders had the teenagers gone
ahead with their plan.3
Of course, the Stratton ordinance does not guarantee that
no canvasser will ever commit a burglary or violent crime.
The Court seems to think this dooms the ordinance, erecting
an insurmountable hurdle that a law must provide a fool-
proof method of preventing crime. In order to survive in-
termediate scrutiny, however, a law need not solve the crime
3 Indeed, an increased focus on apprehending criminals for “petty” of-
fenses, such as not paying subway fares, is credited with the dramatic
reduction in violent crimes in New York City during the last decade. See,
e. g., M. Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big
Difference (2000). If this works in New York City, surely it can work in
a small village like Stratton.

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problem, it need only further the interest in preventing
crime. Some deterrence of serious criminal activity is more
than enough to survive intermediate scrutiny.
The final requirement of intermediate scrutiny is that a
regulation leave open ample alternatives for expression.
Undoubtedly, ample alternatives exist here. Most obvi-
ously, canvassers are free to go door-to-door after filling out
the permit application. And those without permits may
communicate on public sidewalks, on street corners, through
the mail, or through the telephone.
Intermediate scrutiny analysis thus confirms what our
cases have long said: A discretionless permit requirement for
canvassers does not violate the First Amendment. Today,
the Court elevates its concern with what is, at most, a negli-
gible burden on door-to-door communication above this es-
tablished proposition. Ironically, however, today’s decision
may result in less of the door-to-door communication that the
Court extols. As the Court recognizes, any homeowner
may place a “No Solicitation” sign on his or her property,
and it is a crime to violate that sign. Ante, at 168. In light
of today’s decision depriving Stratton residents of the degree
of accountability and safety that the permit requirement pro-
vides, more and more residents may decide to place these
signs in their yards and cut off door-to-door communication
altogether.