EDELMAN v. LYNCHBURG COLLEGE

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106 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
EDELMAN v. LYNCHBURG COLLEGE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 00–1072. Argued January 8, 2002—Decided March 19, 2002
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that a “charge” of em-
ployment discrimination be filed with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission “within [a specified number of] days after the alleged
unlawful . . . practice occurred,” § 706(e)(1), and that the charge “be
in writing under oath or affirmation,” § 706(b). An EEOC regulation
permits an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after the time for
filing has expired. After respondent Lynchburg College denied aca-
demic tenure to petitioner Edelman, he faxed a letter to the EEOC in
November 1997, claiming that the College had subjected him to gender-
based, national origin, and religious discrimination. Edelman made no
oath or affirmation. The EEOC advised him to file a charge within the
applicable 300-day time limit and sent him a Form 5 Charge of Discrimi-
nation, which he returned 313 days after he was denied tenure. Edel-
man subsequently sued in a Virginia state court on various state-law
claims, but later added a Title VII cause of action. The College then
removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss, claiming that
Edelman’s failure to file the verified Form 5 with the EEOC within the
applicable filing period was a bar to subject-matter jurisdiction. Edel-
man replied that his November 1997 letter was a timely filed charge and
that under the EEOC regulation, the Form 5 verification related back
to the letter. The District Court dismissed the Title VII complaint,
finding that the letter was not a “charge” under Title VII because nei-
ther Edelman nor the EEOC treated it as one. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, holding that Title VII’s plain language foreclosed the relation-
back regulation. The court reasoned that, because a charge requires
verification and must be filed within the limitations period, it follows
that a charge must be verified within that period.
Held: The EEOC’s relation-back regulation is an unassailable interpreta-
tion of § 706. Pp. 112–119.
(a) There is nothing plain in reading “charge” to require an oath by
definition. Title VII nowhere defines “charge.” Section 706(b) merely
requires that a charge be verified, without saying when; § 706(e)(1) pro-
vides that a charge must be filed within a given period, without indi-
cating whether it must be verified when filed. Neither provision incor-
porates the other so as to give a definition by necessary implication.

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Syllabus
The Fourth Circuit’s assumption that §§ 706(b) and (e)(1) must be read as
one, with “charge” defined as “under oath or affirmation,” was a doubtful
structural and logical leap. Nor is the gap bridged by the commonsense
rule that statutes are to be read as a whole, see United States v. Morton,
467 U. S. 822, 828, for the two quite different objectives of the timing
and verification requirements prevent reading “charge” to subsume
them both by definition. The time limitation is meant to encourage a
potential charging party to raise a discrimination claim before it gets
stale, while the verification requirement is intended to protect em-
ployers from the disruption and expense of responding to a claim unless
a complainant is serious enough and sure enough to support it by oath
subject to liability for perjury. The latter object, however, demands an
oath only by the time the employer is obliged to respond to the charge,
not at the time an employee files it with the EEOC. The statute is
thus open to interpretation and the regulation addresses a legitimate
question. Pp. 112–113.
(b) The College’s argument that the regulation addressed a substan-
tive issue over which the EEOC has no rulemaking power is simply a
recast of the plain language argument just rejected. Moreover, there
is no need to resolve the degree of deference reviewing courts owe the
regulation because this Court finds that the rule is not only reasonable,
but states the position the Court would adopt were it interpreting the
statute from scratch. Pp. 113–114.
(c) Although the verification provision is meant to forestall catch-
penny claims of disgruntled but not necessarily aggrieved employees,
Congress presumably did not mean to affect Title VII’s nature as a re-
medial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected
to initiate the process, see, e. g., EEOC v. Commercial Office Products
Co., 486 U. S. 107, 124. Construing § 706 to permit the relation back
of an oath omitted from an original filing ensures that the lay com-
plainant, who may not know enough to verify on filing, will not risk
forfeiting his rights inadvertently. At the same time, the EEOC
looks out for the employer’s interest by refusing to call for any re-
sponse to an otherwise sufficient complaint until the verification has
been supplied. This Court would be hard pressed to take issue with
the EEOC’s position after deciding, in Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S.
757, 765, that a failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11’s signature requirement did not require dismissal of a timely filed but
unsigned notice of appeal because nothing prevented later cure of the
signature defect. There is no reason to think that relation back of the
oath here is any less reasonable than relation back of the signature in
Becker. In fact, it would be passing strange to disagree with the EEOC
even without Becker, for a long history of judicial practice with oath

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108 EDELMAN v. LYNCHBURG COLLEGE
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requirements supports the relation-back cure. Moreover, the legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress amended Title VII several times
without once casting doubt on the EEOC’s construction. Pp. 115–118.
(d) This Court’s judgment does not reach the District Court’s con-
clusion that Edelman’s letter was not a charge under Title VII because
neither Edelman nor the EEOC treated it as one. The Court notes,
however, that that view has some support at the factual level in that
the EEOC admittedly failed to comply with § 706(e)(1)’s requirement
that “notice of the charge . . . be served upon the person . . . charge[d]
within ten days” of filing with the EEOC. Edelman’s counsel agrees
with the Government that the significance of the delayed notice to the
College will be open on remand. Pp. 118–119.
228 F. 3d 503, reversed and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 119. O’Connor,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined,
post, p. 120.
Eric Schnapper argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Elaine Charlson Bredehoft.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for the United States et al.
as amici curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were
Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Boyd,
Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Paul R. Q. Wolfson,
Philip B. Sklover, and Barbara L. Sloan.
Alexander W. Bell argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was Mary V. Barney.*
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
The scheme of redress for employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
requires a complainant to file a “charge” with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission within a certain time
*Ann Elizabeth Reesman and Rae T. Vann filed a brief for the Equal
Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Paula A. Brantner filed a brief for the National Employment Lawyers
Association as amicus curiae.

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Opinion of the Court
after the conduct alleged, 78 Stat. 259, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–
5(e)(1) (1994 ed.), and to affirm or swear that the allega-
tions are true, § 2000e–5(b). The issue here is the valid-
ity of an EEOC regulation permitting an otherwise timely
filer to verify a charge after the time for filing has expired.
We sustain the regulation.
I
On June 6, 1997, respondent Lynchburg College denied ac-
ademic tenure to petitioner Leonard Edelman, who faxed a
letter to an EEOC field office on November 14, 1997, claim-
ing “gender-based employment discrimination, exacerbated
by discrimination on the basis of . . . national origin and re-
ligion.” App. 52. Edelman made no oath or affirmation.
On November 26, 1997, Edelman’s lawyer wrote to the field
office requesting an interview with an EEOC investigator
and stating his “understanding that delay occasioned by the
interview will not compromise the filing date, which will re-
main as November 14, 1997.” Id., at 54. An EEOC em-
ployee replied to Edelman and advised him to arrange an
interview with a member of the field office. Without refer-
ring to the lawyer’s letter, the employee reminded Edelman
that “a charge of discrimination must be filed within the time
limits imposed by law.” Id., at 57. In Edelman’s case, the
filing period was 300 days after the alleged discriminatory
practice.1
After the interview, the EEOC sent Edelman a Form 5
Charge of Discrimination for him to review and verify by
1 A Title VII complainant generally has 180 days from the time of the
alleged unlawful employment practice to file with the EEOC, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e–5(e)(1) (1994 ed.), but a 300-day filing period applies if the charging
party “institute[s] proceedings with a State or local agency with authority
to grant or seek relief ” from unlawful employment practices. Ibid.; see
also EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107, 110 (1988).
Virginia has such an agency, operating under a work-sharing agreement
with the EEOC. See Tinsley v. First Union Nat. Bank, 155 F. 3d 435,
439–442 (CA4 1998).

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oath or affirmation. On April 15, 1998, 313 days after the
June 6, 1997, denial of tenure, the EEOC received the veri-
fied Form 5, which it forwarded to the College for response.
After completing an investigation, the EEOC issued Edel-
man a notice of right to sue.
Edelman first sued in a Virginia state court on various
state-law claims, but later added a cause of action under Title
VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The College then removed
the case to Federal District Court and moved to dismiss,
claiming that Edelman’s failure to file the verified Form 5
with the EEOC within the applicable filing period was a bar
to subject-matter jurisdiction. Edelman replied that his No-
vember 1997 letter was a timely filed charge and that under
an EEOC regulation, 29 CFR § 1601.12(b) (1997),2 the verifi-
cation on the Form 5 related back to the letter.
The District Court found, however, that the November
letter was not a “charge” within the meaning of Title VII
because neither Edelman nor the EEOC treated it as one,
App. to Pet. for Cert. 22–24, with the consequence that there
was no timely filing to which the verification on Form 5 could
relate back. After finding no ground for equitable tolling
of the filing requirements, the District Court dismissed the
Title VII complaint and remanded the state-law claims. Id.,
at 24–25.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. 228 F.
3d 503, 512 (CA4 2000). The majority held that the plain
language of the statute foreclosed the EEOC regulation
2 The regulation provides in relevant part that “a charge is sufficient
when the Commission receives from the person making the charge a writ-
ten statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe
generally the action or practices complained of. A charge may be
amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify
the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such
amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute
unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject
matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was
first received.”

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allowing a later oath to relate back to an earlier charge.
The majority reasoned that the verification and filing provi-
sions in § 706 of Title VII 3 were interdependent in defining
“charge”: “Because a charge requires verification . . . , and
because a charge must be filed within the limitations pe-
riod, . . . it follows that a charge must be verified within the
limitations period.” Id., at 508.
Judge Luttig concurred only in the judgment. Id., at 512–
513. He said that although the majority probably had
“the better interpretation” of the statute, id., at 513, its
reading of the filing and verification requirements as one was
not compelled by the language, and the court was “bound to
give deference” to the EEOC’s construction, ibid. He none-
theless joined in the judgment for the District Court’s
reasons.
Because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals,4 we
granted certiorari, 533 U. S. 928 (2001), and now reverse.
3 Section 706(b) reads in relevant part that “[w]henever a charge is filed
by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member
of the Commission, alleging that an employer . . . has engaged in an un-
lawful employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the
charge . . . on such employer . . . within ten days, and shall make an
investigation thereof. Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirma-
tion and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commis-
sion requires.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(b). As to filing, § 706(e)(1) provides
that “[a] charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and
eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and
notice of the charge . . . shall be served upon the person against whom
such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of
an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person ag-
grieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency
with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice . . . , such charge
shall be filed . . . within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.” § 2000e–5(e)(1).
4 Compare, e. g., 228 F. 3d 503, 509 (CA4 2000) (case below); Shempert v.
Harwick Chemical Corp., 151 F. 3d 793, 796–797 (CA8 1998), with Philbin
v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F. 2d 321, 323–324 (CA7
1991) (per curiam); Peterson v. Wichita, 888 F. 2d 1307, 1308 (CA10 1989),

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Opinion of the Court
II
A
Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5, governs the filing of charges of discrim-
ination with the EEOC. Section 706(b) requires “[c]harges”
to “be in writing under oath or affirmation . . . contain[ing]
such information and . . . in such form as the Commission
requires.” § 2000e–5(b). Section 706(e)(1) provides that
“[a] charge . . . shall be filed within one hundred and eighty
[or in some cases, three hundred] days after the alleged un-
lawful employment practice occurred.” § 2000e–5(e)(1).
Neither provision defines “charge,” which is likewise unde-
fined elsewhere in the statute. Section 706(b) merely re-
quires the verification of a charge, without saying when it
must be verified; § 706(e)(1) provides that a charge must be
filed within a given period, without indicating whether the
charge must be verified when filed. Neither provision incor-
porates the other so as to give a definition by necessary
implication.
The assumption of the Court of Appeals that the two pro-
visions must be read as one, with “charge” defined as “under
oath or affirmation,” was thus a structural and logical leap.
Nor is the gap bridged by the rule of common sense that
statutes are to be read as a whole, see United States v. Mor-
ton, 467 U. S. 822, 828 (1984). Although reading the two
provisions together would not be facially inconsistent, doing
that would ignore the two quite different objectives of the
timing and verification requirements, which stand in the way
of reading “charge” to subsume them both by definition.
The point of the time limitation is to encourage a potential
charging party to raise a discrimination claim before it gets
cert. denied, 495 U. S. 932 (1990); Casavantes v. California State Univ.,
732 F. 2d 1441, 1443 (CA9 1984); Price v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 687
F. 2d 74, 77, and n. 3 (CA5 1982).

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stale, for the sake of a reliable result and a speedy end to
any illegal practice that proves out.5 The verification re-
quirement has the different object of protecting employers
from the disruption and expense of responding to a claim
unless a complainant is serious enough and sure enough to
support it by oath subject to liability for perjury.6 This ob-
ject, however, demands an oath only by the time the em-
ployer is obliged to respond to the charge, not at the time
an employee files it with the EEOC. There is accordingly
nothing plain in reading “charge” to require an oath by defi-
nition. Questionable would be the better word.
B
The statute is thus open to interpretation and the regula-
tion addresses a legitimate question. Before we touch on
the merits of the EEOC’s position, however, two threshold
matters about the status of the regulation can be given short
shrift. The first is whether the agency’s rulemaking ex-
ceeded its authority to adopt “suitable procedural regula-
tions,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–12(a), and instead addressed a sub-
stantive issue over which the EEOC has no rulemaking
power, see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S.
244, 257 (1991); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125,
141 (1976). Although the College argues that the EEOC’s
regulation “alter[s] a substantive requirement included by
Congress in the statute,” Brief for Respondent 32–33, this
is really nothing more than a recast of the plain language
argument; the College is merely restating the position we
5 See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250, 256–257 (1980)
(“Limitations periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights
laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protect employers
from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions
that are long past”).
6 See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U. S. 54, 76, n. 32 (1984) (“The function
of an oath is to impress upon its taker an awareness of his duty to tell
the truth”).

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just rejected, that Congress defined “charge” as a verified
accusation.
The other issue insignificant in this case, however promi-
nent it is in much of the litigation that goes on over agency
rulemaking, is the degree of deference owed to the regula-
tion by reviewing courts. We agree with the Government
as amicus that deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843–844
(1984), does not necessarily require an agency’s exercise of
express notice-and-comment rulemaking power,7 see Brief
for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 19, n. 11; we so
observed in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 230–
231 (2001) (“[W]e have sometimes found reasons for Chevron
deference even when no such administrative formality was
required and none was afforded”). But there is no need to
resolve any question of deference here. We find the EEOC
rule not only a reasonable one, but the position we would
adopt even if there were no formal rule and we were inter-
preting the statute from scratch. Because we so clearly
agree with the EEOC, there is no occasion to defer and no
point in asking what kind of deference, or how much.8
7 Title VII does not require the EEOC to utilize notice-and-comment
procedures. Section 713(a) of Title VII requires the procedural regu-
lations to “be in conformity with the standards and limitations” of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 551–559. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–
12(a) (1994 ed.). And the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C.
§ 553(b), excepts “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice”
from notice-and-comment procedures unless required by statute.
8 We, of course, do not mean to say that the EEOC’s position is the
“only one permissible.” See Commercial Office Products, 486 U. S., at
125 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The
agency might, for example, have decided that the time to test the com-
plainant’s seriousness is before the agency expends any effort on the case,
and so have required a verified complaint prior to interview. Justice
O’Connor suggests, see post, at 122 (opinion concurring in judgment),
that recognizing this implies that a sphere of deference is appropriate, and
so resolves the Chevron question. But not all deference is deference
under Chevron, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 234 (2001),

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C
A complaint to the EEOC starts the agency down the road
to investigation, conciliation, and enforcement, and it is no
small thing to be called upon to respond. As we said before,
the verification provision is meant to provide some degree of
insurance against catchpenny claims of disgruntled, but not
necessarily aggrieved, employees. In requiring the oath or
affirmation, however, Congress presumably did not mean to
affect the nature of Title VII as “a remedial scheme in which
laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the
process.” EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486
U. S. 107, 124 (1988); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 527
(1972). Construing § 706 to permit the relation back of an
oath omitted from an original filing ensures that the lay com-
plainant, who may not know enough to verify on filing, will
not risk forfeiting his rights inadvertently. At the same
time, the EEOC looks out for the employer’s interest by
refusing to call for any response to an otherwise sufficient
complaint until the verification has been supplied.9
We would be hard pressed to take issue with the EEOC’s
position after deciding Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757
and there is no need to resolve deference issues when there is no need
for deference.
9 The general practice of EEOC staff members is to prepare a formal
charge of discrimination for the complainant to review and to verify, once
the allegations have been clarified. See Brief for United States et al. as
Amici Curiae 24. The complainant must submit a verified charge before
the agency will require a response from the employer. See Brief for
United States et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 16.
Respondent argues that the employer will be prejudiced by these proce-
dures because “there would be no deadline for verifying a charge.” Brief
for Respondent 34, n. 26. But this is not our case, which simply chal-
lenges relation back per se, and our understanding is that the EEOC’s
standard practice is to caution complainants that if they fail to follow up
on their initial unverified charge, the EEOC will not proceed further with
the complaint. See App. 57; Brief for United States et al. as Amici
Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 17.

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(2001), last Term. In that case, we considered whether the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 signature requirement
entailed the dismissal of a notice of appeal that was timely
filed in the district court but was not signed within the filing
period. We held that while the timing and content require-
ments for the notice of appeal were “jurisdictional in na-
ture,” nothing prevented later cure of the signature defect,
532 U. S., at 765. There is no reason to think that relation
back of the oath here is any less reasonable than relation
back of the signature in Becker. Both are aimed at stem-
ming the urge to litigate irresponsibly, and if relation back
is a good rule for courts of law, it would be passing strange
to call it bad for an administrative agency.10 In fact, it
would be passing strange to disagree with the EEOC even
without Becker, for a long history of practice with oath re-
quirements supports the relation-back cure.
Where a statute or supplemental rule requires an oath,11
courts have shown a high degree of consistency in accepting
later verification as reaching back to an earlier, unverified
filing.12 This background law not only persuades by its reg-
10 We also note that Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits the relation back of amendments to pleadings under specified
circumstances.
11 See, e. g., Rule C(6) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims (“[A] person who asserts an interest in or right
against the property that is the subject of the [civil forfeiture] action must
file a verified statement identifying the interest or right”).
12 See, e. g., United States v. United States Currency in Amount of
$103,387.27, 863 F. 2d 555, 561–563 (CA7 1988); Johnston Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 175 F. 2d 351, 355–356 (CADC 1949); see also 5A C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1339, p. 150 (2d ed. 1990)
(“Even if a federal rule or statute requires verification, a failure to comply
does not render the document fatally defective”). In Armstrong v. Fer-
nandez, 208 U. S. 324, 330 (1908), we approved a bankruptcy court’s allow-
ance of nunc pro tunc verification of a petition filed under the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.
State-court practice before and after Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 has been, for the greater part, the same as federal. See, e. g.,
United Farm Workers of Am. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 37

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ularity over time but points to tacit congressional approval
of the EEOC’s position, Congress being presumed to have
known of this settled judicial treatment of oath requirements
when it enacted and later amended Title VII.13
This presumption is complemented by the fact that Con-
gress amended Title VII several times 14 without once
casting doubt on the EEOC’s construction.15 During the
Cal. 3d 912, 915, 694 P. 2d 138, 140 (1985) (en banc); Easter Seal Soc. for
Disabled Children v. Berry, 627 A. 2d 482, 489 (D. C. 1993); Maliszewski
v. Human Rights Comm’n, 269 Ill. App. 3d 472, 474–477, 646 N. E. 2d 625,
626–628 (1995); Workman v. Workman, 46 N. E. 2d 718, 724 (Ind. App.
1943) (en banc); Pulliam v. Pulliam, 163 Kan. 497, 499–500, 183 P. 2d 220,
222–223 (1947); Southside Civic Assn. v. Warrington, 93–0890, pp. 3–4
(La. App. 4/1/94), 635 So. 2d 721, 723–724, pet. for writ denied, 94–1219
(La. 7/1/94), 639 So. 2d 1168; Drury Displays, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment,
760 S. W. 2d 112, 114 (Mo. 1998); Chisholm v. Vocational School for Girls,
103 Mont. 503, 506–509, 64 P. 2d 838, 841–842 (1936); In re Estate of Ses-
sions, 217 Ore. 340, 347–349, 341 P. 2d 512, 516–517 (1959); State ex rel.
Williams v. Jones, 164 S. W. 2d 823, 826 (Tenn. 1942); Greene v. Union
Pac. Stages, Inc., 182 Wash. 143, 145, 45 P. 2d 611, 612 (1935). But see,
e. g., Dinwiddie v. Board of County Comm’rs, 103 N. M. 442, 445, 708 P.
2d 1043, 1046 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1117 (1986) (denying leave to
amend and dismissing unverified complaint contesting election).
13 See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U. S. 29, 34 (1995) (“ ‘[I]t
is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was
thoroughly familiar with [our] precedents . . . and that it expect[s] its enact-
ment[s] to be interpreted in conformity with them’ ” (citation omitted)).
14 See, e. g., Pub. L. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1075; Pub. L. 92–261, 86 Stat. 104.
15 Respondent argues that the regulation became inconsistent with Title
VII when Congress passed the 1972 amendments to the legislation. Brief
for Respondent 20–25, 37. In 1972, during the floor debate over the Sen-
ate version (S. 2515) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Senator Allen noted that the committee amendments omitted the require-
ment that a charge be made under oath, and proposed an amendment to
define a charge to “ ‘mean an accusation of discrimination supported by
oath or affirmation.’ ” 118 Cong. Rec. 4815 (1972). The Senator ex-
pressed his view that the amendment preserved what he believed to be
an existing requirement under the 1964 Act that “charges are to be filed
and made under oath in writing.” Ibid. This understanding was neither
confirmed nor denied, but Senator Williams, the bill’s floor manager, sug-
gested that rather than the “one coverall, blanket” definition proposed by
Senator Allen, the oath requirement could be included at the beginning of

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118 EDELMAN v. LYNCHBURG COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court
debates over the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the text of the
EEOC procedural regulations, including the predecessor of
§ 1601.12(b), was placed in the Congressional Record. 118
Cong. Rec. 718 (1972). By then the regulation was six years
old, and had been upheld and applied by the federal courts.16
By amending the law without repudiating the regulation,
Congress “suggests its consent to the Commission’s prac-
tice.” EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U. S. 590,
600, n. 17 (1981); see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U. S.
54, 69 (1984).
III
We accordingly hold the EEOC’s relation-back regulation
to be an unassailable interpretation of § 706 and therefore
reverse. Our judgment does not, however, reach the con-
clusion drawn by the District Court, and the single judge
on the Court of Appeals, that Edelman’s letter was not a
charge under the statute because neither he nor the EEOC
§ 706(b). Ibid. So modified, the amendment was adopted by voice vote
and enacted into law.
Besides refining the language of § 706 of Title VII, the 1972 amendments
extended the basic time period for filing a charge with the EEOC from
90 to 180 days, and from 210 to 300 days in deferral States. Pub. L.
92–261, 86 Stat. 104. Congress also added a requirement that the EEOC
notify employers within 10 days of receiving a filed charge. Ibid. In
view of the above-described exchange over the phrasing of the verification
requirement, and because Congress enacted this requirement while at
the same time amending the charge-filing deadline in § 706(e), respondent
advocates our reading the 1972 amendments as a “congressional com-
promise.” Brief for Respondent 24. We are asked, in other words, to
conclude that Congress lengthened the time for filing charges only be-
cause Congress, at the same time, required that a charge necessarily be
verified when first filed. The evidence for such a quid pro quo is, how-
ever, equivocal.
16 See, e. g., Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F. 2d 355, 357 (CA6 1969);
Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F. 2d 462, 466–467 (CA5 1969); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F. 2d 228, 230–231 (CA5 1969); Choate
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F. 2d 357, 359–360 (CA7 1968).

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119 Cite as: 535 U. S. 106 (2002)
Thomas, J., concurring
treated it as one. It is enough to say here that at the factual
level their view has some support. Although § 706(e)(1) of
Title VII provides that the “notice of the charge . . . shall
be served upon the person against whom such charge is
made within ten days” of filing with the EEOC, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 2000e–5(b) and (e)(1), the Government’s lawyer acknowl-
edged at oral argument that the EEOC failed to “comply
with its obligation to provide the employer with notice”
within 10 days after receiving Edelman’s letter of November
14, 1997. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Edelman’s counsel agreed
with the Government that the significance of the delayed no-
tice to the College would be open on remand. Id., at 9–10,
17.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, concurring.
Congress has authorized the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) “to issue, amend, or rescind suit-
able procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of
[Title VII]. Regulations issued under this section shall be
in conformity with the standards and limitations of ” the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA). 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–12(a)
(1994 ed.). The EEOC promulgated 29 CFR § 1601.12(b)
(1997) pursuant to its clear statutory authority to issue
procedural regulations. See § 1601.1 (“The regulations set
forth . . . contain the procedures established by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission for carrying out its
responsibilities in the administration and enforcement of title
VII . . .” (emphasis added)). I concur because I read the
Court’s opinion to hold that the EEOC possessed the author-
ity to promulgate this procedural regulation, and that the
regulation is reasonable, not proscribed by the statute, and
issued in conformity with the APA.

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120 EDELMAN v. LYNCHBURG COLLEGE
O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment
Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Scalia joins,
concurring in the judgment.
The Court today holds that there is no need in this case
to defer to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion’s regulation because the agency’s position is the one it
“would adopt even if there were no formal rule and [the
Court] were interpreting the statute from scratch.” Ante,
at 114. I do not agree that the EEOC has adopted the most
natural interpretation of Title VII’s provisions regarding the
filing with the EEOC of charges of discrimination. See 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–5 (1994 ed.). But, because the statute is at
least somewhat ambiguous, I would defer to the agency’s
interpretation. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843–844 (1984);
EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107, 125
(1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (“[D]eference [to the EEOC] is particularly appro-
priate on this type of technical issue of agency procedure”).
I think the regulation, 29 CFR § 1601.12(b) (1997), should be
sustained on this alternative basis.
Title VII requires “charges” of discrimination to “be in
writing under oath or affirmation.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(b).
It also requires “charge[s]” to “be filed within one hundred
and eighty [or in some circumstances three hundred] days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”
§ 2000e–5(e)(1). The most natural reading of these provi-
sions is that the first is intended to be definitional, defining
a “charge” as an allegation of discrimination made in writing
under oath or affirmation. The second then specifies the
time period in which such a verified charge must be filed.
That Congress intended the provisions to be read together
in this way is suggested by the fact that the two provisions
are found in subsections of the same section of the statute.
See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809
(1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and

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121 Cite as: 535 U. S. 106 (2002)
O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”).
Surprisingly, however, the Court holds that the best read-
ing is precisely the opposite—it says it “clearly agree[s] with
the EEOC” that charges do not need to be verified within
the specified time period. See ante, at 114.
Despite the fact that I think the best reading of the statute
is that a charge must be made under oath or affirmation
within the specified time, this is not the only possible read-
ing of the statute. The definition section of the statute,
42 U. S. C. § 2000e, which expressly defines a number of
terms, does not define the word “charge” to mean an allega-
tion made under oath or affirmation. In fact, the definition
section does not define the word “charge” at all. And the
provision stating that “charges shall be in writing under oath
or affirmation” is not framed as a definition—it does not say,
for example, that a charge is an allegation made in writing
under oath or affirmation. Because the statute does not
explicitly define “charge” to incorporate verification but only
suggests it, the requirement that charges be verified and the
requirement that charges be filed within the specified time
could be read as independent requirements that do not need
to be satisfied simultaneously. Congress, therefore, cannot
be said to have “unambiguously expressed [its] intent”
that the charge must be under oath or affirmation when filed.
Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843 (emphasis added). Given this am-
biguity, under our decision in Chevron, “the question . . .
[becomes] whether the agency’s [position] is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute,” ibid., or, in other
words, whether the agency’s position is “reasonable,” id., at
845. If so, then we must give it “controlling weight,” id.,
at 844.
I find the regulation to be reasonable for some of the same
reasons that the Court finds it to be the best interpretation
of the statute. As the Court notes, Title VII is “ ‘a remedial
scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are ex-
pected to initiate the process.’ ” Ante, at 115 (quoting Com-

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122 EDELMAN v. LYNCHBURG COLLEGE
O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment
mercial Office Products Co., supra, at 124). Permitting re-
lation back of an oath omitted from an original filing is
reasonable because it helps ensure that lay complainants will
not inadvertently forfeit their rights. The regulation is also
consistent, as the Court explains, with the common-law prac-
tice of allowing later verifications to relate back. See ante,
at 116–117. For these reasons, I think the regulation is rea-
sonable and should be sustained.
The Court reserved the question of whether the EEOC’s
regulation is entitled to Chevron deference. See ante, at
114. I doubt that it is possible to reserve this question
while simultaneously maintaining, as the Court does, see
ante, at 114–115, n. 8, that the agency is free to change its
interpretation. To say that the matter is ambiguous enough
to permit agency choice and to suggest that the Court would
countenance a different choice is to say that the Court would
(because it must) defer to a reasonable agency choice. In-
deed, the concurring opinion that the Court cites for the
proposition that the agency could change its position was
premised on the idea that the agency was entitled to defer-
ence. See Commercial Office Products Co., supra, at 125–
126 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
I think the EEOC’s regulation is entitled to Chevron def-
erence. We have, of course, previously held that because
the EEOC was not given rulemaking authority to inter-
pret the substantive provisions of Title VII, its substantive
regulations do not receive Chevron deference, but instead
only receive consideration according to the standards estab-
lished in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).
See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 257
(1991) (“[T]he level of deference afforded [the agency’s judg-
ment] ‘will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control’ ”)

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123 Cite as: 535 U. S. 106 (2002)
O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment
(quoting Skidmore, supra, at 140); General Elec. Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U. S. 125, 141–142 (1976). The EEOC has, how-
ever, been given “authority from time to time to issue . . .
suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions
of ” Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–12(a) (emphasis added).
The regulation at issue here, which permits relation back of
amendments to charges filed with the EEOC, is clearly such
a procedural regulation. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15
(establishing rules for amendments to pleadings and relation
back as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Thus,
as the Court recognizes, see ante, at 113–114, the EEOC was
exercising authority explicitly delegated to it by Congress
when it promulgated this rule.
The regulation was also promulgated pursuant to suffi-
ciently formal procedures. Although the EEOC originally
issued the regulation without undergoing formal notice-
and-comment procedures, it was repromulgated pursuant to
those procedures in 1977. See 42 Fed. Reg. 42022, 42023
(1977); id., at 55388, 55389. We recognized in United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 (2001), that although notice-and-
comment procedures are not required for Chevron defer-
ence, notice-and-comment is “significant . . . in pointing
to Chevron authority,” and that an “overwhelming num-
ber of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed
the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adju-
dication.” 533 U. S., at 230–231. I see no reason why a re-
promulgation pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures
should be less entitled to deference than an original promul-
gation pursuant to those procedures. Cf. Smiley v. Citi-
bank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 741 (1996) (giving
deference to “a full-dress regulation . . . adopted pursuant
to the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act designed to assure . . . deliberation” even
though the regulation was prompted by litigation).
Moreover, the regulation is codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations, 29 CFR § 1601.12(b) (1997), and so is binding

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124 EDELMAN v. LYNCHBURG COLLEGE
O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment
on all the parties coming before the EEOC, as well as on the
EEOC itself. In this regard, it is distinguishable from the
Customs Service ruling letters at issue in Mead Corp., supra,
at 233, which we found not to be binding on third parties and
to be changeable by the Customs Service merely upon notice,
and to which we therefore denied Chevron deference. See
also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 587 (2000)
(denying Chevron deference to an agency opinion letter that
we suggested lacked “the force of law,” but stating that “the
framework of deference set forth in Chevron does apply to
an agency interpretation contained in a regulation”).
Because I believe the regulation is entitled to review
under Chevron, and because the regulation is reasonable,
I concur in the judgment.