PORTER et al. v. NUSSLE

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516 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
PORTER et al. v. NUSSLE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 00–853. Argued January 14, 2002—Decided February 26, 2002
Without filing a grievance under applicable Connecticut Department of
Correction procedures, plaintiff-respondent Nussle, a state prison in-
mate, commenced a federal-court action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, charg-
ing that corrections officers, including defendant-petitioner Porter, had
subjected him to a sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation
and had singled him out for a severe beating in violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.” The District
Court dismissed Nussle’s suit, relying on a provision of the Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a), that directs:
“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 . . . , or any other Federal law, by a prisoner . . . until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” The Second
Circuit reversed, holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not required for a claim of the kind Nussle asserted. The appeals court
concluded that § 1997e(a)’s “prison conditions” phrase covers only condi-
tions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents that immediately
affect only particular prisoners, such as corrections officers’ use of exces-
sive force. In support of its position, the court cited legislative history
suggesting that the PLRA curtails frivolous suits, not actions seeking
relief from corrections officer brutality; the court also referred to pre-
PLRA decisions in which this Court distinguished, for proof of injury
and mens rea purposes, between excessive force claims and conditions
of confinement claims.
Held: The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits
about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or par-
ticular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong. Cf. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 299, n. 1. Pp. 523–532.
(a) The current exhaustion provision in § 1997e(a) differs markedly
from its predecessor. Once within the district court’s discretion, ex-
haustion in § 1997e(a) cases is now mandatory. See Booth v. Churner,
532 U. S. 731, 739. And unlike the previous provision, which encom-
passed only § 1983 suits, exhaustion is now required for all “action[s] . . .
brought with respect to prison conditions.” Section 1997e(a), designed
to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits, affords
corrections officials an opportunity to address complaints internally

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Syllabus
before allowing the initiation of a federal case. In some instances,
corrective action taken in response to an inmate’s grievance might
improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating
the need for litigation. Id., at 737. In other instances, the internal
review might filter out some frivolous claims. Ibid. And for cases
ultimately brought to court, an administrative record clarifying the
controversy’s contours could facilitate adjudication. See, e. g., ibid.
Pp. 523–525.
(b) Determination of the meaning of § 1997e(a)’s “prison conditions”
phrase is guided by the PLRA’s text and context, and by this Court’s
prior decisions relating to “[s]uits by prisoners,” as § 1997e is titled.
The pathmarking opinion is McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U. S. 136, in
which the Court construed the Federal Magistrates Act’s authorization
to district judges to refer “prisoner petitions challenging conditions of
confinement” to magistrate judges. This Court concluded in McCarthy
that, read in its proper context, the phrase “challenging conditions
of confinement” authorizes the nonconsensual reference of all prisoner
petitions to a magistrate, id., at 139. The McCarthy Court emphasized
that Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, had unambiguously placed
cases involving single episodes of unconstitutional conduct within the
broad category of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confine-
ment, 500 U. S., at 141; found it telling that Congress, in composing the
Magistrates Act, chose language that so clearly paralleled the Preiser
opinion, 500 U. S., at 142; and considered it significant that the latter
Act’s purpose—to lighten overworked district judges’ caseload—would
be thwarted by allowing satellite litigation over the precise contours
of an exception for single episode cases, id., at 143. The general pre-
sumption that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity
with this Court’s precedents, United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495,
and the PLRA’s dominant concern to promote administrative redress,
filter out groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of
claims aired in court, see Booth v. Churner, 532 U. S., at 737, persuade
the Court that § 1997e(a)’s key words “prison conditions” are properly
read through the lens of McCarthy and Preiser. Those decisions tug
strongly away from classifying suits about prison guards’ use of ex-
cessive force, one or many times, as anything other than actions “with
respect to prison conditions.” Nussle misplaces principal reliance on
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 8–9, and Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U. S. 825, 835–836. Although those cases did distinguish excessive
force claims from conditions of confinement claims, they did so in the
context of proof requirements: what injury must a plaintiff allege and
show; what mental state must a plaintiff plead and prove. Proof re-
quirements, once a case is in court, however, do not touch or concern

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518 PORTER v. NUSSLE
Syllabus
the threshold inquiry at issue here: whether resort to a prison grievance
process must precede resort to a court. There is no reason to believe
that Congress meant to release the evidentiary distinctions drawn in
Hudson and Farmer from their moorings and extend their application
to § 1997e(a)’s otherwise invigorated exhaustion requirement. It is at
least equally plausible that Congress inserted “prison conditions” into
the exhaustion provision simply to make it clear that preincarceration
claims fall outside § 1997e(a), for example, a § 1983 claim against the
prisoner’s arresting officer. Furthermore, the asserted distinction be-
tween excessive force claims and exhaustion-mandatory “frivolous”
claims is untenable, for excessive force claims can be frivolous, and
exhaustion serves purposes beyond weeding out frivolous allegations.
Pp. 525–530.
(c) Other infirmities inhere in the Second Circuit’s disposition. See
McCarthy, 500 U. S., at 143. In the prison environment, a specific inci-
dent may be symptomatic of a systemic problem, rather than aber-
rational. Id., at 143–144. Nussle urges that his case could be placed
in the isolated episode category, but he might equally urge that his
complaint describes a pattern or practice of harassment climaxing in
the alleged beating. It seems unlikely that Congress, when it included
in the PLRA a firm exhaustion requirement, meant to leave the need
to exhaust to the pleader’s option. Cf. Preiser, 411 U. S., at 489–490.
Moreover, the appeals court’s disposition augurs complexity; bifurcated
proceedings would be normal thereunder when, for example, a prisoner
sues both the corrections officer alleged to have used excessive force
and the supervisor who allegedly failed adequately to monitor those
in his charge. Finally, scant sense supports the single occurrence, pre-
vailing circumstance dichotomy. For example, prison authorities’ in-
terest in receiving prompt notice of, and opportunity to take action
against, guard brutality is no less compelling than their interest in
receiving notice and an opportunity to stop other types of staff wrong-
doing. See id., at 492. Pp. 530–531.
224 F. 3d 95, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut,
argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs
were Gregory T. D’Auria, Robert B. Fiske III, Perry Zinn-
Rowthorn, Steven R. Strom, and Mark F. Kohler, Assistant
Attorneys General.

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519 Cite as: 534 U. S. 516 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
John R. Williams argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the briefs was Norman A. Pattis.
Irving R. Gornstein argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Clement,
Barbara L. Herwig, and Peter R. Maier.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the obligation of prisoners who claim
denial of their federal rights while incarcerated to exhaust
prison grievance procedures before seeking judicial relief.
Plaintiff-respondent Ronald Nussle, an inmate in a Connecti-
cut prison, brought directly to court, without filing an in-
mate grievance, a complaint charging that corrections offi-
cers singled him out for a severe beating, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punish-
ments.” Nussle bypassed the grievance procedure despite
a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA), 110 Stat. 1321–73, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a)
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New
York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D.
Bansal, Solicitor General, and Caitlin J. Halligan, First Deputy Solicitor
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Bill
Lockyer of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker
of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Steve
Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas,
Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland,
Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan,
Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue
Del Papa of Nevada, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Betty D. Mont-
gomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers
of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of
South Carolina, John Cornyn of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Wil-
liam H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington; and
for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda
and James I. Crowley.

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520 PORTER v. NUSSLE
Opinion of the Court
(1994 ed., Supp. V), that directs: “No action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such adminis-
trative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
§ 1997e(a) governs only conditions affecting prisoners gen-
erally, not single incidents, such as corrections officers’ use
of excessive force, actions that immediately affect only par-
ticular prisoners. Nussle defends the Second Circuit’s judg-
ment, but urges that the relevant distinction is between
excessive force claims, which, he says, need not be pursued
administratively, and all other claims, which, he recognizes,
must proceed first through the prison grievance process.
We reject both readings and hold, in line with the text and
purpose of the PLRA, our precedent in point, and the weight
of lower court authority, that § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion re-
quirement applies to all prisoners seeking redress for prison
circumstances or occurrences.
I
Respondent Ronald Nussle is an inmate at the Cheshire
Correctional Institution in Connecticut. App. 38. Accord-
ing to his complaint, corrections officers at the prison sub-
jected him to “a prolonged and sustained pattern of har-
assment and intimidation” from the time of his arrival there
in May 1996. Id., at 39. Nussle alleged that he was singled
out because he was “perceived” to be a friend of the Gov-
ernor of Connecticut, with whom corrections officers were
feuding over labor issues. Ibid.
Concerning the episode in suit, Nussle asserted that, on
or about June 15, 1996, several officers, including defendant-
petitioner Porter, ordered Nussle to leave his cell, “placed
him against a wall and struck him with their hands, kneed
him in the back, [and] pulled his hair.” Ibid. Nussle al-

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leged that the attack was unprovoked and unjustified, and
that the officers told him they would kill him if he reported
the beating. Ibid.
Then, as now, the Connecticut Department of Correction
provided a grievance system for prisoners. See id., at 5–18.
Under that system, grievances must be filed within 30 days
of the “occurrence.” Id., at 11. Rules governing the griev-
ance process include provisions on confidentiality and against
reprisals. Id., at 17–18.
Without filing a grievance, on June 10, 1999, Nussle com-
menced an action in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983; he filed suit days before the three-year statute of limi-
tations ran out on the § 1983 claim.1 Nussle charged, princi-
pally, that the corrections officers’ assault violated his right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment, as made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment. App. 38. The District Court,
relying on § 1997e(a), dismissed Nussle’s complaint for fail-
ure to exhaust administrative remedies. Nussle v. Willette,
3:99CV1091(AHN) (D. Conn., Nov. 22, 1999), App. 43.
Construing § 1997e(a) narrowly because it is an exception
“to the general rule of non-exhaustion in § 1983 cases,” the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District
Court’s judgment; the appeals court held that “exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required for [prisoner] claims
of assault or excessive force brought under § 1983.” Nussle
v. Willette, 224 F. 3d 95, 106 (2000). Section 1997e(a) re-
quires administrative exhaustion of inmates’ claims “with
respect to prison conditions,” but contains no definition of
the words “prison conditions.” The appeals court found
1 The Second Circuit has held that § 1983 actions in Connecticut are
governed by that State’s three-year statute of limitations for tort actions.
Williams v. Walsh, 558 F. 2d 667, 670 (1977).

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522 PORTER v. NUSSLE
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the term “scarcely free of ambiguity.” Id., at 101.2 For
purposes of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the court
concluded, the term was most appropriately read to mean
“ ‘circumstances affecting everyone in the area,’ ” rather
than “ ‘single or momentary matter[s],’ such as beatings . . .
directed at particular individuals.” Ibid. (quoting Booth v.
Churner, 206 F. 3d 289, 300–301 (CA3 2000) (Noonan, J., con-
curring and dissenting), aff ’d on other grounds, 532 U. S. 731
(2001)).
The Court of Appeals found support for its position in the
PLRA’s legislative history. Floor statements “overwhelm-
ingly suggest[ed]” that Congress sought to curtail suits qual-
ifying as “frivolous” because of their “subject matter,” e. g.,
suits over “insufficient storage locker space,” “a defective
haircut,” or “being served chunky peanut butter instead
of the creamy variety.” 224 F. 3d, at 105 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Actions seeking relief from correc-
tions officer brutality, the Second Circuit stressed, are not
of that genre. Further, the Court of Appeals referred to
pre-PLRA decisions in which this Court had “disaggre-
gate[d] the broad category of Eighth Amendment claims so
2 Another provision of the PLRA, 18 U. S. C. § 3626(g)(2) (1994 ed.,
Supp. V), the court observed, does define “prison conditions.” Nussle v.
Willette, 224 F. 3d 95, 101 (CA2 2000). That provision, which concerns
prospective relief, defines “prison conditions” to mean “the conditions of
confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives
of persons confined in prison.” The Second Circuit found the § 3626(g)(2)
definition “no less ambiguous” than the bare text of § 1997e(a). Neither
of the alternative § 3626(g)(2) formulations, the court said, would be used
in “everyday” speech to describe “particular instances of assault or ex-
cessive force.” Id., at 102. But see Booth v. Churner, 206 F. 3d 289,
294–295 (CA3 2000), aff ’d on other grounds, 532 U. S. 731 (2001) (reading
§ 3626(g)(2) to cover all prison conditions and corrections officer actions
that “make [prisoners’] lives worse”). The Second Circuit ultimately con-
cluded that it would be improper, in any event, automatically to import
§ 3626(g)(2)’s “definition of ‘civil actions brought with respect to prison
conditions’ into 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a)” because the two provisions had
“distinct statutory purposes.” 224 F. 3d, at 105.

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as to distinguish [for proof of injury and mens rea purposes]
between ‘excessive force’ claims, on the one hand, and ‘con-
ditions of confinement’ claims, on the other.” Id., at 106
(citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992), and Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825 (1994)).
In conflict with the Second Circuit, other Federal Courts
of Appeals have determined that prisoners alleging assaults
by prison guards must meet § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion require-
ment before commencing a civil rights action. See Smith v.
Zachary, 255 F. 3d 446 (CA7 2001); Higginbottom v. Carter,
223 F. 3d 1259 (CA11 2000); Booth v. Churner, 206 F. 3d 289
(CA3 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F. 3d 641 (CA6 1999).
We granted certiorari to resolve the intercircuit conflict,
532 U. S. 1065 (2001), and now reverse the Second Circuit’s
judgment.
II
Ordinarily, plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under
42 U. S. C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies
before filing suit in court. See Patsy v. Board of Regents
of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 516 (1982). Prisoner suits alleging
constitutional deprivations while incarcerated once fell
within this general rule. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U. S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam).
In 1980, however, Congress introduced an exhaustion pre-
scription for suits initiated by state prisoners. See Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 352, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1994 ed.). This measure
authorized district courts to stay a state prisoner’s § 1983
action “for a period of not to exceed 180 days” while the
prisoner exhausted available “plain, speedy, and effective
administrative remedies.” § 1997e(a)(1). Exhaustion under
the 1980 prescription was in large part discretionary; it could
be ordered only if the State’s prison grievance system met
specified federal standards, and even then, only if, in the par-
ticular case, the court believed the requirement “appropriate
and in the interests of justice.” §§ 1997e(a) and (b). We de-

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524 PORTER v. NUSSLE
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scribed this provision as a “limited exhaustion requirement”
in McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 150–151 (1992), and
thought it inapplicable to prisoner suits for damages when
monetary relief was unavailable through the prison griev-
ance system.
In 1996, as part of the PLRA, Congress invigorated the
exhaustion prescription. The revised exhaustion provision,
titled “Suits by prisoners,” states: “No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are ex-
hausted.” 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
The current exhaustion provision differs markedly from
its predecessor. Once within the discretion of the district
court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now
mandatory. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U. S. 731, 739 (2001).
All “available” remedies must now be exhausted; those
remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they
be “plain, speedy, and effective.” See ibid.; see also id., at
740, n. 5. Even when the prisoner seeks relief not avail-
able in grievance proceedings, notably money damages,
exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. See id., at 741. And
unlike the previous provision, which encompassed only § 1983
suits, exhaustion is now required for all “action[s] . . . brought
with respect to prison conditions,” whether under § 1983
or “any other Federal law.” Compare 42 U. S. C. § 1997e
(1994 ed.) with 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
Thus federal prisoners suing under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), must first ex-
haust inmate grievance procedures just as state prisoners
must exhaust administrative processes prior to instituting a
§ 1983 suit.
Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the
quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to this

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purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials time and
opportunity to address complaints internally before allow-
ing the initiation of a federal case. In some instances, cor-
rective action taken in response to an inmate’s grievance
might improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate,
thereby obviating the need for litigation. Booth, 532 U. S.,
at 737. In other instances, the internal review might “filter
out some frivolous claims.” Ibid. And for cases ultimately
brought to court, adjudication could be facilitated by an
administrative record that clarifies the contours of the con-
troversy. See ibid.; see also Madigan, 503 U. S., at 146.
Congress described the cases covered by § 1997e(a)’s ex-
haustion requirement as “action[s] . . . brought with respect
to prison conditions.” Nussle’s case requires us to deter-
mine what the § 1997e(a) term “prison conditions” means,
given Congress’ failure to define the term in the text of the
exhaustion provision.3 We are guided in this endeavor by
the PLRA’s text and context, and by our prior decisions
relating to “[s]uits by prisoners,” § 1997e.4
3 The parties dispute the meaning of a simultaneously enacted provi-
sion, § 3626(g)(2), which concerns prospective relief, and for that purpose,
defines the expression “civil action with respect to prison conditions.”
See supra, at 522, n. 2 (noting, inter alia, divergent constructions of Sec-
ond and Third Circuits). We rest our decision on the meaning of “prison
conditions” in the context of § 1997e, and express no definitive opinion on
the proper reading of § 3626(g)(2).
4 In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit referred to its “obligation
to construe statutory exceptions narrowly, in order to give full effect to
the general rule of non-exhaustion in § 1983.” 224 F. 3d, at 106 (citing
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U. S. 725, 731–732 (1995), and
Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 508 (1982)). The Second
Circuit did not then have available to it our subsequently rendered deci-
sion in Booth v. Churner, 532 U. S. 731 (2001). Booth held that § 1997e(a)
mandates initial recourse to the prison grievance process even when a
prisoner seeks only money damages, a remedy not available in that
process. See id., at 741. In so ruling, we observed that “Congress . . .
may well have thought we were shortsighted” in failing adequately to

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As to precedent, the pathmarking opinion is McCarthy
v. Bronson, 500 U. S. 136 (1991), which construed 28 U. S. C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) (1988 ed.), a Judicial Code provision author-
izing district judges to refer to magistrate judges, inter
alia, “prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confine-
ment.” 5 The petitioning prisoner in McCarthy argued that
§ 636(b)(1)(B) allowed nonconsensual referrals “only when a
prisoner challenges ongoing prison conditions.” 500 U. S.,
at 138. The complaint in McCarthy targeted no “ongoing
prison conditions”; it homed in on “an isolated incident” of
excessive force. Ibid. For that reason, according to the
McCarthy petitioner, nonconsensual referral of his case was
impermissible. Id., at 138–139.
We did not “quarrel with” the prisoner’s assertion in
McCarthy that “the most natural reading of the phrase ‘chal-
lenging conditions of confinement,’ when viewed in isolation,
would not include suits seeking relief from isolated episodes
of unconstitutional conduct.” Id., at 139. We nonetheless
concluded that the petitioner’s argument failed upon read-
ing the phrase “in its proper context.” Ibid. We found no
suggestion in § 636(b)(1)(B) that Congress meant to divide
recognize the utility of the administrative process to satisfy, reduce, or
clarify prisoner grievances. Id., at 737. While the canon on which the
Second Circuit relied may be dependable in other contexts, the PLRA
establishes a different regime. For litigation within § 1997e(a)’s compass,
Congress has replaced the “general rule of non-exhaustion” with a general
rule of exhaustion.
5 Title 28 U. S. C. § 636(b)(1)(B) provides in relevant part:
“(b)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary—
. . . . .
“a judge may . . . designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, includ-
ing evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed
findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the
court, . . . of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted
of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of
confinement.”

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prisoner petitions “into subcategories.” Ibid. “On the con-
trary,” we observed, “when the relevant section is read in
its entirety, it suggests that Congress intended to auth-
orize the nonconsensual reference of all prisoner petitions
to a magistrate.” Ibid. The Federal Magistrates Act, we
noted, covers actions of two kinds: challenges to “conditions
of confinement”; and “applications for habeas corpus relief.”
Id., at 140. Congress, we concluded, “intended to include in
their entirety th[ose] two primary categories of suits brought
by prisoners.” Ibid.
“Just three years before [§ 636(b)(1)(B)] was drafted,”
we explained in McCarthy, “our opinion in Preiser v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), had described [the] two broad cate-
gories of prisoner petitions: (1) those challenging the fact
or duration of confinement itself; and (2) those challeng-
ing the conditions of confinement.” Ibid. Preiser v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), left no doubt, we further stated
in McCarthy, that “the latter category unambiguously
embraced the kind of single episode cases that petitioner’s
construction would exclude.” 500 U. S., at 141. We found
it telling that Congress, in composing the Magistrates Act,
chose language “that so clearly parallel[ed] our Preiser
opinion.” Id., at 142. We considered it significant as well
that the purpose of the Magistrates Act—to lighten the
caseload of overworked district judges—would be thwarted
by opening the door to satellite litigation over “the pre-
cise contours of [the] suggested exception for single episode
cases.” Id., at 143.
As in McCarthy, we here read the term “prison condi-
tions” not in isolation, but “in its proper context.” Id., at
139. The PLRA exhaustion provision is captioned “Suits
by prisoners,” see § 1997e; this unqualified heading scarcely
aids the argument that Congress meant to bisect the uni-
verse of prisoner suits. See ibid.; see also Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 234 (1998) (“[T]he title

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528 PORTER v. NUSSLE
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of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available
for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
This Court generally “presume[s] that Congress expects
its statutes to be read in conformity with th[e] Court’s prece-
dents.” United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997).
That presumption, and the PLRA’s dominant concern to pro-
mote administrative redress, filter out groundless claims, and
foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court, see
Booth, 532 U. S., at 737, persuade us that § 1997e(a)’s key
words “prison conditions” are properly read through the lens
of McCarthy and Preiser. Those decisions tug strongly
away from classifying suits about prison guards’ use of ex-
cessive force, one or many times, as anything other than
actions “with respect to prison conditions.”
Nussle places principal reliance on Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U. S. 1 (1992), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825,
835–836 (1994), and the Second Circuit found support for
its position in those cases as well, 224 F. 3d, at 106. Hudson
held that to sustain a claim of excessive force, a prisoner
need not show significant injury. 503 U. S., at 9. In so
ruling, the Court did indeed distinguish excessive force
claims from “conditions of confinement” claims; to sustain a
claim of the latter kind “significant injury” must be shown.
Id., at 8–9. Hudson also observed that a “conditions of con-
finement” claim may succeed if a prisoner demonstrates that
prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference,” id., at 8
(citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991)), while a
prisoner alleging excessive force must demonstrate that the
defendant acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,”
Hudson, 503 U. S., at 7. Farmer similarly distinguished
the mental state that must be shown to prevail on an ex-
cessive force claim, i. e., “purposeful or knowing conduct,”
from the lesser mens rea requirement governing “condi-
tions of confinement” claims, i. e., “deliberate indifference.”
511 U. S., at 835–836. We do not question those decisions

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529 Cite as: 534 U. S. 516 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
and attendant distinctions in the context in which they were
made. But the question presented here is of a different
order.
Hudson and Farmer trained solely and precisely on proof
requirements: what injury must a plaintiff allege and show;
what mental state must a plaintiff plead and prove. Proof
requirements once a case is in court, however, do not touch
or concern the threshold inquiry before us: whether resort
to a prison grievance process must precede resort to a court.
We have no reason to believe that Congress meant to release
the evidentiary distinctions drawn in Hudson and Farmer
from their moorings and extend their application to the
otherwise invigorated exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a).
Such an extension would be highly anomalous given Con-
gress’ elimination of judicial discretion to dispense with
exhaustion and its deletion of the former constraint that
administrative remedies must be “plain, speedy, and effec-
tive” before exhaustion could be required. See supra, at
524; Booth, 532 U. S., at 739; cf. id., at 740–741 (“Congress’s
imposition of an obviously broader exhaustion requirement
makes it highly implausible that it meant to give prison-
ers a strong inducement to skip the administrative process
simply by limiting prayers for relief to money damages not
offered through administrative grievance mechanisms.”).
Nussle contends that Congress added the words “prison
conditions” to the text of § 1997e(a) specifically to exempt
excessive force claims from the now mandatory exhaustion
requirement; he sees that requirement as applicable mainly
to “ ‘prison conditions’ claims that may be frivolous as to sub-
ject matter,” 224 F. 3d, at 106. See Brief for Respondent 2,
26–27. It is at least equally plausible, however, that Con-
gress inserted “prison conditions” into the exhaustion pro-
vision simply to make it clear that preincarceration claims
fall outside § 1997e(a), for example, a Title VII claim against
the prisoner’s preincarceration employer, or, for that matter,
a § 1983 claim against his arresting officer.

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530 PORTER v. NUSSLE
Opinion of the Court
Furthermore, the asserted distinction between excessive
force claims that need not be exhausted, on the one hand,
and exhaustion-mandatory “frivolous” claims on the other,
see id., at 2, 26–27, is untenable, for “[e]xcessive force claims
can be frivolous,” Smith, 255 F. 3d, at 452 (“Inmates can al-
lege they were subject to vicious nudges.”), and exhaustion
serves purposes beyond weeding out frivolous allegations,
see supra, at 524–525.
Other infirmities inhere in the Second Circuit’s disposition.
See McCarthy, 500 U. S., at 143 (“Petitioner’s definition
would generate additional work for the district courts be-
cause the distinction between cases challenging ongoing con-
ditions and those challenging specific acts of alleged mis-
conduct will often be difficult to identify.”). As McCarthy
emphasized, in the prison environment a specific incident
may be symptomatic rather than aberrational. Id., at 143–
144. An unwarranted assault by a corrections officer may
be reflective of a systemic problem traceable to poor hiring
practices, inadequate training, or insufficient supervision.
See Smith, 255 F. 3d, at 449. Nussle himself alleged in this
very case not only the beating he suffered on June 15, 1996;
he also alleged, extending before and after that date,
“a prolonged and sustained pattern of harassment and in-
timidation by corrections officers.” App. 39. Nussle urges
that his case could be placed in the isolated episode category,
but he might equally urge that his complaint describes a
pattern or practice of harassment climaxing in the alleged
beating. It seems unlikely that Congress, when it included
in the PLRA a firm exhaustion requirement, meant to leave
the need to exhaust to the pleader’s option. Cf. Preiser, 411
U. S., at 489–490 (“It would wholly frustrate explicit con-
gressional intent to hold that [prisoners] could evade this
[exhaustion] requirement by the simple expedient of putting
a different label on their pleadings.”).
Under Nussle’s view and that of the Second Circuit, more-
over, bifurcation would be normal when a prisoner sues both

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531 Cite as: 534 U. S. 516 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
a corrections officer alleged to have used excessive force and
the supervisor who allegedly failed adequately to monitor
those in his charge. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. The officer alone
could be taken directly to court; the charge against the
supervisor would proceed first through the internal griev-
ance process. Similarly split proceedings apparently would
be in order, under the Second Circuit’s decision, when the
prisoner elects to pursue against the same officers both dis-
crete instance and ongoing conduct charges.
Finally, we emphasize a concern over and above the com-
plexity augured by the Second Circuit’s disposition: Scant
sense supports the single occurrence, prevailing circum-
stance dichotomy. Why should a prisoner have immedi-
ate access to court when a guard assaults him on one occa-
sion, but not when beatings are widespread or routine? See
Smith, 255 F. 3d, at 450. Nussle’s distinction between ex-
cessive force claims and all other prisoner suits, see supra,
at 520, presents a similar anomaly. Do prison authorities
have an interest in receiving prompt notice of, and opportu-
nity to take action against, guard brutality that is somehow
less compelling than their interest in receiving notice and an
opportunity to stop other types of staff wrongdoing? See
Preiser, 411 U. S., at 492 (“Since [the] internal problems of
state prisons involve issues so peculiarly within state author-
ity and expertise, the States have an important interest in
not being bypassed in the correction of those problems.”).6
6 Other provisions of § 1997e that refer to “prison conditions” would have
less scope under the Second Circuit’s construction of the term. Section
1997e(c)(1) provides for dismissal on the court’s own initiative of “any
action brought with respect to prison conditions” that is “frivolous [or]
malicious.” No specific incident complaint would be subject to that pre-
scription under the view that such suits do not implicate “prison condi-
tions.” Further, § 1997e(f)(1) provides that pretrial proceedings in “any
action brought with respect to prison conditions” may be held at the prison
via telephone, video conference, or other telecommunications technology
so that the prisoner need not be physically transferred to participate.
Surely such arrangements would be appropriate in Nussle’s case and

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532 PORTER v. NUSSLE
Opinion of the Court
* * *
For the reasons stated, we hold that the PLRA’s ex-
haustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison
life, whether they involve general circumstances or particu-
lar episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some
other wrong. Cf. Wilson, 501 U. S., at 299, n. 1. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
others of its genre. But on what authority would these practical pro-
cedures rest if cases like Nussle’s do not qualify as actions regarding
“prison conditions”?

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533 OCTOBER TERM, 2001
Syllabus
RAYGOR et al. v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF MINNESOTA et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of minnesota
No. 00–1514. Argued November 26, 2001—Decided February 27, 2002
Petitioners each filed complaints in Federal District Court against re-
spondent university (hereinafter respondent), an arm of the State of
Minnesota, alleging a federal cause of action under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) and a state law discrimination action
under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367,
which purports to toll the limitations period for supplemental claims
while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are
dismissed, § 1367(d). Respondent’s answers included the affirmative de-
fense that the suits were barred by the State’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The District Court subsequently dismissed the claims, and
petitioners withdrew their federal appeal after this Court held that the
ADEA does not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity, see Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 92. In the meantime, petitioners
had refiled their state law claims in state court. Respondent contended
that the claims were barred by the applicable state statute of limitations
and that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll the
limitations period on those claims because the Federal District Court
never had subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claims. Agree-
ing, the State District Court dismissed the suit, but the Minnesota Ap-
peals Court reversed. Reversing, in turn, the State Supreme Court
held § 1367(d) unconstitutional when applied to claims against noncon-
senting state defendants, such as respondent.
Held: Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for state law
claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dis-
missed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Pp. 539–548.
(a) Petitioners sought to have their state law claims heard in federal
court as supplemental claims under § 1367(a). That grant of jurisdiction
does not extend to claims against nonconsenting state defendants, see
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, but the question
remains whether § 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for state law
claims asserted under § 1367(a) but subsequently dismissed on Eleventh
Amendment grounds. Pp. 539–542.
(b) Because § 1367(d), on its face, purports to apply to dismissals of
“any claim asserted under subsection (a),” it could be broadly read to
apply to any such claim regardless of the reason for dismissal. But

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534 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Syllabus
reading subsection (d) to apply when state law claims are dismissed on
Eleventh Amendment grounds raises serious doubts about the provi-
sion’s constitutionality given state sovereign immunity principles.
Such a reading would require a State to defend against a claim in state
court that had never been filed in that court until some indeterminate
time after the original limitations period had elapsed. There is a rebut-
table presumption that equitable tolling under federal law applies to
waivers of the United States’ immunity. However, this Court has never
held that waivers of a State’s immunity presumptively include federal
tolling rules, nor is it obvious that such a presumption would be a realis-
tic assessment of legislative intent. Moreover, a state sovereign pre-
scribes the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued in its
own courts, Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529, and only the sover-
eign’s consent can qualify the absolute character of its immunity from
suit in those courts, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 414. The notion that
federal tolling of a state limitations period constitutes an abrogation of
state sovereign immunity as to claims against state defendants at least
raises a serious constitutional doubt. Thus, this Court has good rea-
son to rely on the statutory construction principle that Congress must
make its intention to alter the constitutional balance between the States
and the Federal Government unmistakably clear in the statute’s lan-
guage, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65. Section
1367(d)’s lack of clarity is apparent in two respects. With respect to
the claims covered, § 1367(d) reflects no specific or unequivocal intent
to toll the limitations period for claims asserted against nonconsent-
ing States, especially considering that such claims do not fall within
§ 1367(a)’s scope. With respect to the dismissals covered, § 1367(d)
occurs in the context of a statute that specifically contemplates only a
few grounds for dismissal, none based on the Eleventh Amendment.
Section 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for claims against non-
consenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but this
Court is looking for a clear statement of what the rule includes, not
what it excludes. Pp. 542–546.
(c) Petitioners argue that the tolling provision should be interpreted
to apply to their claims because it was enacted to prevent due process
violations caused by state claim preclusion and anti-claim-splitting laws.
However, since it is far from clear whether Congress intended tolling
to apply when claims against nonconsenting States were dismissed on
Eleventh Amendment grounds, it is not relevant whether Congress
acted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. And there is no
merit to petitioners’ claim that respondent consented to suit in federal
court, since it raised its Eleventh Amendment defense at the earliest

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535 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
opportunity by including that defense in its answers to the complaints.
Pp. 546–547.
620 N. W. 2d 680, affirmed.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 548.
Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 549.
Howard L. Bolter argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs was Eric Schnapper.
Mark B. Rotenberg argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Lorie S. Gildea and Tracy M.
Smith.
Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for
intervenor United States. With him on the brief were So-
licitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Mc-
Callum, Barbara McDowell, Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B.
Klein.*
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
In federal court, petitioners asserted state law claims
under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Maryland et al. by J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland,
Andrew Baida, Solicitor General, Robert H. Kono, Acting Attorney Gen-
eral of Guam, and Dan Schweitzer, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Ken Salazar
of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Dela-
ware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Steve
Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisi-
ana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jere-
miah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie
Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Betty D.
Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael
Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, John
Cornyn of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Ver-
mont, and Randolph Beales of Virginia; and for the National Conference
of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley.

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536 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Opinion of the Court
§ 1367 (1994 ed.), against respondent university, an arm of
the State of Minnesota. Those claims were dismissed on
Eleventh Amendment grounds, and petitioners refiled them
in state court past the period of limitations. The supple-
mental jurisdiction statute purports to toll the period of
limitations for supplemental claims while they are pending
in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed.
§ 1367(d). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that provi-
sion unconstitutional when applied to claims against noncon-
senting state defendants, such as respondent university, and
dismissed petitioners’ claims. We affirm the judgment on
the alternative ground that the tolling provision does not
apply to claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting
States.
I
In August 1995, petitioners Lance Raygor and James
Goodchild filed charges with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC). The charges alleged that their
employer, the University of Minnesota, discriminated against
them on the basis of age in December 1994 by attempting to
compel them to accept early retirement at the age of 52.
After petitioners refused to retire, the university allegedly
reclassified petitioners’ jobs so as to reduce their salaries.
App. to Pet. for Cert. A–45; Brief for Petitioners 3.
The EEOC cross-filed petitioners’ charges with the Minne-
sota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) and later issued
a right-to-sue letter on June 6, 1996, advising that petitioners
could file a lawsuit within 90 days under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V).
Brief for United States 5. The MDHR likewise issued
right-to-sue letters on July 17, 1996, advising petitioners that
they could file suit within 45 days under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat., ch. 363 (1991). 620
N. W. 2d 680, 681 (Minn. 2001); App. to Pet. for Cert. A–46
to A–47.

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537 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
On or about August 29, 1996, each petitioner filed a sepa-
rate complaint against respondent Board of Regents of the
University of Minnesota (hereinafter respondent), in the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.
620 N. W. 2d, at 681; App. to Pet. for Cert. A–41. Each
complaint alleged a federal cause of action under the ADEA
and a state cause of action under the MHRA. The suits
were subsequently consolidated. 604 N. W. 2d 128, 130
(Minn. App. 2000). Respondent filed answers to these com-
plaints in September 1996, setting forth eight affirmative
defenses, including that the suits were “ ‘barred in whole or
in part by Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.’ ”
Brief for Petitioners 4. The District Court entered a sched-
uling plan that the parties agreed upon. According to the
plan, discovery would finish by May 30, 1997, and dispositive
motions would be filed by July 15, 1997. Ibid. The parties
then engaged in discovery as well as mediation. Ibid.
In early July 1997, respondent filed its motion to dismiss
petitioners’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(1). Brief for Petitioners 5, n. 5. The motion
argued that the federal and state law claims were barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. Brief for Respondent Re-
gents of the University of Minnesota 5. Petitioners’ re-
sponse acknowledged respondent’s “ ‘potential Eleventh
Amendment immunity from state discrimination claims in
Federal Court,’ ” but urged the District Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims if the federal
claims were upheld. Brief for Petitioners 5–6. On July 11,
1997, the District Court granted respondent’s Rule 12(b)(1)
motion and dismissed all of petitioners’ claims. App. to Pet.
for Cert. A–39. Petitioners appealed, but the appeal was
stayed pending this Court’s decision in Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62 (2000). 620 N. W. 2d, at 682.
Kimel held that the “ADEA does not validly abrogate the
States’ sovereign immunity.” 528 U. S., at 92. Given that
result, petitioners moved to withdraw their appeal, and it

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538 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Opinion of the Court
was dismissed in January 2000. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682; Brief
for Petitioners 6–7.
In the meantime, approximately three weeks after the
Federal District Court had dismissed their state law claims,
petitioners refiled their state law claims in Hennepin County
District Court. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent’s answer
asserted that “ ‘plaintiff ’s claims are barred, in whole or in
part, by the applicable statute of limitations.’ ” Brief for
Petitioners 7. The state court initially stayed the lawsuit
because of the pending federal appeal, but lifted the stay in
December 1998 for the purpose of allowing respondent to
move for dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. 620
N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent moved for summary judgment
in February 1999, arguing that petitioners’ state claims were
barred by the applicable 45 day statute of limitations. See
Minn. Stat. §§ 363.06, subd. 3, 363.14, subd. 1(a)(1) (2000).
Respondent also argued that the tolling provision of the
federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367,
did not apply to toll the limitations period on the state law
claims while they were pending in federal court because the
Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction
over petitioners’ ADEA claims. Petitioners argued that the
tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction statute
applied because their state law claims had been dismissed
without prejudice. App. to Brief for Petitioners B–3, B–4.
The State District Court treated respondent’s motion for
summary judgment as a motion to dismiss and granted it,
holding that § 1367(d) did “not apply . . . because the federal
district court never had ‘original jurisdiction’ over the con-
troversy” since “both the state and federal claims were
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id., at
B–5, B–6.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court
first decided that the Federal District Court had original
jurisdiction over the case before respondent’s Eleventh
Amendment defense was “successfully asserted.” 604 N. W.

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539 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
2d, at 132 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht,
524 U. S. 381 (1998)). The court then held that § 1367(d)
applied to toll the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state
law claims because that provision “allows tolling of any claim
dismissed by a federal district court, whether dismissed on
Eleventh Amendment grounds or at the discretion of the
federal district court under [§ 1367](c).” 604 N. W. 2d, at
132–133.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The court
noted that respondent was an arm of the State, and found
that the federal tolling provision facially applied to petition-
ers’ state law claims. 620 N. W. 2d, at 684, 687. The court
concluded, however, “that application of section 1367(d) to
toll the statute of limitations applicable to state law claims
against an unconsenting state defendant first filed in fed-
eral court but then dismissed and brought in state court
is an impermissible denigration of [respondent’s] Eleventh
Amendment immunity.” Id., at 687. The court thus con-
cluded that § 1367(d) could not constitutionally apply to toll
the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state law claims,
and it dismissed those claims. We granted certiorari, 532
U. S. 1065 (2001), on the question whether 28 U. S. C.
§ 1367(d) is unconstitutional as applied to a state defendant.
II
In Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), this Court
held that federal courts deciding claims within their federal-
question subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, may
decide state law claims not within their subject matter juris-
diction if the federal and state law claims “derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact” and comprise “but one
constitutional ‘case.’ ” Mine Workers, supra, at 725. Juris-
diction over state law claims in such instances was known as
“pendent jurisdiction.” This Court later made clear that,
absent authorization from Congress, a district court could
not exercise pendent jurisdiction over claims involving par-

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540 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Opinion of the Court
ties who were not already parties to a claim independently
within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Finley
v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989).
In the wake of Finley, the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee recommended that “Congress expressly authorize federal
courts to hear any claim arising out of the same ‘transaction
or occurrence’ as a claim within federal jurisdiction, includ-
ing claims, within federal question jurisdiction, that require
the joinder of additional parties.” Report of Federal Courts
Study Committee 47 (Apr. 2, 1990). Soon thereafter, Con-
gress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U. S. C. § 1367, as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990. Subsection (a) of § 1367 states that
“[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as ex-
pressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any
civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that in-
volve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”
Subsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction
when the district court’s original jurisdiction is based only
on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Subsection (c) allows district
courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in cer-
tain situations, such as when a “claim raises a novel or com-
plex issue of State law.” § 1367(c)(1) (1994 ed.).
Petitioners originally sought to have their state law claims
heard in federal court as supplemental claims falling under
§ 1367(a). App. to Brief for Petitioners B–3. Prior to the
enactment of § 1367, however, this Court held that the Elev-
enth Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent state law

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541 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
claims against nonconsenting state defendants in federal
court. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halder-
man, 465 U. S. 89, 120 (1984). In that context, the Eleventh
Amendment was found to be an “explicit limitation on fed-
eral jurisdiction.” Id., at 118. Consequently, an express
grant of jurisdiction over such claims would be an abroga-
tion of the sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh
Amendment. Before Congress could attempt to do that, it
must make its intention to abrogate “ ‘unmistakably clear
in the language of the statute.’ ” Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U. S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)).
The most that can be said about subsection (a), how-
ever, is that it is a general grant of jurisdiction, no more
specific to claims against nonconsenting States than the one
at issue in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501
U. S. 775 (1991). There, we considered whether 28 U. S. C.
§ 1362 contained a clear statement of an intent to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. That grant of jurisdiction pro-
vides that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band
with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary
of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” (Emphasis added.)
Such a facially broad grant of jurisdiction over “all civil
actions” could be read to include claims by Indian tribes
against nonconsenting States, but we held that such lan-
guage was insufficient to constitute a clear statement of an
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Blatchford,
supra, at 786. Likewise, we cannot read § 1367(a) to author-
ize district courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims against
nonconsenting States, even though nothing in the statute ex-
pressly excludes such claims. Thus, consistent with Blatch-

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542 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Opinion of the Court
ford, we hold that § 1367(a)’s grant of jurisdiction does not
extend to claims against nonconsenting state defendants.
Even so, there remains the question whether § 1367(d) tolls
the statute of limitations for claims against nonconsenting
States that are asserted under § 1367(a) but subsequently
dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Subsection
(d) of § 1367 provides that
“[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under
subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action
that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after
the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be
tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30
days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for
a longer tolling period.”
On its face, subsection (d) purports to apply to dismissals of
“any claim asserted under subsection (a).” Ibid. (emphasis
added). Thus, it could be broadly read to apply to any claim
technically “asserted” under subsection (a) as long as it was
later dismissed, regardless of the reason for dismissal. But
reading subsection (d) to apply when state law claims against
nonconsenting States are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds raises serious doubts about the constitutionality of
the provision given principles of state sovereign immunity.
If subsection (d) applied in such circumstances, it would toll
the state statute of limitations for 30 days in addition to how-
ever long the claim had been pending in federal court. This
would require a State to defend against a claim in state court
that had never been filed in state court until some indetermi-
nate time after the original limitations period had elapsed.
When the sovereign at issue is the United States, we have
recognized that a limitations period may be “a central condi-
tion” of the sovereign’s waiver of immunity. United States
v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, 843 (1986); see also Block v. North
Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S.
273, 287 (1983) (“When waiver legislation contains a statute

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543 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condi-
tion on the waiver of sovereign immunity”). In suits against
the United States, however, there is a rebuttable presump-
tion that equitable tolling under federal law applies to waiv-
ers of the United States’ immunity. See Irwin v. Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990). From this,
the dissent argues that any broadening of a State’s waiver
of immunity through tolling under § 1367(d) presumptively
does not violate the State’s sovereign immunity. Post, at
552–553, and n. 11 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But this Court
has never held that waivers of a State’s immunity presump-
tively include all federal tolling rules, nor is it obvious that
such a presumption would be “a realistic assessment of legis-
lative intent.” Irwin, supra, at 95.
Moreover, with respect to suits against a state sovereign
in its own courts, we have explained that a State “may pre-
scribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be
sued,” Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858), and that
“[o]nly the sovereign’s own consent could qualify the abso-
lute character of [its] immunity” from suit in its own courts,
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 414 (1979). Thus, although
we have not directly addressed whether federal tolling of a
state statute of limitations constitutes an abrogation of state
sovereign immunity with respect to claims against state de-
fendants, we can say that the notion at least raises a serious
constitutional doubt.
Consequently, we have good reason to rely on a clear state-
ment principle of statutory construction. When “Congress
intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its inten-
tion to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the stat-
ute.’ ” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58,
65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero, supra, at 242). This prin-
ciple applies when Congress “intends to pre-empt the his-
toric powers of the States” or when it legislates in “ ‘tradi-
tionally sensitive areas’ ” that “ ‘affec[t] the federal balance.’ ”

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544 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Opinion of the Court
Will, supra, at 65 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S.
336, 349 (1971)). In such cases, the clear statement principle
reflects “an acknowledgment that the States retain substan-
tial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, pow-
ers with which Congress does not readily interfere.” Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461, 464 (1991).
Here, allowing federal law to extend the time period in
which a state sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts
at least affects the federal balance in an area that has been
a historic power of the States, whether or not it constitutes
an abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Thus, applying
the clear statement principle helps “ ‘assur[e] that the legisla-
ture has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the
critical matters involved in the judicial decision.’ ” Will,
supra, at 65 (quoting Bass, supra, at 349). This is obviously
important when the underlying issue raises a serious consti-
tutional doubt or problem. See Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 787
(2000) (relying in part on clear statement principle to decide
the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729–3733 (1994 ed.), did
not authorize “an action in federal court by a qui tam relator
against a State” and avoiding whether such a suit would vio-
late the Eleventh Amendment, an issue raising a serious con-
stitutional doubt); Gregory, supra, at 464 (relying on clear
statement principle to determine that state judges were ex-
cluded from the ADEA in order to “avoid a potential consti-
tutional problem” given the constraints on the Court’s “abil-
ity to consider the limits that the state-federal balance places
on Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause”).
The question then is whether § 1367(d) states a clear intent
to toll the limitations period for claims against nonconsenting
States that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
Here the lack of clarity is apparent in two respects. With
respect to the claims the tolling provision covers, one could
read § 1367(d) to cover any claim “asserted” under subsec-

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545 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
tion (a), but we have previously found similarly general lan-
guage insufficient to satisfy clear statement requirements.
For example, we have held that a statute providing civil rem-
edies for violations committed by “ ‘any recipient of Federal
assistance’ ” was “not the kind of unequivocal statutory lan-
guage sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment” even
when it was undisputed that a state defendant was a recipi-
ent of federal aid. Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 245–246 (quot-
ing 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982 ed.) (emphasis in original)).
Instead, we held that “[w]hen Congress chooses to subject
the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.”
473 U. S., at 246. Likewise, § 1367(d) reflects no specific or
unequivocal intent to toll the statute of limitations for claims
asserted against nonconsenting States, especially consider-
ing that such claims do not fall within the proper scope of
§ 1367(a) as explained above.
With respect to the dismissals the tolling provision cov-
ers, one could read § 1367(d) in isolation to authorize tolling
regardless of the reason for dismissal, but § 1367(d) occurs in
the context of a statute that specifically contemplates only a
few grounds for dismissal. The requirements of § 1367(a)
make clear that a claim will be subject to dismissal if it
fails to “form part of the same case or controversy” as a
claim within the district court’s original jurisdiction. Like-
wise, § 1367(b) entails that certain claims will be subject to
dismissal if exercising jurisdiction over them would be “in-
consistent” with 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V).
Finally, § 1367(c) (1994 ed.) lists four specific situations in
which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a particular claim. Given that particular
context, it is unclear if the tolling provision was meant to
apply to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute,
such as dismissals on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See
Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809
(1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction

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546 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Opinion of the Court
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”).
In sum, although § 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for
claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, we are looking for a clear statement
of what the rule includes, not a clear statement of what it
excludes. See Gregory, supra, at 467. Section 1367(d) fails
this test. As such, we will not read § 1367(d) to apply to
dismissals of claims against nonconsenting States dismissed
on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
In anticipation of this result, petitioners argue that the
tolling provision should be interpreted to apply to their
claims because Congress enacted it to prevent due process
violations caused by state claim preclusion and anti-claim-
splitting laws. Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief for
Petitioners 5–12. In other words, petitioners contend that
Congress enacted the tolling provision to enforce the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against per-
ceived state violations. We have previously addressed the
argument that if a statute were passed pursuant to Con-
gress’ § 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, fed-
eralism concerns “might carry less weight.” Gregory, 501
U. S., at 468. We concluded, however, that “the Fourteenth
Amendment does not override all principles of federalism,”
id., at 469, and held that insofar as statutory intent was
ambiguous, we would “not attribute to Congress an intent
to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of
whether Congress acted pursuant to . . . § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id., at 470. That same rule applies here.
As already demonstrated, it is far from clear whether Con-
gress intended tolling to apply when claims against non-
consenting States were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds. Thus, it is not relevant whether Congress acted
pursuant to § 5.
Petitioners also argue that our construction of the statute
does not resolve their case because respondent consented to

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547 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
suit in federal court. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2–4. We
have stated that “[a] sovereign’s immunity may be waived”
and have “held that a State may consent to suit against it in
federal court.” Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 99 (citing Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883)). Petitioners claim that
respondent consented to suit by not moving to dismiss peti-
tioners’ state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds
until July 1997, some 10 months after the federal lawsuits
were filed in August 1996. Yet respondent raised its Elev-
enth Amendment defense at the earliest possible opportunity
by including that defense in its answers that were filed in
September 1996. Given that, we cannot say that respondent
“unequivocally expressed” a consent to be sued in federal
court. Pennhurst, supra, at 99 (citing Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974)). The fact that respondent filed its
motion in July 1997 is as consistent with adherence to the
pretrial schedule as it is with anything else.
Indeed, such circumstances are readily distinguishable
from the limited situations where this Court has found a
State consented to suit, such as when a State voluntarily
invoked federal court jurisdiction or otherwise “ma[de] a
‘clear declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to our ju-
risdiction.” College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 676 (1999). And
even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that
consent could be inferred “from the failure to raise the objec-
tion at the outset of the proceedings,” Wisconsin Dept. of
Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S., at 395 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring)—a standard this Court has not adopted—consent
would still not be found here since respondent raised the
issue in its answer. Thus, we find no merit to petitioners’
argument that respondent was a consenting state defend-
ant during the federal court proceedings. We express no
view on the application or constitutionality of § 1367(d)
when a State consents to suit or when a defendant is not a
State.

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548 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Opinion of Ginsburg, J.
III
We hold that respondent never consented to suit in federal
court on petitioners’ state law claims and that § 1367(d) does
not toll the period of limitations for state law claims asserted
against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed
on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Therefore, § 1367(d) did
not operate to toll the period of limitations for petitioners’
claims, and we affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court dismissing those claims.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I join the Court’s judgment and its opinion in princi-
pal part. I agree with the decision’s twin rulings. First,
prevailing precedent supports the view that, in the absence
of a clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate
the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1367(a)’s extension of federal jurisdiction does not reach
claims against nonconsenting state defendants. See ante,
at 540–542. Second, absent “affirmative indicatio[n]” by
Congress, see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 787 (2000),
§ 1367(d)’s tolling provision does not reach claims “asserted,”
but not maintainable, under § 1367(a) against nonconsenting
state defendants. See ante, at 542–545.
The pathmarking decision, it appears to me, is Vermont
Agency.1 There, the Court declined to read the word
“person,” for purposes of qui tam liability, to include a non-
consenting State. Bolstering the Court’s conclusion in Ver-
mont Agency were the two reinforcements pivotal here:
1 This Court’s majority, in contrast to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
does not invoke Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706 (1999), in support of today’s
decision. I joined the dissent in Alden and, in a suitable case, would join
a call to reexamine that decision. Cf. post, at 554–555 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

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549 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Stevens, J., dissenting
first, “ ‘the ordinary rule of statutory construction’ that ‘if
Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance
between States and the Federal Government, it must make
its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute,’ ” 529 U. S., at 787 (quoting Will v. Michi-
gan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989)); and sec-
ond, “the doctrine that statutes should be construed so as to
avoid difficult constitutional questions,” 529 U. S., at 787. I
would not venture further into the mist surrounding § 1367
to inquire, generally, whether § 1367(d) “appl[ies] to dismiss-
als for reasons unmentioned by the statute,” ante, at 545.2
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and
Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
The federal interest in the fair and efficient administration
of justice is both legitimate and important. To vindicate
that interest federal rulemakers and judges have occasion-
ally imposed burdens on the States and their judiciaries.
Thus, for example, Congress may provide for the adjudica-
tion of federal claims in state courts, Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S.
386 (1947), and may direct that state litigation be stayed dur-
ing the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings, 11 U. S. C.
§ 362(a). In appropriate cases federal judges may enjoin the
prosecution of state judicial proceedings.1 By virtue of the
Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Constitution, in all
such cases the federal rules prevail “and the Judges in every
2 The supplemental jurisdiction statute, well-reasoned commentary indi-
cates, “is clearly flawed and needs repair.” Oakley, Prospectus for the
American Law Institute’s Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U. C.
D. L. Rev. 855, 936 (1998); see generally id., at 936–945 (canvassing prob-
lems with 28 U. S. C. § 1367). For a proposed repair of § 1367, see ALI,
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project (Tent. Draft No. 2, Apr. 14, 1998).
1 The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2283 (1994 ed.), provides:
“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.”

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550 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Stevens, J., dissenting
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
The “supplemental jurisdiction” provisions of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1994 ed.), im-
pose a lesser burden on the States than each of these exam-
ples, and do so only in a relatively narrow category of cases—
those in which both federal- and state-law claims are so re-
lated “that they form part of the same case or controversy.”
Adopting a recommendation of the Federal Courts Commit-
tee, Congress in § 1367(a) overruled our misguided decision
in Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989), and expressly
authorized federal courts to entertain such cases even when
the state-law claim is against a party over whom there is no
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.2
Subsection (d) of § 1367 responds to the risk that the plain-
tiff ’s state-law claim, even though timely when filed as a
part of the federal lawsuit, may be dismissed after the state
period of limitations has expired. To avoid the necessity
of duplicate filings, it provides that the state statute shall
be tolled while the claim is pending in federal court and for
30 days thereafter.3 The impact of this provision on the de-
fendant is minimal, because the timely filing in federal court
provides it with the same notice as if a duplicate complaint
had also been filed in state court.
2 Title 28 U. S. C. § 1367(a) provides:
“Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the join-
der or intervention of additional parties.”
3 Section 1367(d) provides:
“The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . .
shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after
it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.”

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551 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Stevens, J., dissenting
The tolling of statutes of limitations is, of course, an an-
cient 4 and widespread practice.5 Some federal tolling stat-
utes apply only to federal limitations periods,6 but others
apply to state statutes as well.7 All of these statutes are
broadly worded, and none of them excludes any special cate-
gory of defendants. The plain text of all these statutes, in-
4 When an equity bill was dismissed to permit the commencement of an
action at law, it was the practice of the English courts to consider the
statute of limitations tolled during the pendency of the suit in equity.
See, e. g., Anonimous, 1 Vern. 73, 73–74, 23 Eng. Rep. 320, 320–321 (Ch.
1682) (“[I]f a man sued in Chancery, and pending the suit here, the statute
of limitations attached on his demand, and his bill was afterwards dis-
missed, as being a matter properly determinable at common law: in such
case . . . [the court] would not suffer the statute to be pleaded in bar to
his demand”); see also Sturt v. Mellish, 2 Atk. 610, 615, 26 Eng. Rep. 765,
767 (Ch. 1743); MacKenzie v. Marquis of Powis, 7 Brown 282, 288, 3 Eng.
Rep. 183, 187 (H. L. 1737).
5 Equitable tolling is a background rule that informs our construction of
federal statutes of limitations, Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397
(1946), including those statutes conditioning the Federal Government’s
waiver of immunity to suit, Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498
U. S. 89, 95–96 (1990) (“[T]he same rebuttable presumption of equitable
tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to
suits against the United States”). The rule also is generally applied by
state courts, such as the Minnesota courts adjudicating claims under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). See, e. g., Ochs v. Streater, Inc.,
568 N. W. 2d 858, 860 (Minn. App. 1997).
6 See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iv) (tolling an alien’s period of unlaw-
ful presence in the United States during certain immigration proceedings);
28 U. S. C. § 2263(b) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (tolling the statute of limitations
on filing for habeas corpus relief); 29 U. S. C. § 1854(f) (1994 ed., Supp. V)
(tolling the statute of limitations on actions for bodily injury or death to
a migrant farmworker).
7 See, e. g., 11 U. S. C. § 108 (tolling during bankruptcy); 50 U. S. C. App.
§ 525 (1994 ed.) (Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940) (tolling
during military service); 15 U. S. C. § 6606(e)(4) (Y2K Act) (tolling during
notice and remediation period for Year 2000 related claims); cf. 42 U. S. C.
§ 9658 (1994 ed.) (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980) (setting uniform limitations-period commence-
ment date in suits under state law for damages due to hazardous release
exposure).

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552 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Stevens, J., dissenting
cluding § 1367, applies to cases in which a State, or an arm
of a State, is named as a defendant. Thus, as the Minnesota
Court of Appeals correctly held, “the plain language of sub-
section (d) allows tolling of any claim dismissed by a federal
district court, whether dismissed on Eleventh Amendment
grounds or at the discretion of the federal district court
under subsection (c).” 8
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, because it consid-
ered this Court’s holding in Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706
(1999), to compel the view that § 1367(d) was an invalid at-
tempt by Congress to make the State of Minnesota subject
to suit in state court without its consent.9 Unlike the State
in Alden, however, Minnesota has given its consent to be
sued in its own courts for alleged violations of the MHRA
within 45 days of receipt of a notice letter from the State
Department of Human Rights. The question whether that
timeliness condition may be tolled during the pendency of an
action filed in federal court within the 45-day period is quite
different from the question whether Congress can entirely
abrogate the State’s sovereign immunity defense. For the
Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence concerns the
question whether an unconsenting sovereign may be sued,
rather than when a consenting sovereign may be sued.
The Court recognized this crucial distinction in Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), a case
in which the application of equitable tolling to a waiver of
federal sovereign immunity was at issue. Although the
Court required the Government’s assent as to whether it
may be sued to be “unequivocally expressed,” it presumed
the rule of equitable tolling applied once assent was estab-
lished because tolling would “amoun[t] to little, if any, broad-
ening of the congressional waiver.” Id., at 95. The Court
8 604 N. W. 2d 128, 132–133 (2000).
9 See 620 N. W. 2d 680, 686 (2001) (“[W]e read Alden to require that the
University’s waiver of immunity be limited to the [45-day limitations
period]”).

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553 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Stevens, J., dissenting
reached this holding despite the inclusion in the waiver pro-
vision of a limitations period shorter than the one for suits
against private parties.
The waiver at issue in this case is more unequivocally
expressed than the one in Irwin. Minnesota has consented
to suit under the MHRA by agreeing to be treated in the
same manner as a private employer.10 The 45-day limita-
tions period is thus applicable to any suit under the MHRA,
not only those against state entities. In light of such a clear
consent to suit, unencumbered by any special limitations
period, it is evident that tolling under § 1367(d) similarly
“amounts to little, if any, broadening of the [legislature’s]
waiver.” 11 Ibid. Given the fact that the timely filing in
Federal Court served the purposes of the 45-day period,12 it
10 See Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subds. 17 and 28 (2000) (defining “employer”
to include private entities and “the state and its departments, agencies,
and political subdivisions”).
11 It is true enough that we “ha[ve] never held that waivers of a State’s
immunity presumptively include all federal tolling rules,” ante, at 543.
Of course, we have never held to the contrary, either. But surely our
federal sovereign immunity cases shed great light on the question, given
our similarly strict analyses of waivers in federal and state sovereign im-
munity cases. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecond-
ary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 682 (1999) (“[I]n the context of federal
sovereign immunity—obviously the closest analogy to the present case—
it is well established that waivers are not implied. . . . We see no reason
why the rule should be different with respect to state sovereign immu-
nity” (citation omitted)).
As the Court observes, ante, at 542–543, our federal sovereign immunity
cases recognize that a limitations period may serve as a central condition
of waiver. The teaching of Irwin, however, is that even when a limita-
tions period is a “condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus
must be strictly construed,” 498 U. S., at 94, application of tolling to that
period is presumptively permissible. I can “see no reason why the rule
should be different with respect to state sovereign immunity.” College
Savings Bank, 527 U. S., at 682.
12 The university received notice of the claim and was able to take part
fully in the prosecution of the litigation by engaging in extensive discovery
and participating in mediation.

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554 RAYGOR v. REGENTS OF UNIV. OF MINN.
Stevens, J., dissenting
seems to me quite clear that the application of the tolling
rule does not raise a serious constitutional issue.13
It is true, of course, that the federal tolling provision, like
any other federal statute that pre-empts state law, “affects
the federal balance” even though it does not “constitut[e]
an abrogation of state sovereign immunity.” Ante, at 544.
But that consequence is surely not sufficient to exclude state
parties from the coverage of statutes of general applicability
like the Bankruptcy Code, the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Re-
lief Act of 1940, or any other federal statute whose general
language creates a conflict with a pre-existing rule of state
law.14 In my judgment, the specific holding in Alden v.
Maine represented a serious distortion of the federal balance
intended by the Framers of our Constitution. If that case
is now to provide the basis for a rule of construction that will
exempt state parties from the coverage of federal statutes of
general applicability, whether or not abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity is at stake, it will foster unintended
and unjust consequences and impose serious burdens on an
already-overworked Congress.15 Indeed, that risk provides
13 Indeed, as an alternative basis for its decision, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals concluded that equitable tolling was appropriate. See 604
N. W. 2d, at 133–134. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not disagree
with the conclusion that equitable tolling was permissible, but rather
found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal of such tolling.
See 620 N. W. 2d, at 687.
14 See, e. g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
(finding pre-emption of common-law tort action by National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U. S. 833 (1997)
(finding pre-emption of state community property laws by Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974).
15 It may also impose serious burdens on already-overworked state
courts. Claims brought under state antidiscrimination statutes such as
the MHRA, for example, will often be bound up with claims under similar
federal statutes, such as 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V); Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp.
V); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U. S. C.
§ 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). The state courts have concurrent

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555 Cite as: 534 U. S. 533 (2002)
Stevens, J., dissenting
an additional reason for reexamining that misguided decision
at the earliest opportunity.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
jurisdiction over these federal statutes. Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131,
139 (1988) (§ 1983); Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U. S. 820
(1990) (Title VII); 29 U. S. C. § 626(c)(1) (ADEA). As a result of the
Court’s reading of § 1367(d), many litigants with such mixed claims against
state entities may decide to file their entire suits in state court. By doing
so, they avoid the cost and confusion of duplicate filings. They also elimi-
nate the risk that a time bar will attach to a claim dismissed from federal
court on Eleventh Amendment grounds, which might occur even when, as
in this case, Eleventh Amendment immunity was not evident at the time
the suit was filed. Thus, in attempting to preserve the “balance between
the States and the Federal Government,” ante, at 543, the Court risks
upending that balance by removing from the state courts the assistance
of the federal courts in adjudicating many claims.

Job: 534ORD Take: NOT1 Date/Time: 03-22-03 09:04:50
Reporter’s Note
The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 555
and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita-
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.