GOOD NEWS CLUB et al. v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL

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Syllabus
GOOD NEWS CLUB et al. v. MILFORD
CENTRAL SCHOOL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 99–2036. Argued February 28, 2001—Decided June 11, 2001
Under New York law, respondent Milford Central School (Milford) enacted
a policy authorizing district residents to use its building after school
for, among other things, (1) instruction in education, learning, or the
arts and (2) social, civic, recreational, and entertainment uses pertain-
ing to the community welfare. Stephen and Darleen Fournier, district
residents eligible to use the school’s facilities upon approval of their
proposed use, are sponsors of the Good News Club, a private Christian
organization for children ages 6 to 12. Pursuant to Milford’s policy,
they submitted a request to hold the Club’s weekly afterschool meet-
ings in the school. Milford denied the request on the ground that the
proposed use—to sing songs, hear Bible lessons, memorize scripture,
and pray—was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the
community use policy. Petitioners (collectively, the Club), filed suit
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the denial of the Club’s
application violated its free speech rights under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. The District Court ultimately granted Milford
summary judgment, finding the Club’s subject matter to be religious
in nature, not merely a discussion of secular matters from a religious
perspective that Milford otherwise permits. Because the school had
not allowed other groups providing religious instruction to use its
limited public forum, the court held that it could deny the Club ac-
cess without engaging in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
In affirming, the Second Circuit rejected the Club’s contention that
Milford’s restriction was unreasonable, and held that, because the Club’s
subject matter was quintessentially religious and its activities fell
outside the bounds of pure moral and character development, Milford’s
policy was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination.
Held:
1. Milford violated the Club’s free speech rights when it excluded the
Club from meeting after hours at the school. Pp. 106–112.
(a) Because the parties so agree, this Court assumes that Milford
operates a limited public forum. A State establishing such a forum is
not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of

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speech. It may be justified in reserving its forum for certain groups
or the discussion of certain topics. E. g., Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829. The power to so restrict
speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must not dis-
criminate against speech based on viewpoint, ibid., and must be rea-
sonable in light of the forum’s purpose, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806. Pp. 106–107.
(b) By denying the Club access to the school’s limited public forum
on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, Milford discrimi-
nated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation
of the Free Speech Clause. That exclusion is indistinguishable from
the exclusions held violative of the Clause in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, where a school district
precluded a private group from presenting films at the school based
solely on the religious perspective of the films, and in Rosenberger,
where a university refused to fund a student publication because it
addressed issues from a religious perspective. The only apparent dif-
ference between the activities of Lamb’s Chapel and the Club is the
inconsequential distinction that the Club teaches moral lessons from a
Christian perspective through live storytelling and prayer, whereas
Lamb’s Chapel taught lessons through films. Rosenberger also is dis-
positive: Given the obvious religious content of the publication there
at issue, it cannot be said that the Club’s activities are any more
“religious” or deserve any less Free Speech Clause protection. This
Court disagrees with the Second Circuit’s view that something that
is quintessentially religious or decidedly religious in nature cannot
also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and char-
acter development from a particular viewpoint. What matters for Free
Speech Clause purposes is that there is no logical difference in kind
between the invocation of Christianity by the Club and the invocation
of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other associations to provide a
foundation for their lessons. Because Milford’s restriction is viewpoint
discriminatory, the Court need not decide whether it is unreasonable
in light of the forum’s purposes. Pp. 107–112.
2. Permitting the Club to meet on the school’s premises would not
have violated the Establishment Clause. Establishment Clause de-
fenses similar to Milford’s were rejected in Lamb’s Chapel, supra, at
395—where the Court found that, because the films would not have been
shown during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the
school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church
members, there was no realistic danger that the community would
think that the district was endorsing religion—and in Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U. S. 263, 272–273, and n. 13—where a university’s forum was

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100 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
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already available to other groups. Because the Club’s activities are
materially indistinguishable from those in Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar,
Milford’s reliance on the Establishment Clause is unavailing. As in
Lamb’s Chapel, the Club’s meetings were to be held after school hours,
not sponsored by the school, and open to any student who obtained pa-
rental consent, not just to Club members. As in Widmar, Milford made
its forum available to other organizations. The Court rejects Milford’s
attempt to distinguish those cases by emphasizing that its policy in-
volves elementary school children who will perceive that the school
is endorsing the Club and will feel coerced to participate because the
Club’s activities take place on school grounds, even though they occur
during nonschool hours. That argument is unpersuasive for a number
of reasons. (1) Allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would
ensure, not threaten, neutrality toward religion. Accordingly, Mil-
ford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment Clause
compels it to exclude the Club. See, e. g., Rosenberger, supra, at 839.
(2) To the extent the Court considers whether the community would feel
coercive pressure to engage in the Club’s activities, cf. Lee v. Weisman,
505 U. S. 577, 592–593, the relevant community is the parents who
choose whether their children will attend Club meetings, not the chil-
dren themselves. (3) Whatever significance it may have assigned in
the Establishment Clause context to the suggestion that elementary
school children are more impressionable than adults, cf., e. g., id., at
592, the Court has never foreclosed private religious conduct during
nonschool hours merely because it takes place on school premises where
elementary school children may be present. Lee, supra, at 592, and
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 584, distinguished. (4) Even if
the Court were to consider the possible misperceptions by school-
children in deciding whether there is an Establishment Clause viola-
tion, the facts of this case simply do not support Milford’s conclusion.
Finally, it cannot be said that the danger that children would mis-
perceive the endorsement of religion is any greater than the danger
that they would perceive a hostility toward the religious viewpoint
if the Club were excluded from the public forum. Because it is not
convinced that there is any significance to the possibility that ele-
mentary school children may witness the Club’s activities on school
premises, the Court can find no reason to depart from Lamb’s Chapel
and Widmar. Pp. 112–119.
3. Because Milford has not raised a valid Establishment Clause claim,
this Court does not address whether such a claim could excuse Milford’s
viewpoint discrimination. Pp. 113, 120.
202 F. 3d 502, reversed and remanded.

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Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and in which
Breyer, JJ., joined in part. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, post,
p. 120. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 127. Ste-
vens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 130. Souter, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 134.
Thomas Marcelle argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were John W. Whitehead and Steven H.
Aden.
Frank W. Miller argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Benjamin J. Ferrara and Norman
H. Gross.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ala-
bama et al. by Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, Margaret L.
Fleming, John J. Park, Jr., and Charles B. Campbell, Assistant Attorneys
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as fol-
lows: Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Mike
Moore of Mississippi, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Betty D. Montgomery of
Ohio, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Paul G. Summers of Tennes-
see, John Cornyn of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, and Mark L. Earley of
Virginia; for the American Center for Law & Justice et al. by Jay Alan
Sekulow, Colby M. May, James M. Henderson, Sr., Walter M. Weber, Paul
D. Clement, and Jeffrey S. Bucholtz; for Child Evangelism Fellowship,
Inc., et al. by Herbert G. Grey, Darren C. Walker, Gregory S. Baylor, and
Kimberlee Wood Colby; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Carl H.
Esbeck and Nathan J. Diament; for the Liberty Legal Institute by Viet
D. Dinh, John L. Carter, and Kelly Shackelford; for the National Council
of Churches et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Gene C. Schaerr, and Nicholas P.
Miller; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs by
Nathan Lewin, Dennis Rapps, and David Zwiebel; for the Northstar
Legal Center et al. by Jordan W. Lorence and Joseph Infranco; for the
Solidarity Center for Law and Justice, P. C., by James P. Kelly III; for
Wallbuilders, Inc., by Barry C. Hodge; for Sally Campbell by Brett M.
Kavanaugh and Stuart J. Roth; for Carol Hood by Kevin J. Hasson, Eric
W. Treene, Roman P. Storzer, and Anthony R. Picarello, Jr.; for Douglas
Laycock by Mr. Laycock, pro se; and for 20 Theologians and Scholars of
Religion by Michael W. McConnell and Steffen N. Johnson.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Jewish Congress by Mark D. Stern; for Americans United for Separation

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102 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents two questions. The first question is
whether Milford Central School violated the free speech
rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club
from meeting after hours at the school. The second ques-
tion is whether any such violation is justified by Milford’s
concern that permitting the Club’s activities would violate
the Establishment Clause. We conclude that Milford’s re-
striction violates the Club’s free speech rights and that no
Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation.
I
The State of New York authorizes local school boards
to adopt regulations governing the use of their school facili-
ties. In particular, N. Y. Educ. Law § 414 (McKinney 2000)
enumerates several purposes for which local boards may
open their schools to public use. In 1992, respondent Mil-
ford Central School (Milford) enacted a community use policy
adopting seven of § 414’s purposes for which its building
could be used after school. App. to Pet. for Cert. D1–D3.
Two of the stated purposes are relevant here. First, district
residents may use the school for “instruction in any branch
of education, learning or the arts.” Id., at D1. Second, the
school is available for “social, civic and recreational meetings
and entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the
welfare of the community, provided that such uses shall
be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general public.”
Ibid.
of Church and State et al. by Ayesha N. Khan, Steven K. Green, Steven R.
Shapiro, Jerome J. Shestack, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Eddie Tabash, Arthur N.
Eisenberg, and Judith E. Schaeffer; for the Anti-Defamation League et al.
by Jeffrey R. Babbin, David B. Isbell, Martin E. Karlinsky, and Steven
M. Freeman; for the National School Boards Association et al. by Julie K.
Underwood; and for the New York State School Boards Association, Inc.,
by Jay Worona, Pilar Sokol, and John A. Miller.

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Stephen and Darleen Fournier reside within Milford’s dis-
trict and therefore are eligible to use the school’s facilities
as long as their proposed use is approved by the school.
Together they are sponsors of the local Good News Club,
a private Christian organization for children ages 6 to 12.
Pursuant to Milford’s policy, in September 1996 the Four-
niers submitted a request to Dr. Robert McGruder, interim
superintendent of the district, in which they sought per-
mission to hold the Club’s weekly afterschool meetings in
the school cafeteria. App. in No. 98–9494 (CA2), p. A–81.
The next month, McGruder formally denied the Fourniers’
request on the ground that the proposed use—to have “a fun
time of singing songs, hearing a Bible lesson and memorizing
scripture,” ibid.—was “the equivalent of religious worship.”
App. H1–H2. According to McGruder, the community use
policy, which prohibits use “by any individual or organiza-
tion for religious purposes,” foreclosed the Club’s activities.
App. to Pet. for Cert. D2.
In response to a letter submitted by the Club’s counsel,
Milford’s attorney requested information to clarify the na-
ture of the Club’s activities. The Club sent a set of ma-
terials used or distributed at the meetings and the following
description of its meeting:
“The Club opens its session with Ms. Fournier taking
attendance. As she calls a child’s name, if the child
recites a Bible verse the child receives a treat. After
attendance, the Club sings songs. Next Club mem-
bers engage in games that involve, inter alia, learning
Bible verses. Ms. Fournier then relates a Bible story
and explains how it applies to Club members’ lives.
The Club closes with prayer. Finally, Ms. Fournier dis-
tributes treats and the Bible verses for memorization.”
App. in No. 98–9494 (CA2), at A–30.
McGruder and Milford’s attorney reviewed the materials
and concluded that “the kinds of activities proposed to be

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engaged in by the Good News Club were not a discussion
of secular subjects such as child rearing, development of
character and development of morals from a religious per-
spective, but were in fact the equivalent of religious in-
struction itself.” Id., at A–25. In February 1997, the Mil-
ford Board of Education adopted a resolution rejecting the
Club’s request to use Milford’s facilities “for the purpose
of conducting religious instruction and Bible study.” Id.,
at A–56.
In March 1997, petitioners, the Good News Club, Ms. Four-
nier, and her daughter Andrea Fournier (collectively, the
Club), filed an action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983, against Milford in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York. The Club alleged
that Milford’s denial of its application violated its free speech
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, its
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and its right to religious freedom under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000bb et seq.1
The Club moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent
the school from enforcing its religious exclusion policy
against the Club and thereby to permit the Club’s use of
the school facilities. On April 14, 1997, the District Court
granted the injunction. The Club then held its weekly
afterschool meetings from April 1997 until June 1998 in a
high school resource and middle school special education
room. App. N12.
In August 1998, the District Court vacated the prelimi-
nary injunction and granted Milford’s motion for summary
judgment. 21 F. Supp. 2d 147 (NDNY 1998). The court
found that the Club’s “subject matter is decidedly religious
in nature, and not merely a discussion of secular matters
1 The District Court dismissed the Club’s claim under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act because we held the Act to be unconstitutional
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997). See 21 F. Supp. 2d 147,
150, n. 4 (NDNY 1998).

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from a religious perspective that is otherwise permitted
under [Milford’s] use policies.” Id., at 154. Because the
school had not permitted other groups that provided reli-
gious instruction to use its limited public forum, the court
held that the school could deny access to the Club with-
out engaging in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
The court also rejected the Club’s equal protection claim.
The Club appealed, and a divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
202 F. 3d 502 (2000). First, the court rejected the Club’s
contention that Milford’s restriction against allowing reli-
gious instruction in its facilities is unreasonable. Second,
it held that, because the subject matter of the Club’s ac-
tivities is “quintessentially religious,” id., at 510, and the
activities “fall outside the bounds of pure ‘moral and char-
acter development,’ ” id., at 511, Milford’s policy of excluding
the Club’s meetings was constitutional subject discrimina-
tion, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Judge
Jacobs filed a dissenting opinion in which he concluded that
the school’s restriction did constitute viewpoint discrimi-
nation under Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993).
There is a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the
question whether speech can be excluded from a limited pub-
lic forum on the basis of the religious nature of the speech.
Compare Gentala v. Tucson, 244 F. 3d 1065 (CA9 2001)
(en banc) (holding that a city properly refused National Day
of Prayer organizers’ application to the city’s civic events
fund for coverage of costs for city services); Campbell v.
St. Tammany’s School Bd., 206 F. 3d 482 (CA5 2000) (holding
that a school’s policy against permitting religious instruction
in its limited public forum did not constitute viewpoint dis-
crimination), cert. pending, No. 00–1194;* Bronx Household
of Faith v. Community School Dist. No. 10, 127 F. 3d 207
(CA2 1997) (concluding that a ban on religious services and
*[Reporter’s Note: See post, p. 913.]

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instruction in the limited public forum was constitutional),
with Church on the Rock v. Albuquerque, 84 F. 3d 1273
(CA10 1996) (holding that a city’s denial of permission to
show the film Jesus in a senior center was unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination); and Good News/Good Sports Club
v. School Dist. of Ladue, 28 F. 3d 1501 (CA8 1994) (holding
unconstitutional a school use policy that prohibited Good
News Club from meeting during times when the Boy Scouts
could meet). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.
531 U. S. 923 (2000).
II
The standards that we apply to determine whether a State
has unconstitutionally excluded a private speaker from use
of a public forum depend on the nature of the forum. See
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S.
37, 44 (1983). If the forum is a traditional or open pub-
lic forum, the State’s restrictions on speech are subject to
stricter scrutiny than are restrictions in a limited public
forum. Id., at 45–46. We have previously declined to de-
cide whether a school district’s opening of its facilities pur-
suant to N. Y. Educ. Law § 414 creates a limited or a tradi-
tional public forum. See Lamb’s Chapel, supra, at 391–392.
Because the parties have agreed that Milford created a lim-
ited public forum when it opened its facilities in 1992, see
Brief for Petitioners 15–17; Brief for Respondent 26, we need
not resolve the issue here. Instead, we simply will assume
that Milford operates a limited public forum.
When the State establishes a limited public forum, the
State is not required to and does not allow persons to en-
gage in every type of speech. The State may be justified
“in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discus-
sion of certain topics.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829 (1995); see also Lamb’s
Chapel, supra, at 392–393. The State’s power to restrict
speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must
not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint,

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Rosenberger, supra, at 829, and the restriction must be “rea-
sonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,” Corne-
lius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S.
788, 806 (1985).
III
Applying this test, we first address whether the exclu-
sion constituted viewpoint discrimination. We are guided
in our analysis by two of our prior opinions, Lamb’s Chapel
and Rosenberger. In Lamb’s Chapel, we held that a school
district violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment when it excluded a private group from presenting films
at the school based solely on the films’ discussions of family
values from a religious perspective. Likewise, in Rosen-
berger, we held that a university’s refusal to fund a student
publication because the publication addressed issues from
a religious perspective violated the Free Speech Clause.
Concluding that Milford’s exclusion of the Good News Club
based on its religious nature is indistinguishable from the
exclusions in these cases, we hold that the exclusion con-
stitutes viewpoint discrimination. Because the restriction
is viewpoint discriminatory, we need not decide whether
it is unreasonable in light of the purposes served by the
forum.2
2 Although Milford argued below that, under § 414, it could not permit
its property to be used for the purpose of religious activity, see Brief
for Appellee in No. 98–9494 (CA2), p. 12, here it merely asserts in one
sentence that it has, “in accordance with state law, closed [its] limited
open forum to purely religious instruction and services,” Brief for Re-
spondent 27. Because Milford does not elaborate, it is difficult to dis-
cern whether it is arguing that it is required by state law to exclude the
Club’s activities.
Before the Court of Appeals, Milford cited Trietley v. Board of Ed.
of Buffalo, 65 App. Div. 2d 1, 409 N. Y. S. 2d 912 (1978), in which a New
York court held that a local school district could not permit a student
Bible club to meet on school property because “[r]eligious purposes are
not included in the enumerated purposes for which a school may be used
under section 414 of the Education Law.” Id., at 5–6, 409 N. Y. S. 2d,

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Milford has opened its limited public forum to activities
that serve a variety of purposes, including events “per-
taining to the welfare of the community.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. D1. Milford interprets its policy to permit discus-
sions of subjects such as child rearing, and of “the de-
velopment of character and morals from a religious per-
spective.” Brief for Appellee in No. 98–9494 (CA2), p. 6.
For example, this policy would allow someone to use Aesop’s
Fables to teach children moral values. App. N11. Addi-
tionally, a group could sponsor a debate on whether there
should be a constitutional amendment to permit prayer in
public schools, id., at N6, and the Boy Scouts could meet
“to influence a boy’s character, development and spiritual
growth,” id., at N10–N11. In short, any group that “pro-
mote[s] the moral and character development of children”
is eligible to use the school building. Brief for Appellee in
No. 98–9494 (CA2), at 9.
Just as there is no question that teaching morals and
character development to children is a permissible pur-
pose under Milford’s policy, it is clear that the Club teaches
morals and character development to children. For exam-
ple, no one disputes that the Club instructs children to over-
come feelings of jealousy, to treat others well regardless
of how they treat the children, and to be obedient, even if
it does so in a nonsecular way. Nonetheless, because Mil-
ford found the Club’s activities to be religious in nature—
“the equivalent of religious instruction itself,” 202 F. 3d,
at 507—it excluded the Club from use of its facilities.
at 915. Although the court conceded that the Bible clubs might provide
incidental secular benefits, it nonetheless concluded that the school would
have violated the Establishment Clause had it permitted the club’s activi-
ties on campus. Because we hold that the exclusion of the Club on the
basis of its religious perspective constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination, it is no defense for Milford that purely religious purposes
can be excluded under state law.

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Applying Lamb’s Chapel,3 we find it quite clear that Mil-
ford engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it excluded
the Club from the afterschool forum. In Lamb’s Chapel, the
local New York school district similarly had adopted § 414’s
“social, civic or recreational use” category as a permitted use
in its limited public forum. The district also prohibited use
“by any group for religious purposes.” 508 U. S., at 387.
Citing this prohibition, the school district excluded a church
that wanted to present films teaching family values from a
Christian perspective. We held that, because the films “no
doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible” under the
rule, the teaching of family values, the district’s exclusion
of the church was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
Id., at 394.
Like the church in Lamb’s Chapel, the Club seeks to
address a subject otherwise permitted under the rule, the
teaching of morals and character, from a religious stand-
point. Certainly, one could have characterized the film pre-
sentations in Lamb’s Chapel as a religious use, as the Court
of Appeals did, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School Dist., 959 F. 2d 381, 388–389 (CA2 1992). And
one easily could conclude that the films’ purpose to instruct
that “ ‘society’s slide toward humanism . . . can only be
counterbalanced by a loving home where Christian values
are instilled from an early age,’ ” id., at 384, was “quintessen-
tially religious,” 202 F. 3d, at 510. The only apparent dif-
3 We find it remarkable that the Court of Appeals majority did not
cite Lamb’s Chapel, despite its obvious relevance to the case. We do not
necessarily expect a court of appeals to catalog every opinion that re-
verses one of its precedents. Nonetheless, this oversight is particularly
incredible because the majority’s attention was directed to it at every turn.
See, e. g., 202 F. 3d 502, 513 (CA2 2000) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“I cannot
square the majority’s analysis in this case with Lamb’s Chapel”); 21 F.
Supp. 2d, at 150; App. O9–O11 (District Court stating “that Lamb’s Chapel
and Rosenberger pinpoint the critical issue in this case”); Brief for Appel-
lee in No. 98–9494 (CA2), at 36–39; Brief for Appellants in No. 98–9494
(CA2), pp. 15, 36.

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ference between the activity of Lamb’s Chapel and the ac-
tivities of the Good News Club is that the Club chooses to
teach moral lessons from a Christian perspective through
live storytelling and prayer, whereas Lamb’s Chapel taught
lessons through films. This distinction is inconsequential.
Both modes of speech use a religious viewpoint. Thus, the
exclusion of the Good News Club’s activities, like the ex-
clusion of Lamb’s Chapel’s films, constitutes unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination.
Our opinion in Rosenberger also is dispositive. In Rosen-
berger, a student organization at the University of Virginia
was denied funding for printing expenses because its publi-
cation, Wide Awake, offered a Christian viewpoint. Just as
the Club emphasizes the role of Christianity in students’
morals and character, Wide Awake “ ‘challenge[d] Christians
to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim
and . . . encourage[d] students to consider what a personal
relationship with Jesus Christ means.’ ” 515 U. S., at 826.
Because the university “select[ed] for disfavored treatment
those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial
viewpoints,” we held that the denial of funding was un-
constitutional. Id., at 831. Although in Rosenberger there
was no prohibition on religion as a subject matter, our
holding did not rely on this factor. Instead, we concluded
simply that the university’s denial of funding to print
Wide Awake was viewpoint discrimination, just as the
school district’s refusal to allow Lamb’s Chapel to show its
films was viewpoint discrimination. Ibid. Given the obvi-
ous religious content of Wide Awake, we cannot say that
the Club’s activities are any more “religious” or deserve any
less First Amendment protection than did the publication of
Wide Awake in Rosenberger.
Despite our holdings in Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger,
the Court of Appeals, like Milford, believed that its char-
acterization of the Club’s activities as religious in nature

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warranted treating the Club’s activities as different in
kind from the other activities permitted by the school. See
202 F. 3d, at 510 (the Club “is doing something other than
simply teaching moral values”). The “Christian viewpoint”
is unique, according to the court, because it contains an
“additional layer” that other kinds of viewpoints do not.
Id., at 509. That is, the Club “is focused on teaching chil-
dren how to cultivate their relationship with God through
Jesus Christ,” which it characterized as “quintessentially re-
ligious.” Id., at 510. With these observations, the court
concluded that, because the Club’s activities “fall outside
the bounds of pure ‘moral and character development,’ ” the
exclusion did not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Id.,
at 511.
We disagree that something that is “quintessentially re-
ligious” or “decidedly religious in nature” cannot also be
characterized properly as the teaching of morals and char-
acter development from a particular viewpoint. See 202 F.
3d, at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the subject mat-
ter is morals and character, it is quixotic to attempt a dis-
tinction between religious viewpoints and religious subject
matters”). What matters for purposes of the Free Speech
Clause is that we can see no logical difference in kind be-
tween the invocation of Christianity by the Club and the
invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other asso-
ciations to provide a foundation for their lessons. It is ap-
parent that the unstated principle of the Court of Appeals’
reasoning is its conclusion that any time religious instruc-
tion and prayer are used to discuss morals and character, the
discussion is simply not a “pure” discussion of those issues.
According to the Court of Appeals, reliance on Christian
principles taints moral and character instruction in a way
that other foundations for thought or viewpoints do not.
We, however, have never reached such a conclusion. In-
stead, we reaffirm our holdings in Lamb’s Chapel and Rosen-

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berger that speech discussing otherwise permissible sub-
jects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the
ground that the subject is discussed from a religious view-
point. Thus, we conclude that Milford’s exclusion of the
Club from use of the school, pursuant to its community use
policy, constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.4
IV
Milford argues that, even if its restriction constitutes
viewpoint discrimination, its interest in not violating the
Establishment Clause outweighs the Club’s interest in gain-
ing equal access to the school’s facilities. In other words,
according to Milford, its restriction was required to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause. We disagree.
We have said that a state interest in avoiding an Establish-
ment Clause violation “may be characterized as compelling,”
and therefore may justify content-based discrimination.
4 Despite Milford’s insistence that the Club’s activities constitute “re-
ligious worship,” the Court of Appeals made no such determination.
It did compare the Club’s activities to “religious worship,” 202 F. 3d,
at 510, but ultimately it concluded merely that the Club’s activities “fall
outside the bounds of pure ‘moral and character development,’ ” id., at 511.
In any event, we conclude that the Club’s activities do not constitute mere
religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values.
Justice Souter’s recitation of the Club’s activities is accurate. See
post, at 137–138 (dissenting opinion). But in our view, religion is used
by the Club in the same fashion that it was used by Lamb’s Chapel and by
the students in Rosenberger: Religion is the viewpoint from which ideas
are conveyed. We did not find the Rosenberger students’ attempt to culti-
vate a personal relationship with Christ to bar their claim that religion
was a viewpoint. And we see no reason to treat the Club’s use of religion
as something other than a viewpoint merely because of any evangelical
message it conveys. According to Justice Souter, the Club’s activities
constitute “an evangelical service of worship.” Post, at 138. Regardless
of the label Justice Souter wishes to use, what matters is the sub-
stance of the Club’s activities, which we conclude are materially indistin-
guishable from the activities in Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger.

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Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 (1981). However, it
is not clear whether a State’s interest in avoiding an Estab-
lishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimi-
nation. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U. S., at 394–395 (noting
the suggestion in Widmar but ultimately not finding an Es-
tablishment Clause problem). We need not, however, con-
front the issue in this case, because we conclude that the
school has no valid Establishment Clause interest.
We rejected Establishment Clause defenses similar to
Milford’s in two previous free speech cases, Lamb’s Chapel
and Widmar. In particular, in Lamb’s Chapel, we explained
that “[t]he showing of th[e] film series would not have been
during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the
school, and would have been open to the public, not just to
church members.” 508 U. S., at 395. Accordingly, we found
that “there would have been no realistic danger that the
community would think that the District was endorsing reli-
gion or any particular creed.” Ibid. Likewise, in Widmar,
where the university’s forum was already available to other
groups, this Court concluded that there was no Establish-
ment Clause problem. 454 U. S., at 272–273, and n. 13.
The Establishment Clause defense fares no better in this
case. As in Lamb’s Chapel, the Club’s meetings were held
after school hours, not sponsored by the school, and open
to any student who obtained parental consent, not just to
Club members. As in Widmar, Milford made its forum
available to other organizations. The Club’s activities are
materially indistinguishable from those in Lamb’s Chapel
and Widmar. Thus, Milford’s reliance on the Establishment
Clause is unavailing.
Milford attempts to distinguish Lamb’s Chapel and Wid-
mar by emphasizing that Milford’s policy involves elemen-
tary school children. According to Milford, children will
perceive that the school is endorsing the Club and will feel
coercive pressure to participate, because the Club’s activities

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take place on school grounds, even though they occur during
nonschool hours.5 This argument is unpersuasive.
First, we have held that “a significant factor in uphold-
ing governmental programs in the face of Establishment
Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.” Rosen-
berger, 515 U. S., at 839 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell
v. Helms, 530 U. S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“In
distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to
the State and indoctrination that is not, [the Court has] con-
sistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid
that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without
regard to their religion” (emphasis added)); id., at 838
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“[N]eutrality is an
important reason for upholding government-aid programs
against Establishment Clause challenges”). Milford’s impli-
cation that granting access to the Club would do damage to
the neutrality principle defies logic. For the “guarantee of
neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government,
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends
benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, in-
cluding religious ones, are broad and diverse.” Rosen-
berger, supra, at 839. The Good News Club seeks nothing
more than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak
about the same topics as are other groups. Because allow-
ing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure neu-
trality, not threaten it, Milford faces an uphill battle in ar-
guing that the Establishment Clause compels it to exclude
the Good News Club.
5 It is worth noting that, although Milford repeatedly has argued that
the Club’s meeting time directly after the schoolday is relevant to its
Establishment Clause concerns, the record does not reflect any offer by
the school district to permit the Club to use the facilities at a different
time of day. The superintendent’s stated reason for denying the appli-
cations was simply that the Club’s activities were “religious instruction.”
202 F. 3d, at 507. In any event, consistent with Lamb’s Chapel and
Widmar, the school could not deny equal access to the Club for any time
that is generally available for public use.

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Second, to the extent we consider whether the commu-
nity would feel coercive pressure to engage in the Club’s ac-
tivities, cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 592–593 (1992), the
relevant community would be the parents, not the elemen-
tary school children. It is the parents who choose whether
their children will attend the Good News Club meetings.
Because the children cannot attend without their parents’
permission, they cannot be coerced into engaging in the
Good News Club’s religious activities. Milford does not
suggest that the parents of elementary school children would
be confused about whether the school was endorsing religion.
Nor do we believe that such an argument could be reason-
ably advanced.
Third, whatever significance we may have assigned in the
Establishment Clause context to the suggestion that elemen-
tary school children are more impressionable than adults,
cf., e. g., id., at 592; School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U. S. 373, 390 (1985) (stating that “symbolism of a union
between church and state is most likely to influence children
of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose be-
liefs consequently are the function of environment as much
as of free and voluntary choice”), we have never extended
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence to foreclose private
religious conduct during nonschool hours merely because it
takes place on school premises where elementary school chil-
dren may be present.
None of the cases discussed by Milford persuades us
that our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has gone this
far. For example, Milford cites Lee v. Weisman for the
proposition that “there are heightened concerns with pro-
tecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pres-
sure in the elementary and secondary public schools,” 505
U. S., at 592. In Lee, however, we concluded that attendance
at the graduation exercise was obligatory. Id., at 586. See
also Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290
(2000) (holding the school’s policy of permitting prayer at

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football games unconstitutional where the activity took place
during a school-sponsored event and not in a public forum).
We did not place independent significance on the fact that
the graduation exercise might take place on school prem-
ises, Lee, supra, at 583. Here, where the school facilities are
being used for a nonschool function and there is no govern-
ment sponsorship of the Club’s activities, Lee is inapposite.
Equally unsupportive is Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S.
578 (1987), in which we held that a Louisiana law that pro-
scribed the teaching of evolution as part of the public school
curriculum, unless accompanied by a lesson on creationism,
violated the Establishment Clause. In Edwards, we men-
tioned that students are susceptible to pressure in the class-
room, particularly given their possible reliance on teachers
as role models. See id., at 584. But we did not discuss this
concern in our application of the law to the facts. Moreover,
we did note that mandatory attendance requirements meant
that state advancement of religion in a school would be par-
ticularly harshly felt by impressionable students.6 But we
did not suggest that, when the school was not actually ad-
vancing religion, the impressionability of students would be
relevant to the Establishment Clause issue. Even if Ed-
wards had articulated the principle Milford believes it did,
the facts in Edwards are simply too remote from those here
6 Milford also cites Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School
Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty., 333 U. S. 203 (1948), for its position that
the Club’s religious element would be advanced by the State through
compulsory attendance laws. In McCollum, the school district excused
students from their normal classroom study during the regular schoolday
to attend classes taught by sectarian religious teachers, who were subject
to approval by the school superintendent. Under these circumstances,
this Court found it relevant that “[t]he operation of the State’s compulsory
education system . . . assist[ed] and [wa]s integrated with the program
of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects.” Id., at
209. In the present case, there is simply no integration and cooperation
between the school district and the Club. The Club’s activities take place
after the time when the children are compelled by state law to be at the
school.

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to give the principle any weight. Edwards involved the
content of the curriculum taught by state teachers during
the schoolday to children required to attend. Obviously,
when individuals who are not schoolteachers are giving
lessons after school to children permitted to attend only
with parental consent, the concerns expressed in Edwards
are not present.7
Fourth, even if we were to consider the possible mis-
perceptions by schoolchildren in deciding whether Milford’s
permitting the Club’s activities would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause, the facts of this case simply do not sup-
port Milford’s conclusion. There is no evidence that young
children are permitted to loiter outside classrooms after
the schoolday has ended. Surely even young children are
aware of events for which their parents must sign permission
7 Milford also refers to Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools
(Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226 (1990), to support its view that “as-
sumptions about the ability of students to make . . . subtle distinctions
[between schoolteachers during the schoolday and Reverend Fournier
after school] are less valid for elementary age children who tend to be
less informed, more impressionable, and more subject to peer pres-
sure than average adults.” Brief for Respondent 19. Four Justices in
Mergens believed that high school students likely are capable of dis-
tinguishing between government and private endorsement of religion.
See 496 U. S., at 250–251 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). The opinion, how-
ever, made no statement about how capable of discerning endorsement
elementary school children would have been in the context of Mergens,
where the activity at issue was after school. In any event, even to the
extent elementary school children are more prone to peer pressure than
are older children, it simply is not clear what, in this case, they could be
pressured to do.
In further support of the argument that the impressionability of ele-
mentary school children even after school is significant, Milford points
to several cases in which we have found Establishment Clause violations
in public schools. For example, Milford relies heavily on School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), in which we found
unconstitutional Pennsylvania’s practice of permitting public schools to
read Bible verses at the opening of each schoolday. Schempp, however,
is inapposite because this case does not involve activity by the school
during the schoolday.

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forms. The meetings were held in a combined high school
resource room and middle school special education room,
not in an elementary school classroom. The instructors are
not schoolteachers. And the children in the group are not
all the same age as in the normal classroom setting; their
ages range from 6 to 12.8 In sum, these circumstances
simply do not support the theory that small children would
perceive endorsement here.
Finally, even if we were to inquire into the minds of school-
children in this case, we cannot say the danger that children
would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any greater
than the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward
the religious viewpoint if the Club were excluded from the
public forum. This concern is particularly acute given the
reality that Milford’s building is not used only for elemen-
tary school children. Students, from kindergarten through
the 12th grade, all attend school in the same building.
There may be as many, if not more, upperclassmen as ele-
mentary school children who occupy the school after hours.
For that matter, members of the public writ large are per-
mitted in the school after hours pursuant to the community
use policy. Any bystander could conceivably be aware of
the school’s use policy and its exclusion of the Good News
Club, and could suffer as much from viewpoint discrimi-
nation as elementary school children could suffer from per-
ceived endorsement. Cf. Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 835–836
(expressing the concern that viewpoint discrimination can
chill individual thought and expression).
8 Milford also relies on the Equal Access Act, 98 Stat. 1302, 20 U. S. C.
§§ 4071–4074, as evidence that Congress has recognized the vulnerability
of elementary school children to misperceiving endorsement of religion.
The Act, however, makes no express recognition of the impressionability
of elementary school children. It applies only to public secondary schools
and makes no mention of elementary schools. § 4071(a). We can de-
rive no meaning from the choice by Congress not to address elementary
schools.

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We cannot operate, as Milford would have us do, under
the assumption that any risk that small children would per-
ceive endorsement should counsel in favor of excluding the
Club’s religious activity. We decline to employ Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler’s veto,
in which a group’s religious activity can be proscribed on
the basis of what the youngest members of the audience
might misperceive. Cf. Capitol Square Review and Ad-
visory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 779–780 (1995) (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(“[B]ecause our concern is with the political community writ
large, the endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions
of particular individuals or saving isolated nonadherents
from . . . discomfort . . . . It is for this reason that the
reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be
deemed aware of the history and context of the commu-
nity and forum in which the religious [speech takes place]”
(emphasis added)). There are countervailing constitutional
concerns related to rights of other individuals in the com-
munity. In this case, those countervailing concerns are the
free speech rights of the Club and its members. Cf. Rosen-
berger, supra, at 835 (“Vital First Amendment speech prin-
ciples are at stake here”). And, we have already found
that those rights have been violated, not merely perceived
to have been violated, by the school’s actions toward the
Club.
We are not convinced that there is any significance in
this case to the possibility that elementary school children
may witness the Good News Club’s activities on school
premises, and therefore we can find no reason to depart from
our holdings in Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar. Accordingly,
we conclude that permitting the Club to meet on the school’s
premises would not have violated the Establishment Clause.9
9 Both parties have briefed the Establishment Clause issue extensively,
and neither suggests that a remand would be of assistance on this issue.
Although Justice Souter would prefer that a record be developed on

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120 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
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V
When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the
school’s limited public forum on the ground that the Club
was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club
because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Because Milford
has not raised a valid Establishment Clause claim, we do
not address the question whether such a claim could excuse
Milford’s viewpoint discrimination.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion but write separately to explain
further my views on two issues.
I
First, I join Part IV of the Court’s opinion, regarding
the Establishment Clause issue, with the understanding
that its consideration of coercive pressure, see ante, at 115,
and perceptions of endorsement, see ante, at 115, 117–118,
“to the extent” that the law makes such factors relevant,
several facts, see post, at 140, and Justice Breyer believes that develop-
ment of those facts could yet be dispositive in this case, see post, at 128
(opinion concurring in part), none of these facts is relevant to the Estab-
lishment Clause inquiry. For example, Justice Souter suggests that we
cannot determine whether there would be an Establishment Clause viola-
tion unless we know when, and to what extent, other groups use the facili-
ties. When a limited public forum is available for use by groups present-
ing any viewpoint, however, we would not find an Establishment Clause
violation simply because only groups presenting a religious viewpoint
have opted to take advantage of the forum at a particular time.

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is consistent with the belief (which I hold) that in this case
that extent is zero. As to coercive pressure: Physical co-
ercion is not at issue here; and so-called “peer pressure,”
if it can even be considered coercion, is, when it arises
from private activities, one of the attendant consequences
of a freedom of association that is constitutionally protected,
see, e. g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622
(1984); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449,
460–461 (1958). What is at play here is not coercion, but the
compulsion of ideas—and the private right to exert and re-
ceive that compulsion (or to have one’s children receive it)
is protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses,
see, e. g., Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647 (1981); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 108–109 (1943); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307–310 (1940), not banned by the
Establishment Clause. A priest has as much liberty to
proselytize as a patriot.
As to endorsement, I have previously written that “[r]eli-
gious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause
where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional
or designated public forum, publicly announced and open
to all on equal terms.” Capitol Square Review and Advi-
sory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 770 (1995). The same is
true of private speech that occurs in a limited public forum,
publicly announced, whose boundaries are not drawn to
favor religious groups but instead permit a cross-section
of uses. In that context, which is this case, “erroneous con-
clusions [about endorsement] do not count.” Id., at 765.
See also Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (“I would hold, simply and clearly, that
giving [a private religious group] nondiscriminatory access
to school facilities cannot violate [the Establishment Clause]
because it does not signify state or local embrace of a par-
ticular religious sect”).

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122 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
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II
Second, since we have rejected the only reason that re-
spondent gave for excluding the Club’s speech from a forum
that clearly included it (the forum was opened to any “us[e]
pertaining to the welfare of the community,” App. to Pet.
for Cert. D1), I do not suppose it matters whether the ex-
clusion is characterized as viewpoint or subject-matter dis-
crimination. Lacking any legitimate reason for excluding
the Club’s speech from its forum—“because it’s religious”
will not do, see, e. g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 532–533, 546 (1993); Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S.
872, 877–878 (1990)—respondent would seem to fail First
Amendment scrutiny regardless of how its action is char-
acterized. Even subject-matter limits must at least be
“reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,”
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473
U. S. 788, 806 (1985).1 But I agree, in any event, that re-
spondent did discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.
As I understand it, the point of disagreement between
the Court and the dissenters (and the Court of Appeals)
1 In this regard, I should note the inaccuracy of Justice Souter’s claim
that the reasonableness of the forum limitation is not properly before us,
see post, at 136, and n. 1 (dissenting opinion). Petitioners argued, both in
their papers filed in the District Court, Memorandum of Law in Support
of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in No. 97–CV–0302 (NDNY),
pp. 20–22, and in their brief filed on appeal, Brief for Appellants in
No. 98–9494 (CA2), pp. 33–35, that respondent’s exclusion of them from
the forum was unreasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum.
Although the District Court did say in passing that the reasonableness
of respondent’s general restriction on use of its facilities for religious
purposes was not challenged, see 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 154 (NDNY 1998), the
Court of Appeals apparently decided that the particular reasonableness
challenge brought by petitioners had been preserved, because it addressed
the argument on the merits, see 202 F. 3d 502, 509 (CA2 2000) (“Taking
first the reasonableness criterion, the Club argues that the restriction
is unreasonable . . . . This argument is foreclosed by precedent”).

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with regard to petitioner’s Free Speech Clause claim is not
whether the Good News Club must be permitted to present
religious viewpoints on morals and character in respondent’s
forum, which has been opened to secular discussions of that
subject, see ante, at 108.2 The answer to that is established
by our decision in Lamb’s Chapel, supra. The point of dis-
agreement is not even whether some of the Club’s religious
speech fell within the protection of Lamb’s Chapel. It cer-
tainly did. See ante, at 108; 202 F. 3d 502, 509 (CA2 2000)
(the Club’s “teachings may involve secular values such as
obedience or resisting jealousy”).
The disagreement, rather, regards the portions of the
Club’s meetings that are not “purely” “discussions” of mo-
rality and character from a religious viewpoint. The Club,
for example, urges children “who already believe in the
Lord Jesus as their Savior” to “[s]top and ask God for the
strength and the ‘want’ . . . to obey Him,” 21 F. Supp. 2d
147, 156 (NDNY 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted),
and it invites children who “don’t know Jesus as Savior” to
“trust the Lord Jesus to be [their] Savior from sin,” ibid.
The dissenters and the Second Circuit say that the presence
of such additional speech, because it is purely religious,
transforms the Club’s meetings into something different
in kind from other, nonreligious activities that teach moral
and character development. See post, at 132–133 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); post, at 137–138 (Souter, J., dissenting); 202
F. 3d, at 509–511. Therefore, the argument goes, excluding
the Club is not viewpoint discrimination. I disagree.
Respondent has opened its facilities to any “us[e] per-
taining to the welfare of the community, provided that such
us[e] shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general
2 Neither does the disagreement center on the mode of the Club’s
speech—the fact that it sings songs and plays games. Although a forum
could perhaps be opened to lectures but not plays, debates but not con-
certs, respondent has placed no such restrictions on the use of its facilities.
See App. N8, N14, N19 (allowing seminars, concerts, and plays).

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124 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
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public.” App. to Pet. for Cert. D1. Shaping the moral
and character development of children certainly “pertain[s]
to the welfare of the community.” Thus, respondent has
agreed that groups engaged in the endeavor of developing
character may use its forum. The Boy Scouts, for example,
may seek “to influence a boy’s character, development and
spiritual growth,” App. N10–N11; cf. Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 649 (2000) (“[T]he general mission of
the Boy Scouts is clear: ‘[t]o instill values in young people’ ”
(quoting the Scouts’ mission statement)), and a group may
use Aesop’s Fables to teach moral values, App. N11. When
the Club attempted to teach Biblical-based moral values,
however, it was excluded because its activities “d[id] not
involve merely a religious perspective on the secular sub-
ject of morality” and because “it [was] clear from the conduct
of the meetings that the Good News Club goes far beyond
merely stating its viewpoint.” 202 F. 3d, at 510.
From no other group does respondent require the sterility
of speech that it demands of petitioners. The Boy Scouts
could undoubtedly buttress their exhortations to keep
“morally straight” and live “clean” lives, see Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale, supra, at 649, by giving reasons why
that is a good idea—because parents want and expect it,
because it will make the scouts “better” and “more success-
ful” people, because it will emulate such admired past Scouts
as former President Gerald Ford. The Club, however, may
only discuss morals and character, and cannot give its rea-
sons why they should be fostered—because God wants and
expects it, because it will make the Club members “saintly”
people, and because it emulates Jesus Christ. The Club may
not, in other words, independently discuss the religious
premise on which its views are based—that God exists and
His assistance is necessary to morality. It may not defend
the premise, and it absolutely must not seek to persuade
the children that the premise is true. The children must,
so to say, take it on faith. This is blatant viewpoint dis-

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125 Cite as: 533 U. S. 98 (2001)
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crimination. Just as calls to character based on patriotism
will go unanswered if the listeners do not believe their coun-
try is good and just, calls to moral behavior based on God’s
will are useless if the listeners do not believe that God exists.
Effectiveness in presenting a viewpoint rests on the persua-
siveness with which the speaker defends his premise—and
in respondent’s facilities every premise but a religious one
may be defended.
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U. S. 819 (1995), we struck down a similar viewpoint re-
striction. There, a private student newspaper sought fund-
ing from a student-activity fund on the same basis as its
secular counterparts. And though the paper printed such
directly religious material as exhortations to belief, see id.,
at 826 (quoting the paper’s self-described mission “ ‘to en-
courage students to consider what a personal relationship
with Jesus Christ means’ ”); id., at 865 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (“ ‘The only way to salvation through Him is by con-
fessing and repenting of sin. It is the Christian’s duty to
make sinners aware of their need for salvation’ ” (quoting
the paper)); see also id., at 865–867 (quoting other examples),
we held that refusing to provide the funds discriminated on
the basis of viewpoint, because the religious speech had been
used to “provid[e] . . . a specific premise . . . from which a
variety of subjects may be discussed and considered,” id.,
at 831 (opinion of the Court). The right to present a view-
point based on a religion premise carried with it the right to
defend the premise.
The dissenters emphasize that the religious speech used
by the Club as the foundation for its views on morals and
character is not just any type of religious speech—although
they cannot agree exactly what type of religious speech it is.
In Justice Stevens’s view, it is speech “aimed principally
at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular re-
ligious faith,” post, at 130; see also post, at 133–134, n. 3.
This does not, to begin with, distinguish Rosenberger, which

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126 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
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also involved proselytizing speech, as the above quotations
show. See also Rosenberger, supra, at 844 (referring ap-
provingly to the dissent’s description of the paper as a
“wor[k] characterized by . . . evangelism”). But in addition,
it does not distinguish the Club’s activities from those of the
other groups using respondent’s forum—which have not, as
Justice Stevens suggests, see post, at 131–132, been re-
stricted to roundtable “discussions” of moral issues. Those
groups may seek to inculcate children with their beliefs, and
they may furthermore “recruit others to join their respective
groups,” post, at 131. The Club must therefore have liberty
to do the same, even if, as Justice Stevens fears without
support in the record, see ibid., its actions may prove (shud-
der!) divisive. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U. S., at 395 (re-
marking that worries about “public unrest” caused by “pros-
elytizing” are “difficult to defend as a reason to deny the
presentation of a religious point of view”); cf. Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U. S. 668, 684–685 (1984) (holding that “political
divisiveness” could not invalidate inclusion of cre` che in
municipal Christmas display); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U. S., at 310–311.
Justice Souter, while agreeing that the Club’s religious
speech “may be characterized as proselytizing,” post, at 139,
n. 3, thinks that it is even more clearly excludable from re-
spondent’s forum because it is essentially “an evangelical
service of worship,” post, at 138. But we have previously
rejected the attempt to distinguish worship from other reli-
gious speech, saying that “the distinction has [no] intelligible
content,” and further, no “relevance” to the constitutional
issue. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6 (1981);
see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S., at 109 (refusing
to distinguish evangelism from worship).3 Those holdings
3 We have drawn a different distinction—between religious speech gen-
erally and speech about religion—but only with regard to restrictions the
State must place on its own speech, where pervasive state monitoring
is unproblematic. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,

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are surely proved correct today by the dissenters’ inability
to agree, even between themselves, into which subcategory
of religious speech the Club’s activities fell. If the dis-
tinction did have content, it would be beyond the courts’
competence to administer. Widmar v. Vincent, supra, at
269, n. 6; cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 616–617 (1992)
(Souter, J., concurring) (“I can hardly imagine a subject
less amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary,
or more deliberately to be avoided where possible,” than
“comparative theology”). And if courts (and other gov-
ernment officials) were competent, applying the distinction
would require state monitoring of private, religious speech
with a degree of pervasiveness that we have previously
found unacceptable. See, e. g., Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., supra, at 844–845; Widmar v. Vin-
cent, supra, at 269, n. 6. I will not endorse an approach that
suffers such a wondrous diversity of flaws.
* * *
With these words of explanation, I join the opinion of the
Court.
Justice Breyer, concurring in part.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion and join its opinion
to the extent that they are consistent with the following
three observations. First, the government’s “neutrality” in
respect to religion is one, but only one, of the considerations
relevant to deciding whether a public school’s policy violates
the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U. S. 793, 839 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment);
374 U. S. 203, 225 (1963) (State schools in their official capacity may not
teach religion but may teach about religion). Whatever the rule there,
licensing and monitoring private religious speech is an entirely dif-
ferent matter, see, e. g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293–294 (1951),
even in a limited public forum where the State has some authority to draw
subject-matter distinctions.

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128 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
Breyer, J., concurring in part
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U. S. 753, 774, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). As this Court previously has
indicated, a child’s perception that the school has endorsed
a particular religion or religion in general may also prove
critically important. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 389–390 (1985); see also Lamb’s Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384,
395 (1993); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 592–594
(1989). Today’s opinion does not purport to change that
legal principle.
Second, the critical Establishment Clause question here
may well prove to be whether a child, participating in the
Good News Club’s activities, could reasonably perceive the
school’s permission for the Club to use its facilities as an
endorsement of religion. See Ball, supra, at 390 (“[A]n im-
portant concern of the effects test is whether . . . the chal-
lenged government action is sufficiently likely to be per-
ceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an
endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of
their individual religious choices”). The time of day, the
age of the children, the nature of the meetings, and other
specific circumstances are relevant in helping to deter-
mine whether, in fact, the Club “so dominate[s]” the “forum”
that, in the children’s minds, “a formal policy of equal access
is transformed into a demonstration of approval.” Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Bd., supra, at 777 (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Third, the Court cannot fully answer the Establishment
Clause question this case raises, given its procedural pos-
ture. The specific legal action that brought this case to the
Court of Appeals was the District Court’s decision to grant
Milford Central School’s motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judg-
ment. We now hold that the school was not entitled to

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summary judgment, either in respect to the Free Speech or
the Establishment Clause issue. Our holding must mean
that, viewing the disputed facts (including facts about the
children’s perceptions) favorably to the Club (the nonmoving
party), the school has not shown an Establishment Clause
violation.
To deny one party’s motion for summary judgment, how-
ever, is not to grant summary judgment for the other side.
There may be disputed “genuine issue[s]” of “material fact,”
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c), particularly about how a reason-
able child participant would understand the school’s role,
cf. post, at 140 (Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court
itself points to facts not in evidence, ante, at 117 (“There is
no evidence that young children are permitted to loiter out-
side classrooms after the schoolday has ended”), ante, at 118
(“There may be as many, if not more, upperclassmen as
elementary school children who occupy the school after
hours”), identifies facts in evidence which may, depending
on other facts not in evidence, be of legal significance, ibid.
(discussing the type of room in which the meetings were
held and noting that the Club’s participants “are not all the
same age as in the normal classroom setting”), and makes as-
sumptions about other facts, ante, at 117–118 (“Surely even
young children are aware of events for which their parents
must sign permission forms”), ante, at 118 (“Any bystander
could conceivably be aware of the school’s use policy and
its exclusion of the Good News Club, and could suffer as
much from viewpoint discrimination as elementary school
children could suffer from perceived endorsement”). The
Court’s invocation of what is missing from the record and
its assumptions about what is present in the record only con-
firm that both parties, if they so desire, should have a fair
opportunity to fill the evidentiary gap in light of today’s
opinion. Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 56(c) (summary judgment
appropriate only where there is “no genuine issue as to any
material fact” and movant “is entitled to a judgment as a

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130 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
Stevens, J., dissenting
matter of law”), 56(f) (permitting supplementation of record
for summary judgment purposes where appropriate).
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
The Milford Central School has invited the public to use
its facilities for educational and recreational purposes, but
not for “religious purposes.” Speech for “religious pur-
poses” may reasonably be understood to encompass three
different categories. First, there is religious speech that is
simply speech about a particular topic from a religious point
of view. The film in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993), illustrates this
category. See id., at 388 (observing that the film series at
issue in that case “would discuss Dr. [James] Dobson’s views
on the undermining influences of the media that could only
be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian
family values instilled at an early stage”). Second, there is
religious speech that amounts to worship, or its equivalent.
Our decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981),
concerned such speech. See id., at 264–265 (describing
the speech in question as involving “religious worship”).
Third, there is an intermediate category that is aimed prin-
cipally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular
religious faith.
A public entity may not generally exclude even religious
worship from an open public forum. Id., at 276. Similarly,
a public entity that creates a limited public forum for the
discussion of certain specified topics may not exclude a
speaker simply because she approaches those topics from
a religious point of view. Thus, in Lamb’s Chapel we held
that a public school that permitted its facilities to be used
for the discussion of family issues and child rearing could
not deny access to speakers presenting a religious point
of view on those issues. See 508 U. S., at 393–394.
But, while a public entity may not censor speech about
an authorized topic based on the point of view expressed

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131 Cite as: 533 U. S. 98 (2001)
Stevens, J., dissenting
by the speaker, it has broad discretion to “preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated.” Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 836 (1976); see
also Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66)
v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 275, n. 6 (1990) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“A school’s extracurricular activities constitute a
part of the school’s teaching mission, and the school accord-
ingly must make ‘decisions concerning the content of those
activities’ ” (quoting Widmar, 454 U. S., at 278 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)). Accordingly, “control over access
to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are rea-
sonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are
viewpoint neutral.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
& Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806 (1985). The novel ques-
tion that this case presents concerns the constitutionality of
a public school’s attempt to limit the scope of a public forum
it has created. More specifically, the question is whether a
school can, consistently with the First Amendment, create a
limited public forum that admits the first type of religious
speech without allowing the other two.
Distinguishing speech from a religious viewpoint, on the
one hand, from religious proselytizing, on the other, is com-
parable to distinguishing meetings to discuss political issues
from meetings whose principal purpose is to recruit new
members to join a political organization. If a school decides
to authorize afterschool discussions of current events in
its classrooms, it may not exclude people from expressing
their views simply because it dislikes their particular politi-
cal opinions. But must it therefore allow organized political
groups—for example, the Democratic Party, the Libertarian
Party, or the Ku Klux Klan—to hold meetings, the prin-
cipal purpose of which is not to discuss the current-events
topic from their own unique point of view but rather to
recruit others to join their respective groups? I think not.
Such recruiting meetings may introduce divisiveness and

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132 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
Stevens, J., dissenting
tend to separate young children into cliques that undermine
the school’s educational mission. Cf. Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (upholding a city’s refusal to
allow “political advertising” on public transportation).
School officials may reasonably believe that evangelical
meetings designed to convert children to a particular re-
ligious faith pose the same risk. And, just as a school may
allow meetings to discuss current events from a political
perspective without also allowing organized political re-
cruitment, so too can a school allow discussion of topics
such as moral development from a religious (or nonreligious)
perspective without thereby opening its forum to religious
proselytizing or worship. See, e. g., Campbell v. St. Tam-
many Parish School Board, 231 F. 3d 937, 942 (CA5 2000)
(“Under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, a government
entity such as a school board has the opportunity to open
its facilities to activity protected by the First Amendment,
without inviting political or religious activities presented
in a form that would disserve its efforts to maintain neu-
trality”). Moreover, any doubt on a question such as this
should be resolved in a way that minimizes “intrusion by
the Federal Government into the operation of our public
schools,” Mergens, 496 U. S., at 290 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968)
(“Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school
system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and
restraint. . . . By and large, public education in our Nation is
committed to the control of state and local authorities”).
The particular limitation of the forum at issue in this case
is one that prohibits the use of the school’s facilities for “re-
ligious purposes.” It is clear that, by “religious purposes,”
the school district did not intend to exclude all speech from
a religious point of view. See App. N13–N15 (testimony of
the superintendent for Milford schools indicating that the
policy would permit people to teach “that man was created
by God as described in the Book of Genesis” and that crime

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133 Cite as: 533 U. S. 98 (2001)
Stevens, J., dissenting
was caused by society’s “lack of faith in God”). Instead, it
sought only to exclude religious speech whose principal goal
is to “promote the gospel.” Id., at N18. In other words,
the school sought to allow the first type of religious speech
while excluding the second and third types. As long as this
is done in an evenhanded manner, I see no constitutional
violation in such an effort.1 The line between the various
categories of religious speech may be difficult to draw, but
I think that the distinctions are valid, and that a school,
particularly an elementary school, must be permitted to
draw them.2 Cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed.
of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty., 333 U. S. 203, 231
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“In no activity of the
State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in
its schools . . .”).
This case is undoubtedly close. Nonetheless, regardless
of whether the Good News Club’s activities amount to “wor-
ship,” it does seem clear, based on the facts in the record,
that the school district correctly classified those activities
as falling within the third category of religious speech and
therefore beyond the scope of the school’s limited public
forum.3 In short, I am persuaded that the school district
1 The school district, for example, could not, consistently with its pres-
ent policy, allow school facilities to be used by a group that affirmatively
attempted to inculcate nonbelief in God or in the view that morality
is wholly unrelated to belief in God. Nothing in the record, however,
indicates that any such group was allowed to use school facilities.
2 “A perceptive observer sees a material difference between the light
of day and the dark of night, and knows that difference to be a reality
even though the two are separated not by a bright line but by a zone of
twilight.” Buirkle v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 832 F. Supp. 469, 483 (Mass.
1993).
3 The majority elides the distinction between religious speech on a
particular topic and religious speech that seeks primarily to inculcate
belief. Thus, it relies on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995), as if that case involved precisely the same
type of speech that is at issue here. But, while both Wide Awake, the
organization in Rosenberger, and the Good News Club engage in a mixture

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134 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
Souter, J., dissenting
could (and did) permissibly exclude from its limited pub-
lic forum proselytizing religious speech that does not rise
to the level of actual worship. I would therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Even if I agreed with Part II of the majority opinion, how-
ever, I would not reach out, as it does in Part IV, to decide
a constitutional question that was not addressed by either
the District Court or the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
The majority rules on two issues. First, it decides that
the Court of Appeals failed to apply the rule in Lamb’s
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
U. S. 384 (1993), which held that the government may not
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in operating a limited
public forum. The majority applies that rule and concludes
that Milford violated Lamb’s Chapel in denying Good News
the use of the school. The majority then goes on to de-
termine that it would not violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment for the Milford School District
to allow the Good News Club to hold its intended gather-
ings of public school children in Milford’s elementary school.
of different types of religious speech, the Rosenberger Court clearly be-
lieved that the first type of religious speech predominated in Wide Awake.
It described that group’s publications as follows:
“The first issue had articles about racism, crisis pregnancy, stress, prayer,
C. S. Lewis’ ideas about evil and free will, and reviews of religious music.
In the next two issues, Wide Awake featured stories about homosexuality,
Christian missionary work, and eating disorders, as well as music reviews
and interviews with University professors.” Id., at 826.
In contrast to Wide Awake’s emphasis on providing Christian com-
mentary on such a diverse array of topics, Good News Club meetings
are dominated by religious exhortation, see post, at 137–138 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). My position is therefore consistent with the Court’s decision
in Rosenberger.

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Souter, J., dissenting
The majority is mistaken on both points. The Court of
Appeals unmistakably distinguished this case from Lamb’s
Chapel, though not by name, and accordingly affirmed the
application of a policy, unchallenged in the District Court,
that Milford’s public schools may not be used for religious
purposes. As for the applicability of the Establishment
Clause to the Good News Club’s intended use of Milford’s
school, the majority commits error even in reaching the
issue, which was addressed neither by the Court of Appeals
nor by the District Court. I respectfully dissent.
I
Lamb’s Chapel, a case that arose (as this one does) from
application of N. Y. Educ. Law § 414 (McKinney 2000) and
local policy implementing it, built on the accepted rule that
a government body may designate a public forum subject
to a reasonable limitation on the scope of permitted sub-
ject matter and activity, so long as the government does
not use the forum-defining restrictions to deny expression
to a particular viewpoint on subjects open to discussion.
Specifically, Lamb’s Chapel held that the government could
not “permit school property to be used for the presentation
of all views about family issues and child rearing except
those dealing with the subject matter from a religious stand-
point.” 508 U. S., at 393–394.
This case, like Lamb’s Chapel, properly raises no issue
about the reasonableness of Milford’s criteria for restrict-
ing the scope of its designated public forum. Milford has
opened school property for, among other things, “instruction
in any branch of education, learning or the arts” and for
“social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment
events and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the com-
munity, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive and
shall be opened to the general public.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. D1–D3. But Milford has done this subject to the re-
striction that “[s]chool premises shall not be used . . . for

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136 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
Souter, J., dissenting
religious purposes.” Id., at D2. As the District Court
stated, Good News did “not object to the reasonableness
of [Milford]’s policy that prohibits the use of [its] facilities
for religious purposes.” Id., at C14.
The sole question before the District Court was, there-
fore, whether, in refusing to allow Good News’s intended
use, Milford was misapplying its unchallenged restriction
in a way that amounted to imposing a viewpoint-based re-
striction on what could be said or done by a group entitled
to use the forum for an educational, civic, or other permitted
purpose. The question was whether Good News was being
disqualified when it merely sought to use the school property
the same way that the Milford Boy and Girl Scouts and the
4–H Club did. The District Court held on the basis of undis-
puted facts that Good News’s activity was essentially unlike
the presentation of views on secular issues from a religious
standpoint held to be protected in Lamb’s Chapel, see App.
to Pet. for Cert. C29–C31, and was instead activity precluded
by Milford’s unchallenged policy against religious use, even
under the narrowest definition of that term.
The Court of Appeals understood the issue the same way.
See 202 F. 3d 502, 508 (CA2 2000) (Good News argues that
“to exclude the Club because it teaches morals and values
from a Christian perspective constitutes unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination”); id., at 509 (“The crux of the Good
News Club’s argument is that the Milford school’s application
of the Community Use Policy to exclude the Club from its
facilities is not viewpoint neutral”).1 The Court of Appeals
1 The Court of Appeals held that any challenge to the policy’s rea-
sonableness was foreclosed by its own precedent, 202 F. 3d, at 509, a hold-
ing the majority leaves untouched, see ante, at 107 (“[W]e need not decide
whether it is unreasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum”);
cf. ante, at 108, n. 2 (“Because we hold that the exclusion of the Club on
the basis of its religious perspective constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination, it is no defense for Milford that purely religious purposes
can be excluded under state law”). In any event, the reasonableness of
the forum limitation was beyond the scope of the appeal from summary

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137 Cite as: 533 U. S. 98 (2001)
Souter, J., dissenting
also realized that the Lamb’s Chapel criterion was the ap-
propriate measure: “The activities of the Good News Club
do not involve merely a religious perspective on the secular
subject of morality.” 202 F. 3d, at 510. Cf. Lamb’s Chapel,
supra, at 393 (district could not exclude “religious stand-
point” in discussion on child rearing and family values, an
undisputed “use for social or civic purposes otherwise per-
mitted” under the use policy).2 The appeals court agreed
with the District Court that the undisputed facts in this case
differ from those in Lamb’s Chapel, as night from day. A
sampling of those facts shows why both courts were correct.
Good News’s classes open and close with prayer. In a
sample lesson considered by the District Court, children are
instructed that “[t]he Bible tells us how we can have our
sins forgiven by receiving the Lord Jesus Christ. It tells us
how to live to please Him. . . . If you have received the Lord
Jesus as your Saviour from sin, you belong to God’s special
group—His family.” App. to Pet. for Cert. C17–C18 (ellipsis
in original). The lesson plan instructs the teacher to “lead
a child to Christ,” and, when reading a Bible verse, to “[e]m-
phasize that this verse is from the Bible, God’s Word,” and
is “important—and true—because God said it.” The lesson
further exhorts the teacher to “[b]e sure to give an opportu-
nity for the ‘unsaved’ children in your class to respond to the
Gospel” and cautions against “neglect[ing] this responsibil-
ity.” Id., at C20.
While Good News’s program utilizes songs and games,
the heart of the meeting is the “challenge” and “invitation,”
which are repeated at various times throughout the lesson.
judgment since the District Court had said explicitly that the religious
use limitation was not challenged.
2 It is true, as the majority notes, ante, at 109, n. 3, that the Court
of Appeals did not cite Lamb’s Chapel by name. But it followed it in
substance, and it did cite an earlier opinion written by the author of the
panel opinion here, Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School Dist.
No. 10, 127 F. 3d 207 (CA2 1997), which discussed Lamb’s Chapel at length.

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138 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
Souter, J., dissenting
During the challenge, “saved” children who “already believe
in the Lord Jesus as their Savior” are challenged to “ ‘stop
and ask God for the strength and the “want” . . . to obey
Him.’ ” Ibid. They are instructed that
“[i]f you know Jesus as your Savior, you need to place
God first in your life. And if you don’t know Jesus as
Savior and if you would like to, then we will—we will
pray with you separately, individually. . . . And the chal-
lenge would be, those of you who know Jesus as Savior,
you can rely on God’s strength to obey Him.” Ibid.
During the invitation, the teacher “invites” the “unsaved”
children “ ‘to trust the Lord Jesus to be your Savior from
sin,’ ” and “ ‘receiv[e] [him] as your Savior from sin.’ ” Id.,
at C21. The children are then instructed that
“[i]f you believe what God’s Word says about your sin
and how Jesus died and rose again for you, you can have
His forever life today. Please bow your heads and close
your eyes. If you have never believed on the Lord
Jesus as your Savior and would like to do that, please
show me by raising your hand. If you raised your hand
to show me you want to believe on the Lord Jesus,
please meet me so I can show you from God’s Word how
you can receive His everlasting life.” Ibid.
It is beyond question that Good News intends to use the
public school premises not for the mere discussion of a sub-
ject from a particular, Christian point of view, but for an
evangelical service of worship calling children to commit
themselves in an act of Christian conversion.3 The majority
3 The majority rejects Milford’s contention that Good News’s activities
fall outside the purview of the limited forum because they constitute “re-
ligious worship” on the ground that the Court of Appeals made no such
determination regarding the character of the club’s program, see ante,
at 112, n. 4. This distinction is merely semantic, in light of the Court

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139 Cite as: 533 U. S. 98 (2001)
Souter, J., dissenting
avoids this reality only by resorting to the bland and gen-
eral characterization of Good News’s activity as “teaching
of morals and character, from a religious standpoint.” Ante,
at 109. If the majority’s statement ignores reality, as it
surely does, then today’s holding may be understood only in
equally generic terms. Otherwise, indeed, this case would
stand for the remarkable proposition that any public school
opened for civic meetings must be opened for use as a church,
synagogue, or mosque.
II
I also respectfully dissent from the majority’s refusal to
remand on all other issues, insisting instead on acting as
a court of first instance in reviewing Milford’s claim that
it would violate the Establishment Clause to grant Good
News’s application. Milford raised this claim to demon-
strate a compelling interest for saying no to Good News,
even on the erroneous assumption that Lamb’s Chapel’s
public forum analysis would otherwise require Milford to
say yes. Whereas the District Court and Court of Appeals
resolved this case entirely on the ground that Milford’s ac-
tions did not offend the First Amendment’s Speech Clause,
the majority now sees fit to rule on the application of the
Establishment Clause, in derogation of this Court’s proper
role as a court of review. E. g., National Collegiate Athletic
of Appeals’s conclusion that “[i]t is difficult to see how the Club’s activities
differ materially from the ‘religious worship’ described” in other case law,
202 F. 3d 502, 510 (CA2 2000), and the record below.
Justice Stevens distinguishes between proselytizing and worship,
ante, at 130 (dissenting opinion), and distinguishes each from discussion
reflecting a religious point of view. I agree with Justice Stevens that
Good News’s activities may be characterized as proselytizing and there-
fore as outside the purpose of Milford’s limited forum, ante, at 133. Like
the Court of Appeals, I also believe Good News’s meetings have elements
of worship that put the club’s activities further afield of Milford’s limited
forum policy, the legitimacy of which was unchallenged in the summary
judgment proceeding.

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140 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
Souter, J., dissenting
Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 470 (1999) (“[W]e do not decide
in the first instance issues not decided below”).
The Court’s usual insistence on resisting temptations to
convert itself into a trial court and on remaining a court of
review is not any mere procedural nicety, and my objection
to turning us into a district court here does not hinge on a
preference for immutable procedural rules. Respect for our
role as a reviewing court rests, rather, on recognizing that
this Court can often learn a good deal from considering how
a district court and a court of appeals have worked their way
through a difficult issue. It rests on recognizing that an
issue as first conceived may come to be seen differently as a
case moves through trial and appeal; we are most likely to
contribute something of value if we act with the benefit of
whatever refinement may come in the course of litigation.
And our customary refusal to become a trial court reflects
the simple fact that this Court cannot develop a record as
well as a trial court can. If I were a trial judge, for example,
I would balk at deciding on summary judgment whether an
Establishment Clause violation would occur here without
having statements of undisputed facts or uncontradicted
affidavits showing, for example, whether Good News con-
ducts its instruction at the same time as school-sponsored
extracurricular and athletic activities conducted by school
staff and volunteers, see Brief for Respondent 6; whether
any other community groups use school facilities imme-
diately after classes end and how many students participate
in those groups; and the extent to which Good News, with
28 students in its membership, may “dominate the forum”
in a way that heightens the perception of official endorse-
ment, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U. S. 819, 851 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981). We will never
know these facts.
Of course, I am in no better position than the majority
to perform an Establishment Clause analysis in the first

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141 Cite as: 533 U. S. 98 (2001)
Souter, J., dissenting
instance. Like the majority, I lack the benefit that devel-
opment in the District Court and Court of Appeals might
provide, and like the majority I cannot say for sure how
complete the record may be. I can, however, speak to the
doubtful underpinnings of the majority’s conclusion.
This Court has accepted the independent obligation to
obey the Establishment Clause as sufficiently compelling
to satisfy strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. See
id., at 271 (“[T]he interest of the [government] in complying
with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as
compelling”); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U. S., at 394. Milford’s ac-
tions would offend the Establishment Clause if they carried
the message of endorsing religion under the circumstances,
as viewed by a reasonable observer. See Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring). The majority concludes that
such an endorsement effect is out of the question in Milford’s
case, because the context here is “materially indistinguish-
able” from the facts in Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar. Ante,
at 113. In fact, the majority is in no position to say that, for
the principal grounds on which we based our Establishment
Clause holdings in those cases are clearly absent here.
In Widmar, we held that the Establishment Clause did
not bar a religious student group from using a public uni-
versity’s meeting space for worship as well as discussion.
As for the reasonable observers who might perceive gov-
ernment endorsement of religion, we pointed out that the
forum was used by university students, who “are, of course,
young adults,” and, as such, “are less impressionable than
younger students and should be able to appreciate that the
University’s policy is one of neutrality toward religion.”
454 U. S., at 274, n. 14. To the same effect, we remarked
that the “large number of groups meeting on campus” ne-
gated “any reasonable inference of University support from
the mere fact of a campus meeting place.” Ibid. Not only
was the forum “available to a broad class of nonreligious as

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142 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
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well as religious speakers,” but there were, in fact, over 100
recognized student groups at the University, and an “absence
of empirical evidence that religious groups [would] dominate
[the University’s] open forum.” Id., at 274–275; see also id.,
at 274 (“The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of
groups is an important index of secular effect”). And if all
that had not been enough to show that the university-student
use would probably create no impression of religious en-
dorsement, we pointed out that the university in that case
had issued a student handbook with the explicit disclaimer
that “the University’s name will not ‘be identified in any way
with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of
any organization or its members.’ ” Id., at 274, n. 14.
Lamb’s Chapel involved an evening film series on child
rearing open to the general public (and, given the subject
matter, directed at an adult audience). See 508 U. S., at 387,
395. There, school property “had repeatedly been used by
a wide variety of private organizations,” and we could say
with some assurance that “[u]nder these circumstances . . .
there would have been no realistic danger that the commu-
nity would think that the District was endorsing religion or
any particular creed . . . .” Id., at 395.
What we know about this case looks very little like Wid-
mar or Lamb’s Chapel. The cohort addressed by Good
News is not university students with relative maturity,
or even high school pupils, but elementary school children
as young as six.4 The Establishment Clause cases have
4 It is certainly correct that parents are required to give permission for
their children to attend Good News’s classes, see ante, at 115 (as parents
are often required to do for a host of official school extracurricular activi-
ties), and correct that those parents would likely not be confused as to the
sponsorship of Good News’s classes. But the proper focus of concern in
assessing effects includes the elementary school pupils who are invited to
meetings, Lodging, Exh. X2, who see peers heading into classrooms for
religious instruction as other classes end, and who are addressed by the
“challenge” and “invitation.”
The fact that there may be no evidence in the record that individual
students were confused during the time the Good News Club met on school

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consistently recognized the particular impressionability of
schoolchildren, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 583–
584 (1987), and the special protection required for those
in the elementary grades in the school forum, see County
of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 620, n. 69 (1989). We
have held the difference between college students and grade
school pupils to be a “distinction [that] warrants a difference
in constitutional results,” Edwards v. Aguillard, supra, at
584, n. 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Nor is Milford’s limited forum anything like the sites for
wide-ranging intellectual exchange that were home to the
challenged activities in Widmar and Lamb’s Chapel. See
also Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 850, 836–837. In Widmar,
the nature of the university campus and the sheer number
of activities offered precluded the reasonable college ob-
server from seeing government endorsement in any one of
them, and so did the time and variety of community use in
the Lamb’s Chapel case. See also Rosenberger, 515 U. S.,
at 850 (“Given this wide array of nonreligious, antireligious
and competing religious viewpoints in the forum supported
by the University, any perception that the University en-
dorses one particular viewpoint would be illogical”); id., at
836–837, 850 (emphasizing the array of university-funded
magazines containing “widely divergent viewpoints” and
the fact that believers in Christian evangelism competed
on equal footing in the University forum with aficionados
of “Plato, Spinoza, and Descartes,” as well as “Karl Marx,
Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre”); Board of Ed.
of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496
premises pursuant to the District Court’s preliminary injunction is imma-
terial, cf. Brief for Petitioners 38. As Justice O’Connor explained in
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753 (1995),
the endorsement test does not focus “on the actual perception of individual
observers, who naturally have differing degrees of knowledge,” but on
“the perspective of a hypothetical observer.” Id., at 779–780 (opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment).

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144 GOOD NEWS CLUB v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
Souter, J., dissenting
U. S. 226, 252 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“To the extent that
a religious club is merely one of many different student-
initiated voluntary clubs, students should perceive no mes-
sage of government endorsement of religion”).
The timing and format of Good News’s gatherings, on the
other hand, may well affirmatively suggest the imprimatur
of officialdom in the minds of the young children. The club
is open solely to elementary students (not the entire com-
munity, as in Lamb’s Chapel), only four outside groups have
been identified as meeting in the school, and Good News is,
seemingly, the only one whose instruction follows imme-
diately on the conclusion of the official schoolday. See Brief
for National School Boards Association et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 6. Although school is out at 2:56 p.m., Good News ap-
parently requested use of the school beginning at 2:30 on
Tuesdays “during the school year,” so that instruction could
begin promptly at 3:00, see Lodging, Exh. W–1, at which
time children who are compelled by law to attend school
surely remain in the building. Good News’s religious meet-
ing follows regular school activities so closely that the Good
News instructor must wait to begin until “the room is clear,”
and “people are out of the room,” App. P29, before starting
proceedings in the classroom located next to the regular
third- and fourth-grade rooms, id., at N12. In fact, the
temporal and physical continuity of Good News’s meetings
with the regular school routine seems to be the whole point
of using the school. When meetings were held in a commu-
nity church, 8 or 10 children attended; after the school be-
came the site, the number went up three-fold. Id., at P12;
Lodging, Exh. AA2.
Even on the summary judgment record, then, a record
lacking whatever supplementation the trial process might
have led to, and devoid of such insight as the trial and ap-
pellate judges might have contributed in addressing the
Establishment Clause, we can say this: there is a good case
that Good News’s exercises blur the line between public

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classroom instruction and private religious indoctrination,
leaving a reasonable elementary school pupil unable to ap-
preciate that the former instruction is the business of the
school while the latter evangelism is not. Thus, the facts
we know (or think we know) point away from the majority’s
conclusion, and while the consolation may be that nothing
really gets resolved when the judicial process is so truncated,
that is not much to recommend today’s result.