SAUCIER v. KATZ et al.

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194 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
SAUCIER v. KATZ et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 99–1977. Argued March 20, 2001—Decided June 18, 2001
Respondent Katz, president of respondent In Defense of Animals, filed a
suit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388, against, inter alios, petitioner Saucier, a military policeman.
Katz alleged, among other things, that Saucier had violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by using excessive force in arresting him while
he protested during Vice President Gore’s speech at a San Francisco
army base. The District Court declined to grant Saucier summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds. In affirming, the Ninth
Circuit made a two-part qualified immunity inquiry. First, it found
that the law governing Saucier’s conduct was clearly established when
the incident occurred. It therefore moved to a second step: to deter-
mine if a reasonable officer could have believed, in light of the clearly
established law, that his conduct was lawful. The court concluded
that this step and the merits of a Fourth Amendment excessive force
claim are identical, since both concern the objective reasonableness
of the officer’s conduct in light of the circumstances the officer faced
at the scene. Thus, it found, summary judgment based on qualified
immunity was inappropriate.
Held:
1. A qualified immunity ruling requires an analysis not susceptible
of fusion with the question whether unreasonable force was used in
making the arrest. The Ninth Circuit’s approach cannot be reconciled
with Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635. A qualified immunity de-
fense must be considered in proper sequence. A ruling should be made
early in the proceedings so that the cost and expenses of trial are
avoided where the defense is dispositive. Such immunity is an en-
titlement not to stand trial, not a defense from liability. Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526. The initial inquiry is whether a constitu-
tional right would have been violated on the facts alleged, for if no
right would have been violated, there is no need for further inquiry into
immunity. However, if a violation could be made out on a favorable
view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is whether
the right was clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in
light of the case’s specific context, not as a broad general proposition.
The relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a rea-

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sonable officer that the conduct was unlawful in the situation he con-
fronted. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 615. The Ninth Circuit’s
approach—to deny summary judgment if a material issue of fact re-
mains on the excessive force claim—could undermine the goal of quali-
fied immunity to avoid excessive disruption of government and permit
the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818. If the law did not put the
officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary
judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that qualified immunity is duplicative in an exces-
sive force case, thus eliminating the need for the second step. In hold-
ing that qualified immunity applied in the Fourth Amendment context
just as it would for any other official misconduct claim, the Anderson
Court rejected the argument that there is no distinction between the
reasonableness standard for warrantless searches and the qualified im-
munity inquiry. In an attempt to distinguish Anderson, Katz claims
that the subsequent Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, decision set forth
an excessive force analysis indistinguishable from qualified immunity,
thus rendering the separate immunity inquiry superfluous and inappro-
priate in such cases. Contrary to his arguments, the immunity and
excessive force inquiries remain distinct after Graham. Graham sets
forth factors relevant to the merits of a constitutional excessive force
claim, which include the severity of the crime, whether the suspect
poses a threat to the officers or others, and whether he is actively resist-
ing arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id., at 396. If an
officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely
to fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more
force than in fact was needed. The qualified immunity inquiry’s con-
cern, on the other hand, is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes
can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.
An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts, but have
a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force
is legal in those circumstances. Pp. 200–207.
2. Petitioner was entitled to qualified immunity. Assuming that a
constitutional violation occurred under the facts alleged, the question
is whether this general prohibition was the source for clearly estab-
lished law that was contravened in the circumstances. In the circum-
stances presented to petitioner, which included the duty to protect the
Vice President’s safety and security from persons unknown in number,
there was no clearly established rule prohibiting him from acting as
he did. This conclusion is confirmed by the uncontested fact that the
force used—dragging Katz from the area and shoving him while placing

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196 SAUCIER v. KATZ
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him into a van—was not so excessive that Katz suffered hurt or in-
jury. Pp. 207–209.
194 F. 3d 962, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Sou-
ter, J., joined as to Parts I and II. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment, in which Stevens and Breyer, JJ., joined, post,
p. 209. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, post, p. 217.
Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for
petitioner. On the briefs were former Solicitor General
Waxman, Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Assistant
Attorney General Ogden, Jeffrey A. Lamken, Barbara L.
Herwig, and Edward Himmelfarb.
J. Kirk Boyd argued the cause for respondents. With him
on the brief was David H. Williams.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Texas
et al. by John Cornyn, Attorney General of Texas, Andy Taylor, First
Assistant Attorney General, Gregory S. Coleman, Solicitor General, and
Lisa R. Eskow, Assistant Solicitor General, joined by the Attorneys Gen-
eral for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce
M. Botelho of Alaska, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California,
Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane
Brady of Delaware, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisi-
ana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachu-
setts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don
Stenberg of Nebraska, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Heidi Heitkamp of
North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of
Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania,
Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota,
Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell
of Vermont, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington; for the Grand Lodge
of the Fraternal Order of Police by Tom Rutherford; and for the National
Association of Police Organizations et al. by Stephen R. McSpadden.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by David Rudovsky, Michael Avery, Ruth E.
Harlow, Steven R. Shapiro, and Alan L. Schlosser; and for the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York by Leon Friedman and Ronald J.
Tabak.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case a citizen alleged excessive force was used
to arrest him. The arresting officer asserted the defense
of qualified immunity. The matter we address is whether
the requisite analysis to determine qualified immunity is so
intertwined with the question whether the officer used ex-
cessive force in making the arrest that qualified immunity
and constitutional violation issues should be treated as one
question, to be decided by the trier of fact. The Court of
Appeals held the inquiries do merge into a single question.
We now reverse and hold that the ruling on qualified immu-
nity requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion with the
question whether unreasonable force was used in making
the arrest.
I
In autumn of 1994, the Presidio Army Base in San Fran-
cisco was the site of an event to celebrate conversion of
the base to a national park. Among the speakers was Vice
President Albert Gore, Jr., who attracted several hundred
observers from the military and the general public. Some
in attendance were not on hand to celebrate, however. Re-
spondent Elliot Katz was concerned that the Army’s Letter-
man Hospital would be used for conducting experiments on
animals. (Katz was president of a group called In Defense
of Animals. Although both he and the group are respond-
ents here, the issues we discuss center upon Katz, and we
refer to him as “respondent.”) To voice opposition to the
possibility that the hospital might be used for experiments,
respondent brought with him a cloth banner, approximately
4 by 3 feet, that read “Please Keep Animal Torture Out of
Our National Parks.” In the past, as respondent was aware,
members of the public had been asked to leave the military
base when they engaged in certain activities, such as dis-
tributing handbills; and he kept the banner concealed under
his jacket as he walked through the base.

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The area designated for the speakers contained seating
for the general public, separated from the stage by a waist-
high fence. Respondent sat in the front row of the public
seating area. At about the time Vice President Gore began
speaking, respondent removed the banner from his jacket,
started to unfold it, and walked toward the fence and speak-
ers’ platform.
Petitioner Donald Saucier is a military police officer who
was on duty that day. He had been warned by his superiors
of the possibility of demonstrations, and respondent had
been identified as a potential protester. Petitioner and Ser-
geant Steven Parker—also a military police officer, but not
a party to the suit—recognized respondent and moved to
intercept him as he walked toward the fence. As he reached
the barrier and began placing the banner on the other side,
the officers grabbed respondent from behind, took the ban-
ner, and rushed him out of the area. Each officer had one
of respondent’s arms, half-walking, half-dragging him, with
his feet “barely touching the ground.” App. 24. Respond-
ent was wearing a visible, knee-high leg brace, although peti-
tioner later testified he did not remember noticing it at
the time. Saucier and Parker took respondent to a nearby
military van, where, respondent claims, he was shoved or
thrown inside. Id., at 25. The reason for the shove remains
unclear. It seems agreed that respondent placed his feet
somewhere on the outside of the van, perhaps the bumper,
but there is a dispute whether he did so to resist. As a
result of the shove, respondent claims, he fell to the floor of
the van, where he caught himself just in time to avoid any
injury. The officers drove respondent to a military police
station, held him for a brief time, and then released him.
Though the details are not clear, it appears that at least one
other protester was also placed into the van and detained for
a brief time. Id., at 27.
Respondent brought this action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California against

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petitioner and other officials pursuant to Bivens v. Six Un-
known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), alleg-
ing, inter alia, that defendants had violated respondent’s
Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force to arrest
him. The District Court granted the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immu-
nity on all claims other than the excessive force claim against
Saucier. It held a dispute on a material fact existed con-
cerning whether excessive force was used to remove re-
spondent from the crowd and place him into the van. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 27a. The District Court held that the law
governing excessive force claims was clearly established at
the time of the arrest, and that “[i]n the Fourth Amendment
context, the qualified immunity inquiry is the same as the
inquiry made on the merits.” Id., at 29a–30a. As a result,
it ruled, petitioner was not entitled to summary judgment.
Id., at 30a.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit petitioner filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial
of qualified immunity. 194 F. 3d 962 (1999). The Court of
Appeals affirmed, noting at the outset its two-part analysis
for qualified immunity questions. First, the Court of Ap-
peals considers “whether the law governing the official’s
conduct was clearly established.” Id., at 967. If it was
not, that ends the matter, and the official is entitled to immu-
nity. If, however, the law was clearly established when the
conduct occurred, the Court of Appeals’ second step is to
determine if a reasonable officer could have believed, in
light of the clearly established law, that his conduct was
lawful. Ibid. As to the first step of its analysis, the court
observed that Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), sets
forth the objective reasonableness test for evaluating ex-
cessive force claims, a principle the Court of Appeals con-
cluded was clearly established for qualified immunity pur-
poses. The court then concluded that the second step of the
qualified immunity inquiry and the merits of the Fourth

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Amendment excessive force claim are identical, since both
concern the objective reasonableness of the officer’s con-
duct in light of the circumstances the officer faced on the
scene. 194 F. 3d, at 968. On this reasoning, summary judg-
ment based on qualified immunity was held inappropriate.
Id., at 968–969.
Saucier, represented by the Government of the United
States, sought review here, arguing the Court of Appeals
erred in its view that the qualified immunity inquiry is
the same as the constitutional inquiry and so becomes su-
perfluous or duplicative when excessive force is alleged.
We granted certiorari, 531 U. S. 991 (2000).
II
The Court of Appeals ruled first that the right was clearly
established; and second that the reasonableness inquiry into
excessive force meant that it need not consider aspects of
qualified immunity, leaving the whole matter to the jury.
194 F. 3d, at 967. This approach cannot be reconciled with
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 (1987), however, and
was in error in two respects. As we shall explain, the first
inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have
been violated on the facts alleged; second, assuming the vio-
lation is established, the question whether the right was
clearly established must be considered on a more specific
level than recognized by the Court of Appeals.
In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a
constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity
defense must be considered in proper sequence. Where the
defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue
should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs
and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is
dispositive. Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to
stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitch-
ell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526 (1985). The privilege is
“an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to lia-

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bility; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost
if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Ibid. As
a result, “we repeatedly have stressed the importance of
resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage
in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224, 227 (1991)
(per curiam).
A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue
must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do
the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a con-
stitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry. Siegert
v. Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 232 (1991). In the course of deter-
mining whether a constitutional right was violated on the
premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set
forth principles which will become the basis for a hold-
ing that a right is clearly established. This is the process
for the law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one
reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence or
nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry.
The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court
simply to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly
established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the
circumstances of the case.
If no constitutional right would have been violated were
the allegations established, there is no necessity for fur-
ther inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other
hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view
of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to
ask whether the right was clearly established. This in-
quiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposi-
tion; and it too serves to advance understanding of the law
and to allow officers to avoid the burden of trial if qualified
immunity is applicable.
In this litigation, for instance, there is no doubt that
Graham v. Connor, supra, clearly establishes the general

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proposition that use of force is contrary to the Fourth
Amendment if it is excessive under objective standards of
reasonableness. Yet that is not enough. Rather, we em-
phasized in Anderson “that the right the official is alleged
to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a
more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a rea-
sonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” 483 U. S., at 640. The relevant, dis-
positive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 615 (1999)
(“[A]s we explained in Anderson, the right allegedly vio-
lated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity
before a court can determine if it was clearly established”).
The approach the Court of Appeals adopted—to deny
summary judgment any time a material issue of fact re-
mains on the excessive force claim—could undermine the
goal of qualified immunity to “avoid excessive disruption of
government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial
claims on summary judgment.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U. S. 800, 818 (1982). If the law did not put the officer on
notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary
judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate. See
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986) (qualified immu-
nity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law”).
This is not to say that the formulation of a general rule
is beside the point, nor is it to insist the courts must have
agreed upon the precise formulation of the standard. As-
suming, for instance, that various courts have agreed that
certain conduct is a constitutional violation under facts not
distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in
the case at hand, the officer would not be entitled to quali-
fied immunity based simply on the argument that courts

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had not agreed on one verbal formulation of the controlling
standard.
The Court of Appeals concluded that qualified immunity
is merely duplicative in an excessive force case, eliminating
the need for the second step where a constitutional viola-
tion could be found based on the allegations. In Anderson,
a warrantless search case, we rejected the argument that
there is no distinction between the reasonableness standard
for warrantless searches and the qualified immunity inquiry.
We acknowledged there was some “surface appeal” to the
argument that, because the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee
was a right to be free from “unreasonable” searches and
seizures, it would be inconsistent to conclude that an officer
who acted unreasonably under the constitutional standard
nevertheless was entitled to immunity because he “ ‘reason-
ably’ acted unreasonably.” 483 U. S., at 643. This super-
ficial similarity, however, could not overcome either our
history of applying qualified immunity analysis to Fourth
Amendment claims against officers or the justifications for
applying the doctrine in an area where officers perform
their duties with considerable uncertainty as to “whether
particular searches or seizures comport with the Fourth
Amendment.” Id., at 644. With respect, moreover, to the
argument made in Anderson that an exception should be
made for Fourth Amendment cases, we observed “the heavy
burden this argument must sustain to be successful,” since
“the doctrine of qualified immunity reflects a balance that
has been struck ‘across the board.’ ” Id., at 642 (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 821). We held that qualified
immunity applied in the Fourth Amendment context just
as it would for any other claim of official misconduct. 483
U. S., at 644.
Faced, then, with the heavy burden of distinguishing An-
derson and of carving out an exception to the typical quali-
fied immunity analysis applied in other Fourth Amendment
contexts, the primary submission by respondent in defense

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of the Court of Appeals’ decision is that our decision in
Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), somehow changes
matters. Graham, in respondent’s view, sets forth an ex-
cessive force analysis indistinguishable from qualified im-
munity, rendering the separate immunity inquiry superfluous
and inappropriate. Respondent asserts that, like the quali-
fied immunity analysis applicable in other contexts, the ex-
cessive force test already affords officers latitude for mis-
taken beliefs as to the amount of force necessary, so that
“Graham has addressed for the excessive force area most
of the concerns expressed in Anderson.” Brief for Re-
spondents 7. Respondent points out that Graham did not
address the interaction of excessive force claims and quali-
fied immunity, since the issue was not raised, see 490 U. S.,
at 399, n. 12; and respondent seeks to distinguish Anderson
on the theory that the issue of probable cause implicates
evolving legal standards and resulting legal uncertainty,
a subject raising recurrent questions of qualified immunity.
By contrast, respondent says, excessive force is governed
by the standard established in Graham, a standard pro-
viding ample guidance for particular situations. Finally,
respondent adopts the suggestion made by one Court of
Appeals that the relevant distinction is that probable cause
is an ex post inquiry, whereas excessive force, like quali-
fied immunity, should be evaluated from an ex ante per-
spective. See Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F. 2d 817, 824,
n. 11 (CA2 1990).
These arguments or attempted distinctions cannot bear
the weight respondent seeks to place upon them. Graham
did not change the qualified immunity framework explained
in Anderson. The inquiries for qualified immunity and ex-
cessive force remain distinct, even after Graham.
In Graham, we held that claims of excessive force in the
context of arrests or investigatory stops should be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness
standard,” not under substantive due process principles.

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490 U. S., at 388, 394. Because “police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,”
id., at 397, the reasonableness of the officer’s belief as to
the appropriate level of force should be judged from that
on-scene perspective, id., at 396. We set out a test that
cautioned against the “20/20 vision of hindsight” in favor
of deference to the judgment of reasonable officers on the
scene. Id., at 393, 396. Graham sets forth a list of factors
relevant to the merits of the constitutional excessive force
claim, “requir[ing] careful attention to the facts and cir-
cumstances of each particular case, including the severity
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an im-
mediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight.” Id., at 396. If an officer reason-
ably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to
fight back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using
more force than in fact was needed.
The qualified immunity inquiry, on the other hand, has a
further dimension. The concern of the immunity inquiry
is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made
as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct. It
is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the
relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to
the factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might
correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mis-
taken understanding as to whether a particular amount
of force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer’s mis-
take as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the
officer is entitled to the immunity defense.
Graham does not always give a clear answer as to whether
a particular application of force will be deemed excessive by
the courts. This is the nature of a test which must accom-
modate limitless factual circumstances. This reality serves

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to refute respondent’s claimed distinction between excessive
force and other Fourth Amendment contexts; in both spheres
the law must be elaborated from case to case. Qualified im-
munity operates in this case, then, just as it does in others,
to protect officers from the sometimes “hazy border between
excessive and acceptable force,” Priester v. Riviera Beach,
208 F. 3d 919, 926–927 (CA11 2000), and to ensure that before
they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct
is unlawful.
Graham and Anderson refute the excessive force/probable
cause distinction on which much of respondent’s position
seems to depend. The deference owed officers facing suits
for alleged excessive force is not different in some qualita-
tive respect from the probable-cause inquiry in Anderson.
Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the
facts establishing the existence of probable cause or exigent
circumstances, for example, and in those situations courts
will not hold that they have violated the Constitution. Yet,
even if a court were to hold that the officer violated the
Fourth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable, war-
rantless search, Anderson still operates to grant officers
immunity for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their
actions. The same analysis is applicable in excessive force
cases, where in addition to the deference officers receive
on the underlying constitutional claim, qualified immunity
can apply in the event the mistaken belief was reasonable.
The temporal perspective of the inquiry, whether labeled
as ex ante or ex post, offers no meaningful distinction be-
tween excessive force and other Fourth Amendment suits.
Graham recognized as much, reviewing several of our
probable-cause and search warrant cases, then stating that
“[w]ith respect to a claim of excessive force, the same stand-
ard of reasonableness at the moment applies.” 490 U. S., at
396 (discussing use of force under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1
(1968); probable cause to arrest under Hill v. California, 401
U. S. 797 (1971); and search warrant requirements under

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Opinion of the Court
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79 (1987)); see also Hunter
v. Bryant, 502 U. S., at 228 (“Probable cause existed if ‘at
the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circum-
stances within their knowledge and of which they had rea-
sonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant
a prudent man in believing’ ” a crime had been committed
(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 (1964))). Excessive
force claims, like most other Fourth Amendment issues,
are evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the
information the officers had when the conduct occurred.
III
The case was presented to the Court of Appeals on the
assumption that respondent’s seizure and brief detention
did not violate clearly established First Amendment privi-
leges and did not violate the Fourth Amendment right to
be free from arrest without probable cause, as distinct
from the force used to detain. The sole question, then,
is whether the force used violated a clearly established
Fourth Amendment protection so that petitioner was not
entitled to immunity.
Our instruction to the district courts and courts of ap-
peals to concentrate at the outset on the definition of the
constitutional right and to determine whether, on the facts
alleged, a constitutional violation could be found is im-
portant. As we have said, the procedure permits courts
in appropriate cases to elaborate the constitutional right
with greater degrees of specificity. Because we granted cer-
tiorari only to determine whether qualified immunity was
appropriate, however, and because of the limits imposed
upon us by the questions on which we granted review, we
will assume a constitutional violation could have occurred
under the facts alleged based simply on the general rule
prohibiting excessive force, then proceed to the question
whether this general prohibition against excessive force was
the source for clearly established law that was contravened

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208 SAUCIER v. KATZ
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in the circumstances this officer faced. There was no con-
travention under this standard. Though it is doubtful that
the force used was excessive, we need not rest our conclu-
sion on that determination. The question is what the offi-
cer reasonably understood his powers and responsibilities
to be, when he acted, under clearly established standards.
Respondent’s excessive force claim for the most part
depends upon the “gratuitously violent shove” allegedly re-
ceived when he was placed into the van, although respond-
ent notes as well that the alleged violation resulted from
the “totality of the circumstances,” including the way he
was removed from the speaking area. See Brief for Re-
spondents 3, n. 2.
These circumstances, however, disclose substantial
grounds for the officer to have concluded he had legitimate
justification under the law for acting as he did. In Graham
we noted that “[o]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investiga-
tory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”
490 U. S., at 396. A reasonable officer in petitioner’s posi-
tion could have believed that hurrying respondent away from
the scene, where the Vice President was speaking and re-
spondent had just approached the fence designed to sepa-
rate the public from the speakers, was within the bounds
of appropriate police responses.
Petitioner did not know the full extent of the threat re-
spondent posed or how many other persons there might be
who, in concert with respondent, posed a threat to the secu-
rity of the Vice President. There were other potential pro-
testers in the crowd, and at least one other individual was
arrested and placed into the van with respondent. In carry-
ing out the detention, as it has been assumed the officers
had the right to do, petitioner was required to recognize
the necessity to protect the Vice President by securing re-
spondent and restoring order to the scene. It cannot be said

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209 Cite as: 533 U. S. 194 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
there was a clearly established rule that would prohibit
using the force petitioner did to place respondent into the
van to accomplish these objectives.
As for the shove respondent received when he was
placed into the van, those same circumstances show some
degree of urgency. We have approved the observation that
“[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem un-
necessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the
Fourth Amendment.” Ibid. (citations omitted). Pushes
and shoves, like other police conduct, must be judged under
the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.
In the circumstances presented to this officer, which
included the duty to protect the safety and security of the
Vice President of the United States from persons unknown
in number, neither respondent nor the Court of Appeals
has identified any case demonstrating a clearly established
rule prohibiting the officer from acting as he did, nor are
we aware of any such rule. Our conclusion is confirmed
by the uncontested fact that the force was not so excessive
that respondent suffered hurt or injury. On these prem-
ises, petitioner was entitled to qualified immunity, and the
suit should have been dismissed at an early stage in the
proceedings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens and
Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.
In Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), the Court an-
nounced and described an “objective reasonableness” stand-
ard to govern all claims that law enforcement officers, in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment, used excessive force in the
course of an arrest. Measuring material facts of this case
that are not subject to genuine dispute against the Graham

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210 SAUCIER v. KATZ
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
standard, I conclude that officer Saucier’s motion for sum-
mary judgment should have been granted. I therefore con-
cur in the Court’s judgment. However, I would not travel
the complex route the Court lays out for lower courts.
Application of the Graham objective reasonableness
standard is both necessary, under currently governing prece-
dent, and, in my view, sufficient to resolve cases of this genre.
The Court today tacks on to a Graham inquiry a second,
overlapping objective reasonableness inquiry purportedly
demanded by qualified immunity doctrine. The two-part
test today’s decision imposes holds large potential to confuse.
Endeavors to bring the Court’s abstract instructions down
to earth, I suspect, will bear out what lower courts have
already observed—paradigmatically, the determination of
police misconduct in excessive force cases and the availabil-
ity of qualified immunity both hinge on the same question:
Taking into account the particular circumstances confronting
the defendant officer, could a reasonable officer, identically
situated, have believed the force employed was lawful? See,
e. g., Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F. 3d 691, 695 (CA1
1994); Rowland v. Perry, 41 F. 3d 167, 173 (CA4 1994).
Nothing more and nothing else need be answered in this
case.
I
All claims that law enforcement officers have used exces-
sive force in the course of an arrest, Graham made explicit,
are to be judged “under the Fourth Amendment and its
‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substan-
tive due process’ approach.” 490 U. S., at 395. Underlying
intent or motive are not relevant to the inquiry; rather,
“the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confront-
ing them.” Id., at 397. The proper perspective in judg-
ing an excessive force claim, Graham explained, is that of
“a reasonable officer on the scene” and “at the moment” force
was employed. Id., at 396. “Not every push or shove,” the

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211 Cite as: 533 U. S. 194 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
Court cautioned, “even if it may later seem unnecessary in
the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amend-
ment.” Ibid. (citation omitted). “The calculus of reason-
ableness” must allow for the reality that “police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments” about the force
a particular situation warrants “in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Id., at 396–397.
Under Graham’s instructions, the question in this case
is whether officer Saucier, in light of the facts and circum-
stances confronting him, could have reasonably believed
he acted lawfully. Here, as in the mine run of excessive
force cases, no inquiry more complex than that is warranted.
Inspecting this case under Graham’s lens, and without
doubling the “objectively reasonable” inquiry, I agree that
Katz’s submissions were too slim to put officer Saucier to the
burden of trial. As the Court points out, it is not genuinely
in doubt that “[a] reasonable officer in [Saucier’s] position
could have believed that hurrying [Katz] away from the
scene . . . was within the bounds of appropriate police re-
sponses.” Ante, at 208. Katz’s excessive force claim thus
depended on the “gratuitously violent shove” he allegedly
received. Ibid.; see Brief for Respondents 3, n. 2 (conceding
that “the gratuitous violent shove” was essential to Katz’s
excessive force claim).
Yet Katz failed to proffer proof, after pretrial discovery,
that Saucier, as distinguished from his fellow officer Parker,1
had a hand in the allegedly violent shove.2 Saucier, in his
1 Though named as a defendant, Parker was never served with the com-
plaint, and therefore did not become a party to this litigation. See Brief
for Petitioner 3, n. 4.
2 See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e) (“When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading,
but the adverse party’s response . . . must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”).

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212 SAUCIER v. KATZ
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
deposition, denied participating in any shove, see App. 39–
40, while Katz, in his deposition, said, without elaborating:
“They [Parker and Saucier] pretty much threw me in. Just
shoved me in,” id., at 25. But critically, at no point did Katz
say, specifically, that Saucier himself, and not only Parker,
pushed or shoved.
Katz’s reluctance directly to charge Saucier with pushing
or shoving is understandable in view of a television news
videotape of the episode Katz presented as an exhibit to his
complaint. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. The videotape
shows that the shove, described by Katz as gratuitously vio-
lent, came from the officer on the right side of the police
van, not from the officer positioned on the left side. It is
undisputed that the officer on the right is Parker, the officer
on the left, Saucier. See Pet. for Cert. 27–28, and n. 19;
Brief for Petitioner 50, n. 26. Mindful of Graham’s cau-
tionary observation that “[n]ot every push or shove, even
if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s
chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment,” 490 U. S., at
396 (citation omitted), and in view of Katz’s failure to deny
that the shove alleged to establish excessive force came from
Parker alone, not from Saucier, I am persuaded that Katz
tendered no triable excessive force claim against Saucier.3
II
In the Court’s opinion, Graham is inadequate to con-
trol adjudication of excessive force cases. Graham must be
overlaid, the Court maintains, by a sequential qualified im-
munity inquiry. Ante, at 200. The Court instructs lower
courts first to undertake what appears to be an unadorned
3 As the Court observes, there is a dispute whether Katz was resist-
ing arrest at the time he was placed in the van. Ante, at 198. That dis-
pute is irrelevant, however, in view of the absence of any indication that
Saucier employed excessive force in removing Katz from the site of the
celebration and placing him in the van. See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F. 3d
167, 174 (CA4 1994) (“[d]isputed versions of the facts alone are not enough
to warrant denial of summary judgment”).

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213 Cite as: 533 U. S. 194 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
Graham inquiry, i. e., to consider initially whether the
parties’ submissions, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, could
show that the officer’s conduct violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. Ante, at 201. If the plaintiff prevails on that
“threshold question,” ibid., the trial court is then to proceed
to the “dispositive [qualified immunity] inquiry,” asking
“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that the
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted,” ante,
at 202.4
In the instant case, however, the Court finds that pro-
cedural impediments stop it from considering first “whether
a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts
alleged.” Ante, at 200, 207–208. The Court therefore “as-
sume[s] a constitutional violation could have occurred,” ante,
at 207—i. e., it supposes a trier could have found that officer
Saucier used force excessive under Graham’s definition.
Even so, the Court reasons, qualified immunity would shield
Saucier because he could have “concluded he had legitimate
justification under the law for acting as he did.” Ante, at
208.
Skipping ahead of the basic Graham (constitutional vio-
lation) inquiry it admonished lower courts to undertake at
the outset, the Court failed to home in on the duplication
inherent in its two-step scheme. As lower courts dealing
with excessive force cases on the ground have recognized,
however, this Court’s decisions invoke “the same ‘objec-
tively reasonable’ standard in describing both the consti-
tutional test of liability [citing Graham, 490 U. S., at 397],
and the . . . standard for qualified immunity [citing Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 639 (1987)].” Roy, 42 F. 3d, at
4 The Court’s observation that “neither respondent nor the Court of
Appeals ha[s] identified any case demonstrating a clearly established rule
prohibiting the officer from acting as he did,” ante, at 209, must be read
in light of our previous caution that “the very action in question [need
not have] previously been held unlawful” for a plaintiff to defeat qualified
immunity, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640 (1987).

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214 SAUCIER v. KATZ
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
695; see Street v. Parham, 929 F. 2d 537, 540 (CA10 1991)
(describing excessive force case as one “where the determi-
nation of liability and the availability of qualified immunity
depend on the same findings”). In other words, an officer
who uses force that is objectively reasonable “in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting [him],” Graham, 490
U. S., at 397, simultaneously meets the standard for qualified
immunity, see ante, at 201, and the standard the Court set
in Graham for a decision on the merits in his favor. Con-
versely, an officer whose conduct is objectively unreason-
able under Graham should find no shelter under a sequential
qualified immunity test.
Double counting “objective reasonableness,” the Court ap-
pears to suggest, ante, at 200, is demanded by Anderson,
which twice restated that qualified immunity shields the con-
duct of officialdom “across the board.” 483 U. S., at 642, 645
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 821 (1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring)); see also Anderson, 483 U. S., at
643 (“we have been unwilling to complicate qualified im-
munity analysis by making the scope or extent of immunity
turn on the precise nature of various officials’ duties or the
precise character of the particular rights alleged to have
been violated”). As I see it, however, excessive force cases
are not meet for Anderson’s two-part test.
Anderson presented the question whether the particu-
lar search conducted without a warrant was supported by
probable cause and exigent circumstances. The answer to
such a question is often far from clear. 5 Law in the area
is constantly evolving and, correspondingly, variously inter-
preted. As aptly observed by the Second Circuit, “even
learned and experienced jurists have had difficulty in de-
5 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603 (1999), is a prototypical case. There,
the Court accorded qualified immunity to police who permitted the media
to accompany them on a search of a house. The constitutionality of
the ride-along practice was unsettled at the time of the incident-in-suit
in Wilson, and remained so until this Court spoke.

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215 Cite as: 533 U. S. 194 (2001)
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
fining the rules that govern a determination of probable
cause . . . . As he tries to find his way in this thicket, the
police officer must not be held to act at his peril.” Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 456 F. 2d 1339, 1348 (1972) (on remand). In this light,
Anderson reasoned: “Law enforcement officers whose judg-
ments in making these difficult determinations [whether
particular searches or seizures comport with the Fourth
Amendment] are objectively legally reasonable should no
more be held personally liable in damages than should
officials making analogous determinations in other areas
of law.” 483 U. S., at 644 (emphasis added).
As the foregoing discussion indicates, however, “excessive
force” typically is not an “analogous determination.” The
constitutional issue whether an officer’s use of force was rea-
sonable in given circumstances routinely can be answered
simply by following Graham’s directions. In inquiring,
under Graham, whether an officer’s use of force was within
a range of reasonable options, the decisionmaker is also
(and necessarily) answering the question whether a rea-
sonable officer “could have believed” his use of force “to be
lawful,” Anderson, 483 U. S., at 638. See Street, 929 F. 2d,
at 541, n. 2 (because of difficulty of deciding probable-cause
issues, the conduct of an officer may be objectively reason-
able even if cause did not exist, but “in excessive force cases,
once a factfinder has determined that the force used was un-
necessary under the circumstances, any question of objective
reasonableness has also been foreclosed”).
The Court fears that dispensing with the duplicative quali-
fied immunity inquiry will mean “leaving the whole matter
to the jury.” Ante, at 200. Again, experience teaches
otherwise. Lower courts, armed with Graham’s directions,
have not shied away from granting summary judgment to
defendant officials in Fourth Amendment excessive force
cases where the challenged conduct is objectively reasonable
based on relevant, undisputed facts. See, e. g., Wilson v.

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216 SAUCIER v. KATZ
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
Spain, 209 F. 3d 713, 716 (CA8 2000) (“address[ing] in one
fell swoop both [defendant’s] qualified immunity and the mer-
its of [plaintiff ’s] Fourth Amendment [excessive force] claim”
and concluding officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable
in the circumstances, so summary judgment for officer was
proper); Roy, 42 F. 3d, at 695 (under single objective reason-
ableness test, District Court properly granted summary
judgment for defendant); 6 Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F. 3d 1297,
1303–1304 (CADC 1993) (same). Indeed, this very case, as
I earlier explained, see supra, at 210–212, fits the summary
judgment bill. Of course, if an excessive force claim turns
on which of two conflicting stories best captures what hap-
pened on the street, Graham will not permit summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant official. And that is as it
should be. When a plaintiff proffers evidence that the offi-
cial subdued her with a chokehold even though she complied
at all times with his orders, while the official proffers evi-
dence that he used only stern words, a trial must be had.
In such a case, the Court’s two-step procedure is altogether
inutile.
* * *
For the reasons stated, I concur in the Court’s judgment,
but not in the two-step inquiry the Court has ordered. Once
it has been determined that an officer violated the Fourth
Amendment by using “objectively unreasonable” force as
6 Upholding summary judgment for a police officer who shot an armed,
intoxicated, belligerently behaving arrestee, the First Circuit in Roy
elaborated: “[T]he Supreme Court intends to surround the police who
make these on-the-spot choices in dangerous situations with a fairly wide
zone of protection in close cases. Decisions from this circuit and other
circuits are consistent with that view. And in close cases, a jury does
not automatically get to second-guess these life and death decisions,
even though the plaintiff has an expert and a plausible claim that the
situation could better have been handled differently.” 42 F. 3d, at 695
(footnote omitted).

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217 Cite as: 533 U. S. 194 (2001)
Opinion of Souter, J.
that term is explained in Graham v. Connor, there is simply
no work for a qualified immunity inquiry to do.
Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion, but would
remand the case for application of the qualified immunity
standard.

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218 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 99–1434. Argued November 8, 2000—Decided June 18, 2001
The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States authorizes the
United States Customs Service to classify and fix the rate of duty on
imports, under rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury. As relevant here, the Secretary provides for tariff rulings
before the entry of goods by regulations authorizing “ruling letters”
setting tariff classifications for particular imports. Any of the 46 port-
of-entry Customs offices and the Customs Headquarters Office may
issue such letters. Respondent imports “day planners,” three-ring
binders with pages for daily schedules, phone numbers and addresses, a
calendar, and suchlike. After classifying the planners as duty free for
several years, Customs Headquarters issued a ruling letter classifying
them as bound diaries subject to tariff. Mead filed suit in the Court of
International Trade, which granted the Government summary judg-
ment. In reversing, the Federal Circuit found that ruling letters should
not be treated like Customs regulations, which receive the highest level
of deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, because they are not preceded by notice
and comment as under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), do not
carry the force of law, and are not intended to clarify importers’s rights
and obligations beyond the specific case. The court gave no deference
at all to the ruling letter at issue.
Held: Administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision
qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress dele-
gated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force
of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was pro-
mulgated in the exercise of such authority. Such delegation may be
shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in ad-
judication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indica-
tion of comparable congressional intent. A Customs ruling letter has
no claim to Chevron deference, but, under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U. S. 134, it is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness.
Pp. 227–239.
(a) When Congress has explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there
has been an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a

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219 Cite as: 533 U. S. 218 (2001)
Syllabus
specific statutory provision by regulation, and any ensuing regula-
tion is binding unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious
in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Even in the ab-
sence of an express delegation of authority on a particular question,
agencies charged with applying a statute necessarily make all sorts
of interpretive choices, and while not all of those choices bind judges
to follow them, they may influence courts facing questions the agen-
cies have already answered. The weight accorded to an administrative
judgment “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, supra, at 140.
In Chevron, this Court identified a category of interpretive choices
distinguished by an additional reason for judicial deference, recogniz-
ing that Congress engages not only in express, but also in implicit,
delegation of specific interpretive authority. It can be apparent from
the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory cir-
cumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak
with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in the statute or fills
in a space in the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not
have intent as to a particular result. When circumstances implying
such an expectation exist, a reviewing court must accept the agency’s
position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. A very good indicator of del-
egation meriting Chevron treatment is express congressional authoriza-
tions to engage in the rulemaking or adjudication process that produces
the regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed. Thus, the
overwhelming number of cases applying Chevron deference have re-
viewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudica-
tion. Although the fact that the tariff classification at issue was not a
product of such formal process does not alone bar Chevron’s application,
cf., e. g., NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
513 U. S. 251, 256–257, 263, there are ample reasons to deny Chevron
deference here. Pp. 227–231.
(b) There is no indication on the statute’s face that Congress meant
to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the
force of law. Also, it is difficult to see in agency practice any indication
that Customs set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind, for it does
not generally engage in notice-and-comment practice and a letter’s
binding character as a ruling stops short of third parties. Indeed, any
suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are being
churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at 46 offices is self-refuting. Nor

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220 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
Syllabus
do statutory amendments effective after this case arose reveal a new
congressional objective of treating classification decisions generally as
rulemaking with force of law or suggest any intent to create a Chevron
patchwork of classification rules, some with force of law, some with-
out. In sum, classification rulings are best treated like “interpreta-
tions contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines,” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 587, and thus
beyond the Chevron pale. Pp. 231–234.
(c) This does not mean, however, that the letters are due no defer-
ence. Chevron did not eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the
“specialized experience and broader investigations and information”
available to the agency, 323 U. S., at 139, and given the value of uniform-
ity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national
law requires, id., at 140. There is room at least to raise a Skidmore
claim here, where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and Customs
can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on this case’s
questions. The classification ruling may at least seek a respect propor-
tional to its “power to persuade,” ibid., and may claim the merit of its
writer’s thoroughness, logic and expertness, its fit with prior interpreta-
tions, and any other sources of weight. Underlying this Court’s posi-
tion is a choice about the best way to deal with the great variety of
ways in which the laws invest the Government’s administrative arms
with discretion, and with procedures for exercising it, in giving meaning
to Acts of Congress. The Court said nothing in Chevron to eliminate
Skidmore’s recognition of various justifications for deference depending
on statutory circumstances and agency action. Judicial responses to
such action must continue to differentiate between the two cases. Any
Skidmore assessment here ought to be made in the first instance by the
lower courts. Pp. 234–239.
185 F. 3d 1304, vacated and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehn-
quist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 239.
Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor

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221 Cite as: 533 U. S. 218 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
General Wallace, William Kanter, Bruce G. Forrest, and
Neal S. Wolin.
J. Peter Coll, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Kristen Bancroft and Sidney H.
Kuflik.*
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether a tariff classification ruling by the
United States Customs Service deserves judicial deference.
The Federal Circuit rejected Customs’s invocation of Chev-
ron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S. 837 (1984), in support of such a ruling, to which it
gave no deference. We agree that a tariff classification has
no claim to judicial deference under Chevron, there being no
indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the
force of law, but we hold that under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U. S. 134 (1944), the ruling is eligible to claim respect
according to its persuasiveness.
I
A
Imports are taxed under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
of the United States (HTSUS), 19 U. S. C. § 1202. Title 19
U. S. C. § 1500(b) provides that Customs “shall, under rules
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Association of Exporters and Importers by Peter Buck Feller, Daniel G.
Jarcho, and Michael J. Haungs; for Cargill, Inc., et al. by John M. Pe-
terson, Michael K. Tomenga, George W. Thompson, and Curtis W. Knauss;
for the Customs and International Trade Bar Association by Sidney N.
Weiss and David Serko; for Filofax Inc. by Charles H. Bayar; for the Joint
Industry Group et al. by William D. Outman II and Bruce N. Shulman;
and for the Tax Executives Institute, Inc., by Timothy J. McCormally and
Mary L. Fahey.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the United States Association of
Importers of Textiles and Apparel et al. by Walter E. Dellinger and Ron-
ald W. Gerdes; and for Professor Thomas W. Merrill, pro se.

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222 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
Opinion of the Court
and regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treas-
ury,] . . . fix the final classification and rate of duty applicable
to . . . merchandise” under the HTSUS. Section 1502(a) pro-
vides that
“[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall establish and
promulgate such rules and regulations not inconsist-
ent with the law (including regulations establishing pro-
cedures for the issuance of binding rulings prior to the
entry of the merchandise concerned), and may dissemi-
nate such information as may be necessary to secure a
just, impartial, and uniform appraisement of imported
merchandise and the classification and assessment of
duties thereon at the various ports of entry.” 1
See also § 1624 (general delegation to Secretary to issue
rules and regulations for the admission of goods).
The Secretary provides for tariff rulings before the entry
of goods by regulations authorizing “ruling letters” setting
tariff classifications for particular imports. 19 CFR § 177.8
(2000). A ruling letter
“represents the official position of the Customs Service
with respect to the particular transaction or issue de-
scribed therein and is binding on all Customs Service
personnel in accordance with the provisions of this
section until modified or revoked. In the absence of a
change of practice or other modification or revocation
which affects the principle of the ruling set forth in the
ruling letter, that principle may be cited as authority
in the disposition of transactions involving the same
circumstances.” § 177.9(a).
1 The statutory term “ruling” is defined by regulation as “a written
statement . . . that interprets and applies the provisions of the Customs
and related laws to a specific set of facts.” 19 CFR § 177.1(d)(1) (2000).

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After the transaction that gives it birth, a ruling letter is
to “be applied only with respect to transactions involving
articles identical to the sample submitted with the ruling
request or to articles whose description is identical to the
description set forth in the ruling letter.” § 177.9(b)(2). As
a general matter, such a letter is “subject to modification or
revocation without notice to any person, except the person
to whom the letter was addressed,” § 177.9(c), and the regula-
tions consequently provide that “no other person should rely
on the ruling letter or assume that the principles of that
ruling will be applied in connection with any transaction
other than the one described in the letter,” ibid. Since rul-
ing letters respond to transactions of the moment, they are
not subject to notice and comment before being issued, may
be published but need only be made “available for public
inspection,” 19 U. S. C. § 1625(a), and, at the time this action
arose, could be modified without notice and comment under
most circumstances, 19 CFR § 177.10(c) (2000).2 A broader
notice-and-comment requirement for modification of prior
rulings was added by statute in 1993, Pub. L. 103–182, § 623,
107 Stat. 2186, codified at 19 U. S. C. § 1625(c), and took effect
after this case arose.3
2 The opinion of the Federal Circuit in this case noted that § 177.10(c)
provides some notice-and-comment procedures for rulings that have the
“ ‘effect of changing a practice.’ ” 185 F. 3d 1304, 1307, n. 1 (1999). The
appeals court noted that this case does not involve such a ruling, and
specifically excluded such rulings from the reach of its holding. Ibid.
3 As amended by legislation effective after Customs modified its classi-
fication ruling in this case, 19 U. S. C. § 1625(c) provides that a ruling or
decision that would “modify . . . or revoke a prior interpretive ruling
or decision which has been in effect for at least 60 days” or would “have
the effect of modifying the treatment previously accorded by the Customs
Service to substantially identical transactions” shall be “published in the
Customs Bulletin. The Secretary shall give interested parties an oppor-
tunity to submit, during not less than the 30-day period after the date of
such publication, comments on the correctness of the proposed ruling or

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224 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
Opinion of the Court
Any of the 46 4 port-of-entry 5 Customs offices may issue
ruling letters, and so may the Customs Headquarters Office,
in providing “[a]dvice or guidance as to the interpretation
or proper application of the Customs and related laws with
respect to a specific Customs transaction [which] may be re-
quested by Customs Service field offices . . . at any time,
whether the transaction is prospective, current, or com-
pleted,” 19 CFR § 177.11(a) (2000). Most ruling letters con-
tain little or no reasoning, but simply describe goods and
state the appropriate category and tariff. A few letters, like
the Headquarters ruling at issue here, set out a rationale in
some detail.
B
Respondent, the Mead Corporation, imports “day plan-
ners,” three-ring binders with pages having room for
notes of daily schedules and phone numbers and addresses,
together with a calendar and suchlike. The tariff sched-
ule on point falls under the HTSUS heading for “[r]egis-
ters, account books, notebooks, order books, receipt books,
letter pads, memorandum pads, diaries and similar articles,”
HTSUS subheading 4820.10, which comprises two sub-
categories. Items in the first, “[d]iaries, notebooks and ad-
dress books, bound; memorandum pads, letter pads and simi-
lar articles,” were subject to a tariff of 4.0% at the time
in controversy. 185 F. 3d 1304, 1305 (CA Fed. 1999) (citing
subheading 4820.10.20); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a.
Objects in the second, covering “[o]ther” items, were free
decision. After consideration of any comments received, the Secretary
shall publish a final ruling or decision in the Customs Bulletin within
30 days after the closing of the comment period. The final ruling or deci-
sion shall become effective 60 days after the date of its publication.”
4 Brief for Customs and International Trade Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae 5 (CITBA Brief).
5 I. e., “a Customs location having a full range of cargo processing func-
tions, including inspections, entry, collections, and verification.” 19 CFR
§ 101.1 (2000).

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of duty. HTSUS subheading 4820.10.40; see also App. to
Pet. for Cert. 46a.
Between 1989 and 1993, Customs repeatedly treated day
planners under the “other” HTSUS subheading. In Janu-
ary 1993, however, Customs changed its position, and issued
a Headquarters ruling letter classifying Mead’s day planners
as “Diaries . . . , bound” subject to tariff under subheading
4820.10.20. That letter was short on explanation, App. to
Brief in Opposition 4a–6a, but after Mead’s protest, Customs
Headquarters issued a new letter, carefully reasoned but
never published, reaching the same conclusion, App. to Pet.
for Cert. 28a–47a. This letter considered two definitions of
“diary” from the Oxford English Dictionary, the first cover-
ing a daily journal of the past day’s events, the second a book
including “ ‘printed dates for daily memoranda and jottings;
also . . . calendars . . . .’ ” Id., at 33a–34a (quoting Oxford
English Dictionary 321 (Compact ed. 1982)). Customs con-
cluded that “diary” was not confined to the first, in part
because the broader definition reflects commercial usage
and hence the “commercial identity of these items in the
marketplace.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. As for the defi-
nition of “bound,” Customs concluded that HTSUS was not
referring to “bookbinding,” but to a less exact sort of fasten-
ing described in the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System Explanatory Notes to Heading 4820, which
spoke of binding by “ ‘reinforcements or fittings of metal,
plastics, etc.’ ” Id., at 45a.
Customs rejected Mead’s further protest of the second
Headquarters ruling letter, and Mead filed suit in the
Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT granted the
Government’s motion for summary judgment, adopting Cus-
toms’s reasoning without saying anything about deference.
17 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (1998).
Mead then went to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. While the case was pending there
this Court decided United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526

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226 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
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U. S. 380 (1999), holding that Customs regulations receive
the deference described in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). The
appeals court requested briefing on the impact of Haggar,
and the Government argued that classification rulings, like
Customs regulations, deserve Chevron deference.
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the CIT and held
that Customs classification rulings should not get Chevron
deference, owing to differences from the regulations at issue
in Haggar. Rulings are not preceded by notice and com-
ment as under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U. S. C. § 553, they “do not carry the force of law and are not,
like regulations, intended to clarify the rights and obliga-
tions of importers beyond the specific case under review.”
185 F. 3d, at 1307. The appeals court thought classifica-
tion rulings had a weaker Chevron claim even than Internal
Revenue Service interpretive rulings, to which that court
gives no deference; unlike rulings by the IRS, Customs rul-
ings issue from many locations and need not be published.
185 F. 3d, at 1307–1308.
The Court of Appeals accordingly gave no deference at
all to the ruling classifying the Mead day planners and re-
jected the agency’s reasoning as to both “diary” and “bound.”
It thought that planners were not diaries because they had
no space for “relatively extensive notations about events,
observations, feelings, or thoughts” in the past. Id., at
1310. And it concluded that diaries “bound” in subheading
4810.10.20 presupposed “unbound” diaries, such that treating
ring-fastened diaries as “bound” would leave the “unbound
diary” an empty category. Id., at 1311.
We granted certiorari, 530 U. S. 1202 (2000), in order to
consider the limits of Chevron deference owed to adminis-
trative practice in applying a statute. We hold that admin-
istrative implementation of a particular statutory provision
qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make

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rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency inter-
pretation claiming deference was promulgated in the ex-
ercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may
be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to
engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking,
or by some other indication of a comparable congressional
intent. The Customs ruling at issue here fails to qualify,
although the possibility that it deserves some deference
under Skidmore leads us to vacate and remand.
II
A
When Congress has “explicitly left a gap for an agency to
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency
to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation,”
Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843–844, and any ensuing regulation
is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbi-
trary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to
the statute.6 See id., at 844; United States v. Morton, 467
U. S. 822, 834 (1984); APA, 5 U. S. C. §§ 706(2)(A), (D). But
whether or not they enjoy any express delegation of author-
ity on a particular question, agencies charged with applying
a statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices,
and while not all of those choices bind judges to follow
them, they certainly may influence courts facing questions
the agencies have already answered. “[T]he well-reasoned
views of the agencies implementing a statute ‘constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance,’ ” Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 642 (1998) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U. S.,
at 139–140), and “[w]e have long recognized that consider-
able weight should be accorded to an executive department’s
6 Assuming in each case, of course, that the agency’s exercise of au-
thority is constitutional, see 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(B), and does not exceed its
jurisdiction, see § 706(2)(C).

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construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to ad-
minister . . . .” Chevron, supra, at 844 (footnote omitted);
see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555,
565 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S.
443, 450 (1978). The fair measure of deference to an agency
administering its own statute has been understood to vary
with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree
of the agency’s care,7 its consistency,8 formality,9 and rela-
tive expertness,10 and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s
position, see Skidmore, supra, at 139–140. The approach
has produced a spectrum of judicial responses, from great
respect at one end, see, e. g., Aluminum Co. of America v.
Central Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U. S. 380, 389–390
(1984) (“ ‘substantial deference’ ” to administrative construc-
tion), to near indifference at the other, see, e. g., Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 212–213 (1988)
(interpretation advanced for the first time in a litigation
brief). Justice Jackson summed things up in Skidmore v.
Swift & Co.:
“The weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control.” 323 U. S., at 140.
7 See, e. g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 142 (1976) (courts
consider the “ ‘thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration’ ”
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944))).
8 See, e. g., Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 417
(1993) (“[T]he consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing
the weight that position is due”).
9 See, e. g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 61 (1995) (internal agency guide-
line that is not “subject to the rigors of the [APA], including public notice
and comment,” is entitled only to “some deference” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
10 See, e. g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Util.
Dist., 467 U. S. 380, 390 (1984).

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Since 1984, we have identified a category of interpretive
choices distinguished by an additional reason for judicial
deference. This Court in Chevron recognized that Congress
not only engages in express delegation of specific interpre-
tive authority, but that “[s]ometimes the legislative dele-
gation to an agency on a particular question is implicit.”
467 U. S., at 844. Congress, that is, may not have expressly
delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particu-
lar provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be ap-
parent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and
other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect
the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it
addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the
enacted law, even one about which “Congress did not actu-
ally have an intent” as to a particular result. Id., at 845.
When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a
reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency’s ex-
ercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a par-
ticular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s
chosen resolution seems unwise, see id., at 845–846, but is
obliged to accept the agency’s position if Congress has not
previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s in-
terpretation is reasonable, see id., at 842–845; cf. 5 U. S. C.
§ 706(2) (a reviewing court shall set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be “arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law”).
We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional au-
thorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or ad-
judication that produces regulations or rulings for which
deference is claimed. See, e. g., EEOC v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 257 (1991) (no Chevron deference
to agency guideline where congressional delegation did
not include the power to “ ‘promulgate rules or regulations’ ”
(quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141

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(1976))); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576,
596–597 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (where it is in doubt
that Congress actually intended to delegate particular in-
terpretive authority to an agency, Chevron is “inapplicable”).
It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates
administrative action with the effect of law when it pro-
vides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tend-
ing to foster the fairness and deliberation that should under-
lie a pronouncement of such force.11 Cf. Smiley v. Citibank
(South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 741 (1996) (APA notice
and comment “designed to assure due deliberation”). Thus,
the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication.12 That said, and as sig-
11 See Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833, 872 (2001)
(“[I]f Chevron rests on a presumption about congressional intent, then
Chevron should apply only where Congress would want Chevron to apply.
In delineating the types of delegations of agency authority that trigger
Chevron deference, it is therefore important to determine whether a
plausible case can be made that Congress would want such a delegation to
mean that agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority”).
12 For rulemaking cases, see, e. g., Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U. S. 1, 20–21 (2000); United States v. Haggar Apparel
Co., 526 U. S. 380 (1999); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366
(1999); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U. S. 382 (1998); Re-
gions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U. S. 448 (1998); United States v. O’Hagan,
521 U. S. 642 (1997); Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S.
735 (1996); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore.,
515 U. S. 687 (1995); ICC v. Transcon Lines, 513 U. S. 138 (1995); PUD
No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U. S. 700
(1994); Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, supra; American Hospital
Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U. S. 606 (1991); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83
(1990); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U. S. 521 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash,
490 U. S. 107 (1989); K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281 (1988);
Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 154 (1986); United States v. Fulton, 475 U. S.
657 (1986); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121
(1985).
For adjudication cases, see, e. g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415,
423–425 (1999); Federal Employees v. Department of Interior, 526 U. S.

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nificant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron
authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide
the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chev-
ron deference even when no such administrative formality
was required and none was afforded, see, e. g., NationsBank
of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S.
251, 256–257, 263 (1995).13 The fact that the tariff classifi-
cation here was not a product of such formal process does
not alone, therefore, bar the application of Chevron.
There are, nonetheless, ample reasons to deny Chevron
deference here. The authorization for classification rulings,
and Customs’s practice in making them, present a case far
removed not only from notice-and-comment process, but
from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that
Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving
the deference claimed for them here.
B
No matter which angle we choose for viewing the Customs
ruling letter in this case, it fails to qualify under Chevron.
On the face of the statute, to begin with, the terms of the
congressional delegation give no indication that Congress
meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classifica-
86, 98–99 (1999); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U. S. 392 (1996); ABF
Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U. S. 317, 324–325 (1994); National
Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U. S. 407,
417–418 (1992); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S.
117, 128 (1991); Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 495 U. S. 641, 644–645
(1990); Department of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA, 494 U. S. 922 (1990).
13 In NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U. S., at 256–257 (internal quotation marks omitted), we quoted longstand-
ing precedent concluding that “[t]he Comptroller of the Currency is
charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants
the invocation of [the rule of deference] with respect to his deliberative
conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.” See also 1 M. Malloy, Bank-
ing Law and Regulation § 1.3.1, p. 1.41 (1996) (stating that the Comptroller
is given “personal authority” under the National Bank Act).

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tion rulings with the force of law. We are not, of course,
here making any global statement about Customs’s author-
ity, for it is true that the general rulemaking power con-
ferred on Customs, see 19 U. S. C. § 1624, authorizes some
regulation with the force of law, or “legal norms,” as we put
it in Haggar, 526 U. S., at 391.14 It is true as well that Con-
gress had classification rulings in mind when it explicitly
authorized, in a parenthetical, the issuance of “regulations
establishing procedures for the issuance of binding rulings
prior to the entry of the merchandise concerned,” 19 U. S. C.
§ 1502(a).15 The reference to binding classifications does not,
however, bespeak the legislative type of activity that would
naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling, once the
goods classified are admitted into this country. And though
the statute’s direction to disseminate “information” neces-
sary to “secure” uniformity, ibid., seems to assume that a
ruling may be precedent in later transactions, precedential
value alone does not add up to Chevron entitlement; inter-
pretive rules may sometimes function as precedents, see
Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 Duke L. J. 1463,
1472–1473 (1992), and they enjoy no Chevron status as a
class. In any event, any precedential claim of a classification
ruling is counterbalanced by the provision for independent
review of Customs classifications by the CIT, see 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2638–2640; the scheme for CIT review includes a provision
that treats classification rulings on par with the Secretary’s
rulings on “valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted mer-
14 Cf. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U. S. 638, 649–650 (1990) (although
Congress required the Secretary of Labor to promulgate standards im-
plementing certain provisions of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act, and “agency determinations within the scope of
delegated authority are entitled to deference,” the Secretary’s interpreta-
tion of the Act’s enforcement provisions is not entitled to Chevron defer-
ence because “[n]o such delegation regarding [those] provisions is evident
in the statute”).
15 The ruling in question here, however, does not fall within that
category.

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chandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or
similar matters,” § 1581(h); see § 2639(b). It is hard to imag-
ine a congressional understanding more at odds with the
Chevron regime.16
It is difficult, in fact, to see in the agency practice itself
any indication that Customs ever set out with a lawmaking
pretense in mind when it undertook to make classifications
like these. Customs does not generally engage in notice-
and-comment practice when issuing them, and their treat-
ment by the agency makes it clear that a letter’s binding
character as a ruling stops short of third parties; Customs
has regarded a classification as conclusive only as between
itself and the importer to whom it was issued, 19 CFR
§ 177.9(c) (2000), and even then only until Customs has given
advance notice of intended change, §§ 177.9(a), (c). Other
importers are in fact warned against assuming any right of
detrimental reliance. § 177.9(c).
Indeed, to claim that classifications have legal force is to
ignore the reality that 46 different Customs offices issue
10,000 to 15,000 of them each year, see Brief for Respond-
ent 5; CITBA Brief 6 (citing Treasury Advisory Committee
on the Commercial Operations of the United States Cus-
toms Service, Report of the COAC Subcommittee on OR&R,
Exhs. 1, 3 (Jan. 26, 2000) (reprinted in App. to CITBA
Brief 20a–21a)). Any suggestion that rulings intended to
have the force of law are being churned out at a rate of
10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered offices is simply
self-refuting. Although the circumstances are less startling
here, with a Headquarters letter in issue, none of the rele-
vant statutes recognizes this category of rulings as separate
or different from others; there is thus no indication that a
16 Although Customs’s decision “is presumed to be correct” on review,
28 U. S. C. § 2639(a)(1), the CIT “may consider any new ground” even if
not raised below, § 2638, and “shall make its determinations upon the basis
of the record made before the court,” rather than that developed by Cus-
toms, § 2640(a); see generally Haggar Apparel, 526 U. S., at 391.

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more potent delegation might have been understood as going
to Headquarters even when Headquarters provides devel-
oped reasoning, as it did in this instance.
Nor do the amendments to the statute made effective after
this case arose disturb our conclusion. The new law re-
quires Customs to provide notice-and-comment procedures
only when modifying or revoking a prior classification rul-
ing or modifying the treatment accorded to substantially
identical transactions, 19 U. S. C. § 1625(c); and under its reg-
ulations, Customs sees itself obliged to provide notice-and-
comment procedures only when “changing a practice” so as
to produce a tariff increase, or in the imposition of a restric-
tion or prohibition, or when Customs Headquarters deter-
mines that “the matter is of sufficient importance to involve
the interests of domestic industry,” 19 CFR §§ 177.10(c)(1),
(2) (2000). The statutory changes reveal no new congres-
sional objective of treating classification decisions generally
as rulemaking with force of law, nor do they suggest any
intent to create a Chevron patchwork of classification rul-
ings, some with force of law, some without.
In sum, classification rulings are best treated like “inter-
pretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines.” Christensen, 529 U. S., at 587.
They are beyond the Chevron pale.
C
To agree with the Court of Appeals that Customs ruling
letters do not fall within Chevron is not, however, to place
them outside the pale of any deference whatever. Chevron
did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form,
given the “specialized experience and broader investiga-
tions and information” available to the agency, 323 U. S.,
at 139, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative
and judicial understandings of what a national law requires,
id., at 140. See generally Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v.

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Rambo, 521 U. S. 121, 136 (1997) (reasonable agency inter-
pretations carry “at least some added persuasive force”
where Chevron is inapplicable); Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50,
61 (1995) (according “some deference” to an interpretive rule
that “do[es] not require notice and comment”); Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S.
144, 157 (1991) (“some weight” is due to informal interpreta-
tions though not “the same deference as norms that derive
from the exercise of . . . delegated lawmaking powers”).
There is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here,
where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and Customs
can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on the
subtle questions in this case: whether the daily planner with
room for brief daily entries falls under “diaries,” when dia-
ries are grouped with “notebooks and address books, bound;
memorandum pads, letter pads and similar articles,” HTSUS
subheading 4820.10.20; and whether a planner with a ring
binding should qualify as “bound,” when a binding may be
typified by a book, but also may have “reinforcements or
fittings of metal, plastics, etc.,” Harmonized Commodity De-
scription and Coding System Explanatory Notes to Head-
ing 4820, p. 687 (cited in Customs Headquarters letter, App.
to Pet. for Cert. 45a. A classification ruling in this situa-
tion may therefore at least seek a respect proportional to
its “power to persuade,” Skidmore, supra, at 140; see also
Christensen, 529 U. S., at 587; id., at 595 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); id., at 596–597 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Such a
ruling may surely claim the merit of its writer’s thorough-
ness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations,
and any other sources of weight.
D
Underlying the position we take here, like the position
expressed by Justice Scalia in dissent, is a choice about
the best way to deal with an inescapable feature of the

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236 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
Opinion of the Court
body of congressional legislation authorizing administrative
action. That feature is the great variety of ways in which
the laws invest the Government’s administrative arms with
discretion, and with procedures for exercising it, in giving
meaning to Acts of Congress. Implementation of a statute
may occur in formal adjudication or the choice to defend
against judicial challenge; it may occur in a central board
or office or in dozens of enforcement agencies dotted across
the country; its institutional lawmaking may be confined
to the resolution of minute detail or extend to legislative
rulemaking on matters intentionally left by Congress to be
worked out at the agency level.
Although we all accept the position that the Judiciary
should defer to at least some of this multifarious adminis-
trative action, we have to decide how to take account of the
great range of its variety. If the primary objective is to
simplify the judicial process of giving or withholding def-
erence, then the diversity of statutes authorizing discre-
tionary administrative action must be declared irrelevant
or minimized. If, on the other hand, it is simply implausi-
ble that Congress intended such a broad range of statutory
authority to produce only two varieties of administrative
action, demanding either Chevron deference or none at all,
then the breadth of the spectrum of possible agency action
must be taken into account. Justice Scalia’s first priority
over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court’s
choice has been to tailor deference to variety.17 This accept-
17 Compare Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 587 (2000)
(“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guide-
lines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style
deference”), and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 257–
258 (1991) (applying Skidmore analysis where Congress did not confer
upon the agency authority to promulgate rules or regulations), with Chris-
tensen, supra, at 589–591 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (urging Chevron treatment); EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co., supra, at 259–260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring

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237 Cite as: 533 U. S. 218 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
ance of the range of statutory variation has led the Court to
recognize more than one variety of judicial deference, just as
the Court has recognized a variety of indicators that Con-
gress would expect Chevron deference.18
Our respective choices are repeated today. Justice
Scalia would pose the question of deference as an either-
or choice. On his view that Chevron rendered Skidmore
anachronistic, when courts owe any deference it is Chevron
deference that they owe, post, at 250. Whether courts do
owe deference in a given case turns, for him, on whether the
agency action (if reasonable) is “authoritative,” post, at 257.
The character of the authoritative derives, in turn, not from
breadth of delegation or the agency’s procedure in imple-
menting it, but is defined as the “official” position of an
agency, ibid., and may ultimately be a function of administra-
tive persistence alone, ante, at 258.
The Court, on the other hand, said nothing in Chevron to
eliminate Skidmore’s recognition of various justifications for
deference depending on statutory circumstances and agency
action; Chevron was simply a case recognizing that even
without express authority to fill a specific statutory gap,
circumstances pointing to implicit congressional delegation
present a particularly insistent call for deference. Indeed,
in holding here that Chevron left Skidmore intact and ap-
plicable where statutory circumstances indicate no intent to
delegate general authority to make rules with force of law,
or where such authority was not invoked, we hold nothing
more than we said last Term in response to the particular
in judgment) (urging Chevron treatment); see also INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 453–455 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(urging broader application of Chevron).
18 It is, of course, true that the limit of Chevron deference is not marked
by a hard-edged rule. But Chevron itself is a good example showing
when Chevron deference is warranted, while this is a good case showing
when it is not. Judges in other, perhaps harder, cases will make reasoned
choices between the two examples, the way courts have always done.

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238 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
Opinion of the Court
statutory circumstances in Christensen, to which Justice
Scalia then took exception, see 529 U. S., at 589, just as he
does again today.
We think, in sum, that Justice Scalia’s efforts to sim-
plify ultimately run afoul of Congress’s indications that dif-
ferent statutes present different reasons for considering
respect for the exercise of administrative authority or defer-
ence to it. Without being at odds with congressional intent
much of the time, we believe that judicial responses to ad-
ministrative action must continue to differentiate between
Chevron and Skidmore, and that continued recognition of
Skidmore is necessary for just the reasons Justice Jackson
gave when that case was decided.19
* * *
Since the Skidmore assessment called for here ought to be
made in the first instance by the Court of Appeals for the
19 Surely Justice Jackson’s practical criteria, along with Chevron’s con-
cern with congressional understanding, provide more reliable guideposts
than conclusory references to the “authoritative” or “official.” Even
if those terms provided a true criterion, there would have to be some-
thing wrong with a standard that accorded the status of substantive law
to every one of 10,000 “official” customs classifications rulings turned out
each year from over 46 offices placed around the country at the Nation’s
entryways. Justice Scalia tries to avoid that result by limiting what
is “authoritative” or “official” to a pronouncement that expresses the
“judgment of central agency management, approved at the highest levels,”
as distinct from the pronouncements of “underlings,” post, at 259, n. 6.
But that analysis would not entitle a Headquarters ruling to Chevron def-
erence; the “highest level” at Customs is the source of the regulation at
issue in Haggar, the Commissioner of Customs with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury. 526 U. S., at 386. The Commissioner did not
issue the Headquarters ruling. What Justice Scalia has in mind here
is that because the Secretary approved the Government’s position in its
brief to this Court, Chevron deference is due. But if that is so, Chevron
deference was not called for until sometime after the litigation began,
when central management at the highest level decided to defend the
ruling, and the deference is not to the classification ruling as such but
to the brief. This explains why the Court has not accepted Justice
Scalia’s position.

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239 Cite as: 533 U. S. 218 (2001)
Scalia, J., dissenting
Federal Circuit or the CIT, we go no further than to vacate
the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, dissenting.
Today’s opinion makes an avulsive change in judicial re-
view of federal administrative action. Whereas previously
a reasonable agency application of an ambiguous statutory
provision had to be sustained so long as it represented the
agency’s authoritative interpretation, henceforth such an ap-
plication can be set aside unless “it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law,” as by giving an agency “power to
engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking,
or . . . some other [procedure] indicati[ng] comparable con-
gressional intent,” and “the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”
Ante, at 226–227.1 What was previously a general presump-
tion of authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in the stat-
utes they have been authorized to enforce has been changed
to a presumption of no such authority, which must be over-
come by affirmative legislative intent to the contrary. And
whereas previously, when agency authority to resolve am-
biguity did not exist the court was free to give the statute
what it considered the best interpretation, henceforth the
court must supposedly give the agency view some indetermi-
nate amount of so-called Skidmore deference. Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944). We will be sorting out the
consequences of the Mead doctrine, which has today replaced
the Chevron doctrine, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), for years
to come. I would adhere to our established jurisprudence,
1 It is not entirely clear whether the formulation newly minted by the
Court today extends to both formal and informal adjudication, or simply
the former. Cf., e. g., ante, at 230.

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240 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
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defer to the reasonable interpretation the Customs Service
has given to the statute it is charged with enforcing, and
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Only five years ago, the Court described the Chevron doc-
trine as follows: “We accord deference to agencies under
Chevron . . . because of a presumption that Congress, when
it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation
by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be re-
solved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the
agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever de-
gree of discretion the ambiguity allows,” Smiley v. Citibank
(South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 740–741 (1996) (cit-
ing Chevron, supra, at 843–844). Today the Court col-
lapses this doctrine, announcing instead a presumption that
agency discretion does not exist unless the statute, expressly
or impliedly, says so. While the Court disclaims any hard-
and-fast rule for determining the existence of discretion-
conferring intent, it asserts that “a very good indicator
[is] express congressional authorizations to engage in the
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regu-
lations or rulings for which deference is claimed,” ante,
at 229. Only when agencies act through “adjudication[,]
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or . . . some other [proce-
dure] indicati[ng] comparable congressional intent [whatever
that means]” is Chevron deference applicable—because these
“relatively formal administrative procedure[s] [designed] to
foster . . . fairness and deliberation” bespeak (according to
the Court) congressional willingness to have the agency,
rather than the courts, resolve statutory ambiguities. Ante,
at 227, 230. Once it is determined that Chevron deference
is not in order, the uncertainty is not at an end—and indeed
is just beginning. Litigants cannot then assume that the
statutory question is one for the courts to determine, accord-

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241 Cite as: 533 U. S. 218 (2001)
Scalia, J., dissenting
ing to traditional interpretive principles and by their own
judicial lights. No, the Court now resurrects, in full force,
the pre-Chevron doctrine of Skidmore deference, see Skid-
more, supra, whereby “[t]he fair measure of deference to an
agency administering its own statute . . . var[ies] with cir-
cumstances,” including “the degree of the agency’s care, its
consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and . . . the
persuasiveness of the agency’s position,” ante, at 228 (foot-
notes omitted). The Court has largely replaced Chevron, in
other words, with that test most beloved by a court unwill-
ing to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who
want to know what to expect): th’ol’ “totality of the circum-
stances” test.
The Court’s new doctrine is neither sound in principle nor
sustainable in practice.
A
As to principle: The doctrine of Chevron—that all authori-
tative agency interpretations of statutes they are charged
with administering deserve deference—was rooted in a legal
presumption of congressional intent, important to the di-
vision of powers between the Second and Third Branches.
When, Chevron said, Congress leaves an ambiguity in a
statute that is to be administered by an executive agency,
it is presumed that Congress meant to give the agency dis-
cretion, within the limits of reasonable interpretation, as
to how the ambiguity is to be resolved. By committing en-
forcement of the statute to an agency rather than the courts,
Congress committed its initial and primary interpretation to
that branch as well.
There is some question whether Chevron was faithful to
the text of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
it did not even bother to cite.2 But it was in accord with the
2 Title 5 U. S. C. § 706 provides that, in reviewing agency action, the
court shall “decide all relevant questions of law”—which would seem
to mean that all statutory ambiguities are to be resolved judicially. See

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242 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
Scalia, J., dissenting
origins of federal-court judicial review. Judicial control of
federal executive officers was principally exercised through
the prerogative writ of mandamus. See L. Jaffe, Judicial
Control of Administrative Action 166, 176–177 (1965). That
writ generally would not issue unless the executive officer
was acting plainly beyond the scope of his authority.
“The questions mooted before the Secretary and de-
cided by him were whether the fund is a tribal fund,
whether the tribe is still existing and whether the dis-
tribution of the annuities is to be confined to members
of the tribe . . . . These are all questions of law the
solution of which requires a construction of the act of
1889 and other related acts. A reading of these acts
shows that they fall short of plainly requiring that
any of the questions be answered in the negative and
that in some aspects they give color to the affirmative
answers of the Secretary. That the construction of the
acts insofar as they have a bearing on the first and third
questions is sufficiently uncertain to involve the exercise
of judgment and discretion is rather plain. . . .
. . . . .
“From what has been said it follows that the case is
not one in which mandamus will lie.” Wilbur v. United
States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U. S. 206, 221–222 (1930).
Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t
Get It, 10 Am. U. Admin. L. J. 1, 9–11 (1996). It could be argued, how-
ever, that the legal presumption identified by Chevron left as the only
“questio[n] of law” whether the agency’s interpretation had gone be-
yond the scope of discretion that the statutory ambiguity conferred.
Today’s opinion, of course, is no more observant of the APA’s text than
Chevron was—and indeed is even more difficult to reconcile with it.
Since the opinion relies upon actual congressional intent to suspend § 706,
rather than upon a legal presumption against which § 706 was presumably
enacted, it runs head-on into the provision of the APA which specifies that
the Act’s requirements (including the requirement that judges shall “de-
cide all relevant questions of law”) cannot be amended except expressly.
See § 559.

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243 Cite as: 533 U. S. 218 (2001)
Scalia, J., dissenting
Statutory ambiguities, in other words, were left to reason-
able resolution by the Executive.
The basis in principle for today’s new doctrine can be de-
scribed as follows: The background rule is that ambiguity
in legislative instructions to agencies is to be resolved not
by the agencies but by the judges. Specific congressional
intent to depart from this rule must be found—and while
there is no single touchstone for such intent it can generally
be found when Congress has authorized the agency to act
through (what the Court says is) relatively formal proce-
dures such as informal rulemaking and formal (and infor-
mal?) adjudication, and when the agency in fact employs
such procedures. The Court’s background rule is contra-
dicted by the origins of judicial review of administrative
action. But in addition, the Court’s principal criterion of
congressional intent to supplant its background rule seems
to me quite implausible. There is no necessary connection
between the formality of procedure and the power of the
entity administering the procedure to resolve authorita-
tively questions of law. The most formal of the procedures
the Court refers to—formal adjudication—is modeled after
the process used in trial courts, which of course are not gen-
erally accorded deference on questions of law. The purpose
of such a procedure is to produce a closed record for deter-
mination and review of the facts—which implies nothing
about the power of the agency subjected to the procedure to
resolve authoritatively questions of law.
As for informal rulemaking: While formal adjudication
procedures are prescribed (either by statute or by the Con-
stitution), see 5 U. S. C. §§ 554, 556; Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-
Grath, 339 U. S. 33, 50 (1950), informal rulemaking is more
typically authorized but not required. Agencies with such
authority are free to give guidance through rulemaking,
but they may proceed to administer their statute case-by-
case, “making law” as they implement their program (not
necessarily through formal adjudication). See NLRB v. Bell

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244 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
Scalia, J., dissenting
Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 290–295 (1974); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202–203 (1947). Is it likely—or indeed
even plausible—that Congress meant, when such an agency
chooses rulemaking, to accord the administrators of that
agency, and their successors, the flexibility of interpreting
the ambiguous statute now one way, and later another;
but, when such an agency chooses case-by-case administra-
tion, to eliminate all future agency discretion by having
that same ambiguity resolved authoritatively (and forever)
by the courts? 3 Surely that makes no sense. It is also the
case that certain significant categories of rules—those in-
volving grant and benefit programs, for example, are ex-
empt from the requirements of informal rulemaking. See
5 U. S. C. § 553(a)(2). Under the Court’s novel theory, when
an agency takes advantage of that exemption its rules will
be deprived of Chevron deference, i. e., authoritative effect.
Was this either the plausible intent of the APA rulemaking
exemption, or the plausible intent of the Congress that
established the grant or benefit program?
Some decisions that are neither informal rulemaking nor
formal adjudication are required to be made personally by
a Cabinet Secretary, without any prescribed procedures.
See, e. g., United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 508 (1974)
(involving application of 18 U. S. C. § 2516 (1970 ed.), requir-
ing wiretap applications to be authorized by “[t]he Attorney
General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially desig-
nated by the Attorney General”); D. C. Federation of Civic
Assns. v. Volpe, 459 F. 2d 1231, 1248–1249 (CADC 1971) (in-
volving application of 23 U. S. C. § 138 (1970 ed.) requiring
the Secretary of Transportation to determine that there is
“no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of ” publicly
owned parkland for a federally funded highway), cert. de-
nied, 405 U. S. 1030 (1972). Is it conceivable that decisions
3 See infra, at 247–250.

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245 Cite as: 533 U. S. 218 (2001)
Scalia, J., dissenting
specifically committed to these high-level officers are meant
to be accorded no deference, while decisions by an admin-
istrative law judge left in place without further discretion-
ary agency review, see 5 U. S. C. § 557(b), are authoritative?
This seems to me quite absurd, and not at all in accord with
any plausible actual intent of Congress.
B
As for the practical effects of the new rule:
1
The principal effect will be protracted confusion. As
noted above, the one test for Chevron deference that the
Court enunciates is wonderfully imprecise: whether “Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, . . . as by . . . adjudication[,]
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or . . . some other [pro-
cedure] indicati[ng] comparable congressional intent.” But
even this description does not do justice to the utter flabbi-
ness of the Court’s criterion, since, in order to maintain
the fiction that the new test is really just the old one, ap-
plied consistently throughout our case law, the Court must
make a virtually open-ended exception to its already im-
precise guidance: In the present case, it tells us, the absence
of notice-and-comment rulemaking (and “[who knows?] [of]
some other [procedure] indicati[ng] comparable congressional
intent”) is not enough to decide the question of Chevron def-
erence, “for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron
deference even when no such administrative formality was
required and none was afforded.” Ante, at 226–227, 231.
The opinion then goes on to consider a grab bag of other
factors—including the factor that used to be the sole crite-
rion for Chevron deference: whether the interpretation rep-
resented the authoritative position of the agency, see ante,

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246 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
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at 231–234. It is hard to know what the lower courts are to
make of today’s guidance.
2
Another practical effect of today’s opinion will be an arti-
ficially induced increase in informal rulemaking. Buy stock
in the GPO. Since informal rulemaking and formal adju-
dication are the only more-or-less safe harbors from the
storm that the Court has unleashed; and since formal adju-
dication is not an option but must be mandated by statute
or constitutional command; informal rulemaking—which the
Court was once careful to make voluntary unless required
by statute, see Bell Aerospace, supra, and Chenery, supra—
will now become a virtual necessity. As I have described,
the Court’s safe harbor requires not merely that the agency
have been given rulemaking authority, but also that the
agency have employed rulemaking as the means of resolv-
ing the statutory ambiguity. (It is hard to understand why
that should be so. Surely the mere conferral of rulemaking
authority demonstrates—if one accepts the Court’s logic—a
congressional intent to allow the agency to resolve ambi-
guities. And given that intent, what difference does it make
that the agency chooses instead to use another perfectly
permissible means for that purpose?) Moreover, the ma-
jority’s approach will have a perverse effect on the rules
that do emerge, given the principle (which the Court leaves
untouched today) that judges must defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of their own regulations. See, e. g.,
United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U. S.
200, 220 (2001) (“We need not decide whether the [informal]
Revenue Rulings themselves are entitled to deference[, . . .
because] the Rulings simply reflect the agency’s longstand-
ing interpretation of its own regulations”). Agencies will
now have high incentive to rush out barebones, ambiguous
rules construing statutory ambiguities, which they can then
in turn further clarify through informal rulings entitled to
judicial respect.

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Scalia, J., dissenting
3
Worst of all, the majority’s approach will lead to the os-
sification of large portions of our statutory law. Where
Chevron applies, statutory ambiguities remain ambiguities
subject to the agency’s ongoing clarification. They create
a space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing agency
discretion. As Chevron itself held, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency can interpret “stationary source” to mean a
single smokestack, can later replace that interpretation with
the “bubble concept” embracing an entire plant, and if that
proves undesirable can return again to the original inter-
pretation. 467 U. S., at 853–859, 865–866. For the indeter-
minately large number of statutes taken out of Chevron by
today’s decision, however, ambiguity (and hence flexibility)
will cease with the first judicial resolution. Skidmore defer-
ence gives the agency’s current position some vague and un-
certain amount of respect, but it does not, like Chevron,
leave the matter within the control of the Executive Branch
for the future. Once the court has spoken, it becomes un-
lawful for the agency to take a contradictory position; the
statute now says what the court has prescribed. See Neal
v. United States, 516 U. S. 284, 295 (1996); Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 502 U. S. 527, 536–537 (1992); Maislin Industries,
U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 131 (1990).
It will be bad enough when this ossification occurs as a result
of judicial determination (under today’s new principles) that
there is no affirmative indication of congressional intent to
“delegate”; but it will be positively bizarre when it occurs
simply because of an agency’s failure to act by rulemaking
(rather than informal adjudication) before the issue is pre-
sented to the courts.
One might respond that such ossification would not result
if the agency were simply to readopt its interpretation, after
a court reviewing it under Skidmore had rejected it, by re-
promulgating it through one of the Chevron-eligible proce-
dural formats approved by the Court today. Approving this

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248 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
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procedure would be a landmark abdication of judicial power.
It is worlds apart from Chevron proper, where the court does
not purport to give the statute a judicial interpretation—
except in identifying the scope of the statutory ambiguity,
as to which the court’s judgment is final and irreversible.
(Under Chevron proper, when the agency’s authoritative in-
terpretation comes within the scope of that ambiguity—and
the court therefore approves it—the agency will not be
“overruling” the court’s decision when it later decides that
a different interpretation (still within the scope of the ambi-
guity) is preferable.) By contrast, under this view, the re-
viewing court will not be holding the agency’s authorita-
tive interpretation within the scope of the ambiguity; but
will be holding that the agency has not used the “delegation-
conferring” procedures, and that the court must therefore
interpret the statute on its own—but subject to reversal if
and when the agency uses the proper procedures.
One is reminded of Justice Jackson’s words in Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S.
103, 113 (1948):
“The court below considered that after it reviewed
the Board’s order its judgment would be submitted to
the President, that his power to disapprove would apply
after as well as before the court acts, and hence that
there would be no chance of a deadlock and no conflict
of function. But if the President may completely dis-
regard the judgment of the court, it would be only be-
cause it is one the courts were not authorized to render.
Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the
Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully
be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by
another Department of Government.”
I know of no case, in the entire history of the federal courts,
in which we have allowed a judicial interpretation of a
statute to be set aside by an agency—or have allowed a

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Scalia, J., dissenting
lower court to render an interpretation of a statute sub-
ject to correction by an agency. As recently as 1996, we
rejected an attempt to do precisely that. In Chapman v.
United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991), we had held that the
weight of the blotter paper bearing the lysergic acid diethyl-
amide (LSD) must be counted for purposes of determining
whether the quantity crossed the 10-gram threshold of 21
U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v) imposing a minimum sentence of 10
years. At that time the United States Sentencing Com-
mission applied a similar approach under the Sentencing
Guidelines, but had taken no position regarding the meaning
of the statutory provision. The Commission later changed
its Guidelines approach, and, according to the petitioner in
Neal v. United States, 516 U. S. 284 (1996), made clear its
view that the statute bore that meaning as well. The peti-
tioner argued that we should defer to that new approach.
We would have none of it.
“Were we, for argument’s sake, to adopt petitioner’s
view that the Commission intended the commentary as
an interpretation of § 841(b)(1), and that the last sen-
tence of the commentary states the Commission’s view
that the dose-based method is consistent with the term
‘mixture or substance’ in the statute, he still would not
prevail. The Commission’s dose-based method cannot
be squared with Chapman. . . . In these circumstances,
we need not decide what, if any, deference is owed the
Commission in order to reject its alleged contrary inter-
pretation. Once we have determined a statute’s mean-
ing, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare
decisis, and we assess an agency’s later interpretation of
the statute against that settled law.” Id., at 294–295
(citations omitted).
There is, in short, no way to avoid the ossification of federal
law that today’s opinion sets in motion. What a court says
is the law after according Skidmore deference will be the

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250 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
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law forever, beyond the power of the agency to change even
through rulemaking.
4
And finally, the majority’s approach compounds the con-
fusion it creates by breathing new life into the anachronism
of Skidmore, which sets forth a sliding scale of deference
owed an agency’s interpretation of a statute that is depend-
ent “upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”; in
this way, the appropriate measure of deference will be ac-
corded the “body of experience and informed judgment”
that such interpretations often embody, 323 U. S., at 140.
Justice Jackson’s eloquence notwithstanding, the rule of
Skidmore deference is an empty truism and a trifling state-
ment of the obvious: A judge should take into account the
well-considered views of expert observers.
It was possible to live with the indeterminacy of Skid-
more deference in earlier times. But in an era when fed-
eral statutory law administered by federal agencies is per-
vasive, and when the ambiguities (intended or unintended)
that those statutes contain are innumerable, totality-of-the-
circumstances Skidmore deference is a recipe for uncer-
tainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation. To condemn
a vast body of agency action to that regime (all except rule-
making, formal (and informal?) adjudication, and whatever
else might now and then be included within today’s in-
tentionally vague formulation of affirmative congressional
intent to “delegate”) is irresponsible.
II
The Court’s pretense that today’s opinion is nothing more
than application of our prior case law does not withstand
analysis. It is, to be sure, impossible to demonstrate that
any of our cases contradicts the rule of decision that the

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Court prescribes, because the Court prescribes none. More
precisely, it at one and the same time (1) renders meaningless
its newly announced requirement that there be an affirma-
tive congressional intent to have ambiguities resolved by
the administering agency, and (2) ensures that no prior de-
cision can possibly be cited which contradicts that require-
ment, by simply announcing that all prior decisions according
Chevron deference exemplify the multifarious ways in which
that congressional intent can be manifested: “[A]s significant
as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority,
the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for
we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference
even when no such administrative formality was required
and none was afforded,” ante, at 230–231.4
4 As a sole, teasing example of those “sometimes” the Court cites Na-
tionsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251
(1995), explaining in a footnote that our “longstanding precedent” evinced
a tradition of great deference to the “ ‘deliberative conclusions’ ” of the
Comptroller of the Currency as to the meaning of the banking laws the
Comptroller is charged with enforcing. Ante, at 231, n. 13. How it is
that a tradition of great judicial deference to the agency head provides
affirmative indication of congressional intent to delegate authority to re-
solve statutory ambiguities challenges the intellect and the imagination.
If the point is that Congress must have been aware of that tradition
of great deference when it enacted the law at issue, the same could be said
of the Customs Service, and indeed of all agencies. See, e. g., 4 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 30.08, pp. 237–238 (1958) (describing the
“great weight” accorded the “determination[s]” of the Federal Trade Com-
mission (quoting FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 720 (1948)); Re-
port of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure,
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 90–91 (1941). Indeed, since our opin-
ion in Chevron Congress must have been aware that we would defer to
all authoritative agency resolutions of statutory ambiguities. Needless
to say, NationsBank itself makes no mention of any such affirmative indi-
cation, because it was never the law. The many other cases that contra-
dict the Court’s new rule will presumably be explained, like NationsBank,
as other “modes” of displaying affirmative congressional intent. If a tra-
dition of judicial deference can be called that with a straight face, what
cannot be?

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The principles central to today’s opinion have no anteced-
ent in our jurisprudence. Chevron, the case that the opinion
purportedly explicates, made no mention of the “relatively
formal administrative procedure[s],” ante, at 230, that the
Court today finds the best indication of an affirmative in-
tent by Congress to have ambiguities resolved by the admin-
istering agency. Which is not so remarkable, since Chevron
made no mention of any need to find such an affirmative in-
tent; it said that in the event of statutory ambiguity agency
authority to clarify was to be presumed. And our cases
have followed that prescription.
Six years ago, we unanimously accorded Chevron defer-
ence to an interpretation of the National Bank Act, 12
U. S. C. § 24 Seventh (1988 ed. and Supp. V), contained in a
letter to a private party from a Senior Deputy Comptroller
of the Currency. See NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Vari-
able Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251, 255, 257 (1995).
We did so because the letter represented (and no one con-
tested) that it set forth the official position of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, see id., at 263.
Several cases decided virtually in the wake of Chevron,
which the Court conveniently ignores, demonstrate that Con-
gress could not (if it was reading our opinions) have acted
in reliance on a background assumption that Chevron defer-
ence would generally be accorded only to agency interpre-
tations arrived at through formal adjudication, notice-and-
comment rulemaking, or other procedures assuring “fairness
and deliberation,” ante, at 230. In FDIC v. Philadelphia
Gear Corp., 476 U. S. 426, 438–439 (1986), we accorded Chev-
ron deference to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion’s interpretation of the statutory term “deposit” re-
flected in a course of unstructured administrative actions,
and gave particular weight to the agency’s “contempora-
neous understanding” reflected in the response given by
an FDIC official to a question asked at a meeting of FDIC
and bank officials. It was clear that the position reflected

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the official position of the agency, and that was enough to
command Chevron deference. In Young v. Community Nu-
trition Institute, 476 U. S. 974 (1986), the statutory ambi-
guity at issue pertained to a provision that “the Secretary
[of Health and Human Services] shall promulgate regulations
limiting the quantity [of any poisonous or deleterious sub-
stance added to any food] to such extent as he finds neces-
sary for the protection of public health.” The Secretary had
regularly interpreted the phrase “to such extent as he finds
necessary” as conferring discretion not to issue a rule, rather
than merely discretion regarding the quantity that the rule
would permit. This interpretation was not, of course, re-
flected in any formal adjudication, and had not been the
subject of any informal rulemaking—it was the Secretary’s
understanding consistently applied in the course of the
Department’s practice. We accorded it Chevron deference,
as unquestionably we should have. And in Mead Corp. v.
Tilley, 490 U. S. 714 (1989), a private suit by retirees against
their former employer under the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), we accorded Chevron
deference to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s in-
terpretation of § 4044(a) of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1344(a) (1982
ed. and Supp. V), that was reflected only in an amicus brief
to this Court and in several opinion letters issued without
benefit of any prescribed procedures. See 490 U. S., at 722.
I could continue to enumerate cases according Chevron
deference to agency interpretations not arrived at through
formal proceedings—for example, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 642–643, 647–648
(1990) (according Chevron deference to the PBGC’s inter-
pretation of the requirements for its restoring a terminated
plan under § 4047 of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1347 (1988 ed.),
which interpretation was reflected in nothing more than
the agency’s act of issuing a notice of restoration). Suffice
it to say that many cases flatly contradict the theory of
Chevron set forth in today’s opinion, and with one exception

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not a single case can be found with language that supports
the theory. That exception, a very recent one, deserves ex-
tended discussion.
In Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576 (2000), the
Court said the following:
“[W]e confront an interpretation contained in an
opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a
formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack
the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style defer-
ence.” Id., at 587.
This statement was dictum, unnecessary to the Court’s hold-
ing. Since the Court went on to find that the Secretary of
Labor’s position “ma[de] little sense” given the text and
structure of the statute, id., at 585–586, Chevron deference
could not have been accorded no matter what the conditions
for its application. See 529 U. S., at 591 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment). It was, more-
over, dictum unsupported by the precedent that the Court
cited.
The Christensen majority followed its above-quoted dic-
tum with a string citation of three cases, none of which
sustains its point. In Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50 (1995),
we had no occasion to consider what level of deference was
owed the Bureau of Prisons’ interpretation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 3585(b) set forth in an internal agency guideline, because
our opinion made clear that we would have independently
arrived at the same interpretation on our own, see 515 U. S.,
at 57–60. And although part of one sentence in Koray might
be read to suggest that the Bureau’s “Program Statemen[t]”
should be accorded a measure of deference less than that
mandated by Chevron, this aside is ultimately inconclusive,

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since the sentence ends by observing that the statement was
“a ‘permissible construction of the statute’ ” under Chevron.
515 U. S., at 61 (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843). In the
second case cited, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
U. S. 244 (1991), it was again unnecessary to our holding
whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute warranted
Chevron deference, since the “longstanding . . . ‘canon of
[statutory] construction’ ” disfavoring extraterritoriality, 499
U. S., at 248, would have required the same result even if
Chevron applied. See 499 U. S., at 260 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment). While the opinion
did purport to accord the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s informally promulgated interpretation only
Skidmore deference, it did so because the Court thought
itself bound by its pre-Chevron, EEOC-specific decision in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976), which noted
that “ ‘Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not’ ” intend to
give the EEOC substantive authority to resolve statutory
ambiguities, Arabian American Oil, supra, at 257 (quoting
Gilbert, supra, at 141). Lastly, in Martin v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144 (1991),
the question of the level of deference owed the Secretary of
Labor’s interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 651
et seq., was neither presented by the case nor considered in
our opinion. The only question before the Court was which
of two competing interpretations of 29 CFR § 1910.1029
(1990)—the Secretary’s or the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission’s—should have been deferred to
by the court below. See 499 U. S., at 150. The dicta the
Christensen Court cited, 529 U. S., at 587 (citing 499 U. S.,
at 157), opined on the measure of deference owed the Sec-
retary’s interpretation, not of the statute, but of his own reg-
ulations, see generally Manning, Constitutional Structure

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and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency
Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996).
To make matters worse, the arguments marshaled by
Christensen in support of its dictum—its observation that
“interpretations contained in policy statements, agency man-
uals, and enforcement guidelines, all . . . lack the force of
law,” and its citation of 1 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administra-
tive Law Treatise § 3.5 (3d ed. 1994), 529 U. S., at 587—are
not only unpersuasive but bear scant resemblance to the rea-
soning of today’s opinion. Davis and Pierce, and Professor
Robert Anthony upon whom they rely, see Anthony, Which
Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (1990), do indeed set forth the
argument I have criticized above, that congressional author-
ization of informal rulemaking or formal (and perhaps even
informal) adjudication somehow bespeaks a congressional
intent to “delegate” power to resolve statutory ambiguities.
But their analysis does not permit the broad add-ons that
the Court’s opinion contains—“some other [procedure] indi-
cati[ng] comparable congressional intent,” ante, at 227, and
“we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference
even when no such administrative formality was required
and none was afforded,” ante, at 231.
III
To decide the present case, I would adhere to the original
formulation of Chevron. “ ‘The power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the mak-
ing of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress,’ ” 467 U. S., at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U. S. 199, 231 (1974)). We accordingly presume—and our
precedents have made clear to Congress that we presume—
that, absent some clear textual indication to the contrary,
“Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for im-

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plementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity
would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess what-
ever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows,” Smiley, 517
U. S., at 740–741 (citing Chevron, supra, at 843–844). Chev-
ron sets forth an across-the-board presumption, which op-
erates as a background rule of law against which Congress
legislates: Ambiguity means Congress intended agency dis-
cretion. Any resolution of the ambiguity by the administer-
ing agency that is authoritative—that represents the official
position of the agency—must be accepted by the courts if it
is reasonable.
Nothing in the statute at issue here displays an intent
to modify the background presumption on which Chevron
deference is based. The Court points, ante, at 233, n. 16, to
28 U. S. C. § 2640(a), which provides that, in reviewing the
ruling by the Customs Service, the Court of International
Trade (CIT) “shall make its determinations upon the basis of
the record made before the court.” But records are made
to determine the facts, not the law. All this provision means
is that new evidence may be introduced at the CIT stage;
it says nothing about whether the CIT must respect the
Customs Service’s authoritative interpretation of the law.
More significant than § 2640(a), insofar as the CIT’s obliga-
tion to defer to the Customs Service’s legal interpretations
is concerned, is § 2639(a)(1), which requires the CIT to accord
a “presum[ption of] correct[ness]” to the Customs Service’s
decision. Another provision cited by the Court, ante, at
233, n. 16, is § 2638, which provides that the CIT, “by rule,
may consider any new ground in support” of the challenge
to the Customs Service’s ruling. Once again, it is impos-
sible to see how this has any connection to the degree of
deference the CIT must accord the Customs Service’s in-
terpretation of its statute. Such “new ground[s]” may be
intervening or newly discovered facts, or some intervening

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258 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
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law or regulation that might render the Customs Service’s
ruling unsound.5
There is no doubt that the Customs Service’s inter-
pretation represents the authoritative view of the agency.
Although the actual ruling letter was signed by only the
Director of the Commercial Rulings Branch of Customs
Headquarters’ Office of Regulations and Rulings, see Pet.
for Cert. 47a, the Solicitor General of the United States has
filed a brief, cosigned by the General Counsel of the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, that represents the position set forth
in the ruling letter to be the official position of the Customs
Service. Cf. Christensen, 529 U. S., at 591 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment). No one con-
tends that it is merely a “post hoc rationalizatio[n]” or an
“agency litigating positio[n] wholly unsupported by regula-
tions, rulings, or administrative practice,” Bowen v. George-
town Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 212 (1988).6
5 The Court also states that “[i]t is hard to imagine” that Congress
would have intended courts to defer to classification rulings since “the
scheme for CIT review includes a provision that treats classification
rulings on par with the Secretary’s rulings on ‘valuation, rate of duty,
marking, restricted merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel
repairs, or similar matters,’ ” ante, at 232–233 (quoting 28 U. S. C.
§ 1581(h), and citing § 2639(b)). I fail to see why this is hard to imagine
at all. If anything, the fact that “the scheme for CIT review . . . treats
classification rulings on par with the Secretary’s rulings on” such impor-
tant matters as “ ‘valuation, rate of duty, . . . restricted merchandise [and]
entry requirements,’ ” ante, at 232–233, which often require interpretation
of the Nation’s customs and tariff statutes, only strengthens the case for
according Chevron deference to whatever statutory interpretations (as op-
posed to factual determinations) such rulings embody. In other words,
the Court’s point is wrong—indeed, the Court’s point cuts deeply into its
own case—unless the Court believes that the Secretary’s personal rulings
on the legal criteria for imposing particular rates of duty, or for determin-
ing restricted merchandise, are entitled to no deference.
6 The Court’s parting shot, that “there would have to be something
wrong with a standard that accorded the status of substantive law to
every one of 10,000 ‘official’ customs classifications rulings turned out
each year from over 46 offices placed around the country at the Nation’s
entryways,” ante, at 238, n. 19, misses the mark. I do not disagree. The

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There is also no doubt that the Customs Service’s inter-
pretation is a reasonable one, whether or not judges would
consider it the best. I will not belabor this point, since the
Court evidently agrees: An interpretation that was unrea-
sonable would not merit the remand that the Court decrees
for consideration of Skidmore deference.
IV
Finally, and least importantly, even were I to accept the
Court’s revised version of Chevron as a correct statement
“authoritativeness” of an agency interpretation does not turn upon
whether it has been enunciated by someone who is actually employed
by the agency. It must represent the judgment of central agency man-
agement, approved at the highest levels. I would find that condition to
have been satisfied when, a ruling having been attacked in court, the
general counsel of the agency has determined that it should be defended.
If one thinks that that does not impart sufficient authoritativeness, then
surely the line has been crossed when, as here, the General Counsel of
the agency and the Solicitor General of the United States have assured
this Court that the position represents the agency’s authoritative view.
(Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, there would be nothing bizarre about
the fact that this latter approach would entitle the ruling to deference
here, though it would not have been entitled to deference in the lower
courts. Affirmation of the official agency position before this court—if
that is thought necessary—is no different from the agency’s issuing a
new rule after the Court of Appeals determination. It establishes a new
legal basis for the decision, which this Court must take into account
(or remand for that purpose), even though the Court of Appeals could not.
See Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U. S. 268, 282 (1969);
see also United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801).)
The authoritativeness of the agency ruling may not be a bright-line
standard—but it is infinitely brighter than the line the Court asks us to
draw today, between a statute such as the one at issue in NationsBank
that (according to the Court) does display an “affirmative intent” to “dele-
gate” interpretive authority, and innumerable indistinguishable statutes
that (according to the Court) do not. And, most important of all, it is a
line that focuses attention on the right question: not whether Congress
“affirmatively intended” to delegate interpretive authority (if it entrusted
administration of the statute to an agency, it did, because that is how
our system works); but whether it is truly the agency’s considered view,
or just the opinions of some underlings, that are at issue.

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260 UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP.
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of the law, I would still accord deference to the tariff classi-
fication ruling at issue in this case. For the case is indis-
tinguishable, in that regard, from NationsBank of N. C.,
N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251 (1995),
which the Court acknowledges as an instance in which Chev-
ron deference is warranted notwithstanding the absence
of formal adjudication, notice-and-comment rulemaking, or
comparable “administrative formality,” ante, at 231. Here,
as in NationsBank, there is a tradition of great deference to
the opinions of the agency head, ante, at 231, n. 13. Just two
Terms ago, we observed:
“As early as 1809, Chief Justice Marshall noted in a cus-
toms case that ‘[i]f the question had been doubtful, the
court would have respected the uniform construction
which it is understood has been given by the treasury
department of the United States upon similar ques-
tions.’ United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch 368, 372. See
also P. Reed, The Role of Federal Courts in U. S. Cus-
toms & International Trade Law 289 (1997) (‘Consistent
with the Chevron methodology, and as has long been
the rule in customs cases, customs regulations are sus-
tained if they represent reasonable interpretations of
the statute’); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States,
437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978) (deferring to the Treasury De-
partment’s ‘longstanding and consistent administrative
interpretation’ of the countervailing duty provision of
the Tariff Act.” United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,
526 U. S. 380, 393 (1999).
And here, as in NationsBank, the agency interpretation in
question is officially that of the agency head. Consequently,
even on the Court’s own terms, the Customs ruling at issue
in this case should be given Chevron deference.
* * *

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Scalia, J., dissenting
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the
Court’s judgment. I would uphold the Customs Service’s
construction of Subheading 4820.10.20 of the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States, 19 U. S. C. § 1202, and
would reverse the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals.
I dissent even more vigorously from the reasoning that pro-
duces the Court’s judgment, and that makes today’s deci-
sion one of the most significant opinions ever rendered by
the Court dealing with the judicial review of administra-
tive action. Its consequences will be enormous, and almost
uniformly bad.