POLLARD v. E. I. du PONT de NEMOURS & CO.

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843 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
POLLARD v. E. I. du PONT de NEMOURS & CO.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 00–763. Argued April 23, 2001—Decided June 4, 2001
Petitioner Pollard sued respondent, her former employer, alleging that
she had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex,
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finding that
Pollard was subjected to co-worker sexual harassment of which her
supervisors were aware, and that the harassment resulted in a medi-
cal leave of absence for psychological assistance and her eventual dis-
missal for refusing to return to the same hostile work environment, the
District Court awarded her, as relevant here, $300,000 in compensatory
damages—the maximum permitted under 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(b)(3). The
court observed that the award was insufficient to compensate Pollard,
but was bound by an earlier Sixth Circuit holding that front pay—money
awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and
reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement—was subject to the damages
cap of § 1981a(b)(3). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Front pay is not an element of compensatory damages under § 1981a
and thus is not subject to the damages cap imposed by § 1981a(b)(3).
Pp. 847–854.
(a) Under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as originally en-
acted, when a court found that an employer had intentionally engaged
in an unlawful employment practice, the court was authorized to award
such remedies as injunctions, reinstatement, backpay, and lost benefits.
42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(g)(1). Because this provision closely tracked the
language of § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), § 10(c)’s
meaning before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted provides guid-
ance as to § 706(g)’s proper meaning. In applying § 10(c), the National
Labor Relations Board consistently had made “backpay” awards up
to the date the employee was reinstated or returned to the position
he should have been in had the NLRA violation not occurred, even
if such event occurred after judgment. Consistent with that inter-
pretation, courts finding unlawful intentional discrimination in Title VII
actions awarded this same type of backpay (known today as “front pay”
when it occurs after the judgment) under § 706(g). After Congress ex-
panded § 706(g)’s remedies in 1972 to include “any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate,” courts endorsed a broad view of front
pay, which included front pay awards made in lieu of reinstatement.

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844 POLLARD v. E. I. du PONT de NEMOURS & CO.
Syllabus
By 1991, virtually all of the courts of appeals had recognized front
pay as a remedy authorized by § 706(g). In 1991, Congress further ex-
panded the available remedies to include compensatory and punitive
damages, subject to § 1981a(b)(3)’s cap. Pp. 848–851.
(b) The 1991 Act’s plain language makes clear that the newly au-
thorized § 1981a remedies were in addition to the relief authorized
by § 706(g). Thus, if front pay was a type of relief authorized under
§ 706(g), it is excluded from the meaning of compensatory damages
under § 1981a and it would not be subject to § 1981a(b)(3)’s cap. As the
original language of § 706(g) authorizing backpay awards was modeled
after the same language in the NLRA, backpay awards (now called
front pay awards under Title VII) made for the period between the
judgment date and the reinstatement date were authorized under
§ 706(g). Because there is no logical difference between front pay
awards made when there eventually is reinstatement and those made
when there is not, front pay awards made in lieu of reinstatement
are authorized under § 706(g) as well. To distinguish between the two
cases would lead to the strange result that employees could receive
front pay when reinstatement eventually is available but not when it
is unavailable—whether because of continuing hostility between the
plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychologi-
cal injuries that the discrimination has caused the plaintiff. Thus, the
most egregious offenders could be subject to the least sanctions. The
text of § 706(g) does not lend itself to such a distinction. Front pay
awards made in lieu of reinstatement fit within § 706(g)’s authorization
for courts to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate.”
Pp. 852–854.
213 F. 3d 933, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except O’Connor, J., who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
Kathleen L. Caldwell argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs was Eric Schnapper.
Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United
States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on
the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Yeomans, Austin C. Schlick,
Dennis J. Dimsey, Jennifer Levin, Gwendolyn Young
Reams, Phillip B. Sklover, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Caren
I. Friedman.

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845 Cite as: 532 U. S. 843 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
Raymond Michael Ripple argued the cause for respond-
ent. With him on the brief was Donna L. Goodman.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a front pay award
is an element of compensatory damages under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. We conclude that it is not.
I
Petitioner Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. I.
du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), alleging that
she had been subjected to a hostile work environment based
on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. After a trial,
the District Court found that Pollard was subjected to co-
worker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were
aware. The District Court further found that the harass-
ment resulted in a medical leave of absence from her job
for psychological assistance and her eventual dismissal for
refusing to return to the same hostile work environment.
The court awarded Pollard $107,364 in backpay and benefits,
$252,997 in attorney’s fees, and, as relevant here, $300,000 in
compensatory damages—the maximum permitted under the
statutory cap for such damages in 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(b)(3).
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Richard M. Wyner, Mat-
thew M. Hoffman, Charles T. Lester, Jr., John Payton, Norman Redlich,
Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Steven R. Shapiro, Lenora
M. Lapidus, Sara L. Mandelbaum, Marcia D. Greenberger, Judith L.
Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, Martha F. Davis, Karen K. Narasaki, Vin-
cent A. Eng, Mark D. Roth, and Laurie A. McCann; and for the National
Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Woodley B. Osborne, H. Can-
dace Gorman, and Paula A. Brantner.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Em-
ployment Advisory Council et al. by Robert E. Williams, Ann Elizabeth
Reesman, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Society for
Human Resource Management by Paul Salvatore.

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The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the record
demonstrated that DuPont employees engaged in flagrant
discrimination based on sex and that DuPont managers and
supervisors did not take adequate steps to stop it. 213 F. 3d
933 (CA6 2000).
The issue presented for review here is whether front pay
constitutes an element of “compensatory damages” under 42
U. S. C. § 1981a and thus is subject to the statutory damages
cap imposed by that section. Although courts have defined
“front pay” in numerous ways, front pay is simply money
awarded for lost compensation during the period between
judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement.
For instance, when an appropriate position for the plaintiff
is not immediately available without displacing an incum-
bent employee, courts have ordered reinstatement upon
the opening of such a position and have ordered front pay
to be paid until reinstatement occurs. See, e. g., Walsdorf v.
Board of Comm’rs, 857 F. 2d 1047, 1053–1054 (CA5 1988);
King v. Staley, 849 F. 2d 1143, 1145 (CA8 1988). In cases
in which reinstatement is not viable because of continuing
hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its work-
ers, or because of psychological injuries suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of the discrimination, courts have or-
dered front pay as a substitute for reinstatement. See, e. g.,
Gotthardt v. National R. R. Passenger Corp., 191 F. 3d 1148,
1156 (CA9 1999); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624
F. 2d 945, 957 (CA10 1980). For the purposes of this opinion,
it is not necessary for us to explain when front pay is an
appropriate remedy. The question before us is only whether
front pay, if found to be appropriate, is an element of compen-
satory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and thus
subject to the Act’s statutory cap on such damages.
Here, the District Court observed that “the $300,000.00
award is, in fact, insufficient to compensate plaintiff,” 16
F. Supp. 2d 913, 924, n. 19 (WD Tenn. 1998), but it stated that

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Opinion of the Court
it was bound by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hudson v.
Reno, 130 F. 3d 1193 (1997), which held that front pay was
subject to the cap. On appeal, Pollard argued that Hudson
was wrongly decided because front pay is not an element
of compensatory damages, but rather a replacement for the
remedy of reinstatement in situations in which reinstate-
ment would be inappropriate. She also argued that § 1981a,
by its very terms, explicitly excludes from the statutory cap
remedies that traditionally were available under Title VII,
which she argued included front pay. The Court of Appeals
agreed with Pollard’s arguments but considered itself bound
by Hudson. The Sixth Circuit declined to rehear the case
en banc.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hudson was one of the first
appellate opinions to decide whether front pay is an element
of compensatory damages subject to the statutory cap set
forth in § 1981a(b)(3). Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s reso-
lution of this question, the other Courts of Appeals to ad-
dress it have concluded that front pay is a remedy that is not
subject to the limitations of § 1981a(b)(3). See, e. g., Pals v.
Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F. 3d 495, 499–500
(CA7 2000); Kramer v. Logan County School Dist. No. R–1,
157 F. 3d 620, 625–626 (CA8 1998); Gotthardt, supra, at 1153–
1154; Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F. 3d 545, 556
(CA10 1999); EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F. 3d 600, 619, n. 10
(CA11 2000); Martini v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn., 178
F. 3d 1336, 1348–1349 (CADC 1999). We granted certiorari
to resolve this conflict. 531 U. S. 1069 (2001).
II
Plaintiffs who allege employment discrimination on the
basis of sex traditionally have been entitled to such reme-
dies as injunctions, reinstatement, backpay, lost benefits,
and attorney’s fees under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act

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of 1964. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(g)(1). In the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Congress expanded the remedies available to
these plaintiffs by permitting, for the first time, the re-
covery of compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U. S. C.
§ 1981a(a)(1) (“[T]he complaining party may recover com-
pensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b)
of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by sec-
tion 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964”). The amount
of compensatory damages awarded under § 1981a for “future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecu-
niary losses,” and the amount of punitive damages awarded
under § 1981a, however, may not exceed the statutory cap
set forth in § 1981a(b)(3). The statutory cap is based on
the number of people employed by the respondent. In this
case, the cap is $300,000 because DuPont has more than 500
employees.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded that front pay constitutes
compensatory damages awarded for future pecuniary losses
and thus is subject to the statutory cap of § 1981a(b)(3). 213
F. 3d, at 945; Hudson, supra, at 1203. For the reasons dis-
cussed below, we conclude that front pay is not an element
of compensatory damages within the meaning of § 1981a, and,
therefore, we hold that the statutory cap of § 1981a(b)(3) is
inapplicable to front pay.
A
Under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as origi-
nally enacted, when a court found that an employer had in-
tentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice,
the court was authorized to “enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–
5(g)(1). This provision closely tracked the language of

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§ 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat.
454, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c), which similarly authorized orders re-
quiring employers to take appropriate, remedial “affirmative
action.” § 160(c) (authorizing the National Labor Relations
Board to issue an order “requiring such person to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with
or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
subchapter”). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U. S. 405, 419, n. 11 (1975). The meaning of this provision
of the NLRA prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, therefore, gives us guidance as to the proper mean-
ing of the same language in § 706(g) of Title VII. In apply-
ing § 10(c) of the NLRA, the Board consistently had made
awards of what it called “backpay” up to the date the em-
ployee was reinstated or returned to the position he should
have been in had the violation of the NLRA not occurred,
even if such event occurred after judgment. See, e. g., Na-
thanson v. NLRB, 344 U. S. 25, 29–30 (1952); NLRB v.
Reeves Broadcasting & Development Corp., 336 F. 2d 590,
593–594 (CA4 1964); NLRB v. Hill & Hill Truck Line,
Inc., 266 F. 2d 883, 887 (CA5 1959); Berger Polishing, Inc.,
147 N. L. R. B. 21, 40 (1964); Lock Joint Pipe Co., 141
N. L. R. B. 943, 948 (1963). Consistent with the Board’s
interpretation of this provision of the NLRA, courts find-
ing unlawful intentional discrimination in Title VII actions
awarded this same type of backpay under § 706(g). See,
e. g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 442 F. 2d 1078, 1080
(CA5 1971); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 3 FEP
Cases 767, 790 (ND Ga. 1971). In the Title VII context, this
form of “backpay” occurring after the date of judgment is
known today as “front pay.”
In 1972, Congress expanded § 706(g) to specify that a court
could, in addition to awarding those remedies previously
listed in the provision, award “any other equitable relief

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as the court deems appropriate.” After this amendment
to § 706(g), courts endorsed a broad view of front pay. See,
e. g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 269
(CA4 1976) (stating that where reinstatement is not im-
mediately feasible, backpay “should be supplemented by an
award equal to the estimated present value of lost earnings
that are reasonably likely to occur between the date of judg-
ment and the time when the employee can assume his new
position”); EEOC v. Enterprise Assn. Steamfitters, 542 F.
2d 579, 590 (CA2 1976) (stating that backpay award would
terminate on the date of actual remedying of discrimination);
Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 538 (ED Tex.
1974) (ordering backpay from the date the employee would
have been entitled to fill a vacancy but for racial discrimi-
nation to the date the employee would in all reasonable
probability reach his rightful place). Courts recognized that
reinstatement was not always a viable option, and that an
award of front pay as a substitute for reinstatement in such
cases was a necessary part of the “make whole” relief man-
dated by Congress and by this Court in Albemarle. See,
e. g., Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F. 2d 1155, 1158–
1159 (CA6 1985) (“Front pay is . . . simply compensation
for the post-judgment effects of past discrimination.” It is
awarded “to effectuate fully the ‘make whole’ purposes of
Title VII”); Brooks v. Woodline Motor Freight, Inc., 852
F. 2d 1061, 1066 (CA8 1988) (stating that front pay was
appropriate given substantial animosity between parties
where “the parties’ relationship was not likely to improve,
and the nature of the business required a high degree of
mutual trust and confidence”); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stock-
ade, Inc., 624 F. 2d, at 957 (upholding award of front pay
where continuing hostility existed between the parties); Cas-
sino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F. 2d 1338, 1347 (CA9
1987) (same). By 1991, virtually all of the courts of appeals
had recognized that “front pay” was a remedy authorized

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Opinion of the Court
under § 706(g). 1 In fact, no court of appeals appears to have
ever held to the contrary. 2
In 1991, without amending § 706(g), Congress further ex-
panded the remedies available in cases of intentional em-
ployment discrimination to include compensatory and puni-
tive damages. See 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(1). At that time,
Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, permitted the recovery
of unlimited compensatory and punitive damages in cases
of intentional race and ethnic discrimination, but no similar
remedy existed in cases of intentional sex, religious, or dis-
ability discrimination. Thus, § 1981a brought all forms of in-
tentional employment discrimination into alignment, at least
with respect to the forms of relief available to successful
plaintiffs. However, compensatory and punitive damages
awarded under § 1981a may not exceed the statutory limita-
tions set forth in § 1981a(b)(3), while such damages awarded
under § 1981 are not limited by statute.
1 See, e. g., Barbano v. Madison Cty., 922 F. 2d 139, 146–147 (CA2 1990);
Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F. 2d 367, 383 (CA3 1987); Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 269 (CA4 1976); Walsdorf v. Board
of Comm’rs, 857 F. 2d 1047, 1054 (CA5 1988); Shore v. Federal Express
Corp., 777 F. 2d 1155, 1159–1160 (CA6 1985); Briseno v. Central Techni-
cal Community College Area, 739 F. 2d 344, 348 (CA8 1984); Thorne v.
El Segundo, 802 F. 2d 1131, 1137 (CA9 1986); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stock-
ade, Inc., 624 F. 2d 945, 957 (CA10 1980); Nord v. United States Steel Corp.,
758 F. 2d 1462, 1473–1474 (CA11 1985); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F. 2d 257,
292 (CADC 1982). See also McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F. 2d
104, 116–117 (CA7 1990) (reserving question of availability of front pay
under Title VII); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F. 2d 605, 615–616
(CA1 1985) (holding that front pay is available under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967, but relying on Title VII case law).
2 The only two Courts of Appeals not to have addressed this issue prior
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have since joined the other Circuits in
holding that front pay is a remedy available under § 706(g). See Selgas
v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F. 3d 9, 12–13 (CA1 1997); Williams v.
Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F. 3d 944, 951–952 (CA7 1998).

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B
In the abstract, front pay could be considered compensa-
tion for “future pecuniary losses,” in which case it would be
subject to the statutory cap. § 1981a(b)(3). The term “com-
pensatory damages . . . for future pecuniary losses” is not
defined in the statute, and, out of context, its ordinary mean-
ing could include all payments for monetary losses after the
date of judgment. However, we must not analyze one term
of § 1981a in isolation. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 99 (1992) (“ ‘[W]e must not
be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence,
but look to the provisions of the whole law’ ”). When § 1981a
is read as a whole, the better interpretation is that front
pay is not within the meaning of compensatory damages in
§ 1981a(b)(3), and thus front pay is excluded from the statu-
tory cap.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress determined that
victims of employment discrimination were entitled to addi-
tional remedies. Congress expressly found that “additional
remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace,”
without giving any indication that it wished to curtail pre-
viously available remedies. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,
105 Stat. 1071, § 2. Congress therefore made clear through
the plain language of the statute that the remedies newly
authorized under § 1981a were in addition to the relief
authorized by § 706(g). Section 1981a(a)(1) provides that,
in intentional discrimination cases brought under Title VII,
“the complaining party may recover compensatory and pu-
nitive damages as allowed in subjection (b) of [§ 1981a], in
addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.” (Empha-
sis added.) And § 1981a(b)(2) states that “[c]ompensatory
damages awarded under [§ 1981a] shall not include back-
pay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief author-
ized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”

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(Emphasis added.) According to these statutory provisions,
if front pay was a type of relief authorized under § 706(g),
it is excluded from the meaning of compensatory damages
under § 1981a.
As discussed above, the original language of § 706(g) au-
thorizing backpay awards was modeled after the same
language in the NLRA. This provision in the NLRA had
been construed to allow awards of backpay up to the date
of reinstatement, even if reinstatement occurred after judg-
ment. Accordingly, backpay awards made for the period be-
tween the date of judgment and the date of reinstatement,
which today are called front pay awards under Title VII,
were authorized under § 706(g).
As to front pay awards that are made in lieu of reinstate-
ment, we construe § 706(g) as authorizing these awards as
well. We see no logical difference between front pay awards
made when there eventually is reinstatement and those
made when there is not. 3 Moreover, to distinguish between
the two cases would lead to the strange result that em-
ployees could receive front pay when reinstatement even-
tually is available but not when reinstatement is not an
option—whether because of continuing hostility between
the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of
psychological injuries that the discrimination has caused
the plaintiff. Thus, the most egregious offenders could be
subject to the least sanctions. Had Congress drawn such a
line in the statute and foreclosed front pay awards in lieu
of reinstatement, we certainly would honor that line. But,
as written, the text of the statute does not lend itself to
such a distinction, and we will not create one. The statute
3 We note that the federal courts consistently have construed § 706(g)
as authorizing front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement. See, e. g., Blum
v. Witco Chem. Corp., supra, at 383 (“A front pay . . . award is the mone-
tary equivalent of the equitable remedy of reinstatement”); Williams v.
Pharmacia, Inc., supra, at 952 (stating that “front pay is the functional
equivalent of reinstatement”).

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authorizes courts to “order such affirmative action as may
be appropriate.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(g)(1). We conclude
that front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement fit within this
statutory term.
Because front pay is a remedy authorized under § 706(g),
Congress did not limit the availability of such awards in
§ 1981a. Instead, Congress sought to expand the available
remedies by permitting the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages in addition to previously available reme-
dies, such as front pay.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

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Reporter’s Note
The next page is purposely numbered 901. The numbers between 854
and 901 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita-
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.