BECKER v. MONTGOMERY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO, et al.

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Syllabus
BECKER v. MONTGOMERY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF OHIO, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 00–6374. Argued April 16, 2001—Decided May 29, 2001
Petitioner Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a pro se civil rights action
contesting conditions of his confinement under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The
Federal District Court dismissed his complaint for failure to exhaust
prison administrative remedies and failure to state a claim for relief.
Within the 30 days allowed for appeal from a district court’s judgment,
see 28 U. S. C. § 2107(a); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1), Becker, still pro se,
filed a notice of appeal using a Government-printed form on which he
filled in all of the requested information. On the line tagged “(Counsel
for Appellant),” Becker typed, but did not hand sign, his own name.
The form contained no indication of a signature requirement. The Dis-
trict Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, and subsequently granted Becker leave to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal. The Sixth Circuit Clerk’s Office sent Becker
a letter telling him that his appeal had been docketed, setting a briefing
schedule, and stating that the court would not hold him to the same
standards it required of attorneys in stating his case. Becker filed his
brief in advance of the scheduled deadline, signing it on both the cover
and the last page. Long after the 30-day time to appeal had expired,
the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal on its own motion, holding, in
reliance on its prior Mattingly decision, that the notice of appeal was
fatally defective because it was not signed. The Court of Appeals
deemed the defect “jurisdictional,” and therefore not curable outside
the time allowed to file the notice. No court officer had earlier called
Becker’s attention to the need for a signature.
Held: When a party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, the
failure to sign the notice does not require the court of appeals to dismiss
the appeal. Pp. 762–768.
(a) The Sixth Circuit based its Mattingly determination on the com-
plementary operation of two Federal Rules: Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure (Appellate Rule) 4(a)(1), which provides that “the notice of
appeal required by Rule 3 [to commence an appeal] must be filed with
the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment . . . appealed from is
entered”; and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule) 11(a), which
provides that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper [filed

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Syllabus
in a district court] shall be signed” by counsel or, if the party is unrepre-
sented, by the party himself. Pp. 762–763.
(b) The Sixth Circuit is correct that the governing Federal Rules call
for a signature on notices of appeal. Civil Rule 11(a), the signature
requirement’s source, comes into play on appeal this way. An appeal
can be initiated, Appellate Rule 3(a)(1) instructs, “only by filing a notice
of appeal with the district clerk within the time allowed by [Appellate]
Rule 4.” Whenever the Appellate Rules provide for a filing in the dis-
trict court, Appellate Rule 1(a)(2) directs, “the procedure must comply
with the practice of the district court.” The district court practice
relevant here is Civil Rule 11(a)’s signature requirement. Notices of
appeal unquestionably qualify as “other paper[s]” under that require-
ment, so they “shall be signed.” Without a rule change so ordering,
the Court is not disposed to extend the meaning of the word “signed”
to permit typed names, as Becker urges. Rather, the Court reads Civil
Rule 11(a) to call for a name handwritten (or a mark handplaced).
Pp. 763–764.
(c) However, the Sixth Circuit erred in its dispositive ruling that the
signature requirement cannot be met after the appeal period expires.
As plainly as Civil Rule 11(a) requires a signature on filed papers, so
the rule goes on to provide that “omission of the signature” may be
“corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney
or party.” Corrections can be made, the Rules Advisory Committee
noted, by signing the paper on file or by submitting a duplicate that
contains the signature. Civil Rule 11(a)’s provision for correction ap-
plies to appeal notices. The rule was formulated and should be applied
as a cohesive whole. So understood, the signature requirement and the
cure for an initial failure to meet the requirement go hand in hand.
Becker proffered a correction of the defect in his notice in the manner
Rule 11(a) permits—he attempted to submit a duplicate containing his
signature—and therefore should not have suffered dismissal of his ap-
peal for nonobservance of that rule. The Court does not disturb its
earlier statements describing Appellate Rules 3 and 4 as “jurisdictional
in nature.” E. g., Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315.
The Court rules simply and only that Becker’s lapse was curable as
Civil Rule 11(a) prescribes; his initial omission was not a “jurisdictional”
impediment to pursuit of his appeal. While Appellate Rules 3 and 4
are indeed linked jurisdictional provisions, Rule 3(c)(1), which details
what the notice of appeal must contain, does not include a signature
requirement. Civil Rule 11(a) alone calls for and controls that require-
ment and renders it nonjurisdictional. Pp. 764–766.
(d) The Court rejects the argument that, even if there is no jurisdic-
tional notice of appeal signature requirement for parties represented

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by attorneys, pro se parties, like Becker, must sign within Rule 4’s time
line to avoid automatic dismissal. The foundation for this argument
is Appellate Rule 3(c)(2), which reads: “A pro se notice of appeal is con-
sidered filed on behalf of the signer and the signer’s spouse and minor
children (if they are parties), unless the notice clearly indicates other-
wise.” That provision does not dislodge the signature requirement
from its Civil Rule 11(a) moorings and make of it an Appellate Rule 3
jurisdictional specification. Rather, Rule 3(c)(2) is entirely ameliora-
tive; it assumes and assures that the pro se litigant’s spouse and minor
children, if they were parties below, will remain parties on appeal, un-
less the notice clearly indicates a contrary intent. This reading of Rule
3(c)(2) is in harmony with a related ameliorative rule, Appellate Rule
3(c)(4), which provides: “An appeal must not be dismissed for informality
of form or title of the notice of appeal, or for failure to name a party
whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.” Imper-
fections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine
doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, to which
appellate court. See, e. g., Smith v. Barry, 502 U. S. 244, 245, 248–249.
Pp. 766–768.
Reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Jeffrey S. Sutton, by appointment of the Court, 531
U. S. 1123, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs were Ronald E. Laymon and Chad A. Readler.
Stewart A. Baker, by invitation of the Court, 531 U. S.
1110, argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae
in support of the judgment below. Betty D. Montgomery,
Attorney General of Ohio, pro se, and David M. Gormley,
State Solicitor, filed a brief for respondents.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Dale G. Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a
pro se civil rights action in a Federal District Court, contest-
ing conditions of his confinement. Upon dismissal of his
complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, Becker sought
to appeal. Using a Government-printed form, Becker timely
filed a notice of appeal that contained all of the requested
information. On the line tagged “(Counsel for Appellant),”

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Becker typed, but did not hand sign, his own name. For
want of a handwritten signature on the notice as origi-
nally filed, the Court of Appeals dismissed Becker’s appeal.
The appellate court deemed the defect “jurisdictional,” and
therefore not curable outside the time allowed to file the
notice.
We granted review to address this question: “When a
party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, does
the failure to sign the notice of appeal require the court of
appeals to dismiss the appeal?” 531 U. S. 1110 (2001). Our
answer is no. For want of a signature on a timely notice,
the appeal is not automatically lost. The governing Federal
Rules direct that the notice of appeal, like other papers filed
in district court, shall be signed by counsel or, if the party
is unrepresented, by the party himself. But if the notice is
timely filed and adequate in other respects, jurisdiction will
vest in the court of appeals, where the case may proceed so
long as the appellant promptly supplies the signature once
the omission is called to his attention.
I
This case originated from a civil rights complaint under
42 U. S. C. § 1983 filed pro se by Ohio prison inmate Dale G.
Becker in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio. Becker challenged the conditions of his
incarceration at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution,
specifically, his exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke.
The District Court dismissed Becker’s complaint for failure
to exhaust prison administrative remedies and failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. App. 5–8.
Within the 30 days allowed for appeal from a district
court’s judgment, see 28 U. S. C. § 2107(a); Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 4(a)(1), Becker, still pro se, filed a notice of appeal.
Using a notice of appeal form printed by the Government
Printing Office, Becker filled in the blanks, specifying him-
self as sole appellant, designating the judgment from which

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he appealed, and naming the court to which he appealed.
See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(c)(1). He typed his own name in
the space above “(Counsel for Appellant),” and also typed,
in the spaces provided on the form, his address and the
date of the notice. The form Becker completed contained
no statement or other indication of a signature requirement
and Becker did not hand sign the notice.
The District Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the
Court of Appeals, and subsequently granted Becker leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Becker received a
letter from the Sixth Circuit Clerk’s Office telling him that
his appeal had been docketed and setting a briefing schedule.
The letter stated: “The court is aware that you are not an
attorney and it will not hold you to the same standards it
requires of them in stating your case.” App. 14.
Becker filed his brief more than two weeks in advance of
the scheduled deadline. He signed it both on the cover and
on the last page. Some six months later, on its own motion,
the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal in a spare order rely-
ing on that court’s prior, published decision in Mattingly v.
Farmers State Bank, 153 F. 3d 336 (1998) (per curiam). In
Becker’s case, the Court of Appeals said, summarily:
“This court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. The
notice of appeal is defective because it was not signed
by the pro se appellant or by a qualified attorney.”
App. 16–17.
No court officer had earlier called Becker’s attention to the
need for a signature, and the dismissal order, issued long
after the 30-day time to appeal expired, accorded Becker no
opportunity to cure the defect.
Becker filed a timely but unsuccessful motion for reconsid-
eration, to which he appended a new, signed notice of appeal.
Thereafter, he petitioned for this Court’s review. The At-
torney General of Ohio, in response, urged us “to summarily

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reverse the judgment below,” Brief in Response to Pet. for
Cert. 1, stating:
“We cannot honestly claim any uncertain[t]y about peti-
tioner Becker’s intention to pursue an appeal once he
filed his timely, though unsigned, notice of appeal in the
district court. We never objected to the lack of a sig-
nature on his notice of appeal, and fully expected the
court of appeals to address his appellate arguments on
the merits.” Id., at 5.
We granted certiorari, 531 U. S. 1069; 531 U. S. 1110 (2001),
to assure the uniform interpretation of the governing Fed-
eral Rules, and now address the question whether Becker’s
failure to sign his timely filed notice of appeal requires the
Court of Appeals to dismiss his appeal.1
II
In Mattingly v. Farmers State Bank, 153 F. 3d 336 (1998)
(per curiam), the Sixth Circuit determined that a notice of
appeal must be signed, and that a signature’s omission can-
not be cured by giving the appellant an opportunity to sign
after the time to appeal has expired. For this determina-
tion, that court relied on the complementary operation of two
Federal Rules: Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (Appel-
late Rule) 4(a)(1), which provides that “the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 [to commence an appeal] must be filed
with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or
order appealed from is entered”; 2 and Federal Rule of Civil
1 Without any party to defend the Sixth Circuit’s position, we invited
Stewart A. Baker to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in sup-
port of the judgment below. 531 U. S. 1110 (2001). His able represen-
tation, and that of Jeffrey S. Sutton, whom we appointed to represent
Becker, 531 U. S. 1123 (2001), permit us to decide this case satisfied that
the relevant issues have been fully aired.
2 On motion filed no later than 30 days after expiration of the original
appeal time, the appeal period may be extended upon a showing of “ex-
cusable neglect or good cause,” but the extension “may [not] exceed 30

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Procedure (Civil Rule) 11(a), which provides that “[e]very . . .
paper [filed in a district court] shall be signed.” We agree
with the Sixth Circuit that the governing Federal Rules call
for a signature on notices of appeal. We disagree, however,
with that court’s dispositive ruling that the signature re-
quirement cannot be met after the appeal period expires.
Civil Rule 11(a), the source of the signature requirement,
comes into play on appeal this way. An appeal can be ini-
tiated, Appellate Rule 3(a)(1) instructs, “only by filing a no-
tice of appeal with the district clerk within the time allowed
by [Appellate] Rule 4.” Whenever the Appellate Rules pro-
vide for a filing in the district court, Appellate Rule 1(a)(2)
directs, “the procedure must comply with the practice of the
district court.” The district court practice relevant here is
Civil Rule 11(a).
Ru le 11(a)’s first sentence st ates the sig nature
requirement:
“Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attor-
ney’s individual name, or, if the party is not represented
by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.”
Notices of appeal unquestionably qualify as “other paper[s],”
so they “shall be signed.”
Becker maintains that typing one’s name satisfies the
signature requirement and that his original notice of appeal,
containing his name typed above “(Counsel of Record),” met
Civil Rule 11(a)’s instruction. We do not doubt that the
signature requirement can be adjusted to keep pace with
technological advances. A 1996 amendment to Civil Rule 5
provides in this regard:
“A court may by local rule permit papers to be filed,
signed, or verified by electronic means that are consist-
days after the [originally] prescribed time or 10 days after the date when
the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later.” Fed. Rule
App. Proc. 4(a)(5).

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ent with technical standards, if any, that the Judicial
Conference of the United States establishes. A paper
filed by electronic means in compliance with a local rule
constitutes a written paper for the purpose of applying
these rules.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(e).
See, e. g., Rule 5.1 (ND Ohio 2000) (permitting “papers filed,
signed, or verified by electronic means”). The local rules
on electronic filing provide some assurance, as does a hand-
written signature, that the submission is authentic. See,
e. g., United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, Electronic Filing Policies and Procedures Manual
4 (Apr. 2, 2001) (available at http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/
Electronic Filing/user.pdf) (allowing only registered attor-
neys assigned identification names and passwords to file
papers electronically). Without any rule change so order-
ing, however, we are not disposed to extend the meaning
of the word “signed,” as that word appears in Civil Rule
11(a), to permit typed names. As Rule 11(a) is now framed,
we read the requirement of a signature to indicate, as a
signature requirement commonly does, and as it did in John
Hancock’s day, a name handwritten (or a mark handplaced).
As plainly as Civil Rule 11(a) requires a signature on filed
papers, however, so the rule goes on to provide in its final
sentence that “omission of the signature” may be “corrected
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney
or party.” “Correction can be made,” the Rules Advisory
Committee noted, “by signing the paper on file or by sub-
mitting a duplicate that contains the signature.” Advisory
Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11, 28 U. S. C.
App., p. 666.
Amicus urges that only the first sentence of Civil Rule
11(a), containing the signature requirement—not Rule 11(a)’s
final sentence, providing for correction of a signature omis-
sion—applies to appeal notices. Appellate Rule 1(a)(2)’s di-

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rection to “comply with the practice of the district court”
ceases to hold sway, amicus maintains, once the notice of
appeal is transmitted from the district court, in which it is
filed, to the court of appeals, in which the case will proceed.
Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below
15–18, and nn. 18–20.
Civil Rule 11(a), in our view, cannot be sliced as amicus
proposes. The rule was formulated and should be applied as
a cohesive whole. So understood, the signature requirement
and the cure for an initial failure to meet the requirement
go hand in hand. The remedy for a signature omission, in
other words, is part and parcel of the requirement itself.
Becker proffered a correction of the defect in his notice in
the manner Rule 11(a) permits—he attempted to submit a
duplicate containing his signature, see supra, at 761—and
therefore should not have suffered dismissal of his appeal for
nonobservance of that rule.
The Sixth Circuit in Mattingly correctly observed that we
have described Appellate Rules 3 and 4 as “jurisdictional in
nature.” 153 F. 3d, at 337 (citing Torres v. Oakland Scav-
enger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315 (1988), and Smith v. Barry, 502
U. S. 244, 248 (1992)). We do not today hold otherwise. We
rule simply and only that Becker’s lapse was curable as Civil
Rule 11(a) prescribes; his initial omission was not a “juris-
dictional” impediment to pursuit of his appeal.
Appellate Rules 3 and 4, we clarify, are indeed linked ju-
risdictional provisions. Rule 3(a)(1) directs that a notice
of appeal be filed “within the time allowed by Rule 4,”
i. e., ordinarily, within 30 days after the judgment appealed
from is entered, see supra, at 762–763, and n. 2. Rule 3(c)(1)
details what the notice of appeal must contain: The notice,
within Rule 4’s timeframe, must (1) specify the party or
parties taking the appeal; (2) designate the judgment from
which the appeal is taken; and (3) name the court to which

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the appeal is taken.3 Notably, a signature requirement is
not among Rule 3(c)(1)’s specifications, for Civil Rule 11(a)
alone calls for and controls that requirement and renders it
nonjurisdictional.
Amicus ultimately urges that even if there is no juris-
dictional notice of appeal signature requirement for parties
represented by attorneys, pro se parties, like Becker, must
sign within Rule 4’s time line to avoid automatic dismissal.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–36. Appellate Rule 3(c)(2) is the
foundation for this argument. That provision reads: “A
pro se notice of appeal is considered filed on behalf of the
signer and the signer’s spouse and minor children (if they
are parties), unless the notice clearly indicates otherwise.”
We do not agree that Rule 3(c)(2)’s prescription, added in
1993 to a then unsubdivided Rule 3(c), see Advisory Commit-
tee’s Notes on Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 590,
places pro se litigants in a singularly exacting time bind.
The provision, as we read it, does not dislodge the signature
requirement from its Civil Rule 11(a) moorings and make
of it an Appellate Rule 3 jurisdictional specification. The
current Rule 3(c)(2), like other changes made in 1993, the
Advisory Committee Notes explain, was designed “to pre-
vent the loss of a right to appeal through inadvertent omis-
sion of a party’s name” when “it is objectively clear that [the]
party intended to appeal.” Advisory Committee’s Notes on
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 590. Seen in this
light, the Rule is entirely ameliorative; it assumes and as-
sures that the pro se litigant’s spouse and minor children,
3 Appellate Rule 3(c)(1), as currently framed, provides in full:
“(1) The notice of appeal must:
“(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one
in the caption or body of the notice, but an attorney representing more
than one party may describe those parties with such terms as ‘all plain-
tiffs,’ ‘the defendants,’ ‘the plaintiffs A, B, et al.,’ or ‘all defendants
except X’;
“(B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed; and
“(C) name the court to which the appeal is taken.”

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if they were parties below, will remain parties on appeal,
“unless the notice clearly indicates a contrary intent.” Ibid.
If we had any doubt that Appellate Rule 3(c)(2) was meant
only to facilitate, not to impede, access to an appeal, we
would find corroboration in a related ameliorative rule, Ap-
pellate Rule 3(c)(4), which provides: “An appeal must not be
dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of ap-
peal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is
otherwise clear from the notice.” Cf. this Court’s Rule 14.5
(“If the Clerk determines that a petition submitted timely
and in good faith is in a form that does not comply with this
Rule [governing the content of petitions for certiorari] or
with Rule 33 or Rule 34 [governing document preparation],
the Clerk will return it with a letter indicating the deficiency.
A corrected petition received no more than 60 days after the
date of the Clerk’s letter will be deemed timely.”).
In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312 (1988),
it is true, we held, that a notice of appeal that omitted the
name of a particular appellant, through a clerical error, was
ineffective to take an appeal for that party. Id., at 318 (con-
struing Rule 3(c) prior to the ameliorative changes made in
1993). 4 Becker’s notice, however, did not suffer from any
failure to “specify the party or parties taking the appeal.”
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(c)(1)(A). Other opinions of this
Court are in full harmony with the view that imperfections
in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine
doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judg-
ment, to which appellate court. See Smith v. Barry, 502
U. S., at 245, 248–249 (holding that “a document intended to
serve as an appellate brief [filed within the time speci-
fied by Appellate Rule 4 and containing the information
required by Appellate Rule 3] may qualify as the notice of
4 The Advisory Committee intended the elaborate 1993 amendment of
Appellate Rule 3(c) “to reduce the amount of satellite litigation spawned
by [Torres].” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3, 28
U. S. C. App., p. 590.

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appeal”); Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 181 (1962) (holding
that an appeal was improperly dismissed when the record as
a whole—including a timely but incomplete notice of appeal
and a premature but complete notice—revealed the orders
petitioner sought to appeal).
* * *
In sum, the Federal Rules require a notice of appeal to
be signed. That requirement derives from Civil Rule 11(a),
and so does the remedy for a signature’s omission on the
notice originally filed. On the facts here presented, the
Sixth Circuit should have accepted Becker’s corrected notice
as perfecting his appeal. We therefore reverse the judg-
ment dismissing Becker’s appeal and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.