DANIELS v. UNITED STATES

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374 OCTOBER TERM, 2000
Syllabus
DANIELS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 99–9136. Argued January 8, 2001—Decided April 25, 2001
Petitioner was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), and his sentence was enhanced under
the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. § 924(e),
which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence on anyone who violates
§ 922(g)(1) and has three previous convictions for, inter alia, a violent
felony. Petitioner had four such prior state convictions. After an un-
successful direct appeal, petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2255. He asserted
that his sentence violated the Constitution because it was based in part
on two prior convictions that were themselves unconstitutional. Both
prior convictions, he claimed, were based on inadequate guilty pleas and
one was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. The District
Court denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
195 F. 3d 501, affirmed.
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in part, con-
cluding that petitioner, having failed to pursue remedies that were oth-
erwise available to him to challenge his prior convictions while he was
in custody on those convictions, may not now use a § 2255 motion di-
rected at his federal sentence to collaterally attack those convictions.
Pp. 378–383, 384.
(a) In Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485, 490–497, this Court held
that with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the
right to counsel, a defendant has no right under the ACCA or the Con-
stitution to collaterally attack prior convictions at his federal sentencing
proceeding. The considerations supporting that conclusion—ease of ad-
ministration and the interest in promoting the finality of judgments—
are also present in the § 2255 context. A district court evaluating a
§ 2255 motion is as unlikely as a district court engaged in sentencing
to have the documents necessary to evaluate claims arising from long-
past proceedings in a different jurisdiction. Moreover, States retain a
strong interest in preserving convictions they have obtained, as they
impose a wide range of disabilities on those who have been convicted,
even after their release. Pp. 378–380.

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Syllabus
(b) Although defendants may challenge their convictions for constitu-
tional infirmity, it does not necessarily follow that a § 2255 motion is an
appropriate vehicle for determining whether a conviction later used to
enhance a federal sentence was unconstitutionally obtained. A defend-
ant convicted in state court has numerous opportunities to challenge the
constitutionality of that conviction, but those vehicles for review are not
available indefinitely and without limitation. Procedural barriers limit
access to review on the merits of constitutional claims, vindicating the
presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments, even when
the question is waiver of constitutional rights. Parke v. Raley, 506
U. S. 20, 29. Thus, if, by the time of sentencing under the ACCA, a
prior conviction has not been set aside on direct or collateral review, it
is presumptively valid and may be used to enhance the federal sentence,
with the exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to
counsel. Custis, supra, at 496–497. After an enhanced federal sen-
tence has been imposed under the ACCA, the person sentenced may
pursue any channels of direct or collateral review still available to chal-
lenge his prior conviction. If, however, a prior conviction used to en-
hance a federal sentence is no longer open to attack in its own right
because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were
available (or because he did so unsuccessfully), then he is without re-
course. The defendant may not collaterally attack his prior conviction
through a motion under § 2255, unless he claims that conviction was
obtained in violation of the right to counsel and he raised that claim at
his federal sentencing proceeding. A contrary rule would effectively
permit challenges far too stale to be brought in their own right, and
sanction an end run around statutes of limitation and other procedural
barriers that would preclude the movant from attacking the prior con-
viction directly. Nothing in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent
requires such a result. Pp. 380–383.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in part, in which Rehn-
quist, C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia,
J., joined, except for that portion of the opinion recognizing that § 2255
may be available in rare circumstances. Scalia, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in part, post, p. 385. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 387. Breyer, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, post, p. 392.
G. Michael Tanaka argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Maria E. Stratton.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for
the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor

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376 DANIELS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson,
James A. Feldman, and Kathleen A. Felton.*
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in
part.
In Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485 (1994), we ad-
dressed whether a defendant sentenced under the Armed
Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. § 924(e),
could collaterally attack the validity of previous state convic-
tions used to enhance his federal sentence. We held that,
with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation
of the right to counsel, a defendant has no right to bring such
a challenge in his federal sentencing proceeding. 511 U. S.,
at 487. We now consider whether, after the sentencing pro-
ceeding has concluded, the individual who was sentenced
may challenge his federal sentence through a motion under
28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1994 ed., Supp. V) on the ground that his
prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained. We hold
that, as a general rule, he may not. There may be rare cir-
cumstances in which § 2255 would be available, but we need
not address the issue here.
I
In 1994, petitioner Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., was tried and
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in viola-
tion of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). The Government then sought
to enhance his sentence under the ACCA. App. 4–5. The
ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on
anyone who violates § 922(g)(1) and who has three previous
convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.
§ 924(e)(1). Petitioner had been convicted in California in
1978 and 1981 for robbery, and in 1977 and 1979 for first
degree burglary. Id., at 14. The District Court found peti-
tioner to be an armed career criminal within the meaning of
*Kent S. Scheidegger filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Founda-
tion as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

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the ACCA and, after granting a downward departure, the
District Court sentenced petitioner to 176 months. Id., at
14, 18. Had petitioner not been adjudged an armed career
criminal, he would have received at most a 120-month sen-
tence. 18 U. S. C. § 924(a)(2). On direct appeal, petitioner
argued unsuccessfully that his two burglary convictions did
not qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA. See 86
F. 3d 1164 (CA9 1996) (table).
Petitioner then filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or cor-
rect his sentence pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2255 in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California.
Section 2255, a postconviction remedy for federal prisoners,
permits “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a [federal]
court” to “move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” upon the ground
that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States.” Petitioner asserted that
his current federal sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution because it was based in part on his 1978 and
1981 robbery convictions. Those prior convictions, he al-
leged, were themselves unconstitutional because they both
were based on guilty pleas that were not knowing and volun-
tary, and because the 1981 conviction was also the product
of ineffective assistance of counsel. App. 51–52. He did
not contend that § 2255 relief was appropriate because his
current sentence was imposed in violation of the ACCA.
Cf. Brief for Petitioner 13.
The District Court denied the § 2255 motion, App. 58–67,
and a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,
195 F. 3d 501 (1999). The court held that our decision in
Custis “bar[s] federal habeas review of the validity of a prior
conviction used for federal sentencing enhancement unless
the petitioner raises a . . . claim [under Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963)].” 195 F. 3d, at 503 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the Courts
of Appeals are divided as to whether Custis bars relief under

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378 DANIELS v. UNITED STATES
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§ 2255 as well as in federal sentencing proceedings, we
granted certiorari. 530 U. S. 1299 (2000).
II
The petitioner in Custis attempted, during his federal sen-
tencing proceeding, to attack prior state convictions used to
enhance his sentence under the ACCA. Like petitioner
here, Custis challenged his prior convictions as the product
of allegedly faulty guilty pleas and ineffective assistance of
counsel. 511 U. S., at 488. We held that with the sole ex-
ception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to
counsel, Custis had no right under the ACCA or the Consti-
tution “to collaterally attack prior convictions” in the course
of his federal sentencing proceeding. Id., at 490–497.
While the “failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defend-
ant was a unique constitutional defect” that justified the
exception for challenges concerning Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U. S. 335 (1963), 511 U. S., at 496, challenges of the type
Custis sought to bring did not “ris[e] to the level of a jurisdic-
tional defect,” ibid.
Two considerations supported our constitutional conclu-
sion in Custis: ease of administration and the interest in
promoting the finality of judgments. With respect to the
former, we noted that resolving non-Gideon-type constitu-
tional attacks on prior convictions “would require sentencing
courts to rummage through frequently nonexistent or diffi-
cult to obtain state-court transcripts or records.” 511 U. S.,
at 496. With respect to the latter, we observed that allow-
ing collateral attacks would “inevitably delay and impair the
orderly administration of justice” and “deprive the state-
court judgment of its normal force and effect.” Id., at 497
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
A
Petitioner contends that the Custis rule should not extend
to § 2255 proceedings because the concerns we articulated

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in Custis are not present in the § 2255 context. Brief for
Petitioner 22–26. We disagree. First, a district court
evaluating a § 2255 motion is as unlikely as a district court
engaged in sentencing to have the documents necessary to
evaluate claims arising from long-past proceedings in a dif-
ferent jurisdiction. While petitioner is quite right that fed-
eral district courts are capable of evaluating fact-intensive
constitutional claims raised by way of a habeas petition, id.,
at 22–23, institutional competence does not make decades-old
state court records and transcripts any easier to locate.
The facts of this case only reinforce our concern. For ex-
ample, petitioner contends that he entered his 1978 and 1981
guilty pleas without a full understanding of the essential ele-
ments of the crimes with which he was charged, and there-
fore the resulting convictions violated due process. App.
40–42, 50–51. These claims by their nature require close
scrutiny of the record below. Yet petitioner has not placed
the transcript from either plea colloquy in the record. In
fact, he has admitted that the 1978 transcript is missing from
the state court file. Cf. id., at 38, n. 3. Under these circum-
stances, it would be an almost futile exercise for a district
court to attempt to determine accurately what was communi-
cated to petitioner more than two decades ago.
With respect to the concern for finality, petitioner argues
that because he has served the complete sentences for his
1978 and 1981 convictions, the State would suffer little, if
any, prejudice if those convictions were invalidated through
a collateral challenge under § 2255. Brief for Petitioner 24–
26. To the contrary, even after a defendant has served the
full measure of his sentence, a State retains a strong interest
in preserving the convictions it has obtained. States impose
a wide range of disabilities on those who have been convicted
of crimes, even after their release. For example, in Califor-
nia, where petitioner committed his crimes, persons con-
victed of a felony may be disqualified from holding public
office, subjected to restrictions on professional licensing, and

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barred from possessing firearms. See U. S. Dept. of Justice,
Office of the Pardon Attorney, Civil Disabilities of Convicted
Felons: A State-By-State Survey 29–32 (Oct. 1996). Fur-
ther, each of the 50 States has a statute authorizing enhanced
sentences for recidivist offenders. E. g., Cal. Penal Code
Ann. § 667 (West 1999). See also Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S.
20, 26–27 (1992).
At oral argument, petitioner suggested that invalidating a
prior conviction on constitutional grounds for purposes of its
use under the ACCA would have no effect beyond the federal
proceeding. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8–10. Although that question
is not squarely presented here, if a state conviction were
determined to be sufficiently unreliable that it could not be
used to enhance a federal sentence, the State’s ability to use
that judgment subsequently for its own purposes would be,
at the very least, greatly undermined. Thus, the State does
have a real and continuing interest in the integrity of its
judgments.
B
On the most fundamental level, petitioner attempts to dis-
tinguish Custis as a decision only about the appropriate
forum in which a defendant may challenge prior convictions
used to enhance a federal sentence. The issue in Custis, ac-
cording to petitioner, was “ ‘where, not whether, the defend-
ant could attack a prior conviction for constitutional infir-
mity.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 14 (quoting Nichols v. United
States, 511 U. S. 738, 765 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(original emphasis deleted)). The appropriate forum for
such a challenge, petitioner argues, at least where no other
forum is available, is a federal proceeding under § 2255.
Brief for Petitioner 16.
The premise underlying petitioner’s argument—that de-
fendants may challenge their convictions for constitutional
infirmity—is quite correct. It is beyond dispute that convic-
tions must be obtained in a manner that comports with the
Federal Constitution. But it does not necessarily follow

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that a § 2255 motion is an appropriate vehicle for determin-
ing whether a conviction later used to enhance a federal sen-
tence was unconstitutionally obtained.
Our system affords a defendant convicted in state court
numerous opportunities to challenge the constitutionality of
his conviction. He may raise constitutional claims on direct
appeal, in postconviction proceedings available under state
law, and in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). See
generally 1 J. Liebman & R. Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice and Procedure § 5.1.a (3d ed. 1998).1 These vehicles
for review, however, are not available indefinitely and with-
out limitation. Procedural barriers, such as statutes of
limitations and rules concerning procedural default and ex-
haustion of remedies, operate to limit access to review on
the merits of a constitutional claim. See, e. g., United States
v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 731 (1993) (“ ‘No procedural principle
is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional
right . . . may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases
by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it’ ” (quoting Yakus
v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444 (1944))). One of the prin-
ciples vindicated by these limitations is a “presumption
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence: the ‘presumption of regu-
larity’ that attaches to final judgments, even when the ques-
tion is waiver of constitutional rights.” Parke, supra, at 29.
1 Justice Souter is concerned that a defendant may forgo “direct chal-
lenge because the penalty was not practically worth challenging, and . . .
collateral attack because he had no counsel to speak for him.” Post, at
391 (dissenting opinion). Whatever incentives may exist at the time of
conviction, the fact remains that avenues of redress are generally available
if sought in a timely manner. If a person chooses not to pursue those
remedies, he does so with the knowledge that the conviction will stay on
his record. This knowledge should serve as an incentive not to commit a
subsequent crime and risk having the sentence for that crime enhanced
under a recidivist sentencing statute.

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Thus, we have held that if, by the time of sentencing under
the ACCA, a prior conviction has not been set aside on direct
or collateral review, that conviction is presumptively valid
and may be used to enhance the federal sentence. See Cus-
tis, 511 U. S., at 497. This rule is subject to only one excep-
tion: If an enhanced federal sentence will be based in part
on a prior conviction obtained in violation of the right to
counsel, the defendant may challenge the validity of his prior
conviction during his federal sentencing proceedings. Id.,
at 496. No other constitutional challenge to a prior convic-
tion may be raised in the sentencing forum. Id., at 497.
After an enhanced federal sentence has been imposed pur-
suant to the ACCA, the person sentenced may pursue any
channels of direct or collateral review still available to chal-
lenge his prior conviction. In Custis, we noted the possibil-
ity that the petitioner there, who was still in custody on his
prior convictions, could “attack his state sentences [in state
court] or through federal habeas review.” Ibid. If any
such challenge to the underlying conviction is successful, the
defendant may then apply for reopening of his federal sen-
tence. As in Custis, we express no opinion on the appro-
priate disposition of such an application. Cf. ibid.
If, however, a prior conviction used to enhance a federal
sentence is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in
its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those
remedies while they were available (or because the defend-
ant did so unsuccessfully), then that defendant is without
recourse. The presumption of validity that attached to the
prior conviction at the time of sentencing is conclusive, and
the defendant may not collaterally attack his prior conviction
through a motion under § 2255. A defendant may challenge
a prior conviction as the product of a Gideon violation in a
§ 2255 motion, but generally only if he raised that claim at
his federal sentencing proceeding. See United States v.
Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 167–168 (1982) (holding that procedural
default rules developed in the habeas corpus context apply

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Opinion of O’Connor, J.
in § 2255 cases); see also Reed v. Farley, 512 U. S. 339, 354–
355 (1994).
Justice Souter says that our holding here “rul[es] out
the application of § 2255 when the choice is relief under § 2255
or no relief at all.” Post, at 390 (dissenting opinion). This
all-or-nothing characterization of the problem misses the
point. As we have said, a defendant generally has ample
opportunity to obtain constitutional review of a state convic-
tion. Supra, at 381. But once the “door” to such review
“has been closed,” post, at 388, by the defendant himself—
either because he failed to pursue otherwise available reme-
dies or because he failed to prove a constitutional violation—
the conviction becomes final and the defendant is not entitled
to another bite at the apple simply because that conviction
is later used to enhance another sentence.
To be sure, the text of § 2255 is broad enough to cover a
claim that an enhanced federal sentence violates due process.
See ibid. See also n. 2, infra. But when such a due process
claim is predicated on the consideration at sentencing of a
fully expired prior conviction, we think that the goals of easy
administration and finality have ample “horsepower” to jus-
tify foreclosing relief under § 2255. Were we to allow de-
fendants sentenced under the ACCA to collaterally attack
prior convictions through a § 2255 motion, we would effec-
tively permit challenges far too stale to be brought in their
own right, and sanction an end run around statutes of limita-
tions and other procedural barriers that would preclude the
movant from attacking the prior conviction directly. Noth-
ing in the Constitution or our precedent requires such a
result.
C
We recognize that there may be rare cases in which no
channel of review was actually available to a defendant with
respect to a prior conviction, due to no fault of his own. The
circumstances of this case do not require us to determine
whether a defendant could use a motion under § 2255 to chal-

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lenge a federal sentence based on such a conviction.2 Cf.,
e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1994 ed., Supp. V) (allowing a second
or successive § 2255 motion if there is “newly discovered evi-
dence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as
a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found
the movant guilty of the offense”); ibid. (tolling 1-year limita-
tion period while movant is prevented from making a § 2255
motion by an “impediment . . . created by governmental ac-
tion in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States”).
III
No such claim is made here. The sole basis on which peti-
tioner Daniels challenges his current federal sentence is that
two of his prior state convictions were the products of in-
adequate guilty pleas and ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner could have pursued his claims while he was in cus-
tody on those convictions. As his counsel conceded at oral
argument, there is no indication that petitioner did so or that
he was prevented from doing so by some external force.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 3–4, 6.
Petitioner’s federal sentence was properly enhanced pur-
suant to the ACCA based on his four facially valid prior state
convictions. Because petitioner failed to pursue remedies
that were otherwise available to him to challenge his 1978
and 1981 convictions, he may not now use a § 2255 motion to
collaterally attack those convictions. The judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
2 After comparing the text of §§ 2254 and 2255, Justice Scalia con-
cludes that “Congress did not expect challenges to state convictions (used
to enhance federal convictions) to be brought under § 2255.” Post, at 386
(opinion concurring in part). This is, of course, true. But it is also beside
the point, as the subject of the § 2255 motion in this circumstance is the
enhanced federal sentence, not the prior state conviction.

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Scalia, J., concurring in part
Justice Scalia, concurring in part.
I agree with the Court that 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1994 ed.,
Supp. V) does not (with the Gideon exception, see Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963)) permit inquiry into
whether a conviction later used to enhance a federal sentence
was unconstitutionally obtained, and I agree with the Court’s
reasoning so far as it goes. I have another reason for reach-
ing that result, however, and one that prevents me from join-
ing that portion of the Court’s opinion which speculates that
“[t]here may be rare circumstances in which § 2255 would be
available,” such as when “no channel of review was actually
available to a defendant with respect to a prior conviction,
due to no fault of his own,” ante, at 376, 383. Simply put,
“the text of § 2255 is” not “broad enough to cover a claim that
an enhanced federal sentence violates due process,” ante, at
383, if the enhancement is based on prior convictions.
In addition to the practical reasons Justice O’Connor
identifies as counseling against petitioner’s interpretation of
§ 2255, there stands the very text of that provision. “[W]e
have long recognized that ‘the power to award the writ [of
habeas corpus] by any of the courts of the United States,
must be given by written law,’ ” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S.
651, 664 (1996), quoting Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94
(1807). Section 2255 authorizes a challenge by “[a] prisoner
in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States.” (Emphases added.) We
have already determined, in Custis v. United States, 511
U. S. 485 (1994), that a sentencing court does not violate the
Due Process Clause by imposing a sentence enhanced by
prior, purportedly tainted, convictions, unless the taint is the
result of a Gideon violation.* It follows ineluctably that
*Justice Souter asserts that Custis “merely held (with [the] exception
[of Gideon violations]) that neither the ACCA nor the Constitution pro-
vides a forum at the sentencing hearing for challenges to the underlying

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386 DANIELS v. UNITED STATES
Scalia, J., concurring in part
§ 2255 does not establish any right to challenge federal sen-
tences based on their enhancement by stale, non-Gideon-
tainted, convictions.
This conclusion is reinforced (if reinforcement is possible)
by comparing the text of § 2255 with that of § 2254. The
latter, governing habeas challenges to state convictions, pro-
vides that “[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel
during Federal or State collateral postconviction proceedings
shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under
§ 2254.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(i) (1994 ed., Supp. V). There is
no conceivable reason why this bar would be placed upon
challenges to state convictions under § 2254, but not upon
challenges to state convictions under § 2255. Congress did
not expect challenges to state convictions (used to enhance
federal convictions) to be brought under § 2255.
Perhaps precepts of fundamental fairness inherent in “due
process” suggest that a forum to litigate challenges like peti-
tioner’s must be made available somewhere for the odd case
in which the challenge could not have been brought earlier.
But it would not follow from this that federal sentencing
must provide the remedy; much less that federal sentencing
need not provide the remedy but § 2255 (which is entirely
dependent upon the impropriety of prior federal sentencing)
conviction.” Post, at 388, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). But the Constitution
would “provide a forum” at the sentencing hearing if it were unconstitu-
tional to sentence on the basis of invalid but nonetheless outstanding prior
convictions. (Assuredly the Constitution does not permit unconstitu-
tional acts.) Custis necessarily held, therefore, that it is not unconstitu-
tional (with the Gideon exception) to sentence on the basis of invalid but
nonetheless outstanding prior convictions. Justice Souter apparently
understood this at the time Custis was decided. His dissent began: “The
Court answers a difficult constitutional question that I believe the under-
lying statute does not pose,” 511 U. S., at 498, which question turns out
to be “whether the Constitution permits courts to enhance a defendant’s
sentence on the basis of a prior conviction the defendant can show was
obtained in violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel,” id.,
at 505.

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Souter, J., dissenting
must do so. Fundamental fairness could be achieved just as
well—indeed, better—by holding that the rendering jurisdic-
tion must provide a means for challenge when enhancement
is threatened or has been imposed. Such a constitutional
rule, combined with a rule that any sentence already im-
posed must be adjusted accordingly, would prevent sentenc-
ing hearings from being routinely complicated by inquiries
into prior convictions, and would locate those inquiries
where they can best be conducted: in the rendering jurisdic-
tion. It would also avoid a possible gap in protection that
would result from using § 2255 (and in state-court cases,
§ 2254) for this inappropriate purpose—arising from the fact
that, as discussed above, § 2254 cannot be used to remedy
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. (We have
left open the question whether such ineffective assistance
can establish a constitutional violation, see Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 755 (1991).) But § 2255 cannot pos-
sibly be the means of relief.
For these reasons, I join the opinion of the Court only
in part.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and
Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
In Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485 (1994), we held
that a federal defendant facing an enhanced sentence on the
basis of prior state convictions under the Armed Career
Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. § 924(e), could not,
with one exception, challenge the constitutionality of the un-
derlying state convictions at his federal sentencing proceed-
ing. Custis was thus a precursor of the case before us now;
Custis is not, however, compelling authority for today’s dis-
position. Although the Court’s opinion in Custis struck me
as portending more than it strictly held, a reading of the case
free of portent was in fact the understanding of one Member
of the Custis majority: “Custis presented a forum question.
The issue was where, not whether, the defendant could attack

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388 DANIELS v. UNITED STATES
Souter, J., dissenting
a prior conviction for constitutional infirmity.” Nichols v.
United States, 511 U. S. 738, 765 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original). The door in Custis re-
mained open to an attack on the prior state convictions,
through a state or federal habeas challenge to the underlying
convictions themselves. See Custis, supra, at 497 (Custis
“was still ‘in custody’ for purposes of his state convictions at
the time of his federal sentencing under § 924(e),” and could
thus “attack his state sentences in Maryland or through fed-
eral habeas review”). This case presents the distinct ques-
tion of what happens when that door has been closed.
The Court’s reasons for reading 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1994 ed.,
Supp. V) as restrictively as it read the ACCA sentencing
provisions have nothing to do either with the text of § 2255
or with any extension of rules governing habeas review of
state convictions under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (1994 ed. and Supp.
V). The language of § 2255 providing a federal prisoner
with the right to relief because a sentence “was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States” is
obviously broad enough to include a claim that a prior convic-
tion used anew to mandate sentence enhancement under the
ACCA was obtained unconstitutionally, so that the new sen-
tence itself violates the terms of the ACCA or the Constitu-
tion.1 Nor does the Court rest its exclusion of such claims
1 The Government argues, citing Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485
(1994), that 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1994 ed., Supp. V) does not provide a remedy
here because “the Constitution is not violated when a conviction that is
facially valid is used to enhance a sentence for committing another crime.”
Brief for United States 12. This misstates the holding of Custis, which
merely held (with one exception discussed below) that neither the ACCA
nor the Constitution provides a forum at the sentencing hearing for chal-
lenges to the underlying conviction. 511 U. S., at 487. The constitutional
holding was necessarily limited to the statutory scheme considered. And,
in any event, § 2255 provides an explicit remedy for a sentence that vio-
lates federal law, not solely the Constitution. Cf. Hill v. United States,
368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962) (describing types of fundamental errors that are

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389 Cite as: 532 U. S. 374 (2001)
Souter, J., dissenting
from § 2255 review on the theory that a § 2255 petitioner who
challenges underlying state convictions should be required,
like a § 2254 petitioner, to exhaust state remedies and to com-
ply with state procedural rules. Cf. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(b)–(c)
(1994 ed. and Supp. V); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982);
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722 (1991). It is not clear,
after all, that such requirements, premised largely on comity
concerns and the State’s interest in the finality of its own
judgments, see, e. g., id., at 731–732, 750, should be imported
into this context of a federal sentence imposed when a peti-
tioner who has completed his state sentence seeks only to
avoid a sentence enhancement under federal law. In any
event, the Court does not purport to apply these specific re-
quirements (which in the § 2254 setting can be waived by the
State, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V); Gray v.
Netherland, 518 U. S. 152, 165–166 (1996), and which are sub-
ject to explicit exceptions). Instead it imposes a flat ban on
§ 2255 relief (subject, maybe, to narrow exceptions).2
Having no textual basis or related precedent in habeas law,
the Court rules out challenges to ACCA sentencing predi-
cates under § 2255 on the same grounds invoked earlier to
bar such challenges under the sentencing provisions of the
cognizable under § 2255). Neither the Custis Court nor today’s Court
takes the position that the ACCA properly applies, as a statutory matter,
to underlying sentences that are in fact invalid. See Custis, supra, at
497; ante, at 382. The language of § 2255 invites a petitioner to establish
such a statutory violation.
2 The Court continues to leave the door open (but with no promises) to
a motion to revise an ACCA sentence if a defendant has first obtained an
order vacating the predicate conviction through a state collateral proceed-
ing or federal habeas review of the state judgment under 28 U. S. C. § 2254
(1994 ed. and Supp. V). See ante, at 382; Custis, supra, at 497. The
plurality adds the possibility of an exception to today’s rule if a petitioner
can show newly discovered evidence or legal disability during the period
of state custody. See ante, at 383–384. These exceptions will not eclipse
the rule.

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390 DANIELS v. UNITED STATES
Souter, J., dissenting
ACCA itself: the ACCA ought to be easy to administer and
state convictions ought to carry finality, ante, at 378–380.
But whatever force these reasons might have if alternative
avenues of challenge were open, they do not even come close
to the horsepower needed to rule out the application of § 2255
when the choice is relief under § 2255 or no relief at all.
Why should it be easy to subject a person to a higher sen-
tencing range and commit him for nearly nine extra years
(as here) when the prisoner has a colorable claim that the
extended commitment rests on a conviction the Constitution
would condemn? If the answer is the value of finality in
state convictions, why is finality valuable when state law it-
self does not demand it, and why is finality a one-way street?
Why should a prisoner like Daniels suddenly be barred from
returning to challenge the validity of a conviction, when the
Government is free to reach back to it to impose extended
imprisonment under a sentence enhancement law unheard of
at the time of the earlier convictions (1978 and 1981 in this
case)? Daniels could not have been expected in 1978 to an-
ticipate the federal enhancement statute enacted in 1984; and
even if he had been blessed with statutory clairvoyance, the
practice in 1978 would have told him he could challenge the
convictions when and if the Government sought to rely on
them under the future enhancement statute. The ACCA
was enacted against the backdrop of a pervasive federal
practice of entertaining constitutional challenges to prior
convictions when used anew for sentence enhancement, a
practice on which Congress threw no cold water when it
enacted the ACCA. See Custis, 511 U. S., at 499–501 (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting). Indeed, even the Court seems to find
something disquieting in the historical practice, as it shows
by recognizing a textually untethered exception to its own
rule, one allowing for collateral attacks on prior convictions
if based on violations of the right to counsel under Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). See ante, at 382. I sup-

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391 Cite as: 532 U. S. 374 (2001)
Souter, J., dissenting
pose I should not begrudge the Court’s concession, but the
Gideon exception, first announced in Custis, is inexplicable
here. One might have argued in Custis that a Gideon viola-
tion was egregious enough to excuse the defendant’s failure
to resort to other forums still open; but there is no excuse
for picking and choosing among constitutional violations
here, when other forums are closed. The need to address
Gideon is no reason to ignore Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S.
86 (1923), or Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935) (per
curiam), or Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936), or
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), or Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), or Brady v. Maryland, 373
U. S. 83 (1963), or any other recognized violations of the
Constitution.
None of this is to say that the Court is wrong to recognize
that collateral review of old state convictions can be very
cumbersome. See ante, at 379. But that is not the only
practical consideration in the real world we confront (or
ought to confront) here. A defendant under the ACCA has
generally paid whatever penalty the old conviction entailed;
he may well have forgone direct challenge because the pen-
alty was not practically worth challenging, and may well
have passed up collateral attack because he had no counsel
to speak for him. But when faced with the ACCA’s 15-year
mandatory minimum the old conviction is suddenly well
worth challenging and counsel may be available under 18
U. S. C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In denying him any right to attack
convictions later when attacks are worth the trouble, the
Court adopts a policy of promoting challenges earlier when
they may not justify the effort and perhaps never will. That
is a very odd incentive for a court to create, and the eccen-
tricity is hardly softened by the likelihood that most defend-
ants will not notice before it is too late.
Today’s decision is devoid of support in either statutory
language or congressional intention. I respectfully dissent.

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392 DANIELS v. UNITED STATES
Breyer, J., dissenting
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
I believe that Congress intended courts to read the si-
lences in federal sentencing statutes as permitting defend-
ants to challenge the validity of an earlier sentence-
enhancing conviction at the time of sentencing. See United
States v. Paleo, 967 F. 2d 7, 11–13 (CA1 1992), implicitly over-
ruled by Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485 (1994). That
was the practice typically followed in the lower courts before
Custis. See id., at 498–499, and n. 2, 511 (Souter, J., dis-
senting). The courts now follow a comparable practice
in respect to other sentence-enhancing factors. See, e. g.,
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 95–97 (1993) (per-
jured testimony enhancement). And, given appropriate
burden of proof rules, see, e. g., United States v. Gilbert, 20
F. 3d 94, 100 (CA3 1994); United States v. Wicks, 995 F. 2d
964, 978 (CA10), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 982 (1993); Paleo,
supra, at 13 (citing United States v. Henry, 933 F. 2d 553,
559 (CA7 1991), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 997 (1992); United
States v. Gallman, 907 F. 2d 639, 643 (CA7 1990), cert. de-
nied, 499 U. S. 908 (1991); and United States v. Taylor, 882
F. 2d 1018, 1031 (CA6 1989), cert. denied, 496 U. S. 907
(1990)), that practice need not prove unusually burdensome,
see Custis, supra, at 511 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Having rejected that procedural approach in Custis,
supra, at 496–497, the Court now must face the alternative—
a later challenge to the earlier convictions in a collateral pro-
ceeding that attacks the present conviction or sentence. To
resolve that challenge the plurality has devised a broad rule
immunizing the earlier conviction with a possible exception
for “rare” circumstances. See ante, at 383. The rule may
well prove unduly “restrictiv[e],” ante, at 388 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Or, through exceptions, it may well bring about
additional delay, still greater litigation complexity, and (inso-
far as the plurality ties Congress’ hands by resting its excep-
tion upon constitutional grounds) legal inflexibility. And,
given the restrictions Custis placed on sentencing courts, the

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Breyer, J., dissenting
inclination to grant a 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (1994 ed., Supp. V)
hearing in the rare circumstances hypothesized by the ma-
jority is subject to Justice Scalia’s criticism that § 2255
may be an inappropriate forum for such a challenge. See
ante, at 387 (opinion concurring in part).
The legal problem lies at the source. While we do not
often overturn a recently decided case, in this instance the
Court’s earlier decision will lead to ever-increasing complex-
ity, for it blocks the simpler procedural approach that Con-
gress intended.
Consequently, I believe this is one of those rare instances
in which the Court should reconsider an earlier case, namely,
Custis, and adopt the dissenters’ views. For that reason,
I dissent.