ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al. v. SANDOVAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.

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ALEXANDER, DIRECTOR, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al. v. SANDOVAL,
individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 99–1908. Argued January 16, 2001—Decided April 24, 2001
As a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of
Public Safety (Department), of which petitioner Alexander is the direc-
tor, is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601
of that title prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national
origin in covered programs and activities. Section 602 authorizes
federal agencies to effectuate § 601 by issuing regulations, and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in an exercise of this authority promul-
gated a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or
administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Respondent Sandoval
brought this class action to enjoin the Department’s decision to adminis-
ter state driver’s license examinations only in English, arguing that
it violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting
non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin.
Agreeing, the District Court enjoined the policy and ordered the De-
partment to accommodate non-English speakers. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. Both courts rejected petitioners’ argument that Title VI did
not provide respondents a cause of action to enforce the regulation.
Held: There is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regu-
lations promulgated under Title VI. Pp. 279–293.
(a) Three aspects of Title VI must be taken as given. First, private
individuals may sue to enforce § 601. See, e. g., Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 694, 696, 699, 703, 710–711. Second, § 601
prohibits only intentional discrimination. See, e. g., Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 293. Third, it must be assumed for purposes of
deciding this case that regulations promulgated under § 602 may validly
proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, even
though such activities are permissible under § 601. Pp. 279–282.
(b) This Court has not, however, held that Title VI disparate-impact
regulations may be enforced through a private right of action. Cannon
was decided on the assumption that the respondent there had inten-

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276 ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL
Syllabus
tionally discriminated against the petitioner, see 441 U. S., at 680. In
Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582,
the Court held that private individuals could not recover compensatory
damages under Title VI except for intentional discrimination. Of the
five Justices who also voted to uphold disparate-impact regulations,
three expressly reserved the question of a direct private right of action
to enforce them, id., at 645, n. 18. Pp. 282–284.
(c) Nor does it follow from the three points taken as given that Con-
gress must have intended such a private right of action. There is no
doubt that regulations applying § 601’s ban on intentional discrimina-
tion are covered by the cause of action to enforce that section. But the
disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply § 601—since they for-
bid conduct that § 601 permits—and thus the private right of action
to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regu-
lations. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173. That right must come, if at all,
from the independent force of § 602. Pp. 284–286.
(d) Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to
enforce federal law must be created by Congress. Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578. This Court will not revert to the un-
derstanding of private causes of action, represented by J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433, that held sway when Title VI was enacted.
That understanding was abandoned in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78.
Nor does the Court agree with the Government’s contention that cases
interpreting statutes enacted prior to Cort v. Ash have given dispositive
weight to the expectations that the enacting Congress had formed in
light of the contemporary legal context. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 378–379; Cannon, supra,
at 698–699; and Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U. S. 174, distinguished.
Pp. 286–288.
(e) The search for Congress’s intent in this case begins and ends
with Title VI’s text and structure. The “rights-creating” language so
critical to Cannon’s § 601 analysis, 441 U. S., at 690, n. 13, is completely
absent from § 602. Whereas § 601 decrees that “[n]o person . . . shall . . .
be subjected to discrimination,” § 602 limits federal agencies to “effec-
tuat[ing]” rights created by § 601. And § 602 focuses neither on the
individuals protected nor even on the funding recipients being regu-
lated, but on the regulating agencies. Hence, there is far less reason
to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons, Cannon, supra,
at 690–691. The methods § 602 expressly provides for enforcing its reg-
ulations, which place elaborate restrictions on agency enforcement, also
suggest a congressional intent not to create a private remedy through

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§ 602. See, e. g., Karahalios v. Federal Employees, 489 U. S. 527, 533.
Pp. 288–291.
(f) The Court rejects arguments that the regulations at issue contain
rights-creating language and so must be privately enforceable; that
amendments to Title VI in § 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments
of 1986 and § 6 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 “ratified”
decisions finding an implied private right of action to enforce the regula-
tions; and that the congressional intent to create a right of action must
be inferred under Curran, supra, at 353, 381–382. Pp. 291–293.
197 F. 3d 484, reversed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 293.
Jeffrey S. Sutton argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Ala-
bama, and John J. Park, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.
Eric Schnapper argued the cause for private respondents.
With him on the brief were J. Richard Cohen, Rhonda
Brownstein, Steven R. Shapiro, Edward Chen, and Christo-
pher Ho.
Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the
United States as respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.6.
With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Lee,
Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Paul R. Q. Wolfson,
Dennis J. Dimsey, and Seth M. Galanter.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Beauty Enter-
prises, Inc., by Joseph E. Schmitz and Richard C. Robinson; for the Eagle
Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund by Karen Tripp and Phyllis
Schlafly; for the National Association of Manufacturers by Michael
W. Steinberg, Michael A. McCord, and Jan Amundson; for the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association by David P. Bruton, Michael
W. McTigue, Jr., and Elsa Kircher Cole; for Pro-English et al. by Barnaby
W. Zall; for U. S. English by Mr. Schmitz; for the Washington Legal Foun-
dation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp; and for Robert
C. Jubelirer et al. by John P. Krill, Jr., and David R. Fine.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Elaine R. Jones,

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278 ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL
Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether private individu-
als may sue to enforce disparate-impact regulations promul-
gated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
I
The Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department),
of which petitioner James Alexander is the director, accepted
grants of financial assistance from the United States Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Transportation
(DOT) and so subjected itself to the restrictions of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42
U. S. C. § 2000d et seq. Section 601 of that Title provides
that no person shall, “on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity” covered by Title VI. 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. Sec-
tion 602 authorizes federal agencies “to effectuate the provi-
sions of [§ 601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–1, and the DOJ in
an exercise of this authority promulgated a regulation for-
bidding funding recipients to “utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individu-
als to discrimination because of their race, color, or national
origin . . . .” 28 CFR § 42.104(b)(2) (2000). See also 49 CFR
§ 21.5(b)(2) (2000) (similar DOT regulation).
The State of Alabama amended its Constitution in 1990
to declare English “the official language of the state of
Norman J. Chachkin, David T. Goldberg, Kenneth Kimerling, Barbara J.
Olshansky, Robert Garcı´a, John Payton, Norman Redlich, Barbara R.
Arnwine, and Thomas J. Henderson; and for the National Women’s Law
Center et al. by George W. Jones, Jr., Jacqueline G. Cooper, Marcia D.
Greenberger, Verna L. Williams, and Leslie T. Annexstein.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Center on Race, Poverty and
the Environment et al. by Luke W. Cole and Douglas Parker; for the Pa-
cific Legal Foundation et al. by John H. Findley; and for the Central Puget
Sound Regional Transit Authority by Paul J. Lawrence.

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Alabama.” Amdt. 509. Pursuant to this provision and,
petitioners have argued, to advance public safety, the De-
partment decided to administer state driver’s license ex-
aminations only in English. Respondent Sandoval, as rep-
resentative of a class, brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama to enjoin
the English-only policy, arguing that it violated the DOJ reg-
ulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English
speakers to discrimination based on their national origin.
The District Court agreed. It enjoined the policy and or-
dered the Department to accommodate non-English speak-
ers. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (1998). Peti-
tioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, which affirmed. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F. 3d 484
(1999). Both courts rejected petitioners’ argument that
Title VI did not provide respondents a cause of action to
enforce the regulation.
We do not inquire here whether the DOJ regulation was
authorized by § 602, or whether the courts below were cor-
rect to hold that the English-only policy had the effect of
discriminating on the basis of national origin. The petition
for writ of certiorari raised, and we agreed to review, only
the question posed in the first paragraph of this opinion:
whether there is a private cause of action to enforce the reg-
ulation. 530 U. S. 1305 (2000).
II
Although Title VI has often come to this Court, it is fair
to say (indeed, perhaps an understatement) that our opinions
have not eliminated all uncertainty regarding its commands.
For purposes of the present case, however, it is clear from
our decisions, from Congress’s amendments of Title VI, and
from the parties’ concessions that three aspects of Title VI
must be taken as given. First, private individuals may sue
to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief
and damages. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441

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Opinion of the Court
U. S. 677 (1979), the Court held that a private right of action
existed to enforce Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. The
reasoning of that decision embraced the existence of a pri-
vate right to enforce Title VI as well. “Title IX,” the Court
noted, “was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.” 441 U. S., at 694. And, “[i]n 1972 when Title IX
was enacted, the [parallel] language in Title VI had already
been construed as creating a private remedy.” Id., at 696.
That meant, the Court reasoned, that Congress had intended
Title IX, like Title VI, to provide a private cause of action.
Id., at 699, 703, 710–711. Congress has since ratified Can-
non’s holding. Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 1845, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–7,
expressly abrogated States’ sovereign immunity against
suits brought in federal court to enforce Title VI and pro-
vided that in a suit against a State “remedies (including
remedies both at law and in equity) are available . . . to the
same extent as such remedies are available . . . in the suit
against any public or private entity other than a State,”
§ 2000d–7(a)(2). We recognized in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60 (1992), that § 2000d–7
“cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon’s holding.”
Id., at 72; see also id., at 78 (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (same). It is thus beyond dispute that private indi-
viduals may sue to enforce § 601.
Second, it is similarly beyond dispute—and no party dis-
agrees—that § 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination.
In Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978),
the Court reviewed a decision of the California Supreme
Court that had enjoined the University of California Medi-
cal School from “according any consideration to race in its
admissions process.” Id., at 272. Essential to the Court’s
holding reversing that aspect of the California court’s de-
cision was the determination that § 601 “proscribe[s] only
those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Pro-

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tection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.” Id., at 287 (opin-
ion of Powell, J.); see also id., at 325, 328, 352 (opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). In Guard-
ians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463
U. S. 582 (1983), the Court made clear that under Bakke only
intentional discrimination was forbidden by § 601. 463 U. S.,
at 610–611 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehn-
quist, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 612 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment); id., at 642 (Stevens, J., joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). What we said in
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 293 (1985), is true today:
“Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of inten-
tional discrimination.” 1
Third, we must assume for purposes of deciding this case
that regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may
validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on
racial groups, even though such activities are permissible
under § 601. Though no opinion of this Court has held that,
five Justices in Guardians voiced that view of the law at
1 Since the parties do not dispute this point, it is puzzling to see Justice
Stevens go out of his way to disparage the decisions in Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), and Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582 (1983), as “somewhat haphazard,”
post, at 307 (dissenting opinion), particularly since he had already accorded
stare decisis effect to the former 18 years ago, see Guardians, 463 U. S.,
at 639–642 (dissenting opinion), and since he participated in creating
the latter, see ibid. Nor does Justice Stevens’s reliance on Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837
(1984), see post, at 309–310, explain his about-face, since he expressly reaf-
firms, see post, at 309, n. 18, the settled principle that decisions of this
Court declaring the meaning of statutes prior to Chevron need not be
reconsidered after Chevron in light of agency regulations that were al-
ready in force when our decisions were issued, Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
502 U. S. 527, 536–537 (1992); Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary
Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 131 (1990); see also Sullivan v. Everhart, 494
U. S. 83, 103–104, n. 6 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is, of course, of
no importance that [an opinion] predates Chevron . . . . As we made clear
in Chevron, the interpretive maxims summarized therein were ‘well-
settled principles’ ”).

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least as alternative grounds for their decisions, see 463 U. S.,
at 591–592 (opinion of White, J.); id., at 623, n. 15 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); id., at 643–645 (Stevens, J., joined by Bren-
nan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting), and dictum in Alexander
v. Choate is to the same effect, see 469 U. S., at 293, 295,
n. 11. These statements are in considerable tension with
the rule of Bakke and Guardians that § 601 forbids only in-
tentional discrimination, see, e. g., Guardians Assn. v. Civil
Serv. Comm’n of New York City, supra, at 612–613 (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring in judgment), but petitioners have not
challenged the regulations here. We therefore assume for
the purposes of deciding this case that the DOJ and DOT
regulations proscribing activities that have a disparate im-
pact on the basis of race are valid.
Respondents assert that the issue in this case, like the first
two described above, has been resolved by our cases. To
reject a private cause of action to enforce the disparate-
impact regulations, they say, we would “[have] to ignore
the actual language of Guardians and Cannon.” Brief for
Respondents 13. The language in Cannon to which re-
spondents refer does not in fact support their position, as we
shall discuss at length below, see infra, at 288–290. But in
any event, this Court is bound by holdings, not language.
Cannon was decided on the assumption that the University
of Chicago had intentionally discriminated against petitioner.
See 441 U. S., at 680 (noting that respondents “admitted ar-
guendo” that petitioner’s “applications for admission to medi-
cal school were denied by the respondents because she is a
woman”). It therefore held that Title IX created a private
right of action to enforce its ban on intentional discrimi-
nation, but had no occasion to consider whether the right
reached regulations barring disparate-impact discrimina-
tion. 2 In Guardians, the Court held that private individu-
2 Although the dissent acknowledges that “the breadth of [Cannon’s]
precedent is a matter upon which reasonable jurists may differ,” post, at
313, it disagrees with our reading of Cannon’s holding because it thinks

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als could not recover compensatory damages under Title VI
except for intentional discrimination. Five Justices in addi-
tion voted to uphold the disparate-impact regulations (four
would have declared them invalid, see 463 U. S., at 611, n. 5
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 612–614 (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring in judgment)), but of those five, three
expressly reserved the question of a direct private right
of action to enforce the regulations, saying that “[w]hether
a cause of action against private parties exists directly
under the regulations . . . [is a] questio[n] that [is] not pre-
sented by this case.” Id., at 645, n. 18 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).3 Thus, only two Justices had cause to reach the issue
the distinction we draw between disparate-impact and intentional discrim-
ination was “wholly foreign” to that opinion, see post, at 297. Cannon,
however, was decided less than one year after the Court in Bakke had
drawn precisely that distinction with respect to Title VI, see supra, at
280–281, and it is absurd to think that Cannon meant, without discussion,
to ban under Title IX the very disparate-impact discrimination that Bakke
said Title VI permitted. The only discussion in Cannon of Title IX’s
scope is found in Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion, which simply assumed
that the conclusion that Title IX would be limited to intentional discrimi-
nation was “forgone in light of our holding” in Bakke. Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 748, n. 19 (1979). The dissent’s additional
claim that Cannon provided a private right of action for “all the discrimi-
nation prohibited by the regulatory scheme contained in Title IX,” post,
at 297–298, n. 4 (emphasis added), simply begs the question at the heart
of this case, which is whether a right of action to enforce disparate-impact
regulations must be independently identified, see infra, at 284–286.
3 We of course accept the statement by the author of the dissent that
he “thought” at the time of Guardians that disparate-impact regulations
could be enforced “in an implied action against private parties,” post, at
301, n. 6. But we have the better interpretation of what our colleague
wrote in Guardians. In the closing section of his opinion, Justice Ste-
vens concluded that because respondents in that case had “violated the
petitioners’ rights under [the] regulations . . . [t]he petitioners were there-
fore entitled to the compensation they sought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and
were awarded by the District Court.” 463 U. S., at 645. The passage
omits any mention of a direct private right of action to enforce the regula-
tions, and the footnote we have quoted in text—which appears immedi-

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Opinion of the Court
that respondents say the “actual language” of Guardians
resolves. Neither that case,4 nor any other in this Court,
has held that the private right of action exists.
Nor does it follow straightaway from the three points we
have taken as given that Congress must have intended a
private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regula-
tions. We do not doubt that regulations applying § 601’s ban
on intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of ac-
tion to enforce that section. Such regulations, if valid and
reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself, see
NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 513 U. S. 251, 257 (1995); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843–844
(1984), and it is therefore meaningless to talk about a sepa-
rate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the
statute. A Congress that intends the statute to be enforced
through a private cause of action intends the authoritative
interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as well. The
many cases that respondents say have “assumed” that a
cause of action to enforce a statute includes one to enforce
its regulations illustrate (to the extent that cases in which
an issue was not presented can illustrate anything) only this
point; each involved regulations of the type we have just
described, as respondents conceded at oral argument, Tr. of
Oral Arg. 33. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v.
Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 468 (1999) (regulation defining who is a
“recipient” under Title IX); School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Ar-
line, 480 U. S. 273, 279–281 (1987) (regulations defining the
terms “physical impairment” and “major life activities” in
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Bazemore v. Friday,
478 U. S. 385, 408–409 (1986) (White, J., joined by four other
ately after this concluding sentence, see id., at 645, n. 18—makes clear
that the omission was not accidental.
4 Ultimately, the dissent agrees that “the holding in Guardians does not
compel the conclusion that a private right of action exists to enforce the
Title VI regulations against private parties . . . .” Post, at 301.

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Justices, concurring) (regulation interpreting Title VI to re-
quire “affirmative action” remedying effects of intentional
discrimination); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S., at 299, 309
(regulations clarifying what sorts of disparate impacts upon
the handicapped were covered by § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, which the Court assumed included some such
impacts). Our decision in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563
(1974), falls within the same category. The Title VI regula-
tions at issue in Lau, similar to the ones at issue here, for-
bade funding recipients to take actions which had the effect
of discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national ori-
gin. Id., at 568. Unlike our later cases, however, the Court
in Lau interpreted § 601 itself to proscribe disparate-impact
discrimination, saying that it “rel[ied] solely on § 601 . . .
to reverse the Court of Appeals,” id., at 566, and that the
disparate-impact regulations simply “[made] sure that recipi-
ents of federal aid . . . conduct[ed] any federally financed
projects consistently with § 601,” id., at 567.5
We must face now the question avoided by Lau, because
we have since rejected Lau’s interpretation of § 601 as reach-
ing beyond intentional discrimination. See supra, at 280–
281. It is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations
do not simply apply § 601—since they indeed forbid conduct
that § 601 permits—and therefore clear that the private right
of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to
enforce these regulations. See Central Bank of Denver,
5 It is true, as the dissent points out, see post, at 296, that three Justices
who concurred in the result in Lau relied on regulations promulgated
under § 602 to support their position, see 414 U. S., at 570–571 (Stewart,
J., concurring in result). But the five Justices who made up the majority
did not, and their holding is not made coextensive with the concurrence
because their opinion does not expressly preclude (is “consistent with,”
see post, at 296) the concurrence’s approach. The Court would be in an
odd predicament if a concurring minority of the Justices could force the
majority to address a point they found it unnecessary (and did not wish)
to address, under compulsion of Justice Stevens’s new principle that
silence implies agreement.

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N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164,
173 (1994) (a “private plaintiff may not bring a [suit based
on a regulation] against a defendant for acts not prohibited
by the text of [the statute]”). That right must come, if at
all, from the independent force of § 602. As stated earlier,
we assume for purposes of this decision that § 602 confers
the authority to promulgate disparate-impact regulations; 6
the question remains whether it confers a private right of
action to enforce them. If not, we must conclude that a fail-
ure to comply with regulations promulgated under § 602 that
is not also a failure to comply with § 601 is not actionable.
Implicit in our discussion thus far has been a particular
understanding of the genesis of private causes of action.
Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action
to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979) (remedies
available are those “that Congress enacted into law”). The
judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed
to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just
a private right but also a private remedy. Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 15 (1979).
Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. See,
e. g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U. S. 1083,
1102 (1991); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thomp-
son, 478 U. S. 804, 812, n. 9 (1986) (collecting cases). With-
out it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not
6 For this reason, the dissent’s extended discussion of the scope of agen-
cies’ regulatory authority under § 602, see post, at 305–307, is beside the
point. We cannot help observing, however, how strange it is to say that
disparate-impact regulations are “inspired by, at the service of, and in-
separably intertwined with” § 601, post, at 307, when § 601 permits the
very behavior that the regulations forbid. See Guardians, 463 U. S., at
613 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“If, as five Members of the
Court concluded in Bakke, the purpose of Title VI is to proscribe only
purposeful discrimination . . . , regulations that would proscribe conduct
by the recipient having only a discriminatory effect . . . do not simply
‘further’ the purpose of Title VI; they go well beyond that purpose”).

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create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy
matter, or how compatible with the statute. See, e. g., Mas-
sachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 145,
148 (1985); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
supra, at 23; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, at
575–576. “Raising up causes of action where a statute has
not created them may be a proper function for common-
law courts, but not for federal tribunals.” Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350,
365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
Respondents would have us revert in this case to the
understanding of private causes of action that held sway
40 years ago when Title VI was enacted. That understand-
ing is captured by the Court’s statement in J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1964), that “it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary
to make effective the congressional purpose” expressed by a
statute. We abandoned that understanding in Cort v. Ash,
422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975)—which itself interpreted a statute
enacted under the ancien regime—and have not returned to
it since. Not even when interpreting the same Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 that was at issue in Borak have we
applied Borak’s method for discerning and defining causes
of action. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Inter-
state Bank of Denver, N. A., supra, at 188; Musick, Peeler &
Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U. S. 286, 291–293
(1993); Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, supra, at
1102–1103; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, at 576–
578. Having sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Con-
gress’s intent, we will not accept respondents’ invitation to
have one last drink.
Nor do we agree with the Government that our cases in-
terpreting statutes enacted prior to Cort v. Ash have given
“dispositive weight” to the “expectations” that the enacting
Congress had formed “in light of the ‘contemporary legal

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context.’ ” Brief for United States 14. Only three of our
legion implied-right-of-action cases have found this sort of
“contemporary legal context” relevant, and two of those in-
volved Congress’s enactment (or reenactment) of the ver-
batim statutory text that courts had previously interpreted
to create a private right of action. See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 378–
379 (1982); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S., at
698–699. In the third case, this sort of “contemporary legal
context” simply buttressed a conclusion independently sup-
ported by the text of the statute. See Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 484 U. S. 174 (1988). We have never accorded dis-
positive weight to context shorn of text. In determining
whether statutes create private rights of action, as in inter-
preting statutes generally, see Blatchford v. Native Village
of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 784 (1991), legal context matters
only to the extent it clarifies text.
We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our search
for Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title VI.7
Section 602 authorizes federal agencies “to effectuate the
provisions of [§ 601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–1. It is
immediately clear that the “rights-creating” language so
critical to the Court’s analysis in Cannon of § 601, see
441 U. S., at 690, n. 13, is completely absent from § 602.
Whereas § 601 decrees that “[n]o person . . . shall . . . be
subjected to discrimination,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, the text
of § 602 provides that “[e]ach Federal department and
7 Although the dissent claims that we “adop[t] a methodology that blinds
itself to important evidence of congressional intent,” see post, at 313, our
methodology is not novel, but well established in earlier decisions (includ-
ing one authored by Justice Stevens, see Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 94, n. 31 (1981)), which explain that the
interpretive inquiry begins with the text and structure of the statute, see
id., at 91, and ends once it has become clear that Congress did not provide
a cause of action.

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agency . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provi-
sions of [§ 601],” 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–1. Far from displaying
congressional intent to create new rights, § 602 limits agen-
cies to “effectuat[ing]” rights already created by § 601. And
the focus of § 602 is twice removed from the individuals who
will ultimately benefit from Title VI’s protection. Statutes
that focus on the person regulated rather than the individu-
als protected create “no implication of an intent to confer
rights on a particular class of persons.” California v. Si-
erra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 294 (1981). Section 602 is yet a
step further removed: It focuses neither on the individuals
protected nor even on the funding recipients being regulated,
but on the agencies that will do the regulating. Like the
statute found not to create a right of action in Universities
Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754 (1981), § 602 is
“phrased as a directive to federal agencies engaged in the
distribution of public funds,” id., at 772. When this is true,
“[t]here [is] far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor
of individual persons,” Cannon v. University of Chicago,
supra, at 690–691. So far as we can tell, this authorizing
portion of § 602 reveals no congressional intent to create a
private right of action.
Nor do the methods that § 602 goes on to provide for
enforcing its authorized regulations manifest an intent to
create a private remedy; if anything, they suggest the
opposite. Section 602 empowers agencies to enforce their
regulations either by terminating funding to the “particular
program, or part thereof,” that has violated the regulation
or “by any other means authorized by law,” 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000d–1. No enforcement action may be taken, however,
“until the department or agency concerned has advised the
appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with
the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot
be secured by voluntary means.” Ibid. And every agency
enforcement action is subject to judicial review. § 2000d–2.
If an agency attempts to terminate program funding, still

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more restrictions apply. The agency head must “file with
the committees of the House and Senate having legislative
jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full
written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such
action.” § 2000d–1. And the termination of funding does
not “become effective until thirty days have elapsed after
the filing of such report.” Ibid. Whatever these elaborate
restrictions on agency enforcement may imply for the pri-
vate enforcement of rights created outside of § 602, com-
pare Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 706, n. 41,
712, n. 49; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S., at
419, n. 26 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part), with Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S., at 609–610 (Powell, J.,
concurring in judgment); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
supra, at 382–383 (opinion of White, J.), they tend to con-
tradict a congressional intent to create privately enforceable
rights through § 602 itself. The express provision of one
method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Con-
gress intended to preclude others. See, e. g., Karahalios v.
Federal Employees, 489 U. S. 527, 533 (1989); Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 93–94 (1981);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S.,
at 19–20. Sometimes the suggestion is so strong that it
precludes a finding of congressional intent to create a pri-
vate right of action, even though other aspects of the statute
(such as language making the would-be plaintiff “a member
of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted”)
suggest the contrary. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U. S., at 145; see id., at 146–147. And as our
Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, cases show, some reme-
dial schemes foreclose a private cause of action to enforce
even those statutes that admittedly create substantive pri-
vate rights. See, e. g., Middlesex County Sewerage Author-
ity v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 19–20
(1981). In the present case, the claim of exclusivity for the

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express remedial scheme does not even have to overcome
such obstacles. The question whether § 602’s remedial
scheme can overbear other evidence of congressional intent
is simply not presented, since we have found no evidence
anywhere in the text to suggest that Congress intended to
create a private right to enforce regulations promulgated
under § 602.
Both the Government and respondents argue that the reg-
ulations contain rights-creating language and so must be
privately enforceable, see Brief for United States 19–20;
Brief for Respondents 31, but that argument skips an ana-
lytical step. Language in a regulation may invoke a private
right of action that Congress through statutory text created,
but it may not create a right that Congress has not. Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S., at 577, n. 18 (“[T]he lan-
guage of the statute and not the rules must control”). Thus,
when a statute has provided a general authorization for pri-
vate enforcement of regulations, it may perhaps be correct
that the intent displayed in each regulation can determine
whether or not it is privately enforceable. But it is most
certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can
conjure up a private cause of action that has not been author-
ized by Congress. Agencies may play the sorcerer’s appren-
tice but not the sorcerer himself.
The last string to respondents’ and the Government’s bow
is their argument that two amendments to Title VI “ratified”
this Court’s decisions finding an implied private right of
action to enforce the disparate-impact regulations. See
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, § 1003, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000d–7; Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, § 6, 102 Stat.
31, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–4a. One problem with this argument
is that, as explained above, none of our decisions establishes
(or even assumes) the private right of action at issue here,
see supra, at 282–285, which is why in Guardians three Jus-
tices were able expressly to reserve the question. See 463
U. S., at 645, n. 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Incorporating

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our cases in the amendments would thus not help respond-
ents. Another problem is that the incorporation claim itself
is flawed. Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amend-
ments of 1986, on which only respondents rely, by its terms
applies only to suits “for a violation of a statute,” 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000d–7(a)(2) (emphasis added). It therefore does not
speak to suits for violations of regulations that go beyond
the statutory proscription of § 601. Section 6 of the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987 is even less on point. That
provision amends Title VI to make the term “program or
activity” cover larger portions of the institutions receiving
federal financial aid than it had previously covered, see
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555 (1984). It is impos-
sible to understand what this has to do with implied causes
of action—which is why we declared in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 503 U. S., at 73, that § 6 did not “in
any way alte[r] the existing rights of action and the corre-
sponding remedies permissible under . . . Title VI.” Re-
spondents point to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S., at 381–382, which inferred con-
gressional intent to ratify lower court decisions regarding
a particular statutory provision when Congress compre-
hensively revised the statutory scheme but did not amend
that provision. But we recently criticized Curran’s reliance
on congressional inaction, saying that “[a]s a general mat-
ter . . . [the] argumen[t] deserve[s] little weight in the inter-
pretive process.” Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S., at 187. And
when, as here, Congress has not comprehensively revised a
statutory scheme but has made only isolated amendments,
we have spoken more bluntly: “It is ‘impossible to assert
with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to
act represents’ affirmative congressional approval of the
Court’s statutory interpretation.” Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 175, n. 1 (1989) (quoting Johnson

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Stevens, J., dissenting
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U. S. 616,
671–672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does
Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private
right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under
§ 602.8 We therefore hold that no such right of action exists.
Since we reach this conclusion applying our standard test
for discerning private causes of action, we do not address
petitioners’ additional argument that implied causes of action
against States (and perhaps nonfederal state actors gener-
ally) are inconsistent with the clear statement rule of Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1
(1981). See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U. S.
629, 656–657, 684–685 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
In 1964, as part of a groundbreaking and comprehensive
civil rights Act, Congress prohibited recipients of federal
funds from discriminating on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
national origin. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000d to 2000d–7. Pursuant to pow-
8 The dissent complains that we “offe[r] little affirmative support” for
this conclusion. Post, at 315. But as Justice Stevens has previously
recognized in an opinion for the Court, “affirmative” evidence of congres-
sional intent must be provided for an implied remedy, not against it, for
without such intent “the essential predicate for implication of a private
remedy simply does not exist,” Northwest Airlines, Inc., 451 U. S., at 94.
The dissent’s assertion that “respondents have marshaled substantial af-
firmative evidence that a private right of action exists to enforce Title VI
and the regulations validly promulgated thereunder,” post, at 316, n. 26
(second emphasis added), once again begs the question whether author-
ization of a private right of action to enforce a statute constitutes authori-
zation of a private right of action to enforce regulations that go beyond
what the statute itself requires.

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ers expressly delegated by that Act, the federal agencies and
departments responsible for awarding and administering
federal contracts immediately adopted regulations prohibit-
ing federal contractees from adopting policies that have the
“effect” of discriminating on those bases. At the time of the
promulgation of these regulations, prevailing principles of
statutory construction assumed that Congress intended a
private right of action whenever such a cause of action was
necessary to protect individual rights granted by valid fed-
eral law. Relying both on this presumption and on inde-
pendent analysis of Title VI, this Court has repeatedly and
consistently affirmed the right of private individuals to bring
civil suits to enforce rights guaranteed by Title VI. A fair
reading of those cases, and coherent implementation of the
statutory scheme, requires the same result under Title VI’s
implementing regulations.
In separate lawsuits spanning several decades, we have
endorsed an action identical in substance to the one brought
in this case, see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974); demon-
strated that Congress intended a private right of action to
protect the rights guaranteed by Title VI, see Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); and concluded
that private individuals may seek declaratory and injunctive
relief against state officials for violations of regulations pro-
mulgated pursuant to Title VI, see Guardians Assn. v. Civil
Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582 (1983). Giv-
ing fair import to our language and our holdings, every Court
of Appeals to address the question has concluded that a pri-
vate right of action exists to enforce the rights guaranteed
both by the text of Title VI and by any regulations validly
promulgated pursuant to that Title, and Congress has
adopted several statutes that appear to ratify the status quo.
Today, in a decision unfounded in our precedent and hostile
to decades of settled expectations, a majority of this Court
carves out an important exception to the right of private
action long recognized under Title VI. In so doing, the

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Court makes three distinct, albeit interrelated, errors.
First, the Court provides a muddled account of both the rea-
soning and the breadth of our prior decisions endorsing a
private right of action under Title VI, thereby obscuring the
conflict between those opinions and today’s decision. Sec-
ond, the Court offers a flawed and unconvincing analysis of
the relationship between §§ 601 and 602 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, ignoring more plausible and persuasive explana-
tions detailed in our prior opinions. Finally, the Court
badly misconstrues the theoretical linchpin of our decision
in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979),
mistaking that decision’s careful contextual analysis for judi-
cial fiat.
I
The majority is undoubtedly correct that this Court has
never said in so many words that a private right of action
exists to enforce the disparate-impact regulations promul-
gated under § 602. However, the failure of our cases to state
this conclusion explicitly does not absolve the Court of the
responsibility to canvass our prior opinions for guidance.
Reviewing these opinions with the care they deserve, I reach
the same conclusion as the Courts of Appeals: This Court
has already considered the question presented today and
concluded that a private right of action exists.1
1 Just about every Court of Appeals has either explicitly or implicitly
held that a private right of action exists to enforce all of the regulations
issued pursuant to Title VI, including the disparate-impact regulations.
For decisions holding so most explicitly, see, e. g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F. 3d
387, 400 (CA3 1999); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v.
Seif, 132 F. 3d 925, 936–937 (CA3 1997), summarily vacated and remanded,
524 U. S. 974 (1998); David K. v. Lane, 839 F. 2d 1265, 1274 (CA7 1988);
Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F. 3d 484 (CA11 1999) (case below). See also
Latinos Unidos De Chelsea v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, 799 F. 2d 774, 785, n. 20 (CA1 1986); New York Urban League, Inc.
v. New York, 71 F. 3d 1031, 1036 (CA2 1995); Ferguson v. Charleston, 186
F. 3d 469 (CA4 1999), rev’d on other grounds, ante, p. 67; Castaneda
v. Pickard, 781 F. 2d 456, 465, n. 11 (CA5 1986); Buchanan v. Bolivar, 99

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When this Court faced an identical case 27 years ago, all
the Justices believed that private parties could bring law-
suits under Title VI and its implementing regulations to
enjoin the provision of governmental services in a manner
that discriminated against non-English speakers. See Lau
v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974). While five Justices saw
no need to go beyond the command of § 601, Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Blackmun relied spe-
cifically and exclusively on the regulations to support the
private action, see id., at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring in re-
sult) (citing Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,
411 U. S. 356, 369 (1973); Thorpe v. Housing Authority of
Durham, 393 U. S. 268, 280–281 (1969)). There is nothing in
the majority’s opinion in Lau, or in earlier opinions of the
Court, that is not fully consistent with the analysis of the
concurring Justices or that would have differentiated be-
tween private actions to enforce the text of § 601 and private
actions to enforce the regulations promulgated pursuant to
§ 602. See Guardians, 463 U. S., at 591 (principal opinion of
White, J.) (describing this history and noting that, up to that
point, no Justice had ever expressed disagreement with Jus-
tice Stewart’s analysis in Lau). 2
F. 3d 1352, 1356, n. 5 (CA6 1996); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F. 2d 969, 981–982
(CA9 1986); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F. 3d 481, 486 (CA10 1996). No
Court of Appeals has ever reached a contrary conclusion. But cf. New
York City Environmental Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F. 3d 65, 72
(CA2 2000) (suggesting that the question may be open).
2 Indeed, it would have been remarkable if the majority had offered any
disagreement with the concurring analysis as the concurring Justices
grounded their argument in well-established principles for determining
the availability of remedies under regulations, principles that all but one
Member of the Court had endorsed the previous Term. See Mourning v.
Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356, 369 (1973); id., at 378
(Douglas, J., joined by Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the majority’s analysis of the regula-
tion in question); but see id., at 383, n. 1 (Powell, J., dissenting) (reserving
analysis of the regulation’s validity). The other decision the concurring
Justices cited for this well-established principle was unanimous and only

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Five years later, we more explicitly considered whether a
private right of action exists to enforce the guarantees of
Title VI and its gender-based twin, Title IX. See Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979). In that case,
we examined the text of the statutes, analyzed the purpose
of the laws, and canvassed the relevant legislative history.
Our conclusion was unequivocal: “We have no doubt that
Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable
to those available under Title VI and that it understood Title
VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for vic-
tims of the prohibited discrimination.” Id., at 703.
The majority acknowledges that Cannon is binding prece-
dent with regard to both Title VI and Title IX, ante, at
279–280, but seeks to limit the scope of its holding to cases
involving allegations of intentional discrimination. The dis-
tinction the majority attempts to impose is wholly foreign
to Cannon’s text and reasoning. The opinion in Cannon
consistently treats the question presented in that case as
whether a private right of action exists to enforce “Title IX”
(and by extension “Title VI”),3 and does not draw any dis-
tinctions between the various types of discrimination out-
lawed by the operation of those statutes. Though the opin-
ion did not reach out to affirmatively preclude the drawing
of every conceivable distinction, it could hardly have been
more clear as to the scope of its holding: A private right of
action exists for “victims of the prohibited discrimination.”
441 U. S., at 703 (emphasis added). Not some of the prohib-
ited discrimination, but all of it.4
five years old. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U. S.
268 (1969).
3 See Cannon, 441 U. S., at 687, 699, 702, n. 33, 703, 706, n. 40, 709.
4 The majority is undoubtedly correct that Cannon was not a case about
the substance of Title IX but rather about the remedies available under
that statute. Therefore, Cannon cannot stand as a precedent for the
proposition either that Title IX and its implementing regulations reach
intentional discrimination or that they do not do so. What Cannon did
hold is that all the discrimination prohibited by the regulatory scheme

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Moreover, Cannon was itself a disparate-impact case. In
that case, the plaintiff brought suit against two private uni-
versities challenging medical school admissions policies that
set age limits for applicants. Plaintiff, a 39-year-old woman,
alleged that these rules had the effect of discriminating
against women because the incidence of interrupted higher
education is higher among women than among men. In pro-
viding a shorthand description of her claim in the text of the
opinion, we ambiguously stated that she had alleged that she
was denied admission “because she is a woman,” but we ap-
pended a lengthy footnote setting forth the details of her
disparate-impact claim. Other than the shorthand descrip-
tion of her claim, there is not a word in the text of the opinion
even suggesting that she had made the improbable allegation
that the University of Chicago and Northwestern University
had intentionally discriminated against women. In the con-
text of the entire opinion (including both its analysis and
its uncontested description of the facts of the case), that
single ambiguous phrase provides no basis for limiting the
case’s holding to incidents of intentional discrimination.
If anything, the fact that the phrase “because she is a
woman” encompasses both intentional and disparate-impact
claims should have made it clear that the reasoning in the
opinion was equally applicable to both types of claims. In
any event, the holding of the case certainly applied to the
disparate-impact claim that was described in detail in foot-
note 1 of the opinion, id., at 680.
Our fractured decision in Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582 (1983), reinforces
the conclusion that this issue is effectively settled. While
contained in Title IX may be the subject of a private lawsuit. As the
Court today concedes that Cannon’s holding applies to Title VI claims as
well as Title IX claims, ante, at 279–280, and assumes that the regulations
promulgated pursuant to § 602 are validly promulgated antidiscrimination
measures, ante, at 281–282, it is clear that today’s opinion is in substantial
tension with Cannon’s reasoning and holding.

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the various opinions in that case took different views as to
the spectrum of relief available to plaintiffs in Title VI cases,
a clear majority of the Court expressly stated that private
parties may seek injunctive relief against governmental
practices that have the effect of discriminating against racial
and ethnic minorities. Id., at 594–595, 607 (White, J.); id.,
at 634 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id., at 638 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). As this
case involves just such an action, its result ought to follow
naturally from Guardians.
As I read today’s opinion, the majority declines to accord
precedential value to Guardians because the five Justices
in the majority were arguably divided over the mechanism
through which private parties might seek such injunctive re-
lief. 5 This argument inspires two responses. First, to the
extent that the majority denies relief to the respondents
merely because they neglected to mention 42 U. S. C. § 1983
5 None of the relevant opinions was absolutely clear as to whether it
envisioned such suits as being brought directly under the statute or under
42 U. S. C. § 1983. However, a close reading of the opinions leaves little
doubt that all of the Justices making up the Guardians majority contem-
plated the availability of private actions brought directly under the stat-
ute. Justice White fairly explicitly rested his conclusion on Cannon’s
holding that an implied right of action exists to enforce the terms of both
Title VI and Title IX. Guardians, 463 U. S., at 594–595. Given that fact
and the added consideration that his opinion appears to have equally con-
templated suits against private and public parties, it is clear that he envi-
sioned the availability of injunctive relief directly under the statute. Jus-
tice Marshall’s opinion never mentions § 1983 and refers simply to “Title
VI actions.” Id., at 625. In addition, his opinion can only be read as
contemplating suits on equal terms against both public and private grant-
ees, thus also suggesting that he assumed such suits could be brought
directly under the statute. That leaves my opinion. Like Justice White,
I made it quite clear that I believed the right to sue to enforce the
disparate-impact regulations followed directly from Cannon and, hence,
was built directly into the statute. 463 U. S., at 635–636, and n. 1. How-
ever, I did also note that, in the alternative, relief would be available in
that particular case under § 1983.

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in framing their Title VI claim, this case is something of a
sport. Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the Title
VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only
reference § 1983 to obtain relief; indeed, the plaintiffs in this
case (or other similarly situated individuals) presumably re-
tain the option of rechallenging Alabama’s English-only pol-
icy in a complaint that invokes § 1983 even after today’s
decision.
More importantly, the majority’s reading of Guardians is
strained even in reference to the broader question whether
injunctive relief is available to remedy violations of the Title
VI regulations by nongovernmental grantees. As Guard-
ians involved an action against a governmental entity, mak-
ing § 1983 relief available, the Court might have discussed
the availability of judicial relief without addressing the scope
of the implied private right of action available directly under
Title VI. See 463 U. S., at 638 (Stevens, J.) (“Even if it
were not settled by now that Title VI authorizes appropriate
relief, both prospective and retroactive, to victims of racial
discrimination at the hands of recipients of federal funds, the
same result would follow in this case because the petitioners
have sought relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983” (emphasis de-
leted)). However, the analysis in each of the relevant opin-
ions did not do so.6 Rather than focusing on considerations
6 The Court today cites one sentence in my final footnote in Guardians
that it suggests is to the contrary. Ante, at 283 (citing 463 U. S., at 645,
n. 18). However, the Court misreads that sentence. In his opinion in
Guardians, Justice Powell had stated that he would affirm the judgment
for the reasons stated in his dissent in Cannon, see 463 U. S., at 609–610
(opinion concurring in judgment), and that he would also hold that private
actions asserting violations of Title VI could not be brought under § 1983,
id., at 610, and n. 3. One reason that he advanced in support of these
conclusions was his view that the standard of proof in a § 1983 action
against public officials would differ from the standard in an action against
private defendants. Id., at 608, n. 1. In a footnote at the end of my
opinion, id., at 645, n. 18, I responded (perhaps inartfully) to Justice

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Stevens, J., dissenting
specific to § 1983, each of these opinions looked instead to our
opinion in Cannon, to the intent of the Congress that
adopted Title VI and the contemporaneous executive deci-
sionmakers who crafted the disparate-impact regulations,
and to general principles of remediation.7
In summary, there is clear precedent of this Court for the
proposition that the plaintiffs in this case can seek injunctive
relief either through an implied right of action or through
§ 1983. Though the holding in Guardians does not compel
the conclusion that a private right of action exists to enforce
the Title VI regulations against private parties, the ration-
ales of the relevant opinions strongly imply that result.
When that fact is coupled with our holding in Cannon and
our unanimous decision in Lau, the answer to the question
presented in this case is overdetermined.8 Even absent my
Powell. I noted that the fact that § 1983 authorizes a lawsuit against the
police department based on its violation of the governing administrative
regulations did not mean, as Justice Powell had suggested, “that a similar
action would be unavailable against a similarly situated private party.”
Ibid. I added the sentence that the Court quotes today, ante, at 283, not
to reserve a question, but rather to explain that the record did not support
Justice Powell’s hypothesis regarding the standard of proof. I thought
then, as I do now, that a violation of regulations adopted pursuant to Title
VI may be established by proof of discriminatory impact in a § 1983 action
against state actors and also in an implied action against private parties.
See n. 5, supra. Contrary to the Court’s partial quotation of my opinion,
see ante, at 283–284, n. 3, what I wrote amply reflected what I thought.
See 463 U. S., at 635 (“a private action against recipients of federal funds”);
id., at 636 (“implied caus[e] of action”); id., at 638 (“Title VI authorizes
appropriate relief ”).
Justice Powell was quite correct in noting that it would be anomalous
to assume that Congress would have intended to make it easier to recover
from public officials than from private parties. That anomaly, however,
does not seem to trouble the majority today.
7 See n. 5, supra.
8 See also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 (1986) (per curiam) (adjudi-
cating on the merits a claim brought under Title VI regulations).

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continued belief that Congress intended a private right of
action to enforce both Title VI and its implementing regula-
tions, I would answer the question presented in the affirma-
tive and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as a
matter of stare decisis.9
9 The settled expectations the Court undercuts today derive not only
from judicial decisions, but also from the consistent statements and actions
of Congress. Congress’ actions over the last two decades reflect a clear
understanding of the existence of a private right of action to enforce Title
VI and its implementing regulations. In addition to numerous other
small-scale amendments, Congress has twice adopted legislation expand-
ing the reach of Title VI. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, § 6,
102 Stat. 31 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–4a) (expanding definition of
“program”); Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1845
(codified at 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–7) (explicitly abrogating States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity in suits under Title VI).
Both of these bills were adopted after this Court’s decisions in Lau,
Cannon, and Guardians, and after most of the Courts of Appeals had
affirmatively acknowledged an implied private right of action to enforce
the disparate-impact regulations. Their legislative histories explicitly re-
flect the fact that both proponents and opponents of the bills assumed
that the full breadth of Title VI (including the disparate-impact regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to it) would be enforceable in private actions.
See, e. g., Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 2658 before the Sub-
committee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., 530 (1984) (memo from the Office of Management and
Budget objecting to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 because it
would bring more entities within the scope of Title VI, thereby subjecting
them to “private lawsuits” to enforce the disparate-impact regulations);
id., at 532 (same memo warning of a proliferation of “discriminatory ef-
fects” suits by “members of the bar” acting as “private Attorneys Gen-
eral”); 134 Cong. Rec. 4257 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that
the disparate-impact regulations go too far and noting that that is a partic-
ular problem because, “[o]f course, advocacy groups will be able to bring
private lawsuits making the same allegations before federal judges”); see
also Brief for United States 24, n. 16 (collecting testimony of academics
advising Congress that private lawsuits were available to enforce the
disparate-impact regulations under existing precedent).
Thus, this case goes well beyond the normal situation in which, “after a
comprehensive reeaxmination and significant amendment,” Congress “left
intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had implied

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II
Underlying the majority’s dismissive treatment of our
prior cases is a flawed understanding of the structure of Title
VI and, more particularly, of the relationship between §§ 601
and 602. To some extent, confusion as to the relationship
between the provisions is understandable, as Title VI is a
deceptively simple statute. Section 601 of the Act lays out
its straightforward commitment: “No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000d. Section 602 “authorize[s] and direct[s]” all federal
departments and agencies empowered to extend federal fi-
nancial assistance to issue “rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability” in order to “effectuate” § 601’s antidis-
crimination mandate. 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–1.10
On the surface, the relationship between §§ 601 and 602 is
unproblematic—§ 601 states a basic principle, § 602 author-
izes agencies to develop detailed plans for defining the con-
tours of the principle and ensuring its enforcement. In the
context of federal civil rights law, however, nothing is ever
so simple. As actions to enforce § 601’s antidiscrimination
principle have worked their way through the courts, we have
developed a body of law giving content to § 601’s broadly
worded commitment. E. g., United States v. Fordice, 505
U. S. 717, 732, n. 7 (1992); Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv.
a private cause of action.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 381–382 (1982). Here, there is no need to rest
on presumptions of knowledge and ratification, because the direct evidence
of Congress’ understanding is plentiful.
10 The remainder of Title VI provides for judicial and administrative
review of agency actions taken pursuant to the statute, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000d–2; imposes certain limitations not at issue in this case, §§ 2000d–3
to 2000d–4; and defines some of the terms found in the other provisions of
the statute, § 2000d–4a.

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304 ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL
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Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582 (1983); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). As the majority
emphasizes today, the Judiciary’s understanding of what con-
duct may be remedied in actions brought directly under § 601
is, in certain ways, more circumscribed than the conduct pro-
hibited by the regulations. See, e. g., ante, at 280–281.
Given that seeming peculiarity, it is necessary to examine
closely the relationship between §§ 601 and 602, in order to
understand the purpose and import of the regulations at
issue in this case. For the most part, however, the majority
ignores this task, assuming that the judicial decisions inter-
preting § 601 provide an authoritative interpretation of its
true meaning and treating the regulations promulgated by
the agencies charged with administering the statute as poor
stepcousins—either parroting the text of § 601 (in the case
of regulations that prohibit intentional discrimination) or
forwarding an agenda untethered to § 601’s mandate (in the
case of disparate-impact regulations).
The majority’s statutory analysis does violence to both the
text and the structure of Title VI. Section 601 does not
stand in isolation, but rather as part of an integrated re-
medial scheme. Section 602 exists for the sole purpose of
forwarding the antidiscrimination ideals laid out in § 601.11
The majority’s persistent belief that the two sections some-
how forward different agendas finds no support in the stat-
ute. Nor does Title VI anywhere suggest, let alone state,
that for the purpose of determining their legal effect, the
“rules, regulations, [and] orders of general applicability”
adopted by the agencies are to be bifurcated by the Judiciary
into two categories based on how closely the courts believe
the regulations track the text of § 601.
11 See 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–1 (§ 602) (“Each Federal department and
agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance . . . is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of [§ 601] . . . by issu-
ing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability”).

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Stevens, J., dissenting
What makes the Court’s analysis even more troubling is
that our cases have already adopted a simpler and more sen-
sible model for understanding the relationship between the
two sections. For three decades, we have treated § 602 as
granting the responsible agencies the power to issue broad
prophylactic rules aimed at realizing the vision laid out in
§ 601, even if the conduct captured by these rules is at times
broader than that which would otherwise be prohibited.
In Lau, our first Title VI case, the only three Justices
whose understanding of § 601 required them to reach the
question explicitly endorsed the power of the agencies to
adopt broad prophylactic rules to enforce the aims of the
statute. As Justice Stewart explained, regulations promul-
gated pursuant to § 602 may “go beyond . . . § 601” as long as
they are “reasonably related” to its antidiscrimination man-
date. 414 U. S., at 571 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J.,
and Blackmun, J., concurring in result). In Guardians, at
least three Members of the Court adopted a similar under-
standing of the statute. See 463 U. S., at 643 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). Finally,
just 16 years ago, our unanimous opinion in Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U. S. 287 (1985), treated this understanding of
Title VI’s structure as settled law. Writing for the Court,
Justice Marshall aptly explained the interpretation of § 602’s
grant of regulatory power that necessarily underlies our
prior case law: “In essence, then, we [have] held that Title
VI [has] delegated to the agencies in the first instance the
complex determination of what sorts of disparate impacts
upon minorities constituted sufficiently significant social
problems, and [are] readily enough remediable, to warrant
altering the practices of the federal grantees that [have]
produced those impacts.” Id., at 293–294.
This understanding is firmly rooted in the text of Title
VI. As § 602 explicitly states, the agencies are authorized
to adopt regulations to “effectuate” § 601’s antidiscrimination
mandate. 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–1. The plain meaning of the

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306 ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL
Stevens, J., dissenting
text reveals Congress’ intent to provide the relevant agen-
cies with sufficient authority to transform the statute’s broad
aspiration into social reality. So too does a lengthy, consist-
ent, and impassioned legislative history.12
This legislative design reflects a reasonable—indeed in-
spired—model for attacking the often-intractable problem of
racial and ethnic discrimination. On its own terms, the stat-
ute supports an action challenging policies of federal grant-
ees that explicitly or unambiguously violate antidiscrimina-
tion norms (such as policies that on their face limit benefits
or services to certain races). With regard to more subtle
forms of discrimination (such as schemes that limit benefits
or services on ostensibly race-neutral grounds but have the
predictable and perhaps intended consequence of materially
benefiting some races at the expense of others), the statute
does not establish a static approach but instead empowers
the relevant agencies to evaluate social circumstances to de-
termine whether there is a need for stronger measures.13
12 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 6543 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)
(“Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of
all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, en-
trenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination”); id., at 1520
(statement of Rep. Celler) (describing § 602 as requiring federal agencies
to “reexamine” their programs “to make sure that adequate action has
been taken to preclude . . . discrimination”).
13 It is important, in this context, to note that regulations prohibiting
policies that have a disparate impact are not necessarily aimed only—
or even primarily—at unintentional discrimination. Many policies whose
very intent is to discriminate are framed in a race-neutral manner. It
is often difficult to obtain direct evidence of this motivating animus.
Therefore, an agency decision to adopt disparate-impact regulations may
very well reflect a determination by that agency that substantial inten-
tional discrimination pervades the industry it is charged with regulating
but that such discrimination is difficult to prove directly. As I have
stated before: “Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be
objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence de-
scribing the subjective state of mind of the actor.” Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S. 229, 253 (1976) (concurring opinion). On this reading, Title VI

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Stevens, J., dissenting
Such an approach builds into the law flexibility, an ability to
make nuanced assessments of complex social realities, and
an admirable willingness to credit the possibility of progress.
The “effects” regulations at issue in this case represent
the considered judgment of the relevant agencies that dis-
crimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin
by federal contractees are significant social problems that
might be remedied, or at least ameliorated, by the applica-
tion of a broad prophylactic rule. Given the judgment un-
derlying them, the regulations are inspired by, at the service
of, and inseparably intertwined with § 601’s antidiscrimina-
tion mandate. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, they
“appl[y]” § 601’s prohibition on discrimination just as surely
as the intentional discrimination regulations the majority
concedes are privately enforceable. Ante, at 284.
To the extent that our prior cases mischaracterize the rela-
tionship between §§ 601 and 602, they err on the side of un-
derestimating, not overestimating, the connection between
the two provisions. While our cases have explicitly adopted
an understanding of § 601’s scope that is somewhat narrower
than the reach of the regulations,14 they have done so in an
unorthodox and somewhat haphazard fashion.
Our conclusion that the legislation only encompasses inten-
tional discrimination was never the subject of thorough con-
sideration by a Court focused on that question. In Bakke,
five Members of this Court concluded that § 601 only pro-
hibits race-based affirmative-action programs in situations
where the Equal Protection Clause would impose a similar
ban. 438 U. S., at 287 (principal opinion of Powell, J.); id., at
simply accords the agencies the power to decide whether or not to credit
such evidence.
14 See, e. g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 293 (1985) (stating, in
dicta, “Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of intentional dis-
crimination”); Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City,
463 U. S. 582 (1983) (in separate opinions, seven Justices indicate that § 601
on its face bars only intentional discrimination).

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308 ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL
Stevens, J., dissenting
325, 328, 352 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).15 In Guardians, the majority of the Court held
that the analysis of those five Justices in Bakke compelled as
a matter of stare decisis the conclusion that § 601 does not
on its own terms reach disparate-impact cases. 463 U. S.,
at 610–611 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 612
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 642 (Ste-
vens, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
However, the opinions adopting that conclusion did not en-
gage in any independent analysis of the reach of § 601. In-
deed, the only writing on this subject came from two of the
five Members of the Bakke “majority,” each of whom wrote
separately to reject the remaining Justices’ understanding of
their opinions in Bakke and to insist that § 601 does in fact
reach some instances of unintentional discrimination. 463
U. S., at 589–590 (White, J.); id., at 623–624 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).16 The Court’s occasional rote invocation of this
Guardians majority in later cases ought not obscure the fact
that the question whether § 601 applies to disparate-impact
claims has never been analyzed by this Court on the merits.17
15 Of course, those five Justices divided over the application of the Equal
Protection Clause—and by extension Title VI—to affirmative action cases.
Therefore, it is somewhat strange to treat the opinions of those five Jus-
tices in Bakke as constituting a majority for any particular substantive
interpretation of Title VI.
16 The fact that Justices Marshall and White both felt that the opinion
they coauthored in Bakke did not resolve the question whether Title VI
on its face reaches disparate-impact claims belies the majority’s assertion
that Bakke “had drawn precisely that distinction,” ante, at 283, n. 2, much
less its implication that it would have been “absurd” to think otherwise,
ibid.
17 In this context, it is worth noting that in a variety of other settings
the Court has interpreted similarly ambiguous civil rights provisions to
prohibit some policies based on their disparate impact on a protected
group. See, e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 432 (1971) (Title
VII); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 172–173 (1980) (§ 5
of the Voting Rights Act); cf. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S., at 292–296

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Stevens, J., dissenting
In addition, these Title VI cases seemingly ignore the
well-established principle of administrative law that is now
most often described as the “Chevron doctrine.” See Chev-
ron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S. 837 (1984). In most other contexts, when the agen-
cies charged with administering a broadly worded statute
offer regulations interpreting that statute or giving con-
crete guidance as to its implementation, we treat their inter-
pretation of the statute’s breadth as controlling unless it pre-
sents an unreasonable construction of the statutory text.
See ibid. While there may be some dispute as to the bound-
aries of Chevron deference, see, e. g., Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U. S. 576 (2000), it is paradigmatically appro-
priate when Congress has clearly delegated agencies the
power to issue regulations with the force of law and es-
tablished formal procedures for the promulgation of such
regulations.18
If we were writing on a blank slate, we might very well
conclude that Chevron and similar cases decided both before
and after Guardians provide the proper framework for
understanding the structure of Title VI. Under such a read-
ing there would be no incongruity between §§ 601 and 602.
Instead, we would read § 602 as granting the federal agen-
cies responsible for distributing federal funds the authority
(explaining why the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was modeled after
§ 601, might be considered to reach some instances of disparate impact and
then assuming that it does for purposes of deciding the case).
18 In relying on the Chevron doctrine, I do not mean to suggest that
our decision in Chevron stated a new rule that requires the wholesale
reconsideration of our statutory interpretation precedents. Instead,
I continue to adhere to my position in Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83,
103–104, n. 6 (1990) (stating that Chevron merely summarized “well-
settled principles”). In suggesting that, with regard to Title VI, we
might reconsider whether our prior decisions gave sufficient deference to
the agencies’ interpretation of the statute, I do no more than question
whether in this particular instance we paid sufficient consideration to
those “well-settled principles.”

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310 ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL
Stevens, J., dissenting
to issue regulations interpreting § 601 on the assumption
that their construction will—if reasonable—be incorporated
into our understanding of § 601’s meaning.19
To resolve this case, however, it is unnecessary to answer
the question whether our cases interpreting the reach of
§ 601 should be reinterpreted in light of Chevron. If one
understands the relationship between §§ 601 and 602 through
the prism of either Chevron or our prior Title VI cases, the
question presented all but answers itself. If the regulations
promulgated pursuant to § 602 are either an authoritative
construction of § 601’s meaning or prophylactic rules neces-
sary to actualize the goals enunciated in § 601, then it makes
no sense to differentiate between private actions to enforce
§ 601 and private actions to enforce § 602. There is but one
private action to enforce Title VI, and we already know that
such an action exists. 20 See Cannon, 441 U. S., at 703.
19 The legislative history strongly indicates that the Congress that
adopted Title VI and the administration that proposed the statute in-
tended that the agencies and departments would utilize the authority
granted under § 602 to shape the substantive contours of § 601. For exam-
ple, during the hearings that preceded the passage of the statute, Attor-
ney General Kennedy agreed that the administrators of the various agen-
cies would have the power to define “what constitutes discrimination”
under Title VI and “what acts or omissions are to be forbidden.” Civil
Rights—The President’s Program, 1963: Hearings before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 399–400 (1963); see also Civil
Rights: Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, p. 2740 (1963) (remarks of Attorney General Ken-
nedy) (only after the agencies “establish the rules” will recipients “under-
stand what they can and cannot do”). It was, in fact, concern for this
broad delegation that inspired Congress to amend the pending bill to en-
sure that all regulations issued pursuant to Title VI would have to be
approved by the President. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000d–1 (laying out the re-
quirement); 110 Cong. Rec. 2499 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay introduc-
ing the amendment). For further discussion of this legislative history, see
Guardians, 463 U. S., at 615–624 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Abernathy,
Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for Defining “Discrimi-
nation,” 70 Geo. L. J. 1 (1981).
20 The majority twice suggests that I “be[g] the question” whether a
private right of action to enforce Title VI necessarily encompasses a right

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311 Cite as: 532 U. S. 275 (2001)
Stevens, J., dissenting
III
The majority couples its flawed analysis of the structure
of Title VI with an uncharitable understanding of the sub-
stance of the divide between those on this Court who are
reluctant to interpret statutes to allow for private rights of
action and those who are willing to do so if the claim of right
survives a rigorous application of the criteria set forth in
Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975). As the majority narrates
our implied right of action jurisprudence, ante, at 286–287,
the Court’s shift to a more skeptical approach represents the
rejection of a common-law judicial activism in favor of a prin-
cipled recognition of the limited role of a contemporary “fed-
eral tribuna[l].” Ante, at 287. According to its analysis,
the recognition of an implied right of action when the text
and structure of the statute do not absolutely compel such a
conclusion is an act of judicial self-indulgence. As much as
we would like to help those disadvantaged by discrimination,
we must resist the temptation to pour ourselves “one last
drink.” Ibid. To do otherwise would be to “ventur[e] be-
yond Congress’s intent.” Ibid.
Overwrought imagery aside, it is the majority’s approach
that blinds itself to congressional intent. While it remains
true that, if Congress intends a private right of action to
support statutory rights, “the far better course is for it to
specify as much when it creates those rights,” Cannon, 441
of action to enforce the regulations validly promulgated pursuant to the
statute. Ante, at 283, n. 2, 293, n. 8. As the above analysis demon-
strates, I do no such thing. On the contrary, I demonstrate that the
disparate-impact regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 are—and have
always been considered to be—an important part of an integrated reme-
dial scheme intended to promote the statute’s antidiscrimination goals.
Given that fact, there is simply no logical or legal justification for differ-
entiating between actions to enforce the regulations and actions to enforce
the statutory text. Furthermore, as my integrated approach reflects the
longstanding practice of this Court, see n. 2, supra, it is the majority’s
largely unexplained assumption that a private right of action to enforce
the disparate-impact regulations must be independently established that
“begs the question.”

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312 ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL
Stevens, J., dissenting
U. S., at 717, its failure to do so does not absolve us of the
responsibility to endeavor to discern its intent. In a series
of cases since Cort v. Ash, we have laid out rules and devel-
oped strategies for this task.
The very existence of these rules and strategies assumes
that we will sometimes find manifestations of an implicit in-
tent to create such a right. Our decision in Cannon repre-
sents one such occasion. As the Cannon opinion iterated
and reiterated, the question whether the plaintiff had a right
of action that could be asserted in federal court was a “ques-
tion of statutory construction,” 441 U. S., at 688; see also id.,
at 717 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), not a question of policy
for the Court to decide. Applying the Cort v. Ash factors,
we examined the nature of the rights at issue, the text and
structure of the statute, and the relevant legislative his-
tory. 21 Our conclusion was that Congress unmistakably in-
tended a private right of action to enforce both Title IX and
Title VI. Our reasoning—and, as I have demonstrated, our
holding—was equally applicable to intentional discrimination
and disparate-impact claims.22
Underlying today’s opinion is the conviction that Cannon
must be cabined because it exemplifies an “expansive rights-
21 The text of the statute contained “an unmistakable focus on the bene-
fited class,” 441 U. S., at 691; its legislative history “rather plainly indicates
that Congress intended to create such a remedy,” id., at 694; the legisla-
tors’ repeated references to private enforcement of Title VI reflected
“their intent with respect to Title IX,” id., at 696–698; and the absence of
legislative action to change the prevailing view with respect to Title VI
left us with “no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX remedies
comparable to those available under Title VI and that it understood Title
VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of prohib-
ited discrimination,” id., at 703.
22 We should not overlook the fact that Cannon was decided after the
Bakke majority had concluded that the coverage of Title VI was co-
extensive with the coverage of the Equal Protection Clause.

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313 Cite as: 532 U. S. 275 (2001)
Stevens, J., dissenting
creating approach.” Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment). But, as I have taken pains to explain, it was
Congress, not the Court, that created the cause of action, and
it was the Congress that later ratified the Cannon holding in
1986 and again in 1988. See 503 U. S., at 72–73.
In order to impose its own preferences as to the availabil-
ity of judicial remedies, the Court today adopts a methodol-
ogy that blinds itself to important evidence of congressional
intent. It is one thing for the Court to ignore the import of
our holding in Cannon, as the breadth of that precedent is a
matter upon which reasonable jurists may differ. It is en-
tirely another thing for the majority to ignore the reasoning
of that opinion and the evidence contained therein, as those
arguments and that evidence speak directly to the question
at issue today. As I stated above, see n. 21, supra, Cannon
carefully explained that both Title VI and Title IX were in-
tended to benefit a particular class of individuals, that the
purposes of the statutes would be furthered rather than frus-
trated by the implication of a private right of action, and
that the legislative histories of the statutes support the con-
clusion that Congress intended such a right. See also Part
IV, infra. Those conclusions and the evidence supporting
them continue to have force today.
Similarly, if the majority is genuinely committed to deci-
phering congressional intent, its unwillingness to even con-
sider evidence as to the context in which Congress legislated
is perplexing. Congress does not legislate in a vacuum. As
the respondents and the Government suggest, and as we
have held several times, the objective manifestations of con-
gressional intent to create a private right of action must be
measured in light of the enacting Congress’ expectations as
to how the judiciary might evaluate the question. See
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U. S. 174 (1988); Merrill Lynch,

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314 ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL
Stevens, J., dissenting
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 378–
379 (1982); Cannon, 441 U. S., at 698–699. 23
At the time Congress was considering Title VI, it was nor-
mal practice for the courts to infer that Congress intended a
private right of action whenever it passed a statute designed
to protect a particular class that did not contain enforcement
mechanisms which would be thwarted by a private remedy.
See Merrill Lynch, 456 U. S., at 374–375 (discussing this his-
tory). Indeed, the very year Congress adopted Title VI,
this Court specifically stated that “it is the duty of the courts
to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose.” J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1964). Assuming, as we must,
that Congress was fully informed as to the state of the law,
the contemporary context presents important evidence as to
Congress’ intent—evidence the majority declines to consider.
Ultimately, respect for Congress’ prerogatives is measured
in deeds, not words. Today, the Court coins a new rule,
holding that a private cause of action to enforce a statute
does not encompass a substantive regulation issued to effec-
tuate that statute unless the regulation does nothing more
than “authoritatively construe the statute itself.” Ante, at
284.24 This rule might be proper if we were the kind of
23 Like any other type of evidence, contextual evidence may be trumped
by other more persuasive evidence. Thus, the fact that, when evaluating
older statutes, we have at times reached the conclusion that Congress did
not imply a private right of action does not have the significance the ma-
jority suggests. Ante, at 287–288.
24 Only one of this Court’s myriad private right of action cases even hints
at such a rule. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 173 (1994). Even that decision,
however, does not fully support the majority’s position for two important
reasons. First, it is not at all clear that the majority opinion in that case
simply held that the regulation in question could not be enforced by pri-
vate action; the opinion also permits the reading, assumed by the dissent,
that the majority was in effect invalidating the regulation in question.
Id., at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority leaves little doubt that
the Exchange Act does not even permit the SEC to pursue aiders and

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Stevens, J., dissenting
“common-law court” the majority decries, ante, at 287, in-
venting private rights of action never intended by Congress.
For if we are not construing a statute, we certainly may re-
fuse to create a remedy for violations of federal regulations.
But if we are faithful to the commitment to discerning con-
gressional intent that all Members of this Court profess, the
distinction is untenable. There is simply no reason to as-
sume that Congress contemplated, desired, or adopted a dis-
tinction between regulations that merely parrot statutory
text and broader regulations that are authorized by statu-
tory text.25
IV
Beyond its flawed structural analysis of Title VI and an
evident antipathy toward implied rights of action, the major-
ity offers little affirmative support for its conclusion that
Congress did not intend to create a private remedy for viola-
tions of the Title VI regulations.26 The Court offers essen-
abettors in civil enforcement actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5”). Sec-
ond, that case involved a right of action that the Court has forthrightly
acknowledged was judicially created in exactly the way the majority now
condemns. See, e. g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S.
723, 737 (1975) (describing private actions under Rule 10b–5 as “a judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”). As the
action in question was in effect a common-law right, the Court was more
within its rights to limit that remedy than it would be in a case, such as
this one, where we have held that Congress clearly intended such a right.
25 See Guardians, 463 U. S., at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is one
thing to conclude, as the Court did in Cannon, that the 1964 Congress,
legislating when implied causes of action were the rule rather than the
exception, reasonably assumed that the intended beneficiaries of Title VI
would be able to vindicate their rights in court. It is quite another thing
to believe that the 1964 Congress substantially qualified that assumption
but thought it unnecessary to tell the Judiciary about the qualification”).
26 The majority suggests that its failure to offer such support is irrele-
vant, because the burden is on the party seeking to establish the existence
of an implied right of action. Ante, at 293, n. 8. That response confuses
apples and oranges. Undoubtedly, anyone seeking to bring a lawsuit has
the burden of establishing that private individuals have the right to bring

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316 ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL
Stevens, J., dissenting
tially two reasons for its position. First, it attaches signifi-
cance to the fact that the “rights-creating” language in § 601
that defines the classes protected by the statute is not re-
peated in § 602. Ante, at 288–289. But, of course, there
was no reason to put that language in § 602 because it is
perfectly obvious that the regulations authorized by § 602
must be designed to protect precisely the same people pro-
tected by § 601. Moreover, it is self-evident that, linguistic
niceties notwithstanding, any statutory provision whose
stated purpose is to “effectuate” the eradication of racial and
ethnic discrimination has as its “focus” those individuals who,
absent such legislation, would be subject to discrimination.
Second, the Court repeats the argument advanced and re-
jected in Cannon that the express provision of a fund cutoff
remedy “suggests that Congress intended to preclude oth-
ers.” Ante, at 290. In Cannon, 441 U. S., at 704–708, we
carefully explained why the presence of an explicit mecha-
nism to achieve one of the statute’s objectives (ensuring that
federal funds are not used “to support discriminatory prac-
tices”) does not preclude a conclusion that a private right of
action was intended to achieve the statute’s other principal
objective (“to provide individual citizens effective protection
against those practices”). In support of our analysis, we of-
fered policy arguments, cited evidence from the legislative
history, and noted the active support of the relevant agen-
cies. Ibid. In today’s decision, the Court does not grapple
such a suit. However, once the courts have examined the statutory
scheme under which the individual seeks to bring a suit and determined
that a private right of action does exist, judges who seek to impose hereto-
fore unrecognized limits on that right have a responsibility to offer rea-
soned arguments drawn from the text, structure, or history of that statute
in order to justify such limitations. Moreover, in this case, the respond-
ents have marshaled substantial affirmative evidence that a private right
of action exists to enforce Title VI and the regulations validly promulgated
thereunder. See supra, at 313. It strikes me that it aids rather than
hinders their case that this evidence is already summarized in an opinion
of this Court. See Cannon, 441 U. S., at 691–703.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
with—indeed, barely acknowledges—our rejection of this ar-
gument in Cannon.
Like much else in its opinion, the present majority’s un-
willingness to explain its refusal to find the reasoning in
Cannon persuasive suggests that today’s decision is the un-
conscious product of the majority’s profound distaste for im-
plied causes of action rather than an attempt to discern the
intent of the Congress that enacted Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Its colorful disclaimer of any interest
in “venturing beyond Congress’s intent,” ante, at 287, has a
hollow ring.
V
The question the Court answers today was only an open
question in the most technical sense. Given the prevailing
consensus in the Courts of Appeals, the Court should have
declined to take this case. Having granted certiorari, the
Court should have answered the question differently by sim-
ply according respect to our prior decisions. But most im-
portantly, even if it were to ignore all of our post-1964 writ-
ing, the Court should have answered the question differently
on the merits.
I respectfully dissent.